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China’s rise has aroused apprehension about the likelihood that China is set to revise 
the legal and political rules of the current international order to pursue and reflect its 
power and status. Inherent in such apprehension is the assumption that, in its exercise 
of State sovereignty, China is unlikely to comply with international law that underlies 
and governs this order. Such an assumption overlooks the empirical and normative 
influence of international law on China’s exercise of State sovereignty, and ignores 
and ultimately undermines the legitimacy, authority and normative values of the 
current international legal order. In caricaturing China’s approaches to international 
law and the current international legal order as merely manifestations of its revisionist 
strategies, the assumption furthermore deprives the development of international law 
and improvement of the current international legal order of important substantive and 
normative input. 
 This thesis explores the extent to which China’s exercise of State sovereignty 
has shaped and contributed to the legitimacy and development of international law 
and the direction in which the current international legal order may proceed. It also 
examines how international law within a normative–institutional framework has 
moderated China’s exercise of State sovereignty and helps mediate differences 
between China’s and other States’ approaches to the principle of State sovereignty 
that has undergone oscillating interpretations, such that the locus in which the 
principle resides in the current international legal order, and international law 
generally, may be better understood. 
 Chapter I explains how the relationship between China and international law 
has been overlooked in existing research literature other than through the lens of 
compliance, and the research framework and methods this thesis adopts in 
demonstrating why one should understand the symbiosis between China’s exercise of 
State sovereignty and the current international legal order in their mutual impact, 
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moderation, conciliation and development. Chapter II presents a critique of dominant 
Western discourses of international law and State sovereignty that typically frame 
and confine analyses of the relationship between China and the current international 
legal order. Chapter III explores China’s approaches to international law, including 
how international law has shaped China’s conception of State sovereignty, since the 
Opium War during China’s last imperial dynasty and its republican, communist, and 
contemporary regimes. Chapters IV and V discuss the roles international human 
rights law has played in China’s recognition and implementation of human rights, 
democracy and self-determination in its territory, and the extent to which China’s 
exercise of internal sovereignty has influenced the understanding and development of 
international human rights law. Chapter VI examines the roles of international law in 
China’s exercise of external sovereignty through its voting behaviour and 
argumentation within the United Nations Security Council, and the extent to which 
China’s actions have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Chapter VII concludes this thesis by emphasising the importance of objective 
appraisal of China’s contribution to international law in our understanding of the 
current international legal order, including the locus in which State sovereignty 
resides and its continuing significance and implications. 
  1 
Chapter I: Introduction 
 
 
I. Research question 
 
China’s rapid rise (or, in Chinese minds, revival) to superpower capability – 
economically, politically, militarily if not also culturally1 – has aroused apprehension 
about the likelihood that China is set to revise the legal and political rules of the 
current international order in order to pursue and reflect its power and status. Inherent 
in such apprehension is the assumption that, in its exercise of State sovereignty, 
China is unlikely to comply with international law that underlies and governs this 
order. Such an assumption overlooks the empirical and normative influence of 
international law on China’s exercise of State sovereignty, and ignores and ultimately 
undermines the legitimacy, authority and normative values of the current 
international legal order. In caricaturing China’s approaches to international law and 
the current international legal order as merely manifestations of its revisionist 
strategies, the assumption furthermore deprives the development of international law 
and improvement of the current international legal order of important substantive and 
normative input.2 
                                                            
1 ‘Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese but also to the whole world … We stand 
ready to step up cultural exchanges with the rest of the world in a joint promotion of cultural 
prosperity’: President Hu Jintao’s address to a joint sitting of the Parliament of Australia, 24 
October 2003, http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2003/10/03-10-24b.shtml. 
2 Joshua Cooper Ramo, who coined the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ in 2004, has described 
China as ‘marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not 
simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way 
that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a 
world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity’: The Beijing Consensus (London: 
Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 4. Ramo, ibid., adds that the Beijing Consensus ‘replaces the 
discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory made famous in the 1990s for its 
prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations how to run themselves. 
The Washington Consensus was a hallmark of end-of-history arrogance; it left a trail of 
destroyed economies and bad feelings around the globe. China’s new development approach 
is driven by a desire to have equitable, peaceful high-quality growth. Critically speaking, it 
turns traditional ideas like privatisation and free trade on their heads. It is flexible enough that 
it is barely classifiable as a doctrine. It does not believe in uniform solutions for every 
  2 
 This thesis explores the extent to which China’s exercise of State sovereignty 
has shaped and contributed to the legitimacy and development of international law 
and the direction in which the current international legal order may proceed. It also 
examines how international law within a normative–institutional framework has 
moderated China’s exercise of State sovereignty and helps mediate differences 
between China’s and other States’ approaches to the principle of State sovereignty 
that has undergone oscillating interpretations, such that the locus in which the 
principle resides in the current international legal order, and international law 
generally, may be better understood. 
 
II. China and international law: Beyond compliance 
 
While a substantial amount of research has explored the interrelationship between 
international law and international relations3 and the roles of international law in the 
                                                                                                                                                           
situation. It is defined by a ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment, by a lively 
defence of national borders and interests, and by the increasingly thoughtful accumulation of 
tools of asymmetric power projection. It is pragmatic and ideological at the same time, a 
reflection of an ancient Chinese philosophical outlook that makes little distinction between 
theory and practice.’ 
3 See, e.g., Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations 
and Customary International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jack 
Goldsmith, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law’, 52 Stanford 
Law Review (2000), 959; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘Moral and Legal Rhetoric in 
International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective’, 31:S1 Journal of Legal Studies 
(2002), S115; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Nico Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: 
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order’, 16 European Journal of 
International Law (2005), 369; Onuma Yasuaki, ‘International Law in and with International 
Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society’, 14 European Journal of 
International Law (2003), 105; Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. 
Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), 538; John K. 
Setear, ‘An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory 
and International Law’, 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996), 139; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, 87 
American Journal of International Law (1993), 205; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. 
Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New 
Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, 92 American Journal of International Law 
(1998), 367; Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff, ‘Power and International Law’, 
100 American Journal of International Law (2006), 64. 
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exercise of State sovereignty by European powers and the United States,4 compliance 
has by and large been the primary focus. In particular, the majority of Western 
scholars regard the exercise of State sovereignty by European powers and the United 
States to be generally in compliance with, and possessive of a normative and 
controlling role in the development of, international law.5 Non-compliance, where it 
occurs, is taken as random or justified by necessity, as a result of faits accomplis or 
political realities, or as reiteration of the legitimacy of Western systems, values and 
norms.6 This one-way direction is not surprising, as it was European powers and later 
                                                            
4 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘International Law, Sovereignty, and American 
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate’, 98 American 
Journal of International Law (2004), 91; Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Better Peoples of the United 
Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations’, 15 European Journal of International 
Law (2004), 857; Jürgen Habermas (trans. Ciaran Cronin), ‘The European Nation-State: On 
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship’, 10 Public Culture (1998), 397; Paul W. 
Kahn, ‘Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New 
International Order’, 1 Chicago Journal of International Law (2000), 1; Robert O. Keohane, 
‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States’, 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2002), 743; Andreas L. Paulus, ‘From Neglect to Defiance? The United 
States and International Adjudication’, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), 
783; Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is 
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)’, 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006), 
327; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, 
Globalization, and International Law’, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004), 885; 
William Wallace, ‘The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox’, 47 Political Studies 
(1999), 503. 
5 See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Implications of the European Convention on Human Rights 
for the Development of Public International Law (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000); J.G. 
Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, 2nd 
ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); W. Michael Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’, 84 American Journal of International 
Law (1990), 866; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 6 
European Journal of International Law (1995), 503. Contra, see, e.g., José E. Alvarez, ‘Do 
Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory’, 12 European 
Journal of International Law (2001), 183; James C. Hathaway, ‘America, Defender of 
Democratic Legitimacy?’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 121; 
Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
International Law?’, 18 European Journal of International Law (2007), 379; Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’, 16 European 
Journal of International Law (2005), 113. 
6 See, e.g., Adeno Addis, ‘Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil’, 25 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2003), 573; Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Allen 
Buchanan, ‘Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention’, in J.L. Holzgrefe 
and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 130; Allen Buchanan and Robert 
O. Keohane, ‘The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, 18 Ethics 
& International Affairs (2004), 1; Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving 
towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World 
Community?’, 10 European Journal of International Law (1999), 23; Lois E. Fielding, 
‘Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of 
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the United States that shaped the development of international law.7 The views, 
interests and concerns of Asian and African States and their peoples are relegated to 
secondary or little importance, or regarded as hindrances or threats to the stability of 
the international system and the development of international law.8 
                                                                                                                                                           
Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy’, 5 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law (1994–1995), 329; W. Michael Reisman, ‘Unilateral Action and the 
Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian 
Intervention’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 3; W. Michael Reisman, ‘In 
Defense of World Public Order’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001), 833; W. 
Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, ‘The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive 
Self-Defense’, 100 American Journal of International Law (2006), 525; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, 43 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2002), 1; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Michael Walzer, 
Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Adam Winkler, ‘Just 
Sanctions’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly (1999), 133. Contra, see, e.g., Michael Byers and 
Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention 
and the Future of International Law’, in Holzgrefe and Keohane, ibid., 177; Christine Chinkin, 
‘The State that Acts Alone: Bully, Good Samaritan or Iconoclast?’, 11 European Journal of 
International Law (2000), 31; Jean L. Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire versus 
International Law’, 18 Ethics & International Affairs (2004), 1; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The 
Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in International Law’, 65 
Modern Law Review (2002), 159; Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New 
Global Politics’, 35 Cornell International Law Journal (2002), 355. 
7 See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’, 97 American Journal 
of International Law (2003), 873; Antony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial 
Origins of International Law’, 5 Social & Legal Studies (1996), 321; Antony Anghie, ‘Finding 
the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’, 40 
Harvard International Law Journal (1999), 1; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael 
Byers and Georg Nolte, eds., United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and 
Imperialism’, in David Freestone, Surya Subedi, and Scott Davidson, eds., Contemporary 
Issues in International Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 197; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and 
Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2004), 197; 
Detlev F. Vagts, ‘Hegemonic International Law’, 95 American Journal of International Law 
(2001), 843. 
8 As illustrated quintessentially in the universalism/cultural relativism debate: see, e.g., Joanne 
R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Daniel A. Bell, ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human 
Rights: Reflections on an East–West Dialogue’, 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996), 641; 
Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human 
Rights’, 19 Human Rights Quarterly (1997), 703; Josiah A.M. Cobbah, ‘African Values and 
the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective’, 9 Human Rights Quarterly (1987), 309; 
Jack Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’, 6 Human Rights Quarterly 
(1984), 400; Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’, 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2007), 281; Wolfgang Friedmann, ‘The Position of Underdeveloped Countries and 
the Universality of International Law’, 2 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1961–
1963), 78; Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business’, 44 
American Journal of Jurisprudence (1999), 1; Sonia Harris-Short, ‘International Human 
Rights Law: Imperialist, Inept and Ineffective? Cultural Relativism and the UN Convention 
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Much Western research literature on China vis-à-vis international law or 
international organisations has focused similarly on compliance, on the premise that 
China is unlikely to comply with international law. For example, in her introduction 
of Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security,9 
Ann Kent argues that ‘China constitutes a least-likely case of compliance by virtue of 
its history, cultural traditions, and power. It has historically considered itself to be the 
“Middle Kingdom”, unconstrained by international society; it lacks a tradition of the 
rule of law; and it is powerful enough to ignore its international obligations. … If it is 
nevertheless reasonably compliant with its international obligations, it helps validate 
the notion that all states, even non-liberal ones, comply with the norms and rules of 
the international system.’10 
While Kent’s strong assertion was placed in the introduction of her book, she 
already had done substantial work previously on China’s compliance with 
international law, international organisations, and international regimes.11 However, 
                                                                                                                                                           
on the Rights of the Child’, 25 Human Rights Quarterly (2003), 130; Rhoda E. Howard, 
‘Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community’, 15 Human Rights Quarterly (1993), 
315; Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social 
Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Robert D. Sloane, ‘Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of 
International Human Rights’, 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2001), 527; M. 
Sornarajah, ‘The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of Globalization’, 5 
Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law (2001), 284; Bassam Tibi, ‘Islamic 
Law/Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations’, 16 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1994), 277; Kamala Visweswaran, ‘Gendered States: Rethinking Culture as 
a Site of South Asian Human Rights Work’, 26 Human Rights Quarterly (2004), 483. 
9 Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Ann Kent, ‘The Limits of Ethics in International Politics: The International Human Rights 
Regime’, 16 Asian Studies Review (1992), 26; Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence: 
China and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Ann Kent, ‘China and the 
International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989–1994’, 
17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995), 1; Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human 
Rights: The Limits of Compliance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); 
Ann Kent, ‘China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations’, 8 
Global Governance (2002), 343; Ann Kent, ‘Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: 
Defining and Defending National Interests’, China Journal (2002), 134; Ann Kent, ‘China’s 
Growth Treadmill: Globalization, Human Rights and International Relations’, 3 Review of 
International Affairs (2004), 524; Ann Kent, ‘Influences on National Participation in 
International Institutions: Liberal v Non-liberal States’, in Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine 
Chiam, Devika Hovell, and George Williams, eds., The Fluid State: International Law and 
National Legal Systems (Sydney: Federation Press, 2005), 251. 
  6 
in reaching the above conclusion at the introductory stage of her recent book and then 
using case studies only as ‘an important test of the effectiveness of international 
organizations and their treaties in achieving compliance with their norms, principles, 
and rules’,12 Kent has reduced opportunities for her readers – and herself – to explore 
the underlying or continuing validity of her previous research and the normative 
values of China’s approaches to international law. As Peter Katzenstein has noted, we 
 
use the concept of norm to describe collective expectations for the 
proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations 
norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus 
having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what actions will cause 
relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations 
norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an 
already defined identity. In such instances norms have ‘regulative’ 
effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either 
define (or constitute identities or prescribe or regulate) behavior, or 
they do both.13 
 
In construing norms as merely defining, constituting, prescribing or 
regulating identities or behaviours, one neglects that identities, behaviours, and norms 
evolve over time. China’s potential to influence and shape the substantive content of 
international norms and the direction in which international norms may develop is 
often overlooked or misunderstood. In fact, China’s rise and its construction of a 
‘harmonious world order’ may evidence revival of imperial China’s role as the 
‘Middle Kingdom’, the tribute system, and the dichotomy between Chinese and 
                                                            
12 Kent, supra n.9, 32. 
13 Peter Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’, in Peter 
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1, 5. 
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Western approaches to international affairs, including the development of 
international law. 
 Every State has its own national characteristics, traditions, and pretensions. 
In deducing China’s non-compliance with international law from its historical-
cultural self-identification as the ‘Middle Kingdom’, Kent has failed to explore the 
underlying basis or continuing relevance of such Chinese mentality or explain its 
implications for the international order from a historical or contemporary standpoint, 
a shortcoming she previously acknowledged – even though she suggested that 
China’s historical circumstances were a concern primarily of Chinese scholars.14 
Antecedent Western research on China that explored whether Chinese perceptions of 
world order might have endured the collapse of the Chinese imperial system or the 
foundation of the Chinese communist state, and how they might resurface if China 
regained its central place in the international order, does exist. For example, 
Benjamin Schwartz argued that as a result of China’s military defeats in the past two 
centuries and its struggles for survival by ceding parts of its territory and some of its 
sovereign rights, ‘however real the Chinese perception of world order may have been 
in the past, it was fundamentally undermined in the twentieth century; we should be 
extremely sceptical of assertions that assign it great causal weight in explaining 
present or future Chinese policies.’15 Conversely, Mark Mancall believed that the 
pace of the breakdown of the institutions of the Chinese world order in the nineteenth 
century did not bring about the collapse of Chinese assumptions about how 
international society should operate or China’s place in it.16 China’s historical-
cultural orientation was one that was not only held by China but also shared by 
neighbouring States, and it constituted the foundation of an international system 
                                                            
14 Kent, ‘China’s Growth Treadmill’, supra n.11, 525. 
15 Benjamin I. Schwartz, ‘The Chinese Perception of World Order: Past and Present’, in John 
King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 276, 284 (emphasis in original). 
16 Mark Mancall, ‘The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy’, 349 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science (1963), 14. 
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antecedent and later parallel to the European State-based international system, one 
which European powers in fact considered ‘a political superior’.17  
Wholesale dismissal of China’s historical-cultural orientation and its national 
role conception not only does not help one understand China’s approaches to the 
current international legal order; it perpetuates the Western-centric nature of 
international law. China’s compliance with international law, where it occurs, does 
not at all causally prove that all States comply with international law; it only shows 
that China does, and only on those occasions of compliance. By ‘the norms and rules 
of the international system’, Kent is referring, naturally, to the norms and rules of the 
international system as created and interpreted by Western powers. The potential of 
China’s non-compliance as positive or desirable change to these norms and rules, if 
not also to the international system itself, is discounted. As Allen Buchanan has 
suggested in relation to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, ‘a person who 
breaks the law with the aim of improving the legal system thereby shows that he 
values the contribution that a system of law can make to justice.’18 
Many international relations scholars rationalise China’s compliance with 
international law and international decision-making as part of its grand strategy for 
power and status. Kent argues that China’s membership in international organisations 
provides ‘a source of international prestige, status, and domestic legitimacy’.19 In 
particular, by joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China ‘has taken 
unprecedented steps to renegotiate the terms of its own sovereignty’20 – even though 
Kent fails to explain what terms of sovereignty China has renegotiated. Marc 
Lanteigne contends that the United States’ dominance precludes China from pursuing 
                                                            
17 Teemu Ruskola, ‘Raping Like a State’, 57 UCLA Law Review (2010), 1477, 1503. 
18 Allen Buchanan, ‘From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal International Legal 
Reform’, 111 Ethics (2001), 673, 675. 
19 Kent, ‘China’s International Socialization’, supra n.11, 346, citing Yoichi Funabashi, 
Michel Oksenberg, and Heinrich Weiss, An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence 
(New York: Trilateral Commission, 1994), 55. 
20 Ibid., 355. Kent, ibid., 356, further asserts that China ‘clearly hopes accession might 
facilitate better relations with Taiwan’, when such causality is non-existent and China and 
Taiwan maintain their own bilateral trade agreements. 
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power through ‘traditional’ means of military, political and economic dominance (by 
‘traditional’ he means war), and that it compels China to resort to participation in 
international organisations as alternate paths to pursue power.21 Probabilities that 
China may benefit, augment and improve the work of international organisations, the 
development of international law and the maintenance of the current international 
order are reflexively dismissed. 
Discourses of international law and international organisations that many 
Western scholars engage in are significantly influenced by their training in 
international relations and used to validate the prevalence of international relations 
theories over the normative values of international law. These scholars often overlook 
that international organisations are created, maintained and bound by international 
legal agreements, mistake what under international law States or governments should 
do or not do (lex ferenda) with what they can or must do or not do (lex lata), and blur 
the meanings, distinctions and significance of an array of international legal concepts, 
rules and principles. In the process, China is reduced to the role of a passive object of 
international legal concepts, rules and principles – or in Kent’s view ‘a “most-likely” 
case study’ to ‘destabilize the underlying consensus that gives legitimacy to these 
formal and informal constraints’22 – non-compliance with any of which is then taken 
as evidence that China is a threat, a non-status quo power, or a power intent on 
revising the current international order underpinned by the United Nations Charter 
and international law. China’s agency as a major international actor is ignored, 
undermined or distorted, while the ‘underlying consensus’ and ‘legitimacy’ to which 
Kent alludes are taken as self-evident. 
Assumptions of incompatibility between China, as a State and as an 
illustration of a particular system of governance, and the current international order 
are illuminated and reinforced by Francis Fukuyama’s declaration that liberal 
                                                            
21 Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
22 Kent, supra n.9, 32. 
  10 
democracy has triumphed, by which all other systems of governance must and will be 
replaced;23 Samuel Huntington’s thesis that the international system is characterised 
and divided by competing and mutually incompatible cultural ideologies;24 and 
assertions by Thomas Franck, Anne-Marie Slaughter and others that there is an 
emerging, crystallised or fundamental right to democratic governance in the post-
Cold War international order, under which the development of international law 
should be guided by ‘liberal internationalism’ applicable to all States.25 Many 
                                                            
23 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, National Interest (Summer 1989), 16; Francis 
Fukuyama, ‘A Reply to My Critics’, National Interest (Winter 1989), 18; Francis Fukuyama, 
The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the re-emergence of China and Russia as leading powers since the end 
of the Cold War, Fukuyama has continued to defend his ‘end-of-history’ thesis. Writing in 
The Washington Post, Fukuyama argued that ‘[d]espite recent authoritarian advances, liberal 
democracy remains the strongest, most broadly appealing idea out there. Most autocrats, 
including Putin and Chávez, still feel that they have to conform to the outward rituals of 
democracy even as they gut its substance. Even China’s Hu Jintao felt compelled to talk about 
democracy in the run-up to Beijing’s Olympic Games’: ‘They Can Only Go So Far’, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/22/AR2008082202395.html, 
24 August 2008. As Chapters II, IV and V illustrate, Western-style liberal democracy is 
generally taken as devoid of flaws; the implementation of democratic practices, or the lack 
thereof, in China does not seem to have entered Fukuyama’s calculus that democracy, 
whatever rhetoric as might have been uttered by the Chinese leadership, is not entrenched 
within Chinese state apparatuses and the Chinese populace; and regression of democratic 
practices, including in the form of universal suffrage, in Hong Kong that was (and still is) 
entitled under international law to the right to self-determination has been willfully ignored 
and undermined by the practices of Western States and the international community. 
Fukuyama noted that the only real competitor to democracy is radical Islamism; if it is indeed 
the case, it only shows that his notion of history ‘ended’ only when the Berlin Wall was 
demolished. The communist ideology and regime in China continues to pervade all segments 
of Chinese society. Fukuyama’s ‘end-of-history’ thesis is not progress in or for human 
understanding, but an epitome of an oasis.  
24 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, 72 Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), 
22; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
25 Thomas M. Franck, ‘United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order’, 22 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1990), 601; Thomas M. Franck, 
The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); 
Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 American Journal 
of International Law (1992), 46; Thomas M. Franck, ‘Democracy as a Human Right’, in Louis 
Henkin and John L.H. Hargrove, eds., Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 
(Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1994), 73; Thomas M. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Revolution of the Spirit’, 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1990), 1; 
Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Toward an Age of Liberal Nations’, 33 Harvard International Law 
Journal (1992), 393; Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Law among Liberal States: Liberal 
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine’, 92 Columbia Law Review (1992), 1907; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International Relations Theory’, 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1993), 180; Slaughter, supra n.5; 
Christina M. Cerna, ‘Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or a Pipe Dream of 
the West?’, 27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (1995), 289; 
Gregory H. Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’, 17 Yale 
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Western scholars do not discern any problem with their assumption that Western 
systems, values and norms are superior, even when it is akin to the notion of 
‘civilised’/‘uncivilised’ nations that justified colonialism. Thus, Jack Donnelly 
argues, ‘“[i]nside” and “outside”, in international no less than national societies, are 
defined not simply by geography or even by a history of interaction, but by cultural 
values that make insiders different from, and in many ways superior to, outsiders.’26 
Tim Dunne is emphatic that human rights have become a new standard of ‘right 
conduct’ and ‘a new standard of legitimacy in international society’,27 while Gregory 
Fox and Brad Roth find criticism of international law as Western-centric to be 
misplaced as non-Western States have benefited substantially from international law, 
without which ‘decolonisation, the delegitimization of apartheid, the strengthening of 
norms against intervention, special dispensations in costly environmental regulatory 
schemes, and others’ would not have taken place.28 
As David Strang reminds us, colonisation ‘took place within and was carried 
forward by a collective delegitimation of the sovereignty of non-Western polities. … 
Western witnesses participated in a status degradation ceremony, where Asian and 
African polities were publicly denounced as outside and in opposition to a self-
                                                                                                                                                           
International Law Journal (1992), 539; Gregory H. Fox and Georg Nolte, ‘Intolerant 
Democracies’, 36 Harvard International Law Journal (1995), 1; Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. 
Roth, ‘Democracy and International Law’, 27 Review of International Studies (2001), 327; 
Fernando R. Tesón, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’, 92 Columbia Law Review 
(1992), 53. Contra, see Thomas Carothers, ‘Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norms of 
Democratic Governance’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1992), 
261; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘“Intolerant Democracies”: A Reaction’, 37 Harvard International 
Law Journal (1996), 231; Susan Marks, ‘The End of History? Reflections on Some 
International Legal Theses’, 8 European Journal of International Law (1997), 449. 
26 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?’, 74 International Affairs 
(1998), 1, 2. 
27 Tim Dunne, ‘Fundamental Human Rights Crisis after 9/11’, 44 International Politics 
(2007), 283, 286. 
28 Fox and Roth, supra n.25, 339. Brad R. Roth in Governmental Illegitimacy in International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 430, has also noted that ‘[t]he inviolability of 
the collectivity can be, and has been, understood not as the negation of the rights of 
individuals, but as a prerequisite to the realization of the values that all other rights seek to 
further. This characterization of sovereignty makes little sense, of course, if foreign 
interventions (armed or unarmed) are assumed to be benevolent and wise rather than 
predatory or misguided, but it is not clear why such benevolence and wisdom should be 
readily assumed, even where powerful states announce, as their end, the furtherance of human 
rights and democracy.’ 
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referentially valid progress … complete with moralizing motives, pragmatic analyses, 
and more than a touch of crowd hysteria.’29 Assumption of Western systems, values 
and norms as superior serves to deny the ‘outsider’ legitimacy in transnational 
discourses and in the ‘outsider’s’ domestic governance itself. Any criticism by the 
‘outsider’ of the flaws or failings of the ‘insider’ is automatically dismissed. Yong 
Deng argues that such ‘[a]ttribution of a negative identity to the “other” affirms and 
magnifies the superior distinctiveness of the in-group identity. Inter-group prejudice 
explains the persistence of international conflict at both the interstate- and 
intertransnational-group levels.’30 As the nature of power/legitimacy imbalances 
dictates that for a system, value or norm to be held out as superior, there must be a 
target audience in the ‘outsider’ who accepts its ascribed inferiority,31 a number of 
Chinese scholars have accepted that the absence of democratisation in China is 
disadvantageous to its international status and grand strategy.32 Both compliance and 
non-compliance with a Western system, value or norm are taken as reflecting and 
                                                            
29 David Strang, ‘Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism’, in 
Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22, 43-44. 
30 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 102. 
31 As the late developmental psychoanalyst Erik H. Erikson in Identity: Youth and Crisis 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 59, observed, ‘[t]herapeutic as well as reformist efforts verify 
the sad truth that in any system based on suppression, exclusion, and exploitation, the 
suppressed, excluded, and exploited unconsciously accept the evil image they are made to 
represent by those who are dominant.’ 
32 See, e.g., Liu Jianfei, ‘Zhongguo minzhu zhengzhi jianshe yu Zhongmei guanxi’ [‘The 
Construction of Democratic Politics in China and Sino-American Relations’], 2 Zhanglue Yu 
Guanli (2003), 76; Ye Zicheng, Zhongguo Dazhanlue [The Grand Strategy of China] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo shehuishexue chubanshe, 2003). Yuan Weishi has gone so far as to argue 
that the absence of democratisation in China, along with the onset of the Cultural Revolution, 
was the reason for the breakdown of negotiations in the 1960s between the People’s Republic 
of China government and the authorities on Taiwan and a liberal rule-of-law order in 
Mainland China would have brought the negotiations to success, and that the disagreements 
that continue to prevail in China’s relations with Japan are ultimately traceable to its failure to 
accept liberal-democratic norms. Yuan concludes that ‘a pluralistic culture taking freedom, 
democracy, and the rule of law as its basis is the system that any country must select in order 
to achieve long-term domestic peace and order. It is also the source of “soft power” most 
effective for a country to use in winning the respect of other countries and strengthening 
internal cohesion’: ‘Kang Zhan: Wenming de jinzhan yu Zhongguo de fansi (xia) [‘The War 
of Resistance: The Progress of Civilization and China’s Reflection (Part 2)’], 484 Gaige 
Neican [Internal Reference Materials on Reform] (2005), 38, 41, as quoted in Daniel C. 
Lynch, ‘Envisioning China’s Political Future: Elite Responses to Democracy as a Global 
Constitutive Norm’, 51 International Studies Quarterly (2007), 701, 707-8. 
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reaffirming the legitimacy of the Western system, value or norm that itself escapes 
scrutiny. 
 An appreciation of how non-Western States engage with Western systems, 
values and norms, and how the latter may be improved and better understood through 
mutual learning, is essential to generating compliance with, and ensuring the 
legitimacy of, international rules, processes, and organisations. In their conception of 
a ‘management model’ of compliance, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes 
argue that ‘the interpretation, elaboration, application and ultimately enforcement of 
international rules [are] accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) 
interchange among interested parties’.33 Franck believes that international 
organisations, with the deliberations, compliance and enforcement that they embody, 
enable and exemplify, confer international rules procedural and substantive 
legitimacy that in turn enhances the legitimacy and effectiveness of decisions these 
organisations make.34 States are required to justify their actions or inactions through 
international legal norms and principles, even if they might have ulterior motives that 
might be readily apparent, and notwithstanding their raw power or their power 
imbalances inter se. Oscar Schachter notes that even powerful States ‘generally base 
their legal case on grounds that are logically independent of their own interests and 
wishes’.35 The current international legal order enables weak States to buttress their 
State sovereignty while strong States have fundamental self-interests in maintaining 
its stability as they hold disproportionate influence. States justify their conduct so that 
reciprocal compliance may be expected and ‘good standing in the regimes that make 
up the substance of international life’ preserved.36 While States remain primary actors 
in international organisations, their deliberative discourses in public settings allow 
                                                            
33 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 118. 
34 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, supra n.25. 
35 Oscar Schachter, ‘International Law in Theory and Practice’, 178 Recueil des cours (1982–
V), 1, 59. 
36 Chayes and Chayes, supra n.33, 32. 
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non-governmental actors, transnational corporations and the media, etc., to form part 
of an ‘interpretive community’ and play a significant role in ensuring and enhancing 
compliance with and development of international law. Additionally, interactions that 
States have inter se and with inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations 
shed light on the meanings of international norms that they may internalise 
domestically. 
 
III. Research significance 
 
For these reasons, it is of pivotal importance to understand how China has engaged 
with international law and international organisations to justify and advance its 
exercise of State sovereignty, and how in the process international law and 
international organisations may be transformed and, perhaps, improved. 
Henry Nau discerns that States disagree in their approaches to foreign policy, 
including international law, because ‘[w]e simplify. We approach the world with 
labels and models that direct us toward a particular slice of reality. We can’t see it all, 
so we use our learning, experience, and judgment to select a direction, to look for 
certain facts that are important to us in terms of how we believe the world works.’37 
Discourses of empirical and normative developments of international law suffer the 
same defect of prejudgments and preconceptions. A scholar trained in a particular 
legal or international relations tradition, and who tends to be aligned with the foreign 
policy approach of the State in which he or she operates, is predisposed to look for 
facts that confirm his or her assumptions. Consequently, discourses of international 
law and the international order continue to be unbalanced, genuine dialogues 
precluded, and the maintenance and development of international law marred by 
disagreements over its content, universality, generality and, ultimately, legitimacy 
                                                            
37 Henry R. Nau, ‘Why We Fight over Foreign Policy’, 142 Policy Review (April/May 2007), 
25, 26. 
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and authority. Jurisprudence must be approached through addressing the many factors 
and issues that are extrinsic as well as those that are intrinsic to it: ‘The way you 
characterize these problems, the intellectual tools you use to research them and the 
information you think relevant for answering them will all be determined by your 
conception of law. Your conception will influence the role you assume, the method 
you use, the ethics you adopt and the outcome.’38 
Samantha Besson argues that ‘[a]s an essentially contestable concept, 
sovereignty is at once a state of affairs, a question pertaining to the nature and 
justification of that state of affairs and a justification of it. The correct use of the 
concept sovereignty and hence the correct exercise of authority it implies consists 
therefore in constantly reflecting and contesting one’s use of the concept and hence 
one’s exercise of sovereignty. … Sovereignty’s use is both dynamic and reflexive and 
implies mutual learning and progress in the protection of the values it 
encompasses’.39 In understanding international law, it is not only legal rules and 
decisions that matter, but also how we reach them, how they affect us, and how we 
may improve them. With China’s rise and its increasing influence in the shaping of 
international law, the workings of international organisations and the conduct of 
international relations, its approaches to the principle of State sovereignty, the 
reasons and rationales underlying such approaches, and the argumentation it proffers 
in justifying and advancing its exercise of State sovereignty play a determinant role in 
the direction in which the current international legal order may develop. 
 
IV. Research framework and methodology 
 
                                                            
38 W. Michael Reisman, ‘The View from the New Haven School of International Law’, 86 
Proceedings of American Society of International Law (1992), 118, 119. 
39 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’, in Stephen Tierney and Colin Warbrick, eds., 
Towards an International Legal Community?: The Sovereignty of States and the Sovereignty 
of International Law (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2006), 
131, 176 (emphasis in original). 
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As I have noted, scholars of international law and of international relations must look 
through and pierce the veil of superiority of Western values, systems and norms in 
the formation, applicability, application, development and understanding of 
international law when exploring China’s, or for that matter any State’s, roles in the 
international system and its compliance with and contribution to international law. 
This thesis draws on primary research materials to explore the symbiotic relationship 
between China’s exercise of State sovereignty and the current international legal 
order. Given the dominant influence of Western conceptions and discourses of certain 
relevant issues in critiques of China’s exercise of State sovereignty, this thesis also 
engages research literature through basic international legal analysis to identify their 
merits and flaws and examine their applicability to our understanding of the limits 
and potential of China’s exercise of State sovereignty, its engagement with 
international law, and the room to which the current international legal order may 
expand or otherwise be confined. 
Chapter II presents a critique of dominant Western discourses of international 
law and State sovereignty that typically frame and confine analyses of the 
relationship between China and the current international legal order. It discusses the 
interrelationship between the disciplines of international law and of international 
relations, the universality and generality of international law, with particular 
reference to Western discourses of liberal democracy, and the question of whether 
State sovereignty is an essential requirement for, or an impediment to, the 
development of international law, the protection of human rights, the promotion and 
implementation of democracy and self-determination, the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and the stability of the current international legal 
order. 
 In appraising China’s approaches to international law and the current 
international legal order, one need be cognisant of China’s historical experience. As 
Lucian Pye puts it, ‘China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. 
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China is a civilization pretending to be a state’.40 The New Haven School of 
International Law holds that ‘[i]t is important to correlate past decisions with 
conditions that influenced them and to note whether that context of conditions has 
changed in a material and pertinent way.’41 Western research literature on China and 
international law or the current international legal order typically lacks such an 
appraisal either entirely or in detail, or proceeds from the premise that China’s history 
– its former self-identification as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ and subsequent victimisation 
by Western powers and Japan – necessitates that it will take, continue or resume a 
negative approach to international law and the current international legal order when 
it attains the capability to do so.42  
 While there might be elements of truth to this premise, China’s historical 
experience with international law is more complicated than the caricature suggests. 
Chapter III examines the historical interactions between China and international law 
since the Opium War (1839–1842). The Opium War is a useful starting point as 
China’s interactions with other States deepened and its international position 
deteriorated significantly thenceforth, and additionally as ‘[w]hether Chinese or 
Western, radical or conservative, scholars have invariably taken it as a starting point 
in the study of modern China’.43 As ‘learning is essentially an evolutionary process in 
which selection through negative learning plays a fundamental role’,44 this chapter 
discusses how China’s approaches to international law and the current international 
legal order have been heavily influenced by military events and international 
agreements since the Opium War, which have resulted in an enduring mentality on 
the part of China, the Chinese leadership and the Chinese people that China has been 
                                                            
40 Lucian Pye, ‘China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society’, 69:4 Foreign Affairs (1990), 56, 58. 
41 Reisman, supra n.38, 124. 
42 Kent, supra n.9, 2. See also Warren I. Cohen, ‘China’s Rise in Historical Perspective’, 30 
Journal of Strategic Studies (2007), 683. 
43 Hsin-Pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), ix. 
44 Tang Shiping, ‘From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation 
of China’s Security Strategy’, in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds, China’s Ascent: Power, 
Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2008), 141, 146. 
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a victim of international law and an imposed international order, from which it must 
guard itself externally and internally. As China regarded itself as the centre of 
civilisation and non-Chinese peoples as barbarians, and ‘[a]n overriding concern of 
Confucian China’s “foreign policy” was to maintain the cultural basis of its 
superiority over other societies’,45 this chapter explores how China since the ‘century 
of humiliation’ – through the last century of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the 
republican era (1912–1949), the period during which the communist regime was not 
recognised by the United Nations and other States as the legitimate government of 
China, the period between 1971 and 1984 when China endured significant political 
and legal upheavals, and since 1984 when China began to embark on extensive 
political, economic and legal reforms and to interact with an international legal order 
that consists in formal and customary rules and principles conceived and determined 
by Western powers, and how it might now shape the development of international 
law and the current international legal order. 
 Having dissected Western discourses of international law and State 
sovereignty and China’s historical experience with international law, this thesis then 
turns to how China has exercised its State sovereignty and how its exercise 
illuminates the relationship between China and international law and international 
organisations. Roxanne Lynn Doty argues that ‘[s]overeignty becomes not so much 
an ontological problem that questions what sovereignty is. Rather, it becomes a 
question of determining what issues, uncertainties, and transformations elicit 
responses in discursive practices that attempt to fix meanings and social/political 
identities. It is also a question of what … the consequences of these practices are.’46 
The most fundamental disagreements between China (and many non-Western States) 
and Western powers inhere in the conceptions, protection, implementation and 
violations of human rights, democracy and self-determination, and how international 
                                                            
45 Deng, supra n.30, 281. 
46 Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National 
Identity’, in Biersteker and Weber, supra n.29, 121, 142. 
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peace and security ought to be maintained. Chapters IV and V focus on China’s 
exercise of internal sovereignty in the contexts of human rights, democracy and self-
determination, whereas Chapter VI explores China’s exercise of external sovereignty 
in the context of its roles in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
While Neil MacCormick distinguishes the internal and external aspects of State 
sovereignty and considers that the two can exist independently of each other;47 
Besson argues that ‘conceptually at least, they cannot be separated logically … 
Without external sovereignty, the internal sovereign cannot define the latter and 
without internal sovereignty in the constitutional determination of competences, there 
cannot be an external sovereign and no human rights limitations in particular’.48 
Chapter IV examines how international law has influenced China’s exercise 
of internal sovereignty in terms of its acceptance, implementation and violations of 
human rights and democracy, and the impact of China’s approaches on the 
development and understanding of international human rights law. China relies on the 
principles of State sovereignty and of non-intervention in other States’ internal affairs 
to shield its domestic policies and practices from foreign criticism or interference. 
Meanwhile, Western States, often without reflection on their own approaches, assert 
that international human rights law possesses a universal character on the basis of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, customary international law, a myriad of 
international human rights treaties (whether or not China has acceded to them), and 
above all the normative and moral values of human rights. China (and most non-
Western States with exceptions such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Africa) and 
Western States disagree over whether liberal democracy possesses universal 
                                                            
47 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Practical Reason (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 129. 
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that ‘[n]eorealists tend to combine population, territory, authority, and recognition – the 
principal constitutive elements of sovereignty – into a single, unproblematic actor: the 
sovereign state. This conflation of state and sovereignty enables them to abstract from, or 
simply ignore, problems in the domestic domain and to leave the assessment of problems of 
internal sovereignty to others’: ‘The Social Construction of State Sovereignty’, in Biersteker 
and Weber, supra n.29, 1, 5. 
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applicability and its merits. Such disagreement is not confined to the Chinese 
government but is discernable among many Chinese people. Understanding how 
human rights and democratic norms are conceived, understood, implemented and 
violated in China from a Chinese perspective is important also because international 
human rights law, as much as it might be able to redress violations and consequences, 
is unable to address the structural and institutional causes of human rights violations 
and resistance to democratic practices. Since the Chinese government’s suppression 
of calls for democratic reform on Tiananmen Square in June 1989, issues of human 
rights and democracy have played major roles in China’s state behaviours internally, 
in its relations with other States and in its approaches to international law and the 
current international legal order. Simultaneously, the same issues shed light on the 
behaviours of many Western States and the international community, on their 
approaches and commitment to international human rights law, and on the schisms 
within international law. 
Differences between China and Western States in their conceptions and 
implementations of international human rights law are particularly heightened in 
territories with contested claims to statehood on the basis of self-determination. As 
Doty has put it, ‘[w]hen it is no longer clear who makes up the nation, a state’s 
internal sovereignty and the existence of the state itself is threatened.’49 Chapter V 
examines how self-determination has evolved as a principle and a right under 
international law and in Chinese laws and practices, including the manners in which it 
may be exercised as well as its ambiguity and fragility. In particular, it explores 
certain issues of self-determination Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet, as well as China’s 
approaches to Kosovo and East Timor, have raised and illuminated. The chapter 
discusses how China, other States and the international community have facilitated or 
undermined self-determination in these territories, and the roles international law has 
played in creating the situations in which these territories and their peoples now find 
                                                            
49 Doty, supra n.46, 122. 
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themselves. 
The roles that China plays in international affairs, especially in the 
maintenance of international peace and security, exemplify the potential and limits of 
its interactions with the current international legal order as it acquires greater 
recognition and influence as a rising power. China being a Permanent Member of the 
United Nations Security Council with veto power, the Security Council is a 
quintessential forum for observations as to how China has exercised its State 
sovereignty through international law and international organisations that may in the 
process be strengthened or stymied. Chapter VI explores the role of international law 
in China’s voting behaviour and argumentation within the Security Council, and how 
China has thus illustrated its potential as a power that may maintain, revise, 
undermine or augment the aims and ideals of the current international legal order. 
Equally fundamentally, an appreciation of how China deploys legal argumentation to 
buttress its positions helps advance ‘our understanding of the law, and thus … the 
identity, objective, and principles of the community’.50 
The United States is generally regarded as the most influential State in 
shaping the behaviours of other States and the development and understanding of 
international law. This thesis shows that China has served important contributions, an 
objective appraisal of which is essential to our understanding of international law, 
including the locus in which the principle of State sovereignty resides in the current 
international legal order, and its continuing significance and implications. 
                                                            
50 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’, 17 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (1995–1996), 455, 480. 
 22 
Chapter II: A Critique of Western Discourses of International Law and State 





Notwithstanding the purposes, principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter 
and non-Western States’ increasing influence in international organisations since the 
Second World War, the current international legal order continues to be 
circumscribed by layers of Western-centrism. From the nineteenth-century mission 
civilisatrice to its contemporary face as promoter and protector of human rights, 
democracy, self-determination and world peace, international law in its formulation, 
development, applicability, application and understanding is beset with undue 
ascription of objectivity, authenticity and universality to what Western States and 
scholars say or do, while actions of non-Western States and opinions of non-Western 
scholars are frequently dismissed or denigrated as subversive, dangerous, biased, 
apologist, distorted, irrational or simply uninformed.1 The United States’ post-Cold 
                                                            
1 Many non-Western scholars who work in Western countries and critique the Western-centric 
nature of international law or international relations scholarship are denied authenticity in 
their work. For example, in his response to Lily Ling’s critique of his discussion about the 
current international system (Georg Sørensen, ‘What Kind of World Order?: The International 
System in the New Millennium’, 41 Cooperation and Conflict (2006), 343) as illustrative of 
‘the academy’s complicity with power’ (L.H.M. Ling, ‘Global Presumptions: A Critique of 
Sørensen’s World-Order Change’, 41 Cooperation and Conflict (2006), 382, 383), Georg 
Sørensen finds that ‘despite her attempts to cast herself as a marginalized outsider, LL is none 
of that; like most of us, she is a Western academic pursuing her work and publishing it in 
journals and books. Nor does she, in any larger sense, represent or speak for the oppressed 
peoples of the world’: ‘What Kind of World Order? A Response to Critics’, 41 Cooperation 
and Conflict (2006), 393, 400. Being in the same shoes as Ling’s, I proffer that the fact that 
many non-Western scholars must work in Western countries and publish in Western journals 
in order to obtain an audience and a semblance of respectability illustrates the marginalisation 
of both non-Western scholarship and non-Western scholars. It is, accordingly, with much 
regret that I need to use English-language research materials primarily, and not the abundance 
of Chinese-language research materials, in this thesis, lest this thesis be accused of Chinese 
biases or dismissed as lacking rigorous informed analysis. It is also hoped that my use of 
English-language research materials primarily in this thesis will enable this thesis to reach a 
wider audience unfamiliar with Chinese language but whose understanding of the symbiotic 
relationship between China’s exercise of State sovereignty and the current international legal 
order is imperative to a proper understanding of China, the principle of State sovereignty, the 
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War dominance and the advent of the European Union – conferred by its Member 
States with powers often erroneously taken as overriding their individual State 
sovereignty – are superficially referred to by many Western scholars to argue that the 
principle of State sovereignty has now become obsolete and that sovereignty of a 
non-liberal State, such as China, impedes the development of international law and 
the stability of the current international legal order. At the same time, many actions of 
Western States, however inconsistent with international law, are reflexively taken as 
reflecting or enhancing normative universal values, precisely on the basis of their 
inconsistencies, in the name of the progressive development of international law. 
This chapter explores how dominant Western discourses of international law 
and State sovereignty that typically frame and confine analyses of the relationship 
between China and the current international legal order are pregnant with 
inconsistencies, contradictions and problems, in order ‘to expose the interests served 
by the production and maintenance of particular truths, and the processes that enable 
some forms of knowledge to be accepted as complete and legitimate while other 
forms are labelled partial and suspect’,2 and the ramifications that ensue for a proper 
understanding of China’s exercise of State sovereignty and the current international 
legal order. It examines the interrelationship between the disciplines of international 
law and of international relations, the universality and generality of international law, 
particularly in respect of whether liberal democracy constitutes a requirement or a 
rule for a State to possess internal and external legitimacy for its exercise of 
sovereignty, and whether State sovereignty impedes the proper functioning of the 
current international legal order. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
state and legitimacy of international law, and the direction in which the current international 
legal order may and should proceed. 
2 Tony Evans, ‘International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge’, 27 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2005), 1046, 1049. 
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II. International law and international relations: Conjoint twins or 
estranged bedfellows? 
 
Like siblings in rivalry, the disciplines of international law and of international 
relations have always viewed each other with contempt and misunderstanding, and 
yet cannot thrive without the contributions of each other. Scholars of international 
relations generally regard international law and international organisations to be at 
best political tools for a State to enable and justify its pursuit of power or its attempt 
to constrain another State’s pursuit of power, or at worst simply irrelevant on the 
premise that compliance with international law, in want of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, ultimately depends on raw power and power asymmetry. Meanwhile, 
scholars of international law tend to consider international relations discourses, 
particularly those rooted in realism, to suffer excessive foci on empirical calculations 
of power, power imbalances and struggles for power among States as the overriding 
framework and determinants in the conduct of international affairs without due regard 
for the need for a normative framework that regulates, influences and shapes state 
behaviours both internally and externally. 
Rémi Bachand and Thierry Lapointe argue that international law and 
international relations are in fact co-constitutive at three levels – in legal forms, in 
legal constraints, and in argumentation; ‘power structures and dynamics in the 
international system never exist (and cannot be conceptualized) outside or 
independent of the legal relationships that crystallize their existence and that, in some 
way, institutionalize them.’3 The primary actors in international relations – States – 
are created, and separated from each other, by international law. International 
relations scholars who argue that international law is irrelevant ignore the fact that 
‘weak countries generally think twice before committing an internationally wrongful 
                                                            
3 Rémi Bachand and Thierry Lapointe, ‘Beyond Presentism: Rethinking the Enduring Co-
constitutive Relationships between International Law and International Relations’, 4 
International Political Sociology (2010), 271, 272. 
 25 
act in their relations with stronger states. It is the latter that usually violate their 
obligations vis-à-vis the former, and with impunity.’4 Even the United States 
endeavours to have its foreign and domestic policies and actions validated by 
reference to international law. As Andrew Hurrell has argued, ‘states follow specific 
rules, even when inconvenient, because they have a longer-term interest in the 
maintenance of law-impregnated international community.’5 In turn, international law 
galvanises and augments the legitimacy of actions taken by powerful States and of 
positions they hold. Nonetheless, empirical general acceptance, even where it exists, 
by itself cannot explain or reflect the normative legitimacy of international law or the 
reasons States accept it. After all, colonialism was justified by all major Western 
powers with the support of international legal doctrines their legal scholars 
propounded.6 
The concomitance of the rise of Western powers and the consolidation of 
international law in the international order during the nineteenth century might lead 
one to suggest that international law is not Western-centric but in fact power-centric, 
both externally vis-à-vis other States and within the domestic structure of a State. The 
emphasis on raw power, power imbalances and struggles for power is illuminated by 
the notion of the ‘China threat’, that it is not whether but when China will seek to 
revise the current international order and the legal and political rules that underlie and 
regulate it. The envisaged revision by China is presumed to be a negative one (with 
                                                            
4 Hans Peter Neuhold, ‘The Foreign-Policy “Cost-Benefit Analysis” Revisited’, 42 German 
Yearbook of International Law (1999), 84, 95. 
5 Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach’, 
in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 49, 59. 
6 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International 
Law’, 5 Social & Legal Studies (1996), 321; Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’, 40 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1999), 1; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International 
Law and Imperialism’, in David Freestone, Surya Subedi, and Scott Davidson, eds., 
Contemporary Issues in International Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial 
Lectures (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 197. 
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the only question as to how negative it will be). John Mearsheimer has contended that 
‘a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic 
powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might 
and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic or deeply 
enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on 
its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies 
do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival.’7 
Samuel Kim argues that China’s rapid development of military capabilities, 
especially in terms of aircraft, missiles, and blue-water naval power, ‘would not be so 
alarming, and China would not be seen as Asia’s least satisfied revisionist power, 
according to the realist received wisdom, if the country did not harbor an acute 
historical grievance and if it did not have so many territorial disputes and irredentist 
claims on so many of its neighbors, if it did not have a deeply rooted para bellum 
strategic culture, if it did not have a repressive authoritarian regime defying the 
democratic peace theory, and if it did not embrace hypernationalism as a substitution 
ideology’.8 
 Such realist thinking is not confined to the discipline of international 
relations. Eric Posner and John Yoo, both scholars of international law with 
significant misgivings about the formulation, development, applicability, application, 
effectiveness, binding nature and normative values of international law,9 have argued 
                                                            
7 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2001), 4. Similarly, David Shambaugh argues that ‘China today is a dissatisfied and non-
status quo power which seeks to change the existing international order and norms of inter-
state relations. Beijing is not satisfied with the status quo, sees that the international system 
and its rules were created by Western countries when China was weak, and believes that the 
existing distribution of power and resources is structurally biased in favor of the West and 
against China. It does not just seek a place at the rule-making table … it seeks to alter the 
rules and existing system’: ‘Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s 
Responses’, 21:2 International Security (1996), 180, 186-87. 
8 Samuel S. Kim, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice’, in Samuel S. Kim, ed., 
China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1998), 3, 5. 
9 For the minefield of scholarship on which Eric Posner and John Yoo critique international 
law, see Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary International Law’, 
66 University of Chicago Law Review (1999), 1113; Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, 
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that international law and international organisations have little relevance to China 
(or to the United States) and to any military conflict between China and the United 
States.10 Gregory Fox, Thomas Franck, Georg Nolte, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and 
Fernando Tesón ostensibly reflect the other end of the spectrum in international legal 
scholarship, which recognises and advocates the roles international law and 
international organisations play at both interstate and domestic levels.11 As this 
                                                                                                                                                           
‘Further Thoughts on Customary International Law’, 23 Michigan Journal of International 
Law (2002), 191; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘Moral and Legal Rhetoric in 
International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective’, 31:S1 Journal of Legal Studies 
(2002), S115; Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Eric A. Posner, ‘Do States Have a Moral Obligation to 
Comply with International Law?’, 55 Stanford Law Review (2003), 1901; Eric A. Posner, ‘A 
Theory of the Laws of War’, 70 University of Chicago Law Review (2003), 297; Eric A. 
Posner, ‘Terrorism and the Laws of War’, 5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2005), 
423; Eric A. Posner and Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Justice 
Biased?’. 34 Journal of Legal Studies (2005), 599; Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, 
‘Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum’, 93 Georgia Law Review (2005), 993; John C. Yoo, ‘The 
Dogs that Didn’t Bark: Why were International Legal Scholars MIA on Kosovo?’, 1 Chicago 
Journal of International Law (2000), 149; John C. Yoo, ‘UN Wars, US War Powers’, 1 
Chicago Journal of International Law (2000), 355; Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, 
‘The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist 
Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them’, 25 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy (2002), 487; John Yoo, ‘International Law and the War in Iraq’, 97 American 
Journal of International Law (2003), 563; John C. Yoo, ‘The Status of Soldiers and Terrorists 
under the Geneva Conventions’, 3 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003), 135; John C. 
Yoo and James C. Ho, ‘The Status of Terrorists’, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 
(2003), 207; John Yoo, ‘Transferring Terrorists’, 79 Notre Dame Law Review (2004), 1183; 
John Yoo, ‘Using Force’, 71 University of Chicago Law Review (2004), 729; Robert J. 
Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention’, 46 Virginia Journal 
of International Law (2005), 131; Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo, ‘Executive Power v. 
International Law’, 30 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (2006), 1; John C. Yoo, 
‘Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention’, 6 Chicago Journal of International Law (2006), 
641; John C. Yoo and Will Trachman, ‘Less than Bargained for: The Use of Force and the 
Declining Relevance of the United Nations’, 5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2005), 
379; Glenn Sulmasy and John Yoo, ‘Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and 
International Law’, 28 Michigan Journal of International Law (2007), 625; Robert J. 
Delahunty and John C. Yoo, ‘Peace through Law? The Failure of a Noble Experiment’, 106 
Michigan Law Review (2008), 923. 
10 Eric A. Posner and John Yoo, ‘International Law and the Rise of China’, 7 Chicago Journal 
of International Law (2006), 1. 
11 See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’, 17 
Yale International Law Journal (1992), 539; Gregory H. Fox and Georg Nolte, ‘Intolerant 
Democracies’, 36 Harvard International Law Journal (1995), 1; Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. 
Roth, ‘Democracy and International Law’. 27 Review of International Studies (2001), 327; 
Thomas M. Franck, ‘United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order’, 22 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics (1990), 601; Thomas M. Franck, The 
Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas M. 
Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 American Journal of 
International Law (1992), 46; Thomas M. Franck, ‘Democracy as a Human Right’, in Louis 
Henkin and John L.H. Hargrove, eds., Human Rights: An Agenda for the Next Century 
(Washington, D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1994), 73; Thomas M. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
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chapter discusses in greater detail below, even their positions – that, in the post-Cold 
War era, there is an emerging right in international law to democratic governance;12 
liberal internationalism is universally applicable to all States;13 and States which do 
not subscribe to liberal democracy within their jurisdictions should have their 
membership in international organisations revoked14 or their statehood de-
recognised,15 or should simply be invaded16 – stem from the same underlying premise 
that the proclaimed values of the United States are normatively universally applicable 
and which, if not adopted voluntarily, should be enforced, diplomatically or by force. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Revolution of the Spirit’, 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal (1990), 1; 
Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Toward an Age of Liberal Nations’, 33 Harvard International Law 
Journal (1992), 393; Anne-Marie Burley, ‘Law among Liberal States: Liberal 
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine’, 92 Columbia Law Review (1992), 1907; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International Relations Theory’, 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1993), 180; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 6 European Journal of 
International Law (1995), 503; Fernando R. Tesón, ‘The Kantian Theory of International 
Law’, 92 Columbia Law Review (1992), 53. 
12 Franck (1992), ibid. 
13 Slaughter (1995), supra n.11. 
14 Franck (1992), supra n.11, 78, argues that ‘[t]he Charter limits UN membership to states 
that are “peace-loving” (Article 4(1)) and enjoins governments to respect the “equal rights and 
self-determination of [their own] peoples” (Article 1(2)). The Genocide and Racism 
Conventions certainly do qualify as rules of deportment imposed on all states by the 
community of nations. Having become customary as well as treaty law – if not also rules of 
jus cogens – these Conventions may be said to exemplify the principle that states collectively 
have the authority to determine minimum standards of conduct from which none may deviate 
without eventually endangering their membership in the club.’ In The Power of Legitimacy 
among Nations, Franck, supra n.11, 92, acknowledges that ‘[a] self-proclaimed regime may 
be denied validation only if it does not exercise effective control. A new state should be 
denied membership only if its existence is still precarious or if it does not want to, or cannot, 
assume the duties of membership … For example, it is not permissible to vote to deny 
membership on the ground … that the government has come to power in a coup.’ 
15 Fox and Roth, supra n.11, 342-43, argue that ‘[s]ome international organizations limit 
membership to “liberal democracies” and therefore inquire into the democratic bona fides of 
new state applicants. The clearest application of democratic legitimacy criteria occurs in 
decisions to declare or refuse recognition of new states and governments, to open or break 
diplomatic relations, and to accord, withhold or suspend states’ memberships in, or deny their 
governments’ credentials to, intergovernmental organizations. On occasion, these measures 
may go so far as to express a collective opinio juris holding that the ruling apparatus lacks 
legal standing to assert rights, incur obligations, and confer immunities on behalf of the 
sovereign state entity – that is, legal, as distinct from merely political, non-recognition. Not to 
recognize an undemocratic regime that nonetheless exercises effective control over the 
national territory represents (or at least affects) a profound affirmation of democratic 
principles. It affirms a willingness to forgo any sort of meaningful relationship with the state 
in the hope that “legitimate” leaders might someday return to office.’ 
16 Tesón, supra n.11, 90, argues that ‘force will sometimes have to be used against nonliberal 
regimes as a last resort in self-defense or in defense of human rights. Liberal democracies 
must seek peace and use all possible alternatives to preserve it. In extreme circumstances, 
however, violence may be the only means to uphold the law and to defend the liberal alliance 
against outlaw dictators that remain nonmembers. Such, I believe, is the proper place of war in 
the Kantian theory.’ 
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Oona Hathaway has noted that ‘[i]nterest-based models often fall back on normative 
insights in order to explain otherwise inexplicable state behavior in the human rights 
arena, and norm-centered accounts do not deny the power of rational interest to 
motivate state behavior.’17 As Slaughter has admitted, ‘[p]ower in a nuclear era and in 
an interdependent global economy is also about influence, about our ability to lead 
and to persuade others to shape the world the way we want to shape it … We must 
work to shape [international rules] so that they conform to United States interests. 
That is what we did in 1945. That is what we need to do in 2000.’18 Michael Reisman 
argues that the United States’ military capability empowers and compels it to decide 
and enforce its perceptions of world order.19 
Just as a natural person has an array of reasons to (not) comply with the law 
(or to do, or to not do, anything), the efficacy of international law cannot be causally 
dismissed because other, oftentimes competing, motivations influence or underlie a 
State’s compliance. Undue foci on power dynamics neglect the influence that the 
internal structures and identities of a State may bring to bear on the State’s 
approaches to the international order, including those to international law, as 
constructivist international relations scholars highlight. As Paul Stephan has argued, 
state behaviours may be guided not by the rational interests of the State but by the 
personal preferences of the state leadership and the powerful groups that influence 
it.20 This is no truer than in China where the people regard the leadership as a primary 
source and manifestation of moral authority and legitimacy, as Chapter IV discusses. 
As much as domestic factors and constraints constitute determinants of how a State 
behaves internationally, international causes influence and shape domestic decision-
making. While Harold Koh argues that in a ‘transnational legal process’ by which 
                                                            
17 Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International 
Law’, 72 University of Chicago Law Review (2005), 469, 477, fn.17. 
18 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Building Global Democracy’, 1 Chicago Journal of International 
Law (2000), 223, 225. 
19 W. Michael Reisman, ‘The United States and International Institutions’, 41:4 Survival 
(1999), 62. 
20 Paul B. Stephan, ‘Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and 
Legitimacy’, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1997), 681. 
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‘public and private actors – nation states, corporations, international organizations, 
and non-governmental organizations – interact in a variety of fora to make, interpret, 
enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of international law’,21 Chih-Yu Shih 
believes that ‘the moral search for international justice can start from within each 
nation’.22 
Realist theories also undervalue the empirical and normative values of liberal 
discourses, dialogues and co-operation that international law and international 
organisations generate;23 even Posner and Yoo acknowledge that the likelihood of 
direct military confrontation between China and the United States rests on ‘not the 
nature of distribution of power, but on the quality of information that states have 
about each other’s interests and capabilities’.24 In their report for the Council on 
Foreign Relations in 1999, Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg concluded that 
‘when intensive, high-level, strategic dialogue with China’s leaders was conducted … 
progress was made in shaping Chinese thinking. Over time, Chinese perceptions can 
be influenced through dialogue, provided the Americans in turn are willing to listen 
carefully to Chinese views. … the dialogue cannot be a lecture’.25 Responding to 
United States pressure in respect of China’s human rights record, Qian Qichen, then 
China’s Foreign Minister, stated in 1997 that ‘we stand ready to have dialogue with 
                                                            
21 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘On American Exceptionalism’, 55 Stanford Law Review (2003), 
1479, 1502. 
22 Chih-Yu Shih, China’s Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1993), 2 (emphasis in original). 
23 See, e.g., William D. Coplin, The Functions of International Law: An Introduction to the 
Role of International Law in the Contemporary World (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); 
Richard A. Falk, The Status of Law in International Society (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970). 
24 Posner and Yoo, supra n.10, 8. Yet, not conceding too much (or at all) to international law, 
the authors immediately argue, ibid., that ‘a state that rigidly insists on the distribution of 
rights and obligations under international law may hasten war rather than avoid it’, and that 
‘states need to treat international law flexibly and consistent with the existing balance of 
power’. 
25 Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 18. David M. Lampton similarly observes 
that ‘before one can effectively address particular problems with the Chinese it is necessary to 
first establish a framework of interest, principles and intention against which they can assess 
particular issues. This frame of reference has several components that, in the aggregate, the 
Chinese call “mutual understanding”’: Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US–China 
Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 371. 
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others in order to better understand each other and seek common ground while 
shelving differences. However, the prerequisite for such dialogue is let there be no 
confrontation … the dialogue must take place on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect.’26 Of course, speaking openly may actually exacerbate conflict and reduce 
the likelihood of mutual understanding about a given issue or about the participants.27 
The United Nations Security Council quintessentially illustrates the processes, values, 
and problems of deliberative discourse, as Chapter VI examines. 
Power and legitimacy are in fact intertwined. Tony Evans has noted that 
‘liberal concern that power can be defined in terms of legitimacy and illegitimacy 
misses the important point that even the legitimate exercise of power also excludes, 
marginalizes, silences, and prohibits alternatives’.28 The concept of legitimacy is 
itself pregnant with power asymmetry and calculus, in terms of who sets the 
standards, the processes of reaching them, and their contents and reach. As China’s 
experience with international law since the Opium War, discussed in Chapter III, 
illustrates, ‘international law is both an instrument of power and an obstacle to its 
exercise; it is always apology and utopia’.29 International law was the tool with which 
Western powers, and later Japan, legitimated their subjugation of China to a semi-
colonial entity;30 it was through international law that China ultimately attained 
emancipation. As Steven Lukes has observed, ‘is it not the supreme and most 
insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having 
grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way 
                                                            
26 Press briefing with United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Kuala Lumpur, 26 
July 1997, as quoted in Marc Lynch, ‘Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative 
Engagement’, 8 European Journal of International Relations (2002), 187, 194-95. 
27 Jack Knight and James Johnson, ‘Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of 
Democratic Legitimacy’, 22 Political Theory (1994), 277, 286. 
28 Evans, supra n.2, 1050. 
29 Nico Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of 
the International Legal Order’, 16 European Journal of International Law (2005), 369, 371 
(emphasis in original). 
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in China, see Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth 
Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis’, in Wolfgang H. Mommsen and Jürgen 
Osterhammel, eds., Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1986), 290. 
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that they accept their role in the existing order of things?’31 It is a misconception that 
international law, to be law, must be devoid of power considerations; our ability to 
advance normative reasoning through and on the basis of international law might well 
be the ultimate power international law offers.32 
To disregard the impact of politics (both international and domestic) on 
international law thus undermines the understanding and development of 
international law. While legal rules and principles must be interpreted without 
reference to the identity of the relevant actor or actors, a positivist approach alone 
prevents international law from constituting a dynamic framework under which 
international affairs and, one would hope, domestic policies are conducted and 
regulated. A positivist approach also does not address whether and why a particular 
rule or principle of international law is normatively valid, or remedy the substantive 
imbalances of the effects of formally universal rules and principles on different 
States. As E.H. Carr explains, ‘[r]ules, however general in form, will be constantly 
found to be aimed at a particular state or group of states; and for this reason, if for no 
other, the power element is more predominant and more obvious in international than 
in municipal law, whose subjects are a large body of anonymous individuals. The 
same consideration makes international law more frankly political than other 
                                                            
31 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1975), 24. 
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branches of law.’33 While avoidance of international anarchy requires that 
international affairs be conducted under the framework of international law, the 
legitimacy, authority, force and normative values of international law lie not in its 
independence but in its distinctness from politics. As Dencho Georgiev argues, ‘[t]he 
objectivity of law, as a requirement of the rule of law, does not have to imply 
independence from politics generally but only the theoretical and practical possibility 
of the separate existence of a set of obligatory rules – i.e. law – which is not mere 
political opinion and which could be applied against political behaviour. The 
interdependence of such rules and politics does not mean that they do not have a 
separate existence’.34 A political approach to international law is not the same as 
‘politically oriented jurisprudence’.35 
Prior to the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, China generally deferred to 
the Soviet Union on matters of communist ideology, including the place of law in 
society and that of international law in international society.36 The concept, power 
and repercussions of the state were the drivers of Soviet ideology and foreign policy, 
and the place of the state within the international order was of central concern to 
Soviet scholars. In Soviet ideology, the state unified, embodied and personified its 
people. The class structures and struggles that existed in non-communist States were 
reflected in the international order, including in international law, and relations with 
non-communist States simply could not take place. Evgeny Korovin stated that ‘the 
theory of class structure of the contemporary state is not only a very instrumental 
hypothesis for understanding the mutual relations between Soviet Russia and the 
world of imperialistic colossuses and pygmies, but also the official doctrine of the 
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35 R.A. Müllerson, ‘Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking’, 83 
American Journal of International Law (1989), 494, 497. 
36 For a brief discussion of why communist China voluntarily assumed a junior role to the 
Soviet Union, see H. Arthur Steiner, ‘Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy’, 44 
American Journal of International Law (1950), 69, 84-89. 
 34 
U.S.S.R. which is consistently realised by the government in building up the structure 
of the republic as well as in its international relations.’37 Unlike in China where 
communist ideology was (and remains) moderated by Confucianism, an enduring 
precept that Chapter IV discusses in detail, in the Soviet Union the state leadership 
‘does not personify the semi-mythological personality of the state-Leviathan but is no 
more and no less than the plenipotentiary of the ruling class in the republic’.38 
 Soviet ideology dictated that post-war international law was merely 
‘international law of the transitional epoch’: 
 
The deeply rooted fundamental difference of the legal and social 
order of capitalist society on one hand and socialist order on the other 
entails a manifold and substantial alteration of legal norms governing 
mutual relations between the bourgeois countries and the socialist 
ones. … The historic limit for the international law of the transitional 
epoch would not be the day when the state machinery is handed over 
to the ‘museum of antiquities’, but the day of victory of the 
proletarian revolution in the countries of the capitalist West.39 
 
The Soviets claimed to champion sovereignty. Sovereignty in Soviet 
ideology referred to a form of popular sovereignty, ‘a weapon in the struggle of the 
progressive-democratic forces against the reactionary-imperialistic ones. Under 
contemporary conditions sovereignty is destined to act as a legal barrier protecting 
against imperialistic encroachment and securing the existence of the most advanced 
social and state forms – socialist and those of a people’s democracy; it is a guarantee 
of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in colonies and dependent territories from 
                                                            
37 Meždunarodnoye pravo perekhodnogo vremeni, 32, as quoted in Mintauts Chakste, ‘Soviet 
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the imperialistic yoke’.40 The Soviet conception of sovereignty is thus interestingly 
akin to the one espoused by modern critics of State sovereignty; it was, after all, the 
Soviets who first insisted upon the withering of the state as prerequisite to true 
liberation and freedom. The importance of the principles of State sovereignty and of 
non-interference was well illustrated when the Soviet Union expanded its sphere of 
actual power to Eastern European States after the Second World War, whose State 
sovereignty was nominally preserved but with their internal and external functions, 
competences and powers subsumed by Moscow in accordance with the Soviet 
conception of sovereignty and the principle of proletarian dictatorship. 
Although it initially accepted the role of a junior partner to the Soviet Union 
in worldwide communist revolution, China did not blindly accept all Soviet 
perspectives of international law or of the international legal order. China’s departure 
from Soviet teaching was especially pronounced after the Sino-Soviet split. The 
Soviet Union became for China yet another, perhaps even more dangerous, world 
power intent on global hegemony, which for strategic reasons ultimately became the 
raison d’être for the normalisation of relations between China and the United States 
and other Western States, recognition of the PRC government as the representative 
government of China in the United Nations and other international organisations, and 
communist China’s formal entry into the current international legal order. 
Scholars in communist China tended to be of the view that the notion of 
international law as a legal basis for the conduct of international relations 
masqueraded the reality that ‘bourgeois international law as a “science” … is … a 
theoretical instrument to defend the aggressive or colonial policy of the strong 
capitalist countries, to do its best to maintain the capitalist “world order” and to 
oppose legal principles of socialism’,41 and ‘in the Western capitalist world, 
                                                            
40 Evgeny Korovin in a lecture before the Social Science Academy of the Russian Communist 
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41 ‘A Criticism of the Reactionary Viewpoint of [Chen Tiqiang] on the Science of 
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suppression of the weak by the strong and the eating of small fish by big fish are not 
only tacitly condoned by bourgeois international law but also are cloaked with a 
mantle of “legality”.’42 State consent assumed central importance in communist 
Chinese thinking, and the notion of international legal personality capable of 
ascription to non-State actors or to individuals was treated with derision. China also 
rejected the Soviet view that international organisations could be ascribed 
international legal personality, however limited in scope.43 
The symbiotic relationship between international law and politics, as between 
domestic law and politics and indeed between the international and the domestic, thus 
needs to be properly understood. A one-sided approach to the understanding of 
international law in terms of power or of compliance, or to the basis, substance and 
normative values of international law of which Western States assume for themselves 
the role of guardian or leader, merely allows Western States to characterise their own 
disregard or violations of international law as random or demanded by necessity or 
exceptional circumstances, or as the results of faits accomplis or political realities 
imposed by non-Western/non-liberal States such as China. Such an approach 
simultaneously enables non-Western/non-liberal States to justify their disregard or 
violations of international law on grounds that they have had no input in the 
development of international law that is thus unrepresentative of their norms and 
values. As subsequent chapters demonstrate, the treatment by Western States and the 
international community of human rights, democracy, self-determination, and 
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international peace and security has all been marred by an unbalanced approach to 
international law. 
At a fundamental level, this thesis explores whether China harbours ‘a longer 
view of national interest [or] a narrower, more immediate approach to interest 
gratification’44 through its position on the principle of State sovereignty in the current 
international legal order. As Franck has pointed out, ‘both long-term and short-term 
approaches have an equal claim to be operating within a theory of rational choice. 
The former, however, takes fully into account the power of legitimacy, while the 
latter focuses only on the legitimacy of power.’45 Important questions that should be 
asked include whether, how and why China may converge with or diverge from other 
States in its approaches to the current international order, including the principle of 
State sovereignty; the conditions underlying China’s approaches; as well as the ways 
in which ‘China’s history, strategic culture, and domestic politics affect its 
perspectives on multilateralism; how and to what extent past experience in 
multilateral settings has influenced and shaped China’s attitudes and behaviors; and, 
finally, if there [is] more than one “script” or version of Chinese multilateralism.’46 
Kim poses six questions that he considers essential in understanding Chinese foreign 
policy: 
 
(1) How constant or changeable is Chinese foreign policy over a 
period of time, especially in the transition from the Cold War to a 
post-Cold War era, and why? (2) How unique and particularistic or 
general and common is Chinese foreign policy behavior compared 
with that of other countries, and why? (3) How wide is the gap 
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45 Ibid. 
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between ideals and reality, between policy pronouncements 
(principles) and policy performance (behavior), and between intent 
and outcome in Chinese foreign policy, and why? (4) What is the 
relative weight of domestic (societal) and external (systemic) factors 
in the shaping of Chinese foreign policy, and what domestic and 
international consequences obtain? (5) How do global systemic 
structures – economic, military, normative, and behavioral – impact 
upon and shape China’s national role and identity? (6) How are the 
global structures themselves affected by the rise of China in the post-
Cold War world?47 
 
A State’s image of the international order and its ‘image gap’ between the realistic 
and the ideational ‘mirror the state’s fundamental relationship with world order on the 
one hand, and shape the state’s basic attitude toward world order on the other, 
although they are certainly not the only or the final determining factors.’48 An 
important task in reconciling a State’s self-image with its image gap vis-à-vis the 
international order is to identify its tendency in the long run rather than at a given 
time.49 It is, thus, imperative to explore how China’s views of international law and 
the international order comport or conflict with the nature of international law that 
Western States conceive, a task the next chapter undertakes. 
 
III. The universality and generality of international law 
 
In the vision of Lon Fuller, the inner morality of law consists of eight desiderata, 
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including universal and general application.50 Notwithstanding dramatic changes in 
its identity and structure in the past century, the international legal order continues to 
be premised on the principles of State sovereignty and sovereign equality of States, 
and international law depends on its universality and generality for its legitimacy and 
authority. 
By the end of the Second World War, the United States had become a power 
with unrivalled military, political and economic capabilities ultimately unconstrained 
by the current international legal order it was to devise in San Francisco. It is United 
States power that has given rise to and illuminated disagreements about whether 
power is the ultimate controlling factor in international relations and whether 
international law, requiring and yet incapable of demanding compliance of States for 
its legitimacy and authority, is simply irrelevant. The United States and scholars 
trained in United States traditions tend to regard United States values and interests to 
be identical to those of the international community.51 Apart from the fact that United 
States values and interests are not universal, the legitimacy and substance of many 
United States values and interests are taken for granted by United States scholars, and 
many opportunities for understanding and improving United States values and 
interests, perhaps so that they might become universal, have been missed. 
As international relations theories inform theories of international law, 
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problems equally inhere in discourses of international law engaged in by United 
States scholars as they assert, yet unconsciously undermine, the universality and 
generality of international law. Slaughter’s much-cited article ‘International Law in a 
World of Liberal States’52 is an exemplar, through which this section now addresses 
certain relevant issues. 
Noting that ‘how states behave depends on how they are internally 
constituted’,53 Slaughter argues that liberal States constitute ‘a world of peace, 
democracy, and human rights’54 and that ‘[l]iberal international relations theory 
applies to all states. Totalitarian governments, authoritarian dictatorships,55 and 
theocracies can all be depicted as representatives of some subset of actors in domestic 
and transnational society, even if it is a very small or particularistic slice.’56 A survey 
of United Nations membership should disabuse Slaughter of her generalisation, as 
totalitarian, authoritarian, and theocratic States are numerically significant and liberal 
States exist only in Europe (excluding Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and States in the 
Caucasus), the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Israel, Japan, 
South Korea, and the Philippines. Moreover, the fact that everyone or almost 
everyone agrees on the validity of a particular matter does not mean that the matter 
must therefore be valid. At a normative level, the number of liberal States, even if 
overwhelming, does not by itself prove the validity of liberal international relations 
theory, much less as a universally applicable theory. Slaughter’s reliance on the fact 
that liberal democracies and totalitarian, authoritarian, and theocratic States agree 
sometimes57 is logically insufficient to substantiate her broad claim that liberal 
international relations theory thus applies to all States. As Michael Doyle has pointed 
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out, liberal and non-liberal States are not just relatively different, but ‘fundamentally 
different’,58 a qualification Slaughter herself has used as she acknowledges the 
‘fundamental difference in the nature of relations among liberal States as compared to 
relations between liberal and non-liberal States’.59 As the schisms across the Atlantic 
– and within both North American and European continents – over the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, among other issues, have shown, differences equally exist among 
Western liberal States.60 Hurrell is critical of the notion that human rights are 
universal by nature or in their origins, and argues that diverse cultural and religious 
ideologies render consensus on human rights immensely difficult,61 while Adam 
Roberts stresses the importance of understanding and respecting foreign States and 
cultures.62 To turn a blind eye to differences among States does not serve the 
purposes, principles and ideals of the current international order as they are 
encapsulated in the United Nations Charter. 
At a more fundamental level, as Slavoj Žižek has argued, ‘[w]e should … be 
very careful not to fight false battles: the debates about how evil Saddam was, even 
about the cost of the war, and so forth, are red herrings. The focus should be on what 
actually transpires in our societies, on what kind of society is emerging here and now 
as the result of the “war on terror”. The ultimate result of the war will be a change in 
our political order.’63 The systemic regressions of civil liberties in the United States 
and the United Kingdom in the name of the ‘war on terror’ well illustrate Žižek’s 
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observation. In focusing on promotion or transplantation of human rights and 
democracy abroad, liberal States portray their human rights and governance practices 
as perfect, while their violations and malpractices escape international scrutiny (with 
any scrutiny within the State taken as part of their perfection). It simultaneously 
allows a non-liberal government enormous room to defend its human rights and 
governance practices from foreign criticism in the name of protector of the State, 
thereby enhancing its internal legitimacy. For the same reason, democratisation, and a 
desire to be seen within the State to be pursuing it, whether genuine or contrived, may 
in fact encourage the state leadership to initiate or continue an adversarial foreign 
policy.64 
In her analysis of how liberal international relations theory is normatively of 
universal applicability, Slaughter makes the qualification, or perhaps augmentation, 
that to the extent the theory ‘shapes our expectations of how law operates among 
liberal States, it will also generate a corollary set of expectations concerning legal 
relations between liberal and non-liberal States. These twin sets of expectations will 
in turn provide the conceptual tools to grasp the differential significance of apparently 
universal phenomena.’65 On the contrary, the expectations or manners in which 
liberal States operate inter se do not logically generate any set of expectations in 
behaviours between liberal and non-liberal States, let alone within non-liberal States 
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internally, or in their legal relations absent an international tribunal to whose 
jurisdiction all liberal and non-liberal States have acceded. The International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’), which Slaughter analogises to the European Court of Justice to 
substantiate her broad normative claim,66 is definitely not such a tribunal when 
numerous States, including China and the United States, do not submit to its 
compulsory jurisdiction. As Slaughter admits, such a model, which is descriptive, 
cannot by itself support normative claims.67 While it may be true that ‘it will be more 
attractive to use the model to generate a universal set of concepts and norms, 
applicable to liberal and non-liberal States alike’,68 a universal set of concepts and 
norms cannot be generated if other voices are denigrated or dismissed. 
In order to validate her claim that liberal international relations theory is 
universally applicable, Slaughter makes a further retreat: 
 
In many cases we are likely to find that relations between liberal and 
non-liberal States display some of the features of the model but not 
others. This congruity is to be expected to the extent that non-liberal 
States display some of the political, economic, and social attributes 
[of a liberal State] but not others. In such cases, it may be preferable 
to accept the necessary fiction inherent in applying a positive model 
and its corollary norms to States that only partially fit the model than 
to sacrifice the principle of universality.69 
 
Slaughter presents us with two stark choices: liberal internationalism ‘normatively 
applicable to all States even if positively descriptive of only some’,70 or ‘[sacrifice] to 
the realism of recognizing that States in the international system inhabit very different 








In imposing a flawed descriptive model of liberal international relations 
theory on non-liberal States in order to generate normative congruity, the principle of 
universality is already sacrificed. The principle of universality, in international law, 
does not mean that every State should or must follow the same systems, values and 
norms; it entails that the same international legal rules and principles apply to all 
States. Customary international law, on the basis of the preponderance of State 
practice accompanied by the requisite opinio juris that cannot be presumed, has 
clearly not evolved to the extent that liberal internationalism is universally applicable 
and that only liberal States may validly or legitimately exercise sovereignty. 
Furthermore, do we not have any choice other than submit to imposed liberal 
internationalism (and how liberal is imposed liberal internationalism)?72 As Phillip 
Trimble points out in his review of Franck’s Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions, international law embodies and represents a particular national political 
culture and ‘fairness will have to be explained and decisions justified in terms of their 
own traditions’.73 The United States’ often contradictory approaches to international 
law stem equally from cultural relativism as it believes in the legal and moral 
righteousness of its interpretations of law, including international law (hence its 
courts’ noted unwillingness to apply international law or interpret United States law 
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in accordance with international law),74 and guards itself from any legal challenge 
from other States. In contrast to other Western States, the United States is singularly 
hostile to recognition and enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights and has 
not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Abolition of capital punishment in the United States in toto remains a virtual 
impossibility; imposition of capital punishment on juveniles, a major reason 
underlying the United States’ refusal to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,75 had been deemed constitutional until the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons76 in 2005. Even European Convention on 
Human Rights jurisprudence has recognised through its doctrine of margin of 
appreciation that a contracting State due to its national circumstances may be justified 
in derogating from what the Convention prescribes.77 It is thus useful to keep in mind 
that ‘[s]ometimes there is unexpectedly subtle and refined communication across 
radically different cultures. … sometimes there is insurmountable bafflement and 
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systematic misunderstanding between relatively close cultures. For the most part, 
however, we live in the interesting intermediate grey area of partial success and 
partial failure of interpretation and communication. The grey area is to be found at 
home among neighbors as well as abroad among strangers.’78 In labelling a State as 
‘cultural-relative’ or non-liberal and not in conformity with a purportedly universal 
standard of human rights or governance, the State’s particular cultural attitudes to 
human rights, governance, law, etc., are at once denigrated, de-legitimated and 
dismissed. As assimilation never succeeds even in a domestic context, attempts at 
assimilation of differences, let alone fundamental differences, among States lead only 
to conflicts and never to peace or co-operation. 
 While Slaughter believes that liberal international relations theory contributes 
to and sustains ‘liberal peace’ among liberal States79 and argues that the theory, and 
‘liberal peace’, is thus normatively applicable to non-liberal States, her position is not 
empirically supported when peace between a liberal State and a non-liberal State is 
not at all guaranteed by the existence of a controlling democratic framework within 
the liberal State. The democratic framework of a liberal State in fact may necessitate 
the liberal State to not pursue peaceful relations, or to resort to military intervention 
or confrontation, with a non-liberal State so as to not confer legitimacy on the non-
liberal State or to prevent a non-liberal State from being capable eventually of 
challenging the liberal framework or threatening the liberal State. The position taken 
by Tesón that use of force against non-liberal States may be justified80 should show 
that liberal internationalism or liberal democracy and peace are by no means 
correlated. An increase in the number of democratic States by itself is insufficient for 
world peace to be maintained, considering the belligerency of existing democratic 
States that believe that their values must be transplanted in other States. The 
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‘democratic peace’ thesis merely draws on the fact that democratic States do not use 
force against each other; it does not prescribe or evidence that they abstain from 
force. Furthermore, as Brad Roth maintains, ‘to transform such an empirical thesis 
into a guide to action would be, rather preposterously, to blame a democratic state’s 
aggression on the internal characteristics of the victim state, and to propose that peace 
requires the victim to remake itself in the image of the aggressor.’81 Finally, 
Slaughter’s account of ‘liberal peace’ among liberal States overlooks the fact that, 
except for conflicts between or within African States, peace has generally been 
sustained among non-liberal States and reinforced by close political and economic 
co-operation. 
 
IV. Liberal democracy: A rule of legitimate sovereignty? 
 
A major part of the broad claim that Western political, economic, social, cultural and 
juristic systems, values and norms are normatively of general applicability to non-
Western States consists in the claims that liberal democracy is normatively superior 
and of general applicability, that liberal democracy sustains international peace and 
security, and that a right in customary international law to democratic governance is 
emerging, has crystallised or should constitute the foundation of the post-Cold War 
international order. It is therefore pertinent to examine the process by which such 
normative claims, which are not uncontested even within Western research literature, 
are developed and deployed. 
According to Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War marked ‘the 
triumph of the West’:82 ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold 
War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as 
such; that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
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universalization of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’83 
Liberal democratic States must safeguard the collective security of the international 
order ‘from threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world’84 and ‘to 
expand the sphere of democracy, wherever possible and prudent’.85 Fox and Roth 
argue that ‘the sovereignty upheld by international law is popular sovereignty, rather 
than the sovereignty of power holders tout court.’86 Reisman regards sovereignty that 
underpins contemporary international law to be ‘the people’s sovereignty rather than 
the sovereign’s sovereignty’,87 from which he concludes that when the people’s 
‘confirmed wishes are ignored by a local caudillo who either takes power himself or 
assigns it to a subordinate he controls, a jurist rooted in the late twentieth century can 
hardly say that the invasion by outside forces to remove the caudillo and install the 
elected government is a violation of national sovereignty’.88  
As Georg Sørensen reminds us, ‘[v]isions of order, including the foreign 
policies based on such visions, have to be seen as inputs to the debate about the 
appropriate world order; they are not in themselves the substance of such an order.’89 
It is thus alarming that many international legal scholars partake in make-believe 
exercises in which both what is law and why a particular matter should or should not 
crystallise as a legal norm are answered by distorted reasoning through selective 
application or disregard of facts and law, all in the name of advancing the 
development of international law, but which results in the undermining of the 
integrity of international law and the notion of an international order. 
James Crawford in 1994 argued that a right to democratic governance could 
be discerned from various United Nations instruments such as the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.90 Crawford pointed to ‘vast changes … in the democratic balance’ in the 
international order after the Cold War as democratisation occurred on all surfaces of 
the globe including in East Asia,91 while failing to provide any example of 
democratisation taking place in the region and as if East Asia, a region comprising 
more than half of the world’s population, were an inconvenient afterthought.92 To 
substantiate his claim that there was now ‘a new stress on democracy as a value, even 
a dominant value, in national and international affairs’,93 Crawford referred only to 
two decisions of the High Court of Australia and the House of Lords (as it was then 
called).94 Glaring examples of democratisation being suppressed or distorted, such as 
in Hong Kong,95 were left entirely unaddressed. Crawford’s omission to reconcile the 
case of Hong Kong with his argument that there was a right to democratic 
governance, based on self-determination or popular sovereignty, is endemic in 
Western international legal literature, as texts of reference on self-determination do 
not discuss Hong Kong at any length. In his seminal work on self-determination,96 
Antonio Cassese mentions Hong Kong only thrice, twice in two footnotes to state that 
Hong Kong was not really a case for self-determination,97 as the Hong Kong people 
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are Han Chinese,98 Hong Kong was ceded to the United Kingdom ‘on the basis of a 
Treaty that provided for a lease and not a cession proper’,99 and the Hong Kong 
people were meaningfully consulted by the United Kingdom and the colonial local 
government, a finding he supports by reference to a statement of the United 
Kingdom.100 Cassese lauds ‘the solution agreed upon in 1984 concerning Hong Kong’ 
as ‘a useful model for dealing with disputed territories’.101 As Chapter V shows, 
Cassese’s findings are wrong in law and in fact. More fundamentally, the fact that 
Hong Kong’s right to self-determination is disregarded in Western research literature 
and government rhetoric and policies in order to preserve the integrity of the principle 
of self-determination (and that of international legal scholarship), particularly in light 
of the ways and frequency in which Western international legal scholars and 
governments make use of the principle, is of such import that it cannot be salvaged by 
characterising Hong Kong as yet another exception. 
In addition, scholars who claim that there is an emerging, crystallised or 
fundamental right in customary international law to democratic governance, or that 
the development of international law should be guided under the framework of liberal 
internationalism, tend to reduce the concept of democracy to electoral processes, 
representative institutions and elected representatives. Criticism of such processes, 
institutions and representatives as undemocratic at a substantive level has largely 
been kept at bay. Whenever liberal States are under threat from a democratic exercise, 
they deny the democratic exercise legitimacy, as were seen in the diplomatic isolation 
of Austria’s democratically elected coalition government in 2000 and in the 
imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Palestinian Territory in 2006 
after Hamas were democratically elected by the Palestinian people as their 
representative government. If democracy should be a human right or a core value of 
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the post-Cold War international order, the fact that a democratically elected 
government holds far-right views or is (declared by other States) a terrorist 
organisation is irrelevant to its status as a democratically elected government. Fox 
and Nolte justify different treatment of unfavourable governments elected through 
democratic processes on the basis that ‘it is not clear if the obligation to respect the 
democratic entitlement is enforceable as a “suicide pact”, forcing governments to 
hand over power to anti-democratic parties who win electoral majorities or 
pluralities.’102 Fox and Roth argue that ‘no empirical account of popular satisfaction 
with an authoritarian system would satisfy the democratic entitlement. It would not 
be sufficient even for a dictatorship to hold a verifiably honest plebiscite on the 
continuation of dictatorial rule, since the “proper conditions” for the exercise of 
popular will require a remaking of authoritarian institutions to allow for knowing, 
willing, and intelligent collective choice.’103 
Through this lens, views, traditions and preferences shared by other peoples 
that do not comport with dominant Western conceptions of proper and desirable 
governance are dismissed or assumed to be negative towards, or otherwise 
indoctrinated or imposed by, their governments. As the next chapter discusses, 
sentiments about China having been traumatised by Western powers and Japan 
during the past two centuries are real, enduring and widely shared among the Chinese 
people. Foreign criticism of Chinese policies, practices, preferences and traditions 
helps bolster the internal legitimacy of the Chinese leadership and undermines the 
development of a more open society in China with a participatory foreign policy. An 
international norm depends on the legitimacy it is accorded in a domestic setting in 
order for it to be effective domestically; its international standing does not necessarily 
correlate with its domestic salience.104 Democratic institutions imposed from outside 
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tend to ‘disintegrate without the initiatives of a population accustomed to freedom’.105 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/150 (1990) in support of enhancing 
the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, which received 
overwhelming support (129 in favour, 8 against, and 9 abstentions), acknowledged 
that ‘the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the 
principle of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question each State’s 
sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and 
cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other States’.106 
The resolution was accompanied by General Assembly Resolution 45/151 (1990), 
which was passed amidst opposition of Western States (111-29-11) as it called for 
respect for the principles of State sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of a State in its electoral processes.107 In proclaiming that there is now a right 
to democratic governance in customary international law or that liberal 
internationalism is empirically and normatively applicable to all States, Western 
scholars have failed to confront the reality of State practice that decidedly contradicts 
their claims. Their failure to do so perhaps is why they characterise a right to 
democratic governance as ‘emerging’, to allow it to ‘remain poised between 
occurrence and prediction’,108 or to equivocate between lex lata and lex ferenda. 
When the United Nations Human Rights Committee debated a draft General 
Comment on the nature, scope and applicability of Article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the right and the 
opportunity to take part in public affairs and to vote and to stand in genuine periodic 
elections by universal suffrage, it noted that the provision ‘made no mention of 
democracy or accountability and was quite neutral regarding the power structure 
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within which the rights it proclaimed were exercised’.109 However, relying on the 
European Union and the Organization of American States as evidence of democratic 
governance having crystallised as a right in customary international law, Fox and 
Roth argue that all international organisations should impose democratic governance 
as a precondition of a State’s membership and participation, and that a State that is 
not truly democratic should be deprived of its right to participate in international 
affairs if not altogether de-recognised as a State.110 Roth asserts that the absence in 
Article 25 of a requirement of democracy or elections as ‘the basis of the authority of 
government’ was ‘calculated to avoid controversy over institutional requisites, while 
still asserting a universal human interest in political participation’.111 As Chapter IV 
discusses, in communist or socialist States such as China, democracy may entail 
suppression of dissent in order for citizens meaningfully ‘to take part in the conduct 
of public affairs’.112 Roth concedes113 that any interpretation of human rights treaties 
that purportedly prescribe a right to political participation must take into account ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’114 
and the primacy of the United Nations Charter over any other international 
agreement.115 
Mortimer Sellers maintains, nonetheless, that international legal norms 
‘imposed’ by non-republican/non-democratic States, of which State sovereignty is 
exemplar, should be disregarded as they are inherently morally invalid.116 In his view, 
proper international law is one that possesses and demands the purity that only 
democratic/republican States share and provide. As democratic States in the past two 
decades have repeatedly taken the initiative to intervene to protect against human 
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rights violations in despotic or non-democratic States, Sellers admonishes those who 
exhaust time and resources to question the legality of humanitarian intervention, as 
the question should be ‘rather when intervention is legitimate and when it is not’.117 
Sellers also finds that the legitimacy and authority of the ICJ are weakened by 
inclusion of judges from despotic/non-democratic States.118 Taking a step further, 
Allen Buchanan argues that a territorial entity, even if it be an existing State, in order 
to (continue to) be recognised as a State with attendant sovereignty, must possess 
legitimacy, confusing the meanings and implications of statehood, State sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and recognition of States and governments all at once.119 
Misstatements of international law and its displacement by subjective notions 
of morality aside, it is regrettable that these scholars, who believe that the decline or 
demise of State sovereignty translates or is essential to protection of human rights and 
implementation of democratic practices, fail to see that their reasoning is self-
defeating. To deprive a State of its right to participate in international affairs or to de-
recognise its statehood, even if at all legally possible, only undermines the right of the 
people of the State to be represented in international affairs, while the state 
leadership’s effective control over its people remains unabated and its violations of 
human rights incapable of being scrutinised. Karima Bennoune notes in relation to 
economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Iraq during the 1990s that Iraq 
‘was largely hindered from exercising its positive sovereign power in terms of 
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ensuring that their human needs were met.’120 Richard Garfield estimated that such 
economic sanctions on Iraq directly led to the deaths of 100,000 to 227,000 
children.121 John Mueller and Karl Mueller argue that ‘economic sanctions may well 
have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain 
by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.’122 Madeleine 
Albright, United States Ambassador to the United Nations at the time, callously 
stated in May 1996 that, such huge casualties notwithstanding, ‘the price is worth 
it’.123 As the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
its General Comment No.8 on the relationship between economic sanctions and 
respect for economic, social and cultural rights emphasised: 
 
the inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, 
social and cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their 
leaders have violated norms relating to international peace and 
security. The aim is not to give support or encouragement to such 
leaders, nor is it to undermine the legitimate interests of the 
international community in enforcing respect for the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations and the general principles of 
international law. Rather, it is to insist that lawlessness of one kind 
should not be met by lawlessness of another kind which pays no heed 
to the fundamental rights that underlie and give legitimacy to any 
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such collective action.124 
 
Disenfranchising non-democratic States entails grave consequences.125 Sergio 
Dellavalle has noted that Sellers’ approach would leave the majority of States 
excluded from the current international legal order, which since its inception has set 
out to be inclusive of all States in order to augment its efficacy, legitimacy and 
normative values.126 As Chapter VI discusses, international law, with its capacity for 
communicative action within a legal–normative framework, provides States with 
opportunities to understand and reflect on positions to which they may otherwise not 
be amenable. For international law to be truly universally applicable, one must 
conceive it as open to – and requiring – the participation of States with differing 
national characteristics. It is neither helpful nor correct to ascribe overwhelming 
influence to practices of the European Union and the Organization of American 
States that alone cannot generate any norm of customary international law that 
modifies established principles of international law, especially when other 
transnational political communities such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the African Union have sidelined democratic governance as a condition 
of membership or participation.127 A customary norm materialises only upon general, 
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consistent and widespread State practice representative of the international 
community and accompanied by the requisite opinio juris. 
In proclaiming that liberal democracy manifested by elections signals the 
‘end of history’ and constitutes a foundational norm of the current international order 
(or a new one), shortcomings and problems of liberal democracy escape scrutiny. As 
Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Narr have noted, Western understanding of liberal 
democracy, as drawn from Joseph Schumpeter’s work,128 only allows for those 
deemed sufficiently not self-interested to be entrusted with political power and to 
save the masses from themselves. Liberal democracy and human rights are by no 
means always compatible.129 The roles civil society plays are often disregarded, as 
could be seen in the discrepancies and changes of views over the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq on the parts of the Australian, British, Spanish and, in time, United States publics 
and their elected representatives. Democracy under the banner of elections and 
elected representatives ignores the structural and substantive flaws of a political 
system in which disagreements are often dismissed as irrelevant, illegitimate, 
subversive or unpatriotic. Possibilities that democracy may manifest in informal 
elections or at a local level, such as village elections in China,130 that a democratic 
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framework may not necessarily embody democratic structures or reflect democratic 
norms, as the electoral and legislative systems in Hong Kong (both before and after 
the transfer of sovereignty in July 1997) illuminate,131 and their implications for the 
character and development of democratic governance as a right in international law, 
have not been sufficiently explored. One also must bear in mind that discrimination 
on grounds of gender, ethnic or national origin, class, sexual orientation, etc., 
continues to be justified and perpetuated in liberal States through democratic 
processes. In order for civil and political rights to materialise, elections, while 
necessary, are not sufficient. Other rights must be furthered and aligned with electoral 
processes and representation: ‘A human rights-driven democracy is one in which all 
social processes are evaluated by their effect on human rights.’132 
 
V. State sovereignty in the international legal order: Impediment or 
essentiality? 
 
The State as personified by its territory permeates all discourses and practices of 
international law and international relations. The United Nations is composed of 
sovereign States.133 One speaks of China or the United States as if it were a natural 
person with a particular collective mentality to be differentiated in terms, among 
others, of liberality/non-liberality. The interests, identities and particular collective 
mentalities of States are socially constructed and ‘embedded in the web of normative 
expectations that prevails in international society at a given time’.134 The social 
structure, in which States with differing collective mentalities and asymmetric power 
capabilities inhabit, in turn guides, shapes and constrains States’ self-conceptions of 
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their roles and subjective interests.135 
 Amidst current proliferation of international human rights treaties and 
organisations, many Western States and scholars argue that human rights now take 
precedence over the principle of State sovereignty and should be enforced by 
humanitarian intervention in cases of gross and egregious violations, particularly – 
although not necessarily – if the State in question has already agreed to ‘transfer’ or 
‘surrender’ its sovereignty by its ratifications of human rights treaties or its 
participation in international organisations for which human rights protection is a 
central concern. As the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel report 
on Threats, Challenges and Change136 in 2004 stated: 
 
In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit 
from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. 
Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian 
system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it 
clearly carries with it the obligations of a State to protect the welfare 
of its own peoples and meet the obligations to the wider international 
community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be 
assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its 
responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its 
neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective 
security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be 
taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the 
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necessary protection, as the case may be.137 
 
 Such propositions have been put forward due to a myriad of confusions about 
the meaning and implications of State sovereignty. First and foremost, State 
sovereignty does not derive from United Nations membership. Without State 
sovereignty, there can be no United Nations membership; without sovereign States, 
there can be no United Nations. Any demise or diminution of the principle of State 
sovereignty only brings about the immediate disintegration of the United Nations and 
the current international legal order. State sovereignty is not a moral, or even 
political, principle that can be swayed at the will of powerful States and the opinions 
of scholars. State sovereignty is a foundational legal principle of the current 
international order that is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and customary 
international law. It remains so until the Charter is amended, or a rule of customary 
international law has crystallised, to the effect that State sovereignty is displaced or 
reduced as a lesser principle. As Xue Hanqin has warned, ‘should the responsibility 
to protect derive from the notion of sovereignty, it would be tantamount to claiming 
that any state or states could individually or collectively take measures to prevent or 
redress human rights violations wherever it occurs. In other words, any state could 
step in and take action against another state when the situation, in its opinion, 
constitutes a violation of human rights in the territory of the latter state.’138 
Furthermore, Roth notes, ‘[t]o frame the issue as sovereignty versus human rights is 
to ignore that sovereignty can itself be characterized as a human right, and indeed – 
given common Article 1 of the two main human rights covenants – as the first human 
right’.139 
China’s exercise of State sovereignty, through its positions on the internal 
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conflicts in Libya and in Syria as reflected by its votes in the Security Council, has 
recently been a subject of sustained criticism. Western States take it a matter of 
course that China ought to support their positions or else must be taken as 
disregarding the security and welfare of the Libyan and Syrian civilians behind the 
veil of (Libya’s and Syria’s) State sovereignty. What has been left unsaid is that 
China did support six of the seven draft Security Council resolutions concerning the 
Libyan government’s use of violence against its civilians, and abstain, along with 
Russia, Brazil, Germany and India, on only one draft Security Council resolution that 
sought to impose sanctions.140 Along with Russia, China vetoed two draft Security 
Council resolutions concerning the Syrian government’s use of violence against its 
civilians on grounds that Security Council action would go beyond the perimeters of 
the principle of non-interference in Member States’ internal affairs.141 China did vote 
with other Security Council Members in unanimity on 14 April 2012 in favour of 
authorising up to thirty unarmed military observers to be dispatched to Syria to 
monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement between forces loyal and hostile to 
the Syrian government;142 on 21 April 2012 of establishing a United Nations 
Supervision Mission in Syria (with an authorised capacity of up to three hundred 
unarmed military observers and necessary civilian personnel);143 and on 20 July 2012 
of extending the mandate of the Mission for a final period of thirty days.144 The 
Security Council in its Resolution 2059 (2012) was adamant that it would be willing 
to further extend the mandate of the Mission ‘only in the event that the Secretary-
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General reports and the Security Council [confirm] the cessation of the use of heavy 
weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides sufficient to allow [the 
Mission] to implement its mandate’.145 The mandate of the Mission ceased as of 19 
August 2012 amidst escalating violence in Syria. In casting its vetoes in respect of 
Syria, China has preserved the integrity of international law and the maintenance of 
international peace and security which would be undermined if a State, or a group of 
States, were able to decide on its own at any time to impose sanctions or use force 
against another State in contravention of the Charter and customary international law. 
At the same time as they proclaim that State sovereignty as a principle of 
international law has become obsolete, Western States and scholars assert that their 
States’ sovereignty must be protected at all costs. Even the European Union, which 
many have treated as the prototype of ‘diminished sovereignty’, is regarded by its 
constituent States as either ‘a puppet of the member states or a superstate in its own 
right’,146 and it is its constituent States that determine its activities and competences 
within and among the constituent States and en bloc. Each and every European Union 
treaty requires the ratifications of all Member States for it to come into force. The 
participation or non-participation in, or the subsequent withdrawal of support of, the 
2003 invasion of Iraq on the parts of individual European Union Member States 
demonstrated that their State sovereignty remained firmly intact. The incessant 
squabbles among European leaders throughout the euro-zone sovereign debt crisis 
have shown that Member States guard their sovereignty jealously. 
 Many Western scholars have taken the view that the absolute nature of State 
sovereignty, as opposed to popular sovereignty, enables a State to violate the human 
rights of its citizens and to disregard international law. Such a view ignores the fact 
that, as much as a source of violations of human rights, the State remains the ultimate 
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irreplaceable arbiter and protector of rights and freedoms of its people. Protection of 
citizens abroad through diplomatic protection, consular assistance, and mutual police 
assistance, to name but three examples, will not be available but for sustained 
interstate co-operation. International co-operation can be achieved only with the 
consent and active participation of States. As the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in its judgment in Wimbledon in 1923 stated, to agree to be bound by 
international law and the capacity to do so are attributes of State sovereignty.147 In 
participating in international organisations, a State ‘acquires rights of international 
decision-making through membership of the organs of the UN, which valuable rights 
it exercises because, and only because, it is a sovereign State, a member of the UN. 
This activity, which it is now entitled to pursue, not only is predicated upon its status 
as sovereign but also itself a method of exercising its proper sovereignty in broadly 
influential and even decisive ways which were formerly wholly closed to it.’148 State 
sovereignty ‘is far and away the most important factor’ in the implementation and 
enforcement of municipal and international law, including human rights law.149 Even 
in Europe where the European Convention on Human Rights has acquired 
omnipotent influence over the municipal laws and practices of States parties, 
implementation and enforcement of the Convention remain dependent on States 
parties’ incorporation of the Convention into their municipal legal systems and laws. 
As Philip Cunliffe has argued: 
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even with popular sovereignty the state has to take the form of an 
institution that is over and above society. Collective political interests 
can only be pursued among modern individuals if these individuals 
abstract themselves from their differing circumstances to become 
citizens in a common political process. … The separation of the state 
from society provides the sovereign people with a barometer by 
which to observe whether their collective, general will is being 
carried out. Though the state is necessary to make possible the 
exercise of the general will, it is still the people, not the state, that is 
sovereign, regardless of how despotic any individual state might be. 
Popular sovereignty, therefore, is a mediated relationship between 
people and state; it cannot belong to the body of the people separate 
from the state. Without a state, modern society cannot conceive of 
itself as a polity.150 
 
Robert Jennings laments the failure of many international legal scholars to see that 
‘what is needed is not so much a theory explaining the decline of national sovereignty 
but a theory explaining and justifying the present vital transformation of State 
sovereignty into the field of governmental activity on the international plane’,151 and 
‘to explain to the general public the importance of, and the necessity for, this 
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transformation of state sovereign power, and not only of course for human rights but 
also for international law and order generally’.152 
 While State sovereignty as a legal concept may be an abstract, elusive or 
remote notion to many individuals, individuals have no difficulty in understanding 
that their capacity to exercise, protect and enforce their contractual, property and 
human rights and interests and their personal safety, not only against the state but also 
vis-à-vis each other, is entirely dependent on the proper functioning of the legislative, 
executive and judicial organs of the State. Many individuals are also keen to enhance 
and defend their State in one way or another to the best of their abilities, even if doing 
so might entail the ultimate sacrifice. To many people in Asia and Africa, oppression 
by Western States, be it colonialism in the past or economic, political or military 
subjugation in the present, constitutes and causes violations of human rights, 
including their right to self-determination and freedom of political participation. As 
Michael Ignatieff has noted, ‘State sovereignty safeguards self-determination and if 
we move into a world in which coalitions of the willing believe that human rights 
considerations automatically override the claim of State sovereignty we may actually 
arrive at the paradoxical and unwelcome result of using human rights arguments to 
sacrifice human rights.’153 It should not escape notice that the ultimate aim of many a 
liberation/independence movement in the name of self-determination or human rights 
is statehood with corresponding State sovereignty being non-negotiable. ‘The 
existence of the right of self-determination’, as Marc Weller has pointed out, ‘served 
as a convenient legitimizing myth for the existing state system.’154 The notion that the 
right to self-determination and its status as a norm of jus cogens manifests the 
diminution or demise of the principle of State sovereignty is, thus, fallacious. 
If State sovereignty as a legal concept is difficult for some to grasp, it surely 
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is unhelpful for international legal scholars to confuse or distort it. Equally, it is 
unhelpful, if not dangerous, for one to inflate the capabilities of States and 
international organisations in the name of the international community, when the 
unity of such a community and the effectiveness of international organisations are 
undermined by such inflation. As David Ellis argues, ‘[i]f normative scholars desire 
the evolution of a comprehensive international community, then they should orient 
their research and prescriptions on how to achieve such an international system with 
guides as to how it can be achieved.’155 Much of the criticism about the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the Security Council neglects that the Security Council itself is 
bound by the United Nations Charter.156 As Franck has stated, the international 
community ‘is constituted not only by its substantive rules, but also by those 
institutional processes that implement the rules’.157 The Security Council – and the 
United Nations – loses all of its legitimacy if it undermines or ignores the legal 
constraints placed upon it. 
Moreover, any abstraction, elusiveness or remoteness of State sovereignty as 
a legal concept pales in comparison with the abstraction, elusiveness and remoteness 
of the notions and workings of international law, international organisations and the 
international community. Ramesh Thakur has noted that ‘[t]oday we use the phrase 
“international community” by habit and without thinking’,158 and the notion that there 
is at present an ‘international community’ that speaks with one voice does not 
comport with reality. The innumerable distortions of international law by powerful 
States instil little confidence on the part of weaker States and their peoples that the 
international community would come to their assistance when tragedy – be it natural, 
political or military – strikes: ‘“International community” is a dangerous reference 
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point for the naïve. Its connotation of sociability and commitment invites unwise 
reliance by those who must ultimately fend for themselves.’159 Carr has observed a 
‘universal reluctance’ on the part of individuals to accord the interests of the 
international community priority over those of their States;160 a fortiori, the 
willingness of individuals to defend the ‘international community’ from a substantive 
threat is clearly absent. Humanitarian intervention in the name of the interests of the 
‘international community’ additionally suffers a lack of internal legitimacy vis-à-vis 
the intervening State insofar as its government allocates military and fiscal resources 
to an armed conflict to (forcibly) protect the rights of non-citizens outside its 
territory.161 The international community – and the current international legal order – 
is in dire need of defence from within and from those who claim to defend and 
augment, but in reality distort and undermine, it. The Security Council’s increasing 
use of powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to identify and confront threats to 
international peace and security even when the matters at hand were internal in 
character, in which the Security Council had no jurisdiction to intervene,162 has 
undermined the principle of State sovereignty and the normative framework for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
Finally, what if the people of a State demand that their government oppose 
the international community, say, by (re-)occupying a territory – perhaps Kosovo, or 
Malvinas (Falkland Islands) – that the international community considers to be 
entitled to self-determination but which the people, in their exercise of self-
determination, consider to be part and parcel of their State? If the State (Serbia, or 
Argentina) conforms to the wishes and demands of the international community 
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despite the democratic will of the people demanding otherwise, is the people’s 
popular sovereignty not thereby forsaken? It cannot have escaped the memory of any 
scholar of international law or international relations that the notion of the ‘family of 
nations’ was relied on to colonise territories and oppress peoples deemed not to 
possess what was required for membership. Similarly, does making the democratic 
will of the people subsidiary to foreign officials and bureaucrats not undermine the 
very meaning of liberal democracy that the State is accountable to its people in whom 
popular sovereignty resides? Democratic governance being an emerging, crystallised 
or fundamental right in customary international law as conceived and delineated by 
Franck, Slaughter and others pertains to democratic governance within the domestic 
sphere; even advocates of democratic governance do not suggest that there is at 
present a right to democratic governance at the international level under which 
international affairs should be conducted by majority rule. Does opposing the 
international community on account of the democratic will of the people constitute a 
threat to international peace and security, warranting military intervention? 
Conversely, if State sovereignty is displaced in favour of liberal internationalism, 
state machineries will coalesce around the international community, as the moral 
cloak of international legitimacy gives them a free hand to dilute, if not altogether 
ignore, the demands of the people, as domestic oppositions in States that partook in 





In order to understand how China’s approaches to international legal norms and 
principles, in its exercise of State sovereignty and generally, may help consolidate 
and buttress those norms and principles and the current international legal order, 
scholars ought to move from the myopic lens of compliance and reflect on, synthesise 
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and augment the understanding and development of international law and proper 
conduct of international affairs. To distort or ignore international law whenever it 
presents inconveniences is a fundamental disservice to its legitimacy, authority and 
normative values and to the validity, authenticity and normative application of 
international relations theories, reducing both disciplines – and the notion of an 
international order underpinned by law – to irrelevance. Susan Marks observes that 
the unease felt by many scholars of international law regarding the place of State 
sovereignty in the current international legal order stems from their ‘anxiety of 
influence’: in their attempts to cleanse international law of the stains and ills of State 
sovereignty through discourses of human rights, democracy and self-determination, 
these scholars struggle with the reality that state power is always a product of 
international law.163 Western discourses about State sovereignty’s demise or 
diminution serve only ‘to reaffirm and hence strengthen the state as the central 
problematic with respect to which analysis and policy must be formulated’.164 
 Compliance with international law, by definition, keeps the current state of 
international law and the international legal order from progressive development, and 
is not always voluntary even where effective enforcement mechanisms may not be in 
place, given the increasing tendency of powerful States to construct fictional norms 
or bypass international law in order to justify unilateral action. Contrary to John 
Tasioulas’ belief that ‘one can only be subject to an authority if one can reasonably 
come to know of its legitimacy without undue expenditure of time and effort’,165 I 
argue that it is through sufferings, trials and errors that the legitimacy of an authority 
and its demand for subjection may endure. The successes of liberal democracy, and 
recognition and implementation of human rights and international law, in Western 
States came from centuries of errors, during which tens of millions of lives were lost, 
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and through which these States came to recognise for themselves that a principled 
normative international legal framework would provide the best avenue and refuge 
for the protection of individuals, the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and the very survival of their statehood. It is imperative for the legitimacy of 
international law to understand China’s relationship with the current international 
legal order in a normative framework that takes into account China’s national 
characteristics and its agency.166 
From its defeat in the Opium War in 1842 until the midst of the Second 
World War, China, despite being a State in the European sense and a civilisation for 
millennia, was adjudged by Western powers and legal theorists to be insufficiently 
civilised to be admitted to the ‘family of nations’. Yet, China was expected in its 
relations with Western powers to comply with international law that the latter created, 
interpreted and manipulated, and was forced to surrender parts of its territory and 
sovereign rights through a series of treaties. Perceptions of international law as a tool 
to subjugate China to the demands of Western powers have influenced and shaped 
imperial, republican, communist and contemporary China’s approaches to 
international law, international organisations and the current international legal order. 
As subsequent chapters demonstrate, through increasing socialisation with 
international organisations, China has learned to adapt its role as a power that expects 
itself and is expected by other States to contribute meaningfully and responsibly to 
the stability of the current international legal order, while maintaining its 
independence, including its traditions, norms and values, and protecting its national 
interests. In the process, China has helped shape the development of international law 
and an international order underlain and governed by the international rule of law. 
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International law is an amalgam of the past, present and future. The vicissitudes of 
international relations and our desires for progressive development of international 
law compel us to focus on the present upon which future may be built, while the past 
is rationalised, distorted or simply forgotten. The past is important not only because 
the vast majority of rules, principles and norms of international law, including those 
codified in treaties, have come into being through decades, if not centuries, of 
deviation, crystallisation and consolidation, but also because the past, and one’s 
perspectives of the past, underlie, inform and explain a State’s perspectives of a 
particular order or particular norms or values and its approaches to the perspectives 
and actions of other States. As Avery Goldstein maintains, ‘[h]istory, especially the 
interpretation of history, affects every country’s contemporary interaction with the 
outside world. History not only bequeaths some of the substantive issues on the 
foreign policy agenda … It also affects foreign policy decision-making when leaders 
draw lessons from past experience or invoke analogical reasoning that compares the 
country’s current circumstances to those it faced before.’1 Progressive development 
of international law does not always mean that change to longstanding principles of 
international law must ensue; in appropriate cases, maintenance of the stability and 
integrity of such principles represents the progressiveness one should desire. 
In ignoring or distorting the historiography of international law, past mistakes 
are revived only to masquerade in different clothing. For instance, the ‘standard of 
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civilisation’, a defining factor in international law that justified colonialism, remains 
in important international legal sources2 and has metamorphosed into contemporary 
discourses of human rights, democracy and self-determination, which, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, many argue should be enforced through humanitarian 
intervention akin to the mission civilisatrice two centuries ago. Susan Marks has 
noted that ‘when we treat international law as a redemptive force that could save the 
world if only it were properly respected and enforced, we obscure the possibility that 
international legal norms may themselves have contributed to creating or sustaining 
the ills from which we are now to be saved. We also mischaracterize the processes of 
emancipatory change as redemption or deliverance. And we weaken our capacity to 
criticize international law, and make it more useful to those by whom liberatory 
processes are actually carried forward.’3 In consequence, not only are discourses of 
human rights, democracy and self-determination rejected by many non-Western 
States and their peoples, but also are the conceptual validity, normative applicability 
and empirical implementation of human rights, democracy and self-determination 
questioned and manipulated, and international peace and security submerged in 
murky waters. 
Mikhaïl Xifaras stresses that ‘the justification of international law must take 
responsibility for the historical meaning of international law for non-Western 
peoples, and not simply content itself with affirming its own legitimacy in terms of its 
conformity with principles that have their origins in Western thought’.4 China’s 
historical experience with international law illuminates the role of international law in 
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legitimating Western powers’ oppression of non-Western States, peoples and 
cultures, including a State and civilisation as old as China, during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries; how China’s adaptation to Western international law faced 
resistance from within and externally; how China has used international law to 
protect and advance its State sovereignty and national interests since the 1860s; and 
how China’s simultaneous resistance to and use of international law have contributed 
to the development of international law. 
This chapter explores how the Opium War (1839–1842) transformed China’s 
approaches during the last century of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to international 
law and the international legal order. While China signed its first treaty with a 
Western power, the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia, in 1689, to be followed by the 
Treaty of Kiakhta in 1727 also with Russia, both with equal status and reciprocal 
terms, ‘[n]o formal procedural aspects of … international law as it was practised in 
Europe at this time were mentioned in these treaties.’5 China’s interactions with 
international law began to take place in the context of its increasing contacts with 
Western powers that culminated in the Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of 
Nanjing in 1842. The Opium War is a useful starting point not only because 
‘[w]hether Chinese or Western, radical or conservative, scholars have invariably 
taken it as a starting point in the study of modern China’,6 but also because the 
concept of an international society to be regulated by international law emerged 
during the nineteenth century. China’s defeats in the Opium War and subsequent 
military conflicts with Western powers and Japan fundamentally shaped its 
perspectives of international law ever since, and its approaches to international law 
during the dying years of its last imperial dynasty were a harbinger of its 
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contemporary use of international law to defend its State sovereignty and define and 
attain its political objectives. 
This chapter then examines the evolution of China’s approaches to 
international law during the republican period (1912–1949); the period from 1949 to 
24 October 1971 during which the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) government 
was not recognised by the United Nations and other States as the representative 
government of China; the period between 25 October 1971 and 1984, when the PRC 
government replaced the authorities on Taiwan as the representative government of 
China in the United Nations and began to adapt to the current international legal 
order; and since 1984 when China began to undergo extensive political and economic 
reforms, accept law as a basis of governance and reconcile its laws, policies and 
practices with international legal norms and standards, and embrace the role of 
international law in the conduct of international relations as well as the roles it may 
play in shaping the development of international law and the workings of 
international organisations. 
 
II. International law in Qing China since the Opium War7 
                                                
7 The starting premise, when it comes to China’s historical interactions with international law, 
invariably relates to how China, self-identified as the Middle Kingdom, did not possess any 
conception of law governing relations among States. In his 1990 Hague Academy of 
International Law Lectures, Wang Tieya noted that international law, in the sense of law 
among nations, in fact had been operative in ancient China during the Spring and Autumn 
(B.C. 722-476) and Warring States periods (B.C. 476-221) before China became a unified 
State under the Qin dynasty in B.C. 221: ‘International Law in China: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives’, 221 Recueil des cours (1990–II), 195, 205-13; see also Yongjin 
Zhang, ‘System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations’, 27 Review of 
International Studies (2001), 43. Adherents to the English School of international relations 
rely on ancient China during the two periods and its resemblance to the modern State-based 
international system to support their argument that an international society existed since 
ancient times: see Xiaoming Zhang, ‘China in the Conception of International Society: The 
English School’s Engagements with China’, 37 Review of International Studies (2011), 763, 
765-68. 
China for millennia was the ruling centre of an international system that John King 
Fairbank and his colleagues, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), call ‘the Chinese world order’, 
which Adda B. Bozeman finds to have ‘proved to be more enduring and successful than the 
comparable order of any other historical nation’: Politics and Culture in International History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 143. While the door to the ‘family of nations’ 
remained closed to China even after the First World War, imperial China embraced inclusion 
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of any ‘barbarians’ into the Chinese world order so long as they acknowledged the superiority 
of Chinese civilisation and assimilated themselves into Chinese culture. The Westphalian 
notion of sovereign equality of States was alien to the Chinese world order politically and 
culturally, but it was the clash of empires, not of civilisations as Samuel P. Huntington has 
argued (‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, 72 Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), 22; The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)), 
between China and Western powers that rendered military conflicts inevitable: see Andrew J. 
Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Li Chen, ‘Universalism and Equal Sovereignty as Contested 
Myths of International Law in the Sino-Western Encounter’, 13 Journal of the History of 
International Law (2011), 75; Helene Carrere d’Encausse and Maxime Rodinson, Islam and 
the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009); 
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Allen Lane, 2004); 
Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations 
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2010); Harold James, The Roman 
Predicament: How the Rules of International Order Create the Politics of Empire (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006); Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its 
Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Lydia H. Liu, ‘The Desire for the 
Sovereign and the Logic of Reciprocity in the Family of Nations’, 29:4 Diacritics (1999), 150; 
Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: 
American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006); Alain Peyrefitte, The Immobile Empire (New York: Knopf, 1992); Earl H. Pritchard, 
The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800 (New York: Routledge, 
2000); Teemu Ruskola, ‘Raping Like a State’, 57 UCLA Law Review (2010), 1477; Ross 
Terrill, The New Chinese Empire (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003); Jan 
Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). As Jan Zielonka explains, ‘[t]he study of empire demands a focus on 
the scope and structure of governance, the nature of borders, centre–periphery relations and 
respective civilising missions. Studies of hegemony take power seriously, but are less 
interested in the actors, their individual features and complex relationships. Studies of empire, 
on the other hand, show that interdependence between periphery and centre often works to the 
former’s advantage (regardless of all material or normative asymmetries). Peripheries are also 
able to drag the centre into their parochial conflicts. Besides, empires often try to “civilise” 
and “institutionalise” their peripheries, rather than simply attempting to conquer or exploit 
them, as is sometimes assumed by scholars of hegemony’: ‘Empires and the Modern 
International System’, 17 Geopolitics (2012), 502, 506. Contra, see James Rosenau, ‘The 
Illusion of Power and Empire’, 44 History and Theory (2005), 73. 
Ruskola, ibid., 1487, maintains that ‘[f]rom this perspective, China’s historic status in 
international law is especially ironic. Because it conceptualized political community in terms 
of kinship, it was ultimately excluded from the Family of Nations. Evidently, the real ground 
for China’s exclusion was not that it made a primitive category mistake – confusing the logics 
of politics and kinship – but the simple fact that it belonged to the wrong political family’ 
(emphasis in original). The Chinese world order was one in fact once considered by European 
powers to be ‘a political superior’: ibid., 1503. As Eric Hayot puts it, ‘modern Europe 
encounters China as the first contemporaneous civilizational other it knows, and not as a 
“tribe” or nation whose comparative lack of culture, technology or economic development 
mitigated the ideological threat it posed to progressivist, Eurocentric models of world history’: 
The Hypothetical Mandarin: Sympathy, Modernity, and Chinese Pain (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 10 (emphasis in original). Similarly, J.A. Hobson opined that Asia 
was the ‘great test of Western imperialism’ because Asian civilisations, as opposed to Africa 
that was more easily colonised as ‘savages or children’, were ‘as complex as our own, more 
ancient and more firmly rooted by enduring custom’: Imperialism: A Study (New York: Allen 
& Unwin, 1902), 182. 
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The Qing dynasty was not a Han Chinese dynasty but one ruled by Manchus, a 
Tungusic people from Manchuria that is now one of the 55 officially recognised 
minority nationalities in China, whom the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) sought to 
control and later defend China from. Soon after taking control of China proper in 
1644, in order to consolidate its control over Han Chinese, the Qing court imposed its 
own customs and styles on pain of death. However, it also adopted Chinese power 
structures and cultural norms – in particular the emperor’s position and mandate as 
Son of Heaven, the omnipotent Confucian principle of filial piety to legitimate and 
reinforce its rule, and the study of Chinese classics as the only route of entry to 
bureaucracy. John Fairbank explains that Chinese culture was Sinocentric and would 
not accommodate ‘barbarian’ ideas or institutions, while the Chinese power structure 
was synarchic, in which ‘barbarians’ – Manchus during the Qing period and Mongols 
(now another official minority nationality) during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) – 
could partake.8 Mongol and Manchu reigns thus ‘did not create a marked break or 
change in the continuity and unity of Chinese culture and civilization’9 but proved its 
longevity.10 According to Li Zhaojie, ‘the Confucian view conceived the world as 
being, which is by definition different from becoming. Process, change, competition, 
and progress were therefore all concepts unnatural to Confucianism’.11 Resistance to 
foreign ideas posed the greatest hindrance to Qing China’s relations with Western 
powers and its receptiveness to international law. Like all Chinese dynasties 
preceding it, the Qing dynasty enjoyed its periods of affluence and decline, with its 
                                                
8 John K. Fairbank, ‘The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order’, in Fairbank, ibid., 
257, 273. 
9 Zhang (2001), supra n.7, 56. 
10 Mark Mancall, ‘The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy’, 349 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science (1963), 14, 17. Ch’ien Mu argues that 
unlike dynasties ruled by Han Chinese when power concentrated among scholars, during the 
Yuan and Qing dynasties power was invested primarily among the Mongols and the Manchus, 
respectively, as tribal groups. However, the Qing court did not openly reject scholars whose 
apparent centrality in the bureaucracy was still preserved. The traditional examination system 
was retained as ‘a mere propaganda device’ and ‘a special favor to those Chinese who sided 
with the alien regime’: Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis, trans. 
Chün-tu Hsüeh and George O. Totten (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), 126-35. 
11 Li Zhaojie, ‘Traditional Chinese World Order’, 1 Chinese Journal of International Law 
(2002), 20, 39 (emphasis in original). 
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decline exacerbated by its reluctant yet increasing trade with Western powers that the 
latter eventually compelled by force. 
Nevertheless, claims about imperial China’s isolation or self-isolation from 
other States are untrue,12 as European diplomatic and religious missions had been 
received by China’s imperial court since the sixteenth century.13 From an economic 
standpoint, China stood as the centre of the largest trading system in the world 
through its tribute system;14 Kenneth Pomeranz argues that ‘eighteenth-century China 
(and perhaps Japan as well) actually came closer to resembling the neoclassical ideal 
of a market economy than did Western Europe.’15 The real discord between imperial 
China and Western powers lay in the former’s reluctance to purchase Western goods 
and its insistence on the latter’s observance of diplomatic protocols in their 
interactions with the imperial court that were standard in the Chinese world order. 
Seeing international society as an extension of Chinese society that was 
hierarchical, imperial China adopted the tribute system in its relations with 
neighbouring States (and Western States), and the frequency of a State’s ability to 
pay tribute to China, as China would permit, represented the degree of the tribute 
State’s assimilation to Chinese culture and reflected the position of the tribute State in 
the Chinese world order. Western powers abhorred the tribute system for violating 
their Westphalian conception of world order based on the principles of State 
sovereignty and sovereign equality of States, and ‘regarded it as a hierarchical 
regional order and an abnormal case of historical states systems’.16 While 
                                                
12 See, generally, Valerie Hansen, The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600 (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2000); Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in 
Chinese History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999). 
13 See, e.g., John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to 
K’ang-Hsi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
14 Andre Gunder Frank, ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1998), 126. 
15 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 70. 
16 Zhang (2011), supra n.7, 768. Ruskola, supra n.7, 1485, argues that ‘[i]n historical analysis, 
periodization is inevitable but never innocent. Evidently there is no single date that constitutes 
the objective point of origin of international law. Yet the choice of 1648 and the Treaty of 
Westphalia – like any other date – has vital political and ideological consequences. With a 
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acknowledging the tribute system as a regional system, Adam Watson accentuated its 
‘hegemonial or imperial’ elements, with China as ‘suzerain’ exercising ‘direct 
authority over the Heartland; and around this empire extended a periphery of locally 
autonomous realms that acknowledged the suzerain’s overlordship and paid his 
tribute.’17 
Western powers misconstrued the culturally dictated tribute system as a 
mechanism by which imperial China subjugated other States to perpetual inferiority 
and submission. As Prasenjit Duara, John Kelly, and Martha Kaplan have noted, 
nation-states in the nineteenth century were essentially imperialist in character and 
their being equal, and equally sovereign, political units is a post-Second World War 
notion.18 International law endured profound conceptual shifts during the nineteenth 
century in order that colonialism, and notions of the ‘family of nations’ and the 
‘standard of civilisation’, could be accommodated.19 Randle Edwards argues that 
substantive equality, reciprocity, and territorial integrity were in fact observed by 
Qing China in its relations with tribute States, even if such relations still manifested a 
hierarchy in which China was unquestionably leader and protector.20 The tribute 
                                                                                                                           
historical perspective focusing on 1648, the official story of international law becomes a 
history of the emergence of the liberal norm of sovereign equality among secular nation-
states. This story is not necessarily untrue, but it is misleading insofar as it concerns only 
Europe. If we instead follow Carl Schmitt, for example, and date our account of modern 
international law from 1492 and Europe’s “discovery” of the New World, the story changes 
significantly. From this perspective, the narrative becomes not simply one of increasing 
inclusion and equality within Europe, but also of violent exclusion of others outside Europe, 
on the basis of religious, civilizational, and racial difference’ (emphasis in original; internal 
citations omitted). Ruskola, ibid., fn.18, adds that ‘it is important to note that, at a minimum, it 
is an exaggeration even as a story about Europe. For example, many of the aspects of modern 
international law that are attributed to the Peace of Westphalia did not in fact emerge even in 
Europe until later’ (internal citation omitted).  
17 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis 
(London: Routledge, 1992), 3. 
18 Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 9 and 19; John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, 
Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), 1-4. 
19 Liu (2004), supra n.7. 
20 Randle Edwards, ‘The Old Canton System of Foreign Trade’, in Victor H. Li, ed., Law and 
Politics in China’s Foreign Trade (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 360; R. 
Randle Edwards, ‘Imperial China’s Border Control Law’, 1 Journal of Chinese Law (1987), 
33; R. Randle Edwards, ‘China’s Practice of International Law – Patterns from the Past’, in 
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system was adopted not only by imperial China vis-à-vis neighbouring States, but 
also by the latter inter se21 and, as a marker of their own legitimacy, internally;22 
tribute States regarded the tribute system as akin to a ‘universal kingship linked to a 
widely shared sense of participation in a high culture’.23 Imperial China, seeing itself 
as the civilisation that had no competitor, was indifferent to exporting its ideals and 
values, and ‘allowed surrounding peoples and polities to contest, modify and adapt 
Chinese ideas to their own ends’.24 Importantly, Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan 
point out, ‘as the Chinese conception of the world is civilizational, the tributary 
system is open to anyone who wishes to participate on terms defined largely by 
Imperial China. By implication, any participant can exercise agency to withdraw its 
participation, and this was not uncommon in practice … The tributary system, thus, 
has open access and is also inherently elastic.’25 Instead of a means by which China 
                                                                                                                           
Ronald St John Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 243. 
21 Mancall, supra n.10, 19. 
22 Kevin Herrick, ‘The Merger of Two Systems: Chinese Adoption and Western Adaptation in 
the Formation of Modern International Law’, 33 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2005), 685, 693. David C. Kang observes that the three most Sinic States – 
Korea, Japan, and Assam (Vietnam) – ‘were centrally administered bureaucratic systems 
based on the Chinese model. They developed complex bureaucratic structures and bear more 
than a “family resemblance” in their organization, cultures, and outlooks. This form of 
government, along with the calendar, language and writing system, bureaucracy, and 
education system, was derived from the Chinese experience, and the civil-service examination 
in these countries emphasized a knowledge of Chinese political philosophy, classics, and 
culture’: East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 33. Of the three Sinic States, Japan under the Tokugawa 
gradually withdrew from the Sino-centric tribute system and reproduced a Japanese-centric 
tribute system in which Japan sought to replace China as the virtuous and supreme civilisation 
vis-à-vis its neighbours: see Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s 
Encounter with European International Society (London: Routledge, 2009).  
23 Benjamin I. Schwartz, ‘The Chinese Perception of World Order: Past and Present’, in 
Fairbank, supra n.7, 276, 277. 
24 Kang, supra n.22, 25. Moreover, Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan maintain, ‘[w]ithout 
social recognition or rejection, social acceptance or contestation, the ideas and practices of the 
Chinese world order and Chinese cultural assumptions of superiority would have no 
substantive social existence in East Asian international relations. They would play no 
significant structuring role in shaping the norms of legitimate and acceptable behaviour for, 
and social identity of, not just Imperial China, but, equally, other constituent states. Ideas, 
beliefs, norms and values central to the constitutional nature of Imperial China’s own 
imagining become intersubjective to varying degrees (or not) among Imperial China and 
others only through a long and tumultuous historical and social process of assertion, 
imposition, contention, contestation, rejection, acquiescence and acceptance’: ‘The Tributary 
System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, 5 Chinese Journal of International 
Politics (2012), 3, 16-17. 
25 Zhang and Buzan, ibid., 19. 
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subjugated other States to submission, the tribute system served the function of 
translating its moral authority into ‘normative pacification’ within the Chinese world 
order.26 Tribute visits entailed a major burden on China’s finances as the Qing court, 
having to be always benevolent and generous, had to provide gifts to tribute missions 
and defray their expenses. Larisa Zabrovskaia has calculated that about one-thirteenth 
of Qing China’s annual budget was spent on receiving tribute visits.27  
Imperial China’s interactions with Western powers, as early as the 
seventeenth century with Russia, and later the Netherlands, were modelled on the 
tribute system in order that basic Chinese cultural assumptions were not disturbed.28 
However, no compromise could be achieved between the Qing court and the British. 
Of the seventeen missions led by Western powers between 1655 and 1793, only the 
one from Great Britain led by Lord Macartney in 1792 refused to follow the Chinese 
ritual of kowtow, and his mission inevitably failed its aim.29 While opium was the 
casus belli of China’s first military conflict with a Western power, at the fundamental 
level it was the incongruity between the Chinese world order and Western powers’ 
Westphalian vision of State sovereignty, and the clash of Chinese and Western 
empires, that a series of military conflicts ensued. 
Immanuel Hsü notes that international law was referred to by Lin Tse-hsu, 
the Imperial Commissioner in charge of halting the opium trade in Canton, in his 
letter to Queen Victoria requesting that her subjects cease their trading of a noxious 
product in Chinese territory.30 Although Hsü suggests that ‘the initial effect of 
international law in China was a strengthening of Lin’s determination to take a firm 
                                                
26 Zhang (2001), supra n.7, 53. See also Rodney Bruce Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power 
Source’, 51 International Organization (1997), 591. 
27 Larisa V. Zabrovskaia, ‘The Traditional Foreign Policy of the Qing Empire: How the 
Chinese Reacted to the Efforts of Europeans to Bring the Chinese into the Western System of 
International Relations’, 6 Journal of Historical Sociology (1993), 351, 352-53. 
28 Mancall, supra n.10, 20-21. 
29 John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), 14. For a discussion of the historical event and the significance of 
kowtow in imperial China, see James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual 
and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). 
30 See Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, China’s Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic 
Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 123-25. 
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stand against the English’,31 Lin’s letter made no mention of international law and 
was more a request that Great Britain proscribe its subjects bringing opium into 
China. Lin’s letter was ignored (or perhaps not received), and the war that followed 
his open burning of opium ended with the Treaty of Nanjing under which China 
ceded Hong Kong Island to Great Britain in perpetuity and agreed to open five ports 
for trade. Similar to the British as they conceived of the First World War as ‘the war 
to end all wars’, the Chinese regarded the Treaty of Nanjing as the ‘Treaty of Eternal 
Peace’.32 Subsequently, China concluded the Treaty of the Bogue (1843) with Great 
Britain, the Treaty of Wanghia (1844) with the United States, and the Treaty of 
Whampoa (1844) with France that conferred the three States extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over their nationals accused of crimes committed in China. While later a 
cause of great resentment among the Chinese, concessions such as extraterritoriality33 
were made out of expediency and ‘as an expression of the emperor’s traditional 
benevolence toward all men from afar, regardless of their culture or nationality’.34 
Western powers justified their incursions into China’s State sovereignty on the basis 
that China at the time did not consider State sovereignty to be an international legal 
principle.35 Excluded from the terms of these treaties was permanent foreign 
diplomatic representation in the Chinese capital, something Western powers 
considered a matter of course in the conduct of international relations but which 
China could not countenance as it would directly challenge the central and superior 
place of the emperor and the tribute system,36 and which was agreed to only after the 
                                                
31 Ibid., 125. 
32 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 144. 
33 China had in fact extended foreign merchants a limited guarantee against private debts of 
Chinese merchants to compensate for their lack of access to officials in the Chinese capital or 
to diplomatic protection in China, with the proviso that a Westerner who violated Chinese law 
against another Westerner should be deported to and punished by his home country, while one 
who contravened Chinese law against a Chinese person was to be dealt with under Chinese 
law: Chen, supra n.7, 90-92. 
34 Gong, supra n.32, 145. 
35 Ruskola, supra n.7, 1531-32. 
36 As Hsü has stated, ‘[t]he international relations of the Far East were regulated by a product 
of li, the tributary system. No foreign resident ministers were ever received in the Chinese 
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burning of the Summer Palace by Great Britain and France and China’s signing of the 
Treaty of Tianjing with the two States in 1858. 
Although the Qing court resented the treaties and foreign intrusions, it found 
solace in these treaties as they formalised and restrained Western powers’ demands 
on China. As Mary Wright has noted, ‘[b]efore 1860 the treaties had represented the 
minimum privileges that foreigners could expect – a line from which they could press 
forward in the further opening of China. During the 1860s the minimum became the 
maximum – a line behind which the Chinese government could find security.’37 Yet, 
Fairbank observes, ‘the early treaties in themselves did not remake the Chinese view 
of the world. To China they represented the supremacy of Western power, but this did 
not convey the Western idea of the supremacy of law. When Western diplomats 
extolled the sanctity of the treaties, their Chinese listeners could see the treaty 
documents as written compacts, but not the institution of law that underlay them.’38 
Li Hongzhang, an influential Chinese official and reformer at the time, noted that 
‘when China signed treaties with Britain and France before, it was under the threat of 
force. We were threatened and deceived. Those beyond the pale of the protection of 
international law often suffer huge losses from these treaties’.39 China’s signing of 
these treaties should not be construed as signifying its acceptance of international 
law, as treaty obligations operated between the parties only and were not to form part 
                                                                                                                           
capital, and no Chinese resident ministers were ever sent abroad. To demand a resident 
minister at the capital was to disrupt the tributary system externally and to pre-empt the 
concept of li internally, thereby shaking the very foundations of Chinese society. The question 
involved was not ritual formality, as it might appear on the surface, but the basic fabric of 
Chinese society and government. Therefore, the demand had to be resisted to the bitter end’: 
supra n.30, 112. 
37 Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih 
Restoration, 1862–1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 243. 
38 Fairbank, supra n.8, 262. 
39 Li Hongzhang, ‘Tuochou qiuan zhe’, Li Hongzhang Quanji: Zougao, Vol.3 (Changchun: 
Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), 1541, as quoted in Shogo Suzuki, ‘China’s Perceptions of 
International Society in the Nineteenth Century: Learning More about Power Politics?’, 28 
Asian Perspectives (2004), 115, 132. 
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of the corpus of general international law, particularly when treaties that China 
entered into with foreign powers during the nineteenth century were all bilateral.40 
Interest in international law in China increased only when Zongli Yamen, 
China’s first foreign ministry, was established in 1861 and supported a translation of 
Wheaton’s Elements of International Law by W.A.P. Martin, an American 
missionary, to be presented to the imperial court. In his memorial to the imperial 
court proposing the establishment of Zongli Yamen, Prince Gong stated thus: 
 
Your servants have surveyed the current situation, and believe that 
dealing with the barbarians is similar to that of how the kingdom of 
Shu dealt with the kingdom of Wu. The kingdoms of Shu and Wu 
were sworn enemies. However, when Zhuge Liang took control of 
policy, he sent ambassadors and established diplomatic relations and 
fought the kingdom of Wei together. But how could it forget about 
[its future plans] of swallowing up the kingdom of Wu? … The 
barbarians take advantage of our weak position and try to control us. 
If we do not restrain our rage but continue the hostilities, we are 
liable to sudden catastrophe. On the other hand, if we overlook the 
way they have harmed us and do not make any preparations against 
them, then we shall be bequeathing a source of grief to our sons and 
grandsons. The ancients had a saying: ‘resort to peace and friendship 
when temporarily obliged to do so; use war and defense as your 
actual policy.’ This is truly a well-founded statement.41 
                                                
40 As J.L. Brierly has stated, ‘[t]he ordinary treaty by which two or more states enter into 
engagements with one another for some special object can very rarely be used even as 
evidence to establish the existence of a rule of general law; it is more probable that the very 
reason of the treaty was to create an obligation which would not have existed by the general 
law, or to exclude an existing rule which would otherwise have been applied. Still less can 
such treaties be regarded as actually creating law’: The Law of Nations, 6th ed. rev. Humphrey 
Waldock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 57. 
41 As quoted in Suzuki, supra n.39, 135-36. 
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As Gerrit Gong puts it, ‘Wheaton’s was not merely a commentary on international 
law; it was international law in the Chinese mind.’42 Qing officials regarded 
Wheaton’s Elements of International Law as ‘a diplomatic reference book with which 
the Ch’ing officials might restrain “wild” foreign consuls and avoid diplomatic 
mistakes’.43 The United States embassy in China was concerned that Martin’s work 
might enable the Chinese to ‘endeavour to apply [international law] to their 
intercourse with foreign countries’ and to appreciate ‘how greatly the principle of 
extraterritoriality contained in their treaties modifies the usage in force between the 
Western and Christian powers’.44 The chargé d’affaires of the French legation in 
China was incensed: ‘Who is this man who is going to give the Chinese an insight 
into our European international law? Kill him – choke him off; he will make us 
endless trouble’.45 When China through reference to international law successfully 
defended its territorial waters and demanded compensation after Prussia seized three 
Danish merchant ships as war prize in violation of China’s neutrality, the utility of 
international law was underscored within the Qing court.46 Wright observes that the 
Qing court in the 1860s ‘accepted and succeeded in using the principles and practices 
of Western diplomacy and succeeded in using them as the main bulwark of Chinese 
sovereignty’.47 The capacity of international law to change the behaviour of the Qing 
court should not be overestimated, however. As Gong observes, ‘[t]he Middle 
Kingdom’s size, inertia, and adherence to its own standard of “civilization” made 
China slow to implement the European standard’.48 Instead of conceiving and 
applying international law to change its normative worldview, the Qing court used it 
                                                
42 Gong, supra n.32, 154. 
43 Hsü, supra n.30, 145. 
44 Ibid., 136-37. 
45 Ibid., 138. 
46 Ibid., 132-34. 
47 Wright, supra n.37, 231. 
48 Gong, supra n.32, 146. 
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as a practical tool to protect China and Chinese interests from further foreign 
onslaught until an opportunity presented China to reassert itself. 
 Such normative rejection of international law was partaken in not only by 
China, but also by Western powers seeking to deny China a place, let alone an equal 
place, in international society. Western powers, supported by their legal theorists 
whose work justified colonialism and the superiority of Western legal norms and 
principles, devised the notion that only they constituted the ‘family of nations’ from 
which China, alongside other ancient kingdoms such as Japan, Siam, and the 
Ottoman Empire, must be excluded on account of their inferior standards of 
civilisation. The extension of international law (including the principle of State 
sovereignty), and of an international legal order of which States are primary subjects 
and actors, beyond Europe into the Americas was possible only after ‘completely 
recasting all non-Western political entities into the mould of modern European states, 
which in turn required the irreparable destruction of all traditional forms of polity in 
existence’.49 The standard of civilisation ‘is not just a historical curiosity, but forms 
an important thread in the social, legal, and institutional fabric of contemporary 
international society’.50 While Western powers and legal theorists conceded the 
existence of the Chinese state and Chinese civilisation, they questioned whether the 
Chinese state, with its level of civilisation, was capable of inclusion in the ‘family of 
nations’; Lassa Oppenheim asserted that ‘[s]tatehood alone does not include 
membership of the Family of Nations’.51 Even a recognised State may be denied 
membership in the ‘family of nations’, should its level of civilisation be found by 
Western powers to be wanting. Oppenheim noted that ‘[t]here are States in existence, 
although their number decreases gradually, which are not, or not fully, members of 
that family because their civilisation, if any, does not enable them and their subjects 
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to act in conformity with the principles of International Law.’52 Martti Koskenniemi 
argues that the ambiguity of ‘civilisation’ was deliberate and ‘an important aspect of 
its value’: 
 
It was not part of some rigid classification but a shorthand for the 
qualities that international lawyers valued in their own societies, 
playing upon its opposites: the uncivilized, barbarian, and the savage. 
This provided a language for attitudes about social difference and for 
constructing one’s own identity through what the historian Hayden 
White has called ‘ostensive self-definition by negation’ – a reflexive 
action pointing towards the practices of others and affirming that 
whatever we as Europeans are, at least we are not like that.53 
 
Gong asserts that the ‘standard of civilisation’, and with it the ‘family of nations’, 
was fundamentally racist,54 and ‘European military superiority left non-European 
societies no choice but to come to grips with the European standard of 
“civilization”.’55 Despite some dissension that an ancient non-European civilisation, 
such as China or Japan, ‘with an old and stable order of its own, with organised force 
at the back of it, and complex enough for the leading minds of that country to be able 
to appreciate the necessities of an order different from theirs … must be recognized 
as being civilised, though with other civilisation than ours’,56 Worse still, 
‘extraterritoriality had been the main form of legal imperialism in both, indexing their 
intermediate status on the scale of civilizations. When the point of reference for 
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China’s racial identity began shifting to Africa, not only was there a growing 
preference for territorial forms of control such as leases, but the West was also 
increasingly willing to resort to pure violence.’57 
Western legal theorists stressed the case of Japan, which was forced to enter 
into unequal treaties with Western powers and adopt Western legal, educational and 
military models, and whose admission to the ‘family of nations’ took place only after 
it attained military victory over Russia in 1905, to show the racial heterogeneity of 
the ‘family of nations’.58 According to Oppenheim, ‘Persia, Siam, China, Korea, 
Abyssinia and the like, are civilised, but their civilisation has not yet reached a point 
to enable them to carry out rules of international law … the example of Japan can 
show them that it depends entirely upon their own efforts to be received as full 
members into that family.’59 However, the rejection of Japan’s demand at the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919, that the peace treaty with Germany contain a racial 
equality clause, demonstrated that modernisation under Western terms, a military 
victory over a Western power, and an alliance with a Western power (Great Britain 
since 1905) did not suffice.60 As ‘the existence of a language of a standard still gave 
the appearance of fair treatment and regular administration to what was simply a 
conjectural policy’,61 Koskenniemi points out that ‘the non-European community 
could never really become European, no matter how much it tried, as Turkey had 
always known and Japan was to find out to its bitter disappointment.’62 The standard 
was impossible to meet, given that ‘if there was no external standard for civilizaton, 
then everything depended on what Europeans approved. But the more eagerly the 
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non-Europeans wished to prove that they played by European rules, the more suspect 
they became … In order to attain equality, the non-European community must accept 
Europe as its master – but to accept a master was proof that one was not equal.’63 
As China was considered incapable of appreciating and respecting 
international law, its capacity to conclude treaties, even unequal ones, with Western 
powers could not be reconciled other than by further distortion of international law 
and normative logic. Thus, Hall explained, Western powers ‘acquire rights by way of 
protectorate over barbarous or imperfectly civilised countries, which [did] not amount 
to full rights of property or sovereignty, but which [were] good as against other 
civilised states, so as to prevent occupation or conquest by them, and so as to debar 
them from maintaining relations with the protected states or peoples’.64 Hall further 
noted that uncivilised or semi-civilised States were ‘subject to a law of which they 
[had] never heard, their relations to the protecting state [were] not therefore 
determined by international law’.65 Protection that international law might afford, 
including respect for State sovereignty, would be unavailable to non-members of the 
‘family of nations’, as international law applied vis-à-vis a non-member only in 
relations between the protecting State and other civilised States. 
 
III. International law in republican China, 1912–1949 
 
Imperial Chinese rule finally collapsed in 1912. William Kirby asserts that ‘Chinese 
history during the era of the first Republic was defined and shaped – and must 
ultimately be interpreted – according to the nature of its foreign relations.’66 By the 
end of the First World War, Sun Yat-sen, regarded as the founding father of modern 
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China, declared that nationalism was only half-complete. Han Chinese must ‘sacrifice 
the separate nationality, history, and identity that they are so proud of and merge in 
all sincerity with the Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans in one melting pot to 
create a new order of Chinese nationalism’,67 and the importance previously placed 
on the superiority of Chinese culture must now give way to China’s national 
territory.68 Kirby maintains that ‘the amazing fact of the Republican era is that this 
space was not only redefined, as “Chinese” and as the sacred soil of China, but also 
defended diplomatically to such a degree that the borders of the PRC today are 
essentially those of the Qing, minus only Outer Mongolia. The Qing fell but the 
empire remained. More accurately, the empire became the basis of the Chinese 
national state.’69 By refusing to ratify the 1914 Simla Convention with Great Britain 
and Tibet (as it refused to recognise that Tibet was capable of entering into an 
international treaty on an equal basis as a State), by emphasising its suzerainty over 
Tibet, by insisting that proclamations of the Dalai Lama were always subject to the 
approval of the Chinese government, and by extending the concept of suzerainty to 
Xinjiang even though Xinjiang had become ‘a virtual territorial extension of the 
Soviet Union’70 and performing a ‘delicate surgical procedure’71 to install its own 
regime in Xinjiang that John Garver argues ‘saved Xinjiang for the Chinese nation’,72 
China managed to retain Tibet and Xinjiang within the realm of China even though 
China at the time had no real power or authority within the two territories and was 
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struggling within China proper from endless warlord conflicts, communist guerrilla 
attacks, and aggression from Japan.73 
In respect of Manchuria, republican China showed not only its adept 
diplomacy but also its willingness to fight Russia in 1929 and Japan from 1931 to 
1945.74 It was Manchuria that prompted the United States to introduce a new rule of 
international law – Stimson Doctrine – under which recognition of a territory that 
came into being as a State through the threat or use of force would thenceforth be 
unlawful. Brook Gotberg argues that Manchuria served as the ‘acid test’ of the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the League of Nations.75 As China invoked Article XI 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations76 (predecessor to Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter), Japan argued that as China was mired in warlord conflicts, it could 
not be ascribed the qualities of a State (similar to the present-day notion of a failed 
State) and thus could not invoke the Covenant.77 When the League of Nations 
accepted the Stimson Doctrine as ‘a statement of the course of action to which the 
parties to the Covenant and the Pact [of Paris of 1928] are legally obliged by their 
ratification of those instruments’,78 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. 
Thus, while struggling from within and externally, China was able to utilise 
international law and the international legal order of the day not only to defend its 
State sovereignty de jure, but also to have substantive influence on the development 
of international law. 
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 A discussion of republican China’s approaches to international law cannot 
omit the demands that Japan imposed on China during the First World War and the 
complicity of other States. Japan, which had already been ceded Formosa (Taiwan) 
after its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), seized control of 
Shandong when the First World War broke out, on the premise that the province, over 
which Qing China had given concessions to Germany, was now enemy territory, 
despite the fact that both China and Japan were allies against Germany and China 
entered the war on condition that all concessions China had given Germany be 
returned or abrogated. Japan additionally made ‘Twenty-One Demands’ on China in 
1915 that China agree, inter alia, to confirm Japan’s acquisition of Shandong, to 
expand Japan’s sphere of influence in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner 
Mongolia, and not to make any further coastal or island concessions to any other 
foreign power. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 confirmed that 
Germany’s rights over Shandong be transferred to Japan, together with Western 
powers’ ignoral of China’s request that all concessions Qing China had given foreign 
powers, especially extraterritoriality, be abrogated, led China to refuse to sign the 
treaty and set off the May Fourth Movement in 1919 that Zhidong Hao argues 
contributed to the Chinese communist movement and its eventual success in 1949.79 
 Apart from aggression from foreign powers and power struggles within 
China, the problem of extraterritoriality had yet to be resolved. Miles Lampson, the 
United Kingdom’s representative to China, considered China to suffer from an 
‘extraterritoriality complex’.80 Nineteen States secured extraterritoriality from Qing 
China.81 While the focus of the 1921 Nine-Power Washington Conference was on 
naval disarmament, China’s demand that the extraterritoriality that Qing China had 
conceded be abrogated was the subject of heated debate. The Chinese delegation 
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presented a series of statements of principles, including that ‘[t]he Powers engage to 
respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative 
independence of the Chinese Republic’,82 and that ‘[i]mmediately or as soon as 
circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China’s political, jurisdictional 
and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.’83 On 10 December 1921, 
the Nine Powers adopted a resolution establishing a Commission on 
Extraterritoriality to explore if, how and when China might progress towards 
attaining the requisite standard of civilisation. The Powers agreed ‘to give every 
assistance towards the attainment by the Chinese government of its expressed desire 
to reform its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations’, 
and indicated their willingness ‘to relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that 
the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other 
considerations warranted them in so doing’.84 Article I of the 1922 Nine-Power 
Treaty stated that 
 
The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: 
(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial 
and administrative integrity of China; 
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to 
China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable 
government; 
(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing 
and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce 
and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; 
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(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order 
to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of 
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action 
inimical to the security of such States.85 
 
When Germany in 1921 and Russia in 1924 had their extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
China abrogated by agreement, they did not find Chinese laws and courts 
objectionable, which Harold Scott Quigley described as a ‘remarkable’ 
development.86 
When China negotiated revision of treaties with foreign powers that it 
considered to have been concluded by Qing China under duress, it invoked the 
doctrine of rebus sic standibus, which has since been affirmed as a rule of customary 
international law and incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.87 On 16 April 1926, China sent a note to Belgium demanding that the treaty 
of amity, commerce and navigation Qing China concluded with Belgium in 1865 be 
revised and eventually terminated. In its note, China stated that ‘[t]he aforesaid 
Treaty which still regulates the commercial relations between the two countries was 
concluded as long as 60 years ago. During the long period which has elapsed since its 
conclusion, so many momentous political and commercial changes have taken place 
in both countries, that, taking all circumstances into consideration, it is not only 
desirable, but also essential to the mutual interests of both parties concerned, to have 
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the said Treaty revised and replaced by a new one to be mutually agreed upon.’88 No 
agreement was reached and China issued a declaration unilaterally terminating the 
treaty on 6 November 1926.89 In a note of 16 November 1926, China indicated that its 
termination was in accordance with Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and the doctrine of rebus sic standibus, and rejected Belgium’s proposal that 
the matter be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice on grounds that 
it was ‘political in character and no nation can consent to the basic principle of 
equality between States being made the subject of a judicial inquiry’.90 The matter 
was settled with the conclusion of a new treaty of 22 November 1928 that included a 
conditional abrogation of Belgium’s rights of extraterritoriality, although Belgium 
rejected China’s position that China was entitled to terminate the treaty unilaterally.91 
On 7 July 1928, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that 
 
(1) All unequal treaties between the Republic of China and other 
countries which have already expired shall ipso facto be abrogated 
and new treaties shall be concluded. 
(2) The Nationalist Government will immediately take steps to 
terminate, in accordance with proper procedure, those unequal 
treaties which have not yet expired and conclude new treaties. 
(3) In the case of the old treaties which have already expired but have 
not yet been replaced by new treaties, the Nationalist Government 
will promulgate appropriate regulations to meet the exigencies of the 
new situation.92 
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As its negotiations with most Western States for revision of treaties stalled, China on 
17 May 1931 declared that ‘all unequal treaties previously imposed upon China by 
various countries would not be recognized by the Chinese nationals’.93 
Eventually, due to the outbreak of the Second World War, notwithstanding 
Western concern about the ‘absence of written laws, the different conceptions of 
jurisprudence between the Western world and the East (e.g., the doctrine of 
responsibility)’ and ‘the apparent lack of independence of the Chinese judiciary’,94 
China on 9 December 1941 unilaterally abrogated extraterritoriality in China vis-à-vis 
Germany, Italy, and Japan. China concluded treaties with major Allies and neutral 
countries between 1943 and 1947, under which the latter relinquished their special 
rights and privileges in China. Praise for the normative roles and utility of 
international law should not be sung too quickly, however, as it was the diminution of 
European powers and the rise of the United States and its opposition to colonial rule, 
as well as the need for a military alliance with China and use of its military bases 
during the war, that enabled China to secure revision or termination of treaties that 
conferred foreign powers extraterritorial jurisdiction.95 As William Callahan has 
commented, ‘the unequal treaties that exploited China were not abrogated until the 
height of the Second World War in 1943 – when the Chinese demands were not as 
much of a concession from Britain and America since Japan controlled the treaty 
ports covered by these treaties. Thus China actually entered International Society not 
as the result of a gradual process of ethical civilizing to European norms but through 
pragmatic diplomacy that was spurred by the contingency, uncertainty and violence 
of war.’96 
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IV. International law in communist China, 1949–1971 
 
The communist forces prevailed in the Chinese civil war (1947–1949) and the PRC 
government became the effective government of China on 1 October 1949, while 
Nationalist leaders and followers fled en masse to Taiwan. The communist regime, ‘a 
grave threat to the international society’,97 was not recognised by the United Nations 
as the representative government of China until 25 October 1971. Indeed, as the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was raging in China, Coral Bell regarded China as 
‘the most determined and implacable revolutionary enemy of the existing 
international order’.98 
 A brief clarification as to foreign recognition of States and governments is in 
order here, as it helps explain not only the rejection of the PRC government as the 
representative government of China by the United Nations and other States and 
communist China’s approaches to international law and international organisations, 
but also, as Chapter V discusses, the continual impasse over the legal status of 
Taiwan. 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States99 sets 
out what is considered a rule of customary international law that ‘[t]he State as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to 
enter into relations with other States.’100 However, government does not necessarily 
denote sovereignty and many territories that lack sovereignty, such as Hong Kong, 
satisfy the four criteria. The criterion vis-à-vis a capacity to enter into relations with 
other States is also undefined, and such capacity is not confined to States alone. The 
criterion is also circular insofar as in relating a territorial entity to other States it 
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presupposes the entity being a State already existent.  
The PRC government began to be recognised by the majority of foreign 
States in the 1970s. However, China as a State under international law has always 
subsisted. As John Moore in his formulation of a general principle of international 
law stated, ‘[c]hanges in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a 
rule affect its position in international law. A monarchy may be transformed into a 
republic or a republic into a monarchy; absolute principles may be substituted with 
constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government changes, the nation 
remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired.’101 Foreign recognition constitutes 
evidence, but is not a precondition, of a territory’s statehood; otherwise, statehood 
would be rendered a matter of Realpolitik and be rid of its legal objectivity. While it 
might be argued that foreign recognition of Kosovo as a State in February 2008 
independent of Serbia might have set a precedent for foreign recognition to be a 
controlling factor in determining statehood, a fait accompli imposed by powerful 
States does not equate legality or legal validity. Russia’s retaliatory recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 as States independent of Georgia should 
serve as a stern warning of the importance of legality and the dire consequences of 
ignoring legal rules and principles that apply to statehood. As Article 3 of the 
Montevideo Convention states, ‘[t]he political existence of the state is independent of 
recognition by the other states.’102 
 Quincy Wright has stated that ‘international law forbids premature 
recognition of an insurgent or revolutionary government and, apart from the Stimson 
doctrine, forbids continued non-recognition of a firmly established government.’103 
The authorities on Taiwan once sought to invoke the Stimson Doctrine against other 
States’ recognition of China as represented by the PRC government as a State, on 
                                                
101 John Bassett Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1906), 249. 
102 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Art.3. 
103 Wright, supra n.37, 324. 
 98 
grounds that the communist forces’ success in the Chinese civil war had been brought 
about by the military intervention of the Soviet Union. The United Nations General 
Assembly refused to accept the argument and passed a resolution calling for respect 
for the independence of China in accordance with the United Nations Charter and 
general principles of international law. The consensus of the General Assembly was 
that ‘[t]he acquisition of control by the [Chinese] Communist government was in its 
opinion a manifestation of the self-determination of the Chinese people rather than a 
manifestation of aggression by the Soviet Union.’104 As Nicholas Tsagourias argues, 
‘non-recognition reveals the international society’s powerlessness when confronted 
with facts. Non-recognition is not the negation of a fact to the extent that recognition 
is not the creation of a fact. Non-recognition is the denial of formal rights. It is a half 
measure between the maxims ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur’.105 
Early communist Chinese foreign policy focused on endorsing and 
supporting any national independence movement. Liu Shaoqi, a leading Chinese 
Communist Party figure, stated in a national broadcast in 1948 that ‘Communists 
must be the staunchest, most reliable and most able leaders in the movement for 
national liberation and independence of all oppressed nations; they must be the 
firmest defenders of the rightful interests of their own nation; they must 
unconditionally aid the liberation movements of all the world’s oppressed 
nationalities, and certainly cannot conduct aggression on any other nation or oppress 
national minorities within the country.’106 Arthur Steiner has identified six major 
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premises of early communist Chinese foreign policy stemming from its basic doctrine 
of anti-imperialism: 
 
(1) ‘imperialism’ is the greatest enemy of the Chinese people and the 
Chinese revolution; 
(2) the United States, the most advanced capitalist country and the 
‘necessary’ leader of the ‘world imperialist camp’, is by nature the 
major enemy among the nations of the world; 
(3) the Soviet Union, leader of the states of the ‘new democracy’, 
whose policies are necessarily antithetical to those of the United 
States, is the leader of the ‘world revolutionary front against 
imperialism’, and hence the chief friend of the Chinese people and 
the Chinese Communist Party; 
(4) China does not stand alone in her struggle against American 
‘imperialism’: while waging her own battle for ‘Chinese national 
liberation’, China must struggle in common with the ‘international 
united front’ of all revolutionary and anti-imperialistic peoples; 
(5) the countries of the ‘international united front’ must resist the 
counter-revolutionary policies of the ‘imperialistic states’ by a 
political, economic and ideological counter-attack, waged in a 
militant, offensive spirit; and 
(6) incessant struggle must be sustained until the inevitable 
proletarian victory is complete on all fronts and the foundations of 
the new world order are firmly secured.107 
 
That China was reduced by imperialism during the ‘century of humiliation’ 
since the Opium War to a semi-colonial entity was – and remains – ‘a cardinal 
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principle of the Chinese Communist faith’108 and widely shared among the Chinese 
people. The PRC government focused on the social dynamics and consequences of 
imperialism, and decried international law for abetting imperialism. Steiner notes 
that, as early as February 1947, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party issued a declaration indicating that certain foreign loans and agreements 
concluded by the Nationalist government were ‘completely contrary to the will of the 
Chinese people and … have plunged and will continue to plunge China into civil war, 
reaction, national disgrace, loss of national rights, colonialism and to ultimate crisis 
in chaos and collapse’.109 The Committee declared that the Communist Party 
 
will not now [or] in the future recognize any foreign loans, any 
treaties which disgrace the country and strip it of its rights, and any 
of the … agreements and understandings reached by the Kuomintang 
Government after January 10, 1946, nor will it recognize any future 
diplomatic negotiations of the same character which have not been 
passed by the [Chinese People’s] Political Consultative Conference 
or which have not been agreed to by this Party and other parties and 
groups participating in the Political Consultative Conference. This 
Party furthermore will absolutely not bear any obligations for any 
such loans, treaties, agreements or understandings.110 
 
On 29 September 1949, the Chinese Communist Party indicated in Article 55 of the 
Political Consultative Conference Common Programme that ‘[t]he Central People’s 
Government of the People’s Republic of China must study the treaties and 
agreements concluded by the Kuomintang government with foreign governments and, 
                                                
108 Ibid., 80.  
109 As quoted ibid., 93. 
110 As quoted ibid. 
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depending on their contents, recognize, annul, revise or re-conclude them.’111 The 
PRC government relied on the doctrine of rebus sic standibus to argue that all treaties 
concluded by imperial or republican China were now void since communist China 
possessed a radically different class character.112 Significantly, at a Security Council 
meeting on 28 November 1950, the PRC government’s special representative 
indicated that ‘without the participation of the lawful delegates of the People’s 
Republic of China, the people of China have no reason to recognize any resolutions 
and decisions of the United Nations.’113 The PRC government’s position should 
demonstrate the fallacy of the notion that non-democratic States should be not 
recognised or de-recognised, or be excluded from membership or participation in 
international organisations, as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The concept of unequal treaties was not adopted in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Humphrey Waldock, as special rapporteur, stated before the 
United Nations International Law Commission in 1963 that ‘[w]hile accepting the 
view that some forms of “unequal treaties” brought about by coercion of the State 
must be regarded as lacking essential validity, the Special Rapporteur feels that it 
would be unsafe in the present state of international law to extend the notion of 
“coercion” beyond the illegal use or threat of force.’114 The principle of the 
intertemporal law entails that a treaty comprising terms that were lawful and valid at 
the time when it was concluded must continue to be treated as lawfully concluded, 
valid and binding notwithstanding subsequent developments in international law. 
Otherwise, all treaties would be at risk of being unilaterally treated as nullities that 
would lead to widespread international conflicts. The principle of the intertemporal 
law is not absolute, however, as any treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
international law, even if the norm matured after the treaty was concluded, becomes 
                                                
111 As quoted in Wang, supra n.7, 348. 
112 Chen Tiqiang, ‘The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law’, 8 
Dalhousie Law Journal (1984), 3, 22. 
113 S/PV.527, 28 November 1950, 4. 
114 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Vol.II, 52. 
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void and terminates.115 Thus, instead of arguing that certain treaties that imperial or 
republican China entered into with foreign powers were ‘unequal treaties’, China 
might be better placed to rely on the peremptory norm of international law – the 
prohibition of the use of force – in the conduct of international relations, to argue that 
such treaties should be considered void. Nonetheless, China was not in a position to 
argue that a fundamental change of circumstances (regarding the fundamental change 
of its regime, governance or society) would enable it to amend, repudiate, terminate 
or withdraw from any treaty which established a boundary,116 although the fact, as 
discussed in Chapter V, that it was able to terminate the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing and 
the 1860 Treaty of Beijing under which China ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity 
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island meant that China 
eventually was able to shape to its advantage, through diplomacy or disguised or 
actual threat of force, the interpretation of a customary norm embodied in a widely 
ratified treaty often taken as codification of the law of treaties. 
 The PRC government did not wholly reject international law as an 
imperialistic or Western tool to contain or exploit China. In line with Soviet teaching 
that ‘international law, in addition to being a body of principles and norms which 
must be observed by every country, is also, just as any law, a political instrument; 
whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will to a certain degree utilize 
international law in implementing its foreign policy’,117 international law for 
communist China was a means to attain socialist revolution as well as modernisation 
for the State, and Chinese scholarly writing at the time reflected such a view. For 
example, Chu Li-lu argued that ‘[i]nternational law is one of the instruments of 
settling international problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to socialist 
enterprise, or to the peace enterprise of the people of the world, we will use it. 
                                                
115 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.64. 
116 Ibid., Art.62(2)(a). 
117 Chou Fu-lun, Chiao hsiieh yii yen chin [Teaching and Research], No.3 (1958), 52, as 
quoted in Hungdah Chiu, ‘Communist China’s Attitude toward International Law’, 60 
American Journal of International Law (1966), 245, 248. 
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However, if this instrument is disadvantageous to our country, to socialist enterprises 
or to peace enterprises of the people of the world, we will not use it and should create 
a new instrument to replace it. Today we have a majority of the old international law 
jurists who still adhere to the purely legalistic viewpoint by restricting themselves to 
the limited area of international law and thus they subject themselves to the disposal 
of imperialism.’118 
                                                
118 Chu Li-lu, ‘Refute the Absurd Theory Concerning International Law by [Chen T’iqiang]’, 
People’s Daily, 18 September 1957, as quoted in Chiu, ibid., 248-49. (Chiu notes, ibid., fn.15, 
that Chen had received a doctorate in international law from the University of London and 
until he was purged in 1958 had been Head of Division of International Law of the Institute of 
International Relations at the Chinese Academy of Sciences.) Similarly, Liu Fengming 
maintained that ‘[s]o far as our country is concerned, [modern international law] is an 
indispensable legal means to realize socialist modernization and construction. For instance, in 
order to explore resources near our coast, we must study the legal status of the continental 
shelf, fishing zone and exclusive economic zone and international norms and customs 
between states in delimiting these regions. In order to introduce foreign advanced technology, 
we must immediately confront the problems of international patent, protection of trademarks, 
intellectual property and others. In order to create a safe and peaceful international 
environment for our socialist modernization construction, we must actively join international 
legislative activities and strengthen the struggle within the United Nations so as to form the 
broadest international united front for anti-hegemonism for the purpose of preventing and 
delaying the outbreak of World War’: Xiandai guoji fa gangyao [Essentials of Modern 
International Law] (Beijing: Mass Press, 1982), 5, as quoted in Hungdah Chiu, ‘Chinese 
Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978–1987’, 21 International 
Lawyer (1987), 1127, 1129. Such a policy-oriented approach to international law, espoused 
also by many Western scholars (see Chapter II), was strongly criticised by Pan Baocun, who 
maintained in 1985 that ‘“[t]he policy-oriented” theory considers power as the nucleus of 
international politics and international law. They regard policy as the determining factor [in 
formulating international law] and the latter is the concrete expression of the external policy 
of a state. It is true that international political relations have comparatively significant 
influence on the formulation of international law and each state’s attitude toward international 
law is based on its external policy, however, international law is a matter of superstructure and 
it is, in the final analysis, decided by international economic relations. It is possible that 
imperialist big powers may impose their will on the international community and thus 
influence the enactment of international law. However, the international community has its 
own objective rules of development which cannot be diverted by will of imperialist big 
powers and the development of international law cannot be separated from the [objective] 
rules of the development of the international community. Therefore, we cannot just observe 
the phenomenon at a given moment in the international community and mix up the power 
politics of big powers, external policy and international law’: ‘On the Scientific Nature of 
International Law’, 5 Studies in Law (1985), 84, as quoted in Chiu, ibid., 1130, fn.9. Wei Min 
likewise criticised the policy-oriented approach as ‘[mixing] law and policy and [attempting] 
to make international law to follow the change of policy of certain big powers. … It considers 
the external policy [of States] as the basis of international law and even to consider external 
policy as international law. To view law and policy as the same is baseless’: Wei Min, ed., 
Guoji Fa Gailun [Introduction to International Law] (Beijing: Guangmin Daily Press, 1986), 
38, as quoted in Chiu, ibid. Wei believes that an objective yet realistic approach should be 
taken: ‘How should one correctly explain the function of international law in international 
relations? First, international law serves as a criterion for identifying fundamental issues of 
right and wrong in the international [community]. … Second, it serves as legal forms of self-
restraint and mutual restraint on the basis of equality among countries in order to establish 
normal international order. … Third, it serves as legal forms for establishing certain concrete 
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 When discussing the relationship between China and international law, 
reference must be had to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that China set 
out in a bilateral treaty with India in 1954, particularly as the Principles remain a 
cornerstone of contemporary China’s approach to international law and Chinese 
foreign policy. In the 1954 treaty, China and India stated that the Principles should 
guide their bilateral relations. These Principles are, namely, ‘mutual respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty’, ‘mutual non-aggression’, ‘mutual non-
interference’, ‘equality and mutual benefit’, and ‘peaceful co-existence’. The 
Principles were subsequently expanded by the 1955 Bandung Conference to ten 
guiding principles, namely, ‘respect for fundamental human rights and for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, ‘respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations’, ‘recognition of the equality of all 
races and of the equality of all nations large and small’, ‘abstention from intervention 
or interference in the internal affairs of another country’, ‘respect for the right of each 
nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations’, ‘abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to 
serve any particular interests of the big powers’, ‘abstention by any country from 
exerting pressures on other countries’, ‘refraining from acts or threats of aggression 
or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
country’, ‘settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as 
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful 
means of the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations’, ‘promotion of mutual interests and cooperation’, and ‘respect for justice 
and international obligations’. It is noteworthy that China referred to the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence to call on the Soviet Union to cease suppression 
                                                                                                                           
international rights and duties for countries in the process of their mutual intercourse. … The 
above three roles of international law are interrelated and reciprocally supplemented, i.e., one 
cannot emphasize one role to the exclusion of the others. One should view the three roles as 
an integrated one to observe and study the function of international law’: ibid., 15-18, as 
quoted in Chiu, ibid., 1131, fn.12. 
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of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 before the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, 
thereby affirming that for China these Principles were of normative universal 
applicability.119 
 Albeit a creation in a bilateral treaty between China and India in 1954, the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence did not reflect a novel or peculiarly Chinese 
(or Indian) perspective of international law or of the international legal order. James 
Chieh Hsuing has characterised the Principles ‘as having received their legal basis 
from pre-existing fundamental principles (e.g., sovereignty, non-intervention, etc.), to 
which the United Nations Charter has only given new expression, and as forming a 
body of peremptory norms necessary for the international ordre public’.120 Russell 
Fifield argued in 1958 that the inclusion of these Principles in a General Assembly 
declaration in October 1957 without objection constituted ‘a significant step in the 
evolution of the Five Principles since their formal inception in 1954’.121 Wang holds 
the view that the Principles constitute fundamental principles not ‘of a special branch 
of international law, but of the whole system of international law’,122 and adds that 
the PRC government and Chinese scholars do not regard these Principles as the only 
fundamental principles of the international legal order, but ‘the core, or at least the 
main part, of the fundamental principles of international law’.123 
                                                
119 In his meeting with the Prime Minister of India on 21 December 1988, Deng Xiaoping 
stated that ‘[t]he general world situation is changing, and every country is thinking about 
appropriate new policies to establish a new international order. Hegemonism, bloc politics and 
treaty organizations no longer work. Then what principle should we apply to guide the new 
international relations? … Two things have to be done at the same time. One is to establish a 
new international political order; the other is to establish a new international economic 
order. … As for a new international political order, I think the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
Existence, initiated by China and India, can withstand all tests. … We should take them as 
norms for international relations. If we want to recommend these principles as a guide to the 
international community, first of all, we should follow them in our relations with each other 
and with our other neighbours’: as quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Zhang Wankun, ‘Patterns 
and Dynamics of China’s International Strategic Behaviour’, 11:31 Journal of Contemporary 
China (2002), 235, 243. 
120 James Chieh Hsuing, Law and Policy in China’s Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes 
and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 29. 
121 Russell H. Fifield, ‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’, 52 American Journal of 
International Law (1958), 504, 504. 
122 Wang, supra n.7, 274. 
123 Ibid., 276. 
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V. International law in communist China, 1971–1984 
 
25 October 1971 marked the turning point in the relationship between China and the 
current international legal order, when the PRC government, by a majority vote of the 
General Assembly, replaced the authorities on Taiwan as the representative 
government of China in the United Nations. The PRC government soon also replaced 
the authorities on Taiwan in other international organisations, and recognition by 
other States of the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China 
quickly followed. However, the PRC government continued to hold hostility towards 
the United Nations.124 Hedley Bull argued in the early 1970s that ‘China disavows 
entirely the role of a great power, and views itself as the champion of the Third 
World nations in their struggle against “super power hegemonism”’,125 until it 
warmed during the 1980s to the roles it may play through the United Nations to shape 
the conduct of international relations, including the development of international law. 
In a communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1977, China 
stated that 
 
1. With regard to the multilateral treaties signed, ratified or acceded to 
by the defunct Chinese government before the establishment of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, my Government will 
examine their contents before making a decision in the light of the 
circumstances as to whether or not they should be recognized. 
2. As from October 1, 1949, the day of the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, the Chiang Kai-shek clique has no right at all to 
                                                
124 See Natalie G. Lichtenstein, ‘The People’s Republic of China and Revision of the United 
Nations Charter’, 18 Harvard International Law Journal (1977), 629. 
125 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 1977), 286. 
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represent China. Its signature and ratification of, or accession to, any 
multilateral treaties by usurping the name of ‘China’ are all illegal 
and null and void. My Government will study these multilateral 
treaties before making a decision in the light of the circumstances as 
to whether or not they should be acceded to.126 
 
Given the emphasis in international legal literature on compliance, as China 
is a leading power in East Asia and beyond, but which possesses a legal system that 
has only recently been regarded by its own state apparatuses and populace as a tool, 
forum and refuge through which rights may be vindicated and wrongs redressed, a 
discussion as to China’s position on sources of international law is useful as it 
illustrates China’s approaches to international law, international organisations and 
international adjudication, as well as the relationship between international law and 
municipal law in the Chinese legal system.127 
In line with Soviet thinking, China emphasised that only treaties and customs 
could be considered sources of international law. According to the Soviet view, 
treaties formed the cornerstone of international law. Customs enjoyed only a 
subsidiary role, contrary to the Western position that a norm of customary 
international law became binding on a State even if the State refused to ratify a treaty 
                                                
126 Multilateral Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary 
Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accession, etc., as at 31 December 1976, 
St/Leg/Ser. D/10 (1977), iii-iv. 
127 A comparison of China’s positions, approaches and practices with those of other States, 
including those with civil-law legal systems or in East Asia, only distracts and digresses from 
a discussion of China’s positions, and this thesis does not purport to be a comparative study of 
legal systems or their treatment of international law. Furthermore, a civil-law legal system 
such as Germany, which deploys a monist approach to international law in its municipal legal 
order, places the relationship between international law and municipal law in different 
manners from those that pertain to China, which deploys a dualist approach. Not all legal 
systems in East Asia are based on European civil law; notably, Hong Kong adopts a dualist 
approach. Similarly, not all common-law legal systems adopt a dualist approach, as the United 
States exemplifies. Indeed, the hierarchy in a national legal order between international law 
and municipal law varies among continental European legal systems. 
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that contained the same norm.128 In his Hague Academy Lectures in 1958, Grigory 
Tunkin stated that for a custom to become a binding legal norm, it must have been 
accepted by all States. While Tunkin accepted that customs had played a large role in 
the formation of international law during the nineteenth century, he argued that their 
importance since then had subsided,129 and that ‘[t]he doctrine according to which 
customary norms recognised as such by a considerable number of States are binding 
upon all the States implies a considerable danger in the epoch of coexistence. This 
point should be specifically emphasised in view of the fact that this doctrine is widely 
accepted by western writers, and some judgments of the International Court of Justice 
may be interpreted in favour of this doctrine.’130 The Soviet perspective placed 
emphasis on strict observance of treaties, embodied in the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, in legal relations among States, although ‘Soviet jurists would retain for 
themselves, so to speak, a unilateral right of repudiation or denunciation of those 
treaties that they themselves do not particularly like.’131 Meanwhile, China 
maintained that only resolutions adopted by the General Assembly that were of a 
normative character relating to the rights and obligations of States, interpretations of 
the United Nations Charter or fundamental principles of international law, or 
declaratory of existing international law, might be capable of constituting a subsidiary 
source of international law.132 
                                                
128 Edward McWhinney, ‘“Peaceful Coexistence” and Soviet–Western International Law’, 56 
American Journal of International Law (1962), 951, 955. 
129 Grigory Ivanovich Tunkin, ‘Co-existence and International Law’, 95 Recueil des cours 
(1958–III), 1, 23. 
130 Ibid., 20. 
131 McWhinney, supra n.128, 956-57. 
132 Wang Tieya and Wei Min, eds., Guoji fa [International Law] (Beijing: Law Press, 1981), 
35, stated that ‘[t]here are divergent opinions on the effect of the resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly. According to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
the function of the United Nations General Assembly is generally one of deliberation and 
recommendation. Except for resolutions relating to organizational and financial questions 
[which are legally binding], the resolutions of the General Assembly are in the nature of 
recommendations and do not possess legally binding force. However, one cannot infer from 
this fact that there would be no legal consequence of resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly. Some resolutions of the General Assembly were adopted by unanimous or 
overwhelming majority votes of member states. Therefore, these resolutions not only have a 
certain binding force on those members who voted for their adoption, but also have general 
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Unlike their Soviet counterparts, scholars in China rejected general principles 
of law and awards or decisions of international tribunals as sources of international 
law, unless these principles and awards or decisions had been or have since been 
recognised in treaties or as customs.133 Zhu Lisun has written that ‘[f]irst, in reality 
there are only two legal systems, i.e., municipal law and international law, and there 
exists neither an abstract law nor a legal system above the municipal law and 
international law. Therefore, there will be no general principles of law in abstract. 
Second, the general principles of law advocated by Western legal scholars are 
municipal law principles. However, since international law and municipal law are 
two different legal systems, the principles of municipal law cannot be applied to 
international law.’134 The standard textbook on international law in China at the time 
argued that the important point about whether general principles of law constituted a 
source of international law ‘is the requirement of being “recognized”. Obviously, any 
general principles of law which have not gone through the recognition of various 
                                                                                                                           
significance in international relations. In the meantime, some declarations included in certain 
resolutions may in whole or in part reflect existing or formative principles, rules, regulations 
or institutions of international law. Thus, these declarations undoubtedly become subsidiary 
means to determine principles, rules, regulations and institutions of international law. 
Consequently, one should consider resolutions of international organizations, especially 
certain kinds of resolutions of the United Nations, as parallel to judicial decisions and writings 
of publicists. [They have] become “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”, 
though [these resolutions] are not direct sources of international law. Moreover, in view of 
their international character, their [priority as subsidiary means] should be higher than that of 
judicial decisions and writings of publicists’: as quoted in Chiu, supra n.118, 1142-43. 
Similarly, Liu Ding asserted that ‘[a]ccording to international law, an international 
organization does not have legislative power and the resolutions it passes generally do not 
have binding force upon its members. … However, resolutions of international organizations 
of significant importance, which are consistent with generally recognized guiding principles 
of international law, do possess legal validity and should be considered as a source of 
international law. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order and its Programme of Action adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on May 1, 1974, and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties adopted by the Twenty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on December 12, 1974, which confirm the permanent sovereignty over natural resources of 
states, sovereign equality of all states, the undeniable rights of all states to participate equally 
in resolving world economic problems and other principles, should have the validity of 
international law’: Guoji jingji fa [International Economic Law] (1984), 14-15, as quoted in 
Hungdah Chiu, ‘Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law’, 28 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1987), 289, 304. 
133 Chiu, supra n.118, 1140-41. 
134 Zhu Lisun, Guoji gong fa [Public International Law] (Beijing: Central Broadcasting and 
Televising University Press, 1985), 10, as quoted in Chiu, ibid., 1141, fn.47. 
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states cannot become sources of international law. … Since [general principles] must 
be recognized and states explicitly or implicitly express their recognition through 
international treaties or international customs, then the general principles of law, in 
this sense, are merged together with these two principal sources of international law – 
international treaties and international customs. Therefore, they are not an 
independent source of international law.’135 Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ itself 
is not a source of international law; it is a provision that enumerates sources to which 
the ICJ may refer in its decisions and advisory opinions. Constituting one facet of the 
ICJ’s specific procedures, the provision cannot be taken to represent a codification, or 
general recognition among States, of what constitutes international law. Article 59 of 
the Statute, which states that a decision of the Court has binding force only inter 
partes and in respect of the particular case, shows that the legal significance of a 
decision of the Court does not go beyond the scope of the decision and metamorphose 
into the general corpus of international law.136 In respect of teachings of jurists which 
Article 38(3)(d) of the Statute recognises as a subsidiary source of international law, 
scholars in China held the view that Western jurists’ interpretations of international 
law merely reflected the bourgeois and imperialistic nature of international law and 
should be rejected, and only jurists trained in ‘the proletarian science of international 
                                                
135 Wang and Wei, supra n.132, 32, as quoted in Chiu, ibid., 1141-42. 
136 Not all scholars in China reject the possibility that a decision of the International Court of 
Justice may have wider legal effects. For example, Zhou Xiaoling maintains that ‘[a]s the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations and the only existing universal judicial organ, 
the judgments and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice have significant 
influence on the development of international law. Although Article 59 of the ICJ Statute 
provides that a judgment of the Court is binding only on the parties and in respect of the 
particular case, … because of the status of the ICJ in the area of international judiciary, the 
judgments and advisory opinions of the Court have always been considered as the 
authoritative expression and interpretation of the questions involved in the case. For instance, 
significant influences have been produced by the judgments of the ICJ in the Nottebohm case 
and the Barcelona Traction case toward the question of nationality and diplomatic 
protections, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
toward the width of the territorial sea and the nature of continental shelf and the Advisory 
Opinion on the Reservation to the Genocide Convention toward the international rules on the 
question of reservation to multilateral conventions’: ‘The United Nations and International 
Law-Making’, 4 International Studies (1985), 29, as quoted in Chiu, ibid., 1144-45. 
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law can correctly apply or interpret rules of international law’.137 
Samuel Kim suggested in 1978 that China’s frequent non-participation and 
abstentions as a Permanent Member within the Security Council in the 1970s, which 
Chapter VI explores in detail, were indicative of its lack of a ‘principled stand’ on 
many legal issues.138 However, Kim later argued that through non-participation in 
Security Council decision-making processes during the 1970s, China managed to 
maintain ‘both passive opposition based on China’s “principled stand” and passive 
cooperation based on China’s refusal to obstruct the majority (Third World) will.’139 
Calling China a ‘Club of One’ within the United Nations, Ann Kent argues that 
instead of posing as a leader of developing States, China sought to balance its own 
fundamental interests and at the same time advocate those of developing States.140 
Even after China started to participate more actively in international organisations in 
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and following the onset of political reform 
that Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1982, many remained unconvinced by its motives. 
Bell, for instance, was adamant that ‘[p]resent Chinese concepts of the world order 
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1973, 6-7. 
139 Samuel S. Kim, ‘Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy’, 35 International Organization 
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140 Ann Kent, ‘China’s International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations’, 8 
Global Governance (2002), 343, 349. See also Trong R. Chai, ‘Chinese Policy toward the 
Third World and the Superpowers in the UN General Assembly 1971–1977: A Voting 
Analysis’, 33 International Organization (1979), 391. 
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as-it-should-be presumably continue to embody the vague Marxist notion of the 
eventual withering-away of the state, a development which (if it ever occurs) will 
obviously make the notion of a society of states obsolete.’141 Other scholars were 
concerned about the apparent incompatibility between China and the current 
international legal order in which human rights began to assume a primary place, as 
the Chinese conception of rights emphasises collective rather than individual 
rights.142 Kim argues that China allowed its insistence on State sovereignty to take a 
back seat due to its increasing dependence on the international system between the 
end of the Cultural Revolution and the international uproar following its suppression 
of dissent on Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Kim finds that ‘[i]n the post-
Tiananmen period the old conception of State sovereignty has returned with a 
vengeance to the Chinese leadership afflicted with a siege mentality that goes back to 
the semi-colonial period of unequal treaties. A tendency to carry the logic of State 
sovereignty to a self-serving protective but untenable extreme makes China the odd 
man out in the post-Cold War quest for a new world order.’143 
Meanwhile, China avoided, and continues to avoid, international mechanisms 
of a judicial character, as it considers that interstate disputes should be resolved by 
negotiations and not by legal proceedings. In a letter to the International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’) of 5 September 1972, China as represented by the PRC government 
stated that it ‘does not recognize the statement made by the defunct Chinese 
Government on 26 October 1946 … concerning the acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court.’144 Similarly, in its participation in the negotiations for the 
eventual 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China opposed 
vesting compulsory jurisdiction in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
                                                
141 Bell, supra n.98, 265. 
142 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 41-42. See discussion in Chapter IV. 
143 Samuel S. Kim, ‘Sovereignty in the Chinese Image of World Order’, in Macdonald, supra 
n.20, 425, 432. 
144 Report of the International Court of Justice (August 1972–July 1973), 28 G.A.O.R. Supp. 
No.5, 1. 
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as contrary to the principle of State sovereignty.145 Even though as a Permanent 
Member of the Security Council its candidate would have been automatically elected, 
China did not nominate any candidate to the bench of the ICJ between 1971 and 
1984, largely due to its inexperience with international law and, during the Cultural 
Revolution, hostility to any notion of law, and its rejection of any international 
tribunal as an appropriate forum to settle disputes between States. It was not until 
1984 that China nominated Ni Zhengyu to the bench of the ICJ. 
As time went on, the PRC government began to accept China’s capacity to 
play major substantive roles in resolving international disputes, particularly after the 
Nicaragua decision146 in which the ICJ sided with a developing State and not the 
United States. China’s Ambassador Huang Jiahua stated in 1987 that ‘in recent years, 
the International Court of Justice has undergone some changes with the development 
of the international situation and changes within the United Nations. Its composition, 
applicable law and rules of procedure have all witnessed some positive progress. On 
the whole, the role and impact of the Court have been gradually increasing. This is 
reflected in the fact that the number of cases submitted to the Court for adjudication 
has increased, and that some important international treaties and agreements all 
contain provisions for submitting disputes to the Court for settlement. This shows that 
the international community is attaching greater importance to the Court.’147 
China is not alone in its hostility to international dispute settlement by 
judicial means. The United States has painstakingly refused to submit to, or otherwise 
withdrawn from, compulsory jurisdiction of international tribunals, including the ICJ 
and the International Criminal Court, precisely in the name of State sovereignty and 
in its confidence of the superior quality of its municipal laws and legal system and 
                                                
145 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Official Records, Vol.V (1976), 
24. 
146 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
147 China’s Ambassador Huang Jiahua’s speech at New York University School of Law, 11 
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their conformity with international law. In fact, among the five Permanent Members 
of the Security Council, only the United Kingdom has accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Kim argued in 1999 that all the changes in Chinese foreign 
policy since China began to undergo domestic reform and participate more actively in 
international organisations should be ‘better seen as adaptive/instrumental learning 
rather than cognitive/normative learning at the basic level of worldview and national 
identity’.148 However, Kim believed that in continuing to deepen its participation in 
international organisations, China’s choices would be constrained and many of its 
foreign policy policies, practices and principles would require readjustment.149 
As law was regarded during the Cultural Revolution as a tool of exploitation 
of the masses, a large number of judges, cadres, and legal scholars were purged 
without recourse to formal process, and legal education in China was entirely 
abolished until order was restored. In China until the reform era during the 1980s, law 
was not to protect rights and freedoms between individuals or against the state, but 
served as ‘an instrument of social engineering, to be used for the transformation of 
Chinese society and its members in accordance with the revolutionary ideology. 
Either in a formal or informal style, law is seen as an important agent of political 
socialization and mobilization to inculcate the people with the new socialist 
morality.’150 Even the PRC government’s representation of China in the United 
Nations since October 1971 did not rejuvenate international law as a field of study or 
an element of policy-making.151 However, since 1974, as the Cultural Revolution was 
coming to an end, legal education, including instructions and research on 
international law, was reintroduced at Chinese universities, many of which focused 
                                                
148 Samuel S. Kim, ‘China and the United Nations’, in Elizabeth Economy and Michel 
Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1999), 42, 80. 
149 Ibid., 81. 
150 Shao-Chuan Leng, ‘The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao 
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on different aspects of public and private international law.152 Since then, universities 
offering degrees and courses, and students trained, in international law have 
proliferated. The Chinese Society of International Law was established in 1980 and 
the Chinese Yearbook of International Law began to be published in 1982, which has 
now been complemented with the publication of the Chinese Journal of International 
Law by Oxford University Press. 
 
VI. International law in socialist-market China since 1984 
 
From communist China’s perspective, the applicability of international law in the 
municipal sphere was a matter for the State, and conflict between international law 
and municipal law simply could not arise. Various Chinese scholars, following the 
footsteps of their Soviet counterparts, explained how international law and municipal 
law were always reconcilable. Soviet scholar Feodor Kozhevnikov explained in 1957 
that ‘[p]roceeding from one and the same supreme authority, both the rules of 
International Law and those of domestic origin should have the same binding force 
for all organs and nationals of the countries concerned. By concluding an 
international agreement a governing authority undertakes, if necessary, to bring its 
domestic legislation into line with the international commitments it has assumed. On 
the other hand, by promulgating a law clearly contrary to International Law, the 
government concerned commits a violation of International Law, for which the State 
concerned is responsible under International Law. Therefore, International Law and 
Municipal Law must not in their very nature either contradict each other or have 
primacy one over the other.’153 Zhou Gengsheng stated that 
 
                                                
152 Chiu, supra n.118, 1159-60. 
153 Feodor I. Kozhevnikov, ed., International Law: A Textbook for Use in Law School 
(Moscow: Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1957; trans. 
1961), 15, as quoted in Chiu, supra n.117, 259-60. 
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Looking at the question of the relationship between international law 
and municipal law as a practical question, in the final analysis this is 
a question of how a state implements international law in its 
municipal sphere, i.e., a question of performing its obligation 
assumed under international law. International law by its nature is 
binding on a state and is not directly binding on its organs or people. 
Even if a municipal law is contrary to international law, the court of 
that state still has to execute that law, but the state will assume 
responsibility for violating international obligations. As states have 
recognized the norms of international law, they have the obligation to 
make their municipal law consistent with obligations assumed under 
international law. With respect to the question of how to fulfill this 
requirement, it is within the discretion of various states. … As long 
as states themselves seriously perform their international obligations, 
the relationship between international law and municipal law can 
always be reconciled.154 
 
While Zhou rejected the monist theory of international law as an imperialist notion, 
Wang and Wei in their textbook regarded it as an attempt to undermine the principle 
of State sovereignty by using ‘“world law” to substitute international law’ and 
‘“world government” to substitute sovereign states, which is theoretically illogical 
and also contrary to the reality’.155 Wang and Wei explained that 
 
                                                
154 Zhou Gengsheng, Guoji fa [International Law] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1981), 20, as 
quoted in Chiu, supra n.118, 1146. Interestingly, Zhou’s analysis of the relationship between 
international law and municipal law in a municipal legal order (not necessarily a Chinese or 
socialist one) was identical to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), that even the United Nations Charter is a treaty binding on the 
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Charter constitutes a self-executing treaty which the Court found not to be the case. 
155 Wang and Wei, supra n.132, 43-44, as quoted in Chiu, ibid. 
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International law and municipal law are two systems of law or one 
may say that international law is a special system of law which is 
different from domestic law. … However, because municipal law is 
enacted by states and international law is enacted through the 
participation of states, there are close connections between these two 
systems – mutual infiltration and mutual supplementation. In 
principle, when states enact municipal law, they should take into 
consideration the requirement of international law. [Similarly] when 
states participate in enacting international law, they should also 
consider it from the standpoint of municipal law. In practice, there 
are various methods to resolve or avoid the conflict between 
international law and municipal law. If a state enacts a law which is 
obviously contrary to principles, rules, regulations or institutions of 
international law and thus infringing on the legitimate right and 
interest of another state, then it becomes an international illegal act 
and the question of incurring international responsibility will arise. 
This is not a question of the basic contradiction between international 
law and municipal law.156 
 
As Liu put it, ‘[s]o far as our socialist state is concerned, in the principle the question 
of conflict between modern international law and municipal law will not arise … we 
will neither accept any international obligation which is contradictory to our 
municipal law principles, nor promulgate any municipal law and regulations which 
are contradictory to the international obligations we assumed.’157 
 Notwithstanding these views espoused by Chinese scholars, and although the 
1982 Constitution is silent on the status of international law vis-à-vis municipal law, 
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Articles 18, 32 and 50 guarantee that in certain areas international law takes 
precedence over municipal law.158 In addition, Article 238 of the Law of Civil 
Procedure,159 Article 142 of the General Principles of the Civil Law,160 Article 16 of 
the Income Tax Law concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment,161 Article 28 of the Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises,162 Article 6 of the Law on Foreign-related 
                                                
158 Article 18 of the 1982 Constitution states that ‘[t]he People’s Republic of China permits 
foreign enterprises, other foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest 
in China and to enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises 
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People’s Republic of 
China. All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations in China, as well as 
joint ventures with Chinese and foreign investment located in China, shall abide by the law of 
the People’s Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the law of 
the People’s Republic of China.’ Article 32, ibid., states that ‘[t]he People’s Republic of China 
protects the lawful rights and interests of foreigners within Chinese territory, and while on 
Chinese territory foreigners must abide by the law of the People’s Republic of China. The 
People’s Republic of China may grant asylum to foreigners who request it for political 
reasons.’ Article 50, ibid., states that ‘[t]he People’s Republic of China protects the legitimate 
rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad and protects the lawful rights and 
interests of returned overseas Chinese and of the family members of Chinese nationals 
residing abroad.’ 
159 Adopted by the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 9 April 1991 
and promulgated by Order No.44 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, and 
effective on the date of promulgation. Article 238 states that ‘[i]f an international treaty 
concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provisions that differ 
from those of this Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the 
provisions are the ones on which China has announced reservations.’ 
160 Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress on 12 April 1986 
and promulgated by Order No.37 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 12 
April 1986. Article 142 states that ‘[t]he application of law in civil relations with foreigners 
shall be determined by the provisions in this chapter [i.e., Chapter VIII: Application of Law in 
Civil Relations with Foreigners]. If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the 
People’s Republic of China contains provisions differing from those in the civil laws of the 
People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the 
provisions are ones on which the People’s Republic of China has announced reservations. 
International practice may be applied to matters for which neither the law of the People’s 
Republic of China nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People’s 
Republic of China has any provisions.’ 
161 Adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated 
on 10 September 1980. Article 16 states that ‘[i]ncome tax paid by a joint venture or its 
branch in other countries may be credited against the assessed income tax of the head office as 
foreign tax credit. Where agreements on avoidance of double taxation have been concluded 
between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the government of another 
country, income tax credits shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of the related 
agreements.’ 
162 Adopted at the Fourth Session of the National People’s Congress on 9 April 1991 and 
promulgated by Order No.45 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 9 April 
1991, and effective as of 1 July 1991. Article 28 states that ‘[w]here the provisions of tax 
agreements concluded between the government of the People’s Republic of China and foreign 
governments are different from the provisions of this Law, the provisions of the respective 
agreements shall apply.’ 
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Economic Contracts,163 and Article 36 of the Law of Succession164 provide that 
China’s treaty obligations override any inconsistent municipal laws or regulations 
save those on which China has declared reservations. Taken together, these municipal 
laws ‘should be regarded as a valid and accountable expression of China’s general 
position as to the issue of validity of treaties in general … within the Chinese legal 
system.’165 
A treaty, to be binding on and enforceable in China, must have been entered 
into by China in accordance with the Law on the Procedures of the Conclusion of 
Treaties promulgated in 1990; such a treaty, except for provisions on which China 
has made reservations, is binding on municipal courts and takes precedence over 
municipal law.166 In China, a treaty does not automatically become part of national 
law and must go through the process of implementation through administrative 
measures or transformation through national legislation, although a particular treaty 
may be directly applied by municipal courts in pursuance of particular enabling 
                                                
163 Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s 
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national legislation or Article 142 of the General Principles of the Civil Law and 
Article 238 of the Law of Civil Procedure.167 Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian have noted 
that China is now party to over three hundred multilateral treaties and about seventy 
municipal laws touch upon its treaty obligations.168 As it was about to join the World 
Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) in 2001, China stated in the Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China as part of its agreement with the WTO thus: 
 
The representative of China stated that China had been consistently 
performing its international treaty obligations in good faith. 
According to the Constitution and the Law on the Procedures of 
Conclusion of Treaties, the WTO Agreement fell within the category 
of ‘important international agreements’ subject to ratification by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. China would 
ensure that its laws and regulations pertaining to or affecting trade 
were in conformity with the WTO Agreement and with its 
commitments so as to fully perform its international obligations. For 
this purpose, China had commenced a plan to systematically revise 
its relevant domestic laws. Therefore, the WTO Agreement would be 
implemented by China in an effective and uniform manner through 
revising its existing domestic laws and enacting new ones fully in 
compliance with the WTO Agreement.169 
 
Xue and Jin note that ‘China has repealed, abrogated, revised, enacted and 
promulgated more than 3000 domestic laws, administrative regulations and 
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Western powers created, interpreted and manipulated international law to suit their 
needs and interests, and expected non-Western States to follow it. Japan, Siam, and 
the Ottoman Empire modernised their legal systems and adapted to international law 
during the nineteenth century in their attempts to gain admission to the ‘family of 
nations’ and be treated as equal members. Yet only Japan managed and even then its 
demand at the Paris Peace Conference that the peace treaty with Germany contain a 
racial equality clause was rejected. Siam, a major ancient kingdom in Southeast Asia 
with its own tribute system, had to enter into treaties with foreign States conferring 
foreign diplomatic representation in the Siamese capital, extraterritoriality, and 
foreign access to the Siamese market. The Ottoman Empire, realising that it would 
never be accepted as a member within the ‘family of nations’, decided to react against 
the international system and align itself with Germany in the First World War, with 
the result that the entire empire disintegrated.171 
 Qing China’s approaches to international law were at variance with those of 
Japan, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire, as it resisted international law and foreign 
intrusions into Chinese territory, although it did occasionally utilise international law 
to defend its State sovereignty and sovereign rights and to attempt to re-negotiate 
concessions it had been forced to make. Revision and eventually abrogation of such 
concessions, through reference to international legal norms and principles such as 
rebus sic standibus, succeeded during the republican era, which also witnessed 
China’s use of international law and the League of Nations to defend its State 
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171 For a discussion of how Siam and the Ottoman Empire adapted or reacted to international 
law and the international system before the First World War, see Horowitz, supra n.68. See 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity vis-à-vis Manchuria from Japan that resulted in 
the emergence of a new and enduring norm of customary international law under 
which recognition of a territory that comes into being as a State through the threat or 
use of force is unlawful. Communist China initially objected to international law as 
an imperialistic tool oppressing weak States and hindering worldwide communist 
revolution, until the PRC government gradually realised after 1971, through 
increasing socialisation with international organisations, the roles China may play in 
the conduct of international relations through international law and international 
organisations. With China’s rise as arguably one of the two most important actors in 
the current international legal order, it is imperative to understand the influence of 
international law on China’s approaches to human rights, democracy, self-
determination, and international peace and security, and how China’s approaches may 
contribute to the understanding and development of international law and the 
direction in which the current international legal order may proceed. 
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China’s rise to superpower capability and status and its increasing influence in 
shaping the normative and substantive structure and content of the current 
international legal order has aroused significant concern that human rights 
development and liberal democracy will be placed in a precarious position, as other 
non-liberal States may look to emulate China’s development model and justify their 
violations of human rights and authoritarian, or even totalitarian, governance. Harry 
Harding describes China’s political system as a ‘consultative authoritarian regime’ 
marked by ‘significant departure from the totalitarianism of the past but not yet a 
fully democratic, or even a quasi-pluralistic, political system. … It is increasingly 
consultative in its recognition of the need to obtain information, advice, and support 
from key sectors of the population, but still authoritarian in its desire to suppress 
dissent and maintain ultimate political power in the hands of the party.’1 Robert 
Jackson has strongly doubted Western countries’ capacity or willingness to force 
China to accept their demand for democratisation or improvement of its human rights 
record, partly because to do so ‘would go against the fundamental commercial 
interests of such countries. It would be an irresponsible and unrealistic foreign 
policy.’2 In contrast to Bruce Gilley’s contention that ‘there is simply no compelling 
argument that China will be a great exception to the nearly-worldwide movement of 
social emancipation from “sclerotic authoritarianism” that we now call 
                                                            
* An earlier version of this chapter is published in 13 Human Rights Law Review (2013), 645-
89. 
1 Harry Harding, ‘Political Development in Post-Mao China’, in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph 
N. Clough, eds., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986), 13, 33. 
2 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 364. 
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democratization’,3 Andrew Nathan speaks of the ‘disturbing possibility’ that China’s 
experience may suggest that ‘authoritarianism is a viable regime from even under 
conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the global economy’.4 
However, is authoritarianism5 perforce incompatible with human rights and 
democracy? Do Western conceptions of human rights and democracy constitute the 
only viable and proper interpretations to which there are no alternatives? What are 
Chinese conceptions of human rights and democracy, and how might these 
conceptions enhance or undermine the human rights project? With its increasingly 
adept socialisation with international organisations as discussed in Chapters III and 
VI, how has China’s approach to international human rights law evolved since its 
realisation of the roles it may play in shaping international law, how international 
human rights norms might already have contributed to human rights protection under 
China’s Constitution and laws, and might China reconcile its governance with the 
rule of law? Are democratic practices entirely absent in China; if not, in what forms 
do they manifest? At a fundamental level, is it possible that China’s experience may 
help augment our understanding and the development of international human rights 
law and democracy through a mixture of convergence and divergence? These 
questions raise interesting and important issues from scholarly, political and legal 
standpoints that this chapter examines. 
                                                            
3 Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How it will Happen and Where it will Lead (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 251. 
4 Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 16. 
5 Many Western scholars confuse authoritarianism with totalitarianism and define it as 
absence of democracy and meaningfully protected human rights. Anne-Marie Slaughter, in 
‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, 6 European Journal of International Law 
(1995), 503, 514 and 509, argues that liberal States constitute ‘a world of peace, democracy, 
and human rights’ and ‘[l]iberal international relations theory applies to all states. Totalitarian 
governments, authoritarian dictatorships, and theocracies can all be depicted as representatives 
of some subset of actors in domestic and transnational society, even if it is a very small or 
particularistic slice’ (emphasis in original). As noted in Chapter II, an authoritarian 
dictatorship is a misnomer. An authoritarian government relies on inculcation in its people of 
certain beliefs, norms and values in order to maintain and exercise control, and not on overt 
coercion as a dictatorship does. In addition, an authoritarian government may be a 
democratically elected one, as many Western governments evidence. 
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This chapter first discusses China’s conceptions of human rights and 
democracy, cognisance of which is essential not only to our understanding the human 
rights situation in China but also to the legitimacy of international human rights law 
and the merits and flaws of liberal democracy. As noted in Chapters I and II, many 
Western States and scholars assume that China does not subscribe to international 
human rights law and is a non-liberal State least likely to be compliant with 
international human rights norms and principles. This chapter thus proceeds to 
explore the evolution of China’s approach to international human rights law since 
October 1971 when the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) government replaced the 
authorities on Taiwan in the United Nations as the representative government of 
China. It also examines China’s approaches to the newly created Human Rights 
Council and its universal periodic review mechanism under which all United Nations 
Member States’ human rights performances are regularly assessed. As all 
international human rights norms require domestic implementation and enforcement, 
this chapter then discusses the extent to which human rights protection may already 
be available under China’s Constitution and laws, with workers’ rights, women’s 
rights, and privacy rights as case studies (which should not be taken as exhaustive), 
and the contributions international human rights norms may have made in their 
domestic development and formulation. Subsequently, this chapter addresses the 
applicability of a rule-of-law model in China, and the roles and problems civil society 
in China and abroad play and present in the promotion, development and 
understanding of human rights norms in China. Finally, this chapter considers how 
democratic practices, as exemplified by experiences in China, need not necessarily be 
in the form of periodic elections, and how democracy, contrary to Western 





II. Human rights with Chinese characteristics? 
 
A fundamental difference between Western States and China over human rights is 
that in Western States human rights serve as the ultimate bulwark against the state, 
are relied on also between private persons or companies, and are of an individualistic 
nature; in China, communitarian rights and obligations take precedence over 
individual rights. While not a religion and indeed ‘thoroughly secular’, 6 
Confucianism (except during the Cultural Revolution when adherents were purged, 
publicly humiliated, or killed) as a philosophy of life pervades the moral, social, 
political and juristic fabrics of society and governance throughout East Asia. William 
Gabrenya and Kwang-Kuo Hwang note that ‘Confucian concepts are employed both 
in an analytical, abstract, philosophical sense and as a useful heuristic for describing 
the professed values of Chinese people.’7 
The institution of family, in particular, is central to Confucianism, with the 
principle of filial piety controlling all social thoughts and interactions as well as 
providing moral guidance. Although obedience and deference to authority is expected 
of in other cultures, filial piety ‘surpasses all other ethics in its historical continuity, 
the proportion of humanity under its governance, and the encompassing and 
imperative nature of its precepts. The attributes of intergenerational relationships 
governed by filial piety are structural, enduring, and invariable across situations 
within Chinese culture.’8  Filial piety constitutes ‘a guiding principle governing 
                                                            
6 William K. Gabrenya, Jr., and Kwang-Kuo Hwang, ‘Chinese Social Interaction: Harmony 
and Hierarchy on the Good Earth’, in Michael Harris Bond, ed., The Handbook of Chinese 
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7 Ibid., 309. See also Kwang-Kuo Hwang, ‘Two Moralities: Reinterpreting the Findings of 
Empirical Research on Moral Reasoning in Taiwan’, 1 Asian Journal of Social Psychology 
(1998), 221; Kwang-Kuo Hwang, ‘Filial Piety and Loyalty: Two Types of Social 
Identification in Confucianism’, 2 Asian Journal of Social Psychology (1999), 163; Kwang-
Kuo Hwang, ‘Chinese Relationalism: Theoretical Construction and Methodological 
Considerations’, 30 Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (2000), 155. 
8 David Y.F. Ho, ‘Filial Piety and its Psychological Consequences’, in Bond, supra n.6, 155, 
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generational Chinese patterns of socialization, as well as specific rules of 
intergenerational conduct, applicable throughout the length of one’s life span’.9 
Not only do filial obligations guide familial interactions, but they also 
provide and constitute the framework against which authority in all generalities and 
circumstances is to be understood and observed. Individuals are culturally engrained 
to regard as their ultimate purpose not serving their own goals and ideals but those of 
their parents and, above all, the State. As Henry Rosemont observes, ‘[f]or the early 
Confucians there can be no me in isolation, to be considered abstractly; I am the 
totality of roles I live in relation to specific others. I do not play or perform these 
roles; I am these roles. When they have all been specified I have been defined 
uniquely, fully, and altogether, with no remainder with which to piece together a free, 
autonomous self.’10 It is this difference in the relationship between the individual and 
the state that has led to mutual miscomprehension and unease between Western States 
and China and between their peoples. 
Of course, a culture does not possess any rights in se. As Peter Jones puts it, 
‘[b]eliefs and forms of life are not entities possessed of moral standing to which we 
might, as a consequence, owe duties.’11 Some might even question how traditional 
Confucian norms and values could survive in China after 1949 with a communist 
ideology operating in tandem. Yet, as Mark Mancall explains: 
 
The survival of elements of the tradition into the contemporary scene 
has not necessarily brought the Chinese Marxism into a sharp 
schizophrenic conflict with his own tradition as a Chinese. Quite the 
contrary, it would appear that, in large areas, the tradition may well 
                                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Henry Rosemont, Jr., ‘Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique’, in Leroy Rouner, 
ed., Human Rights and the World’s Religions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), 167, 177. 
11 Peter Jones, ‘Individuals, Communities and Human Rights’, 26 Review of International 
Studies (2000), 199, 202. 
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reinforce certain Marxist-Leninist assumptions, at least as these 
assumptions have developed out of an amalgam of Chinese 
Communist revolutionary experience and Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary theory. To take but one brief and general example, the 
unitary nature of the traditional Chinese state together with the 
traditional existence of an official ideology – Confucianism – which 
served as the intellectual basis for the state certainly do not conflict 
with, and in fact reinforce, the Chinese Communist tendency to see 
no real or apparent dichotomy between the state and the party, a 
tendency which evolved directly out of Chinese revolutionary 
experience. Or another: the traditional hierarchical view of the world 
order together with the traditional respect due elders may well have 
contributed to the creation of an intellectual disposition to acquiesce 
to Stalin’s approach to bloc organization, enabling Mao, as a 
Communist, to accept Stalin’s leadership despite his own 
dissatisfactions with Stalin’s leadership in China during the 
revolutionary struggle.12  
 
It must also be noted that in China communism originated from within, unlike in 
Eastern Europe where it was imposed by the Soviet Union. Many predicted that the 
demise of communism in the Soviet Union would be followed by the collapse of the 
communist Party-state in China. China’s astonishing economic development in the 
past two decades suggests that its communist Party-state is likely to endure for some 
time to come. Furthermore, as Benjamin Schwartz has argued, one of the reasons 
Marxism-Leninism had its appeal to young Chinese was its theory of nationalism, 
                                                            
12 Mark Mancall, ‘The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy’, 349 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science (1963), 14, 24-25. 
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which ‘provided a plausible explanation for China’s failure to achieve its rightful 
place in the world of nations’.13 
As noted in Chapter II, in a survey of seven hundred Beijing residents in 
December 1995, more than 95 per cent of the respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement that they ‘would rather live in an orderly society than in a 
freer society which is prone to disruptions’.14 Nathan and Tianjian Shi found the 
Chinese to be generally disengaged from their government. In their survey conducted 
in 1990, 71.6 per cent of the 2,896 respondents considered their local government to 
have no effect on their daily life, while 71.8 per cent held the same view in respect of 
the national government.15 The authors suggested that the respondents had such 
apathy towards their local and national governments not so much because they 
thought that government policy would have little impact on their lives but out of a 
belief that government officials would not treat them equally given the hierarchical 
nature of Chinese society.16 Together with Confucian enculturation through which 
rights are regarded and engrained as not inherent in being a human but ‘[flowing] 
from the state in the form of a gratuitous grant that can be subjected to conditions or 
abrogation by the unilateral decision of the state’,17 the economic progress and 
benefits brought to the Chinese people as a whole (albeit not all of them individually) 
by China’s modernisation and increasing economic relations with other States have 
augmented the general contentment of the Chinese people with the Chinese 
leadership. External pressures may be stymied by ‘countervailing national norms and 
value structures that emphasized sovereignty and domestic cohesion more than 
                                                            
13 Benjamin I. Schwartz, ‘The Chinese Perception of World Order: Past and Present’, in John 
King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 276, 286. 
14 Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John M Scheb, II, ‘Political Views from Below: A Survey of 
Beijing Residents’, 30 PS: Political Science and Politics (1997), 474, 476. The response rate 
was 97 per cent. 
15 Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, ‘Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings 
from a Survey’, 122:2 Daedalus (1993), 95, 99-100. 
16 Ibid., 115. 
17 R. Randle Edwards, ‘Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today’, 
in R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J. Nathan, eds., Human Rights in 
Contemporary China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 41, 44-45. 
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human rights principles.’ 18  Thus, when seeking to foster the development and 
protection of human rights in China, one should heed Ann Kent’s caution that ‘[i]n 
pitting the sovereignty and national prestige of one state against another they may 
have the counter-productive effect of mobilizing the very citizenry whose human 
rights are being abused in support of the abusing state.’19  
In automatically dismissing communitarian notions of rights (and duties) as 
incompatible with individualism and attendant notions of rights and freedoms, 
Western States and scholars deny the right of other States and their peoples to decide 
the forms of society in and governance under which they wish to live.20 Democracy is 
not necessarily identical to popular sovereignty, and if a people decide that they 
desire a non-democratic form of governance for their State and society, it is not 
merely that non-democratic governance is part of their culture but also that it is 
accepted by the people as part of their culture, and an ‘appeal to a traditional culture 
against democracy is still an appeal to a form of populism’.21 Individualism demands 
that ‘We should respect their form of government because it is the form that they 
endorse, even though they do not themselves believe that the legitimacy of their form 
of government depends upon their own endorsement.’22 As Brad Roth explains, in 
States where communism is subscribed to (by both the state and its people), Western 
notions of democracy qua elections undermine true and meaningful participation in 
the political process: 
 
                                                            
18 Thomas Risse, ‘International Institutions, Non-State Actors, and Domestic Change: The 
Case of Human Rights’, Recueil des cours de l’académie de droit européen, Vol.VIII, Book 2 
(2000), 1, 39. 
19  Ann Kent, ‘China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of 
Multilateral Monitoring, 1989–1994’, 17 Human Rights Quarterly (1995), 1, 1. 
20 The notion that communitarianism perforce undermines individual rights and freedoms and 
is subscribed to only in non-liberal States (or perpetuated by their governments in order to 
legitimate their governance) is also not true, as the example of Ireland shows: see Aisling 
O’Sullivan and Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Judicial Review in Ireland and the Relationship between the 
Irish Constitution and Natural Law’, 15:2 Nottingham Law Journal (2006), 18. 
21 Jones, supra n.11, 210. 
22 Ibid., 211 (emphasis in original). 
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In the Marxist-Leninist view, multi-party competition masks the 
inalterable structure of power rooted in the concentrated ownership 
and control of the major means of production, distribution and 
exchange. In conditions of social stratification, dissent and 
opposition party activity aimed at challenging the structure of social 
decisionmaking are effectively marginalized, as a particular social 
stratum holds de facto control over the major parties, the mass media, 
the sources of campaign financing, and other channels of influence. 
Even where politicians espousing change are elected to office, the 
private sector’s stranglehold over the economy forces efforts at social 
transformation to yield in the name of preserving the ‘investment 
climate’. Voters are thus left merely to choose which representatives 
of private sector interests will administer a public sector of limited 
scope and autonomy.23  
 
Furthermore, popular will may dissipate in the face of a democratically elected 
government failing its promises and duties to its citizens, while an authoritarian or 
totalitarian government may be held by its people in esteem. Thus, ‘it cannot be said 
a priori that coups d’état, emergency rule, or even substantial periods of one-party or 
coalitional dictatorship violate popular sovereignty.’24 
 
III. China’s approach to international human rights law 
 
The five-phase spiral model developed by constructivist international relations 
theorists posits a network of domestic and international non-governmental 
organisations (‘NGOs’), together with United Nations monitoring mechanisms, with 
                                                            
23 Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 331. 
24 Ibid., 344. 
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the capacity to influence a State’s approach to its identities and short- and long-term 
state interests and behaviours through socialisation with international human rights 
norms.25 The five phases are, namely, a State’s marked deterioration in its human 
rights record (phase one), NGOs being able to receive information about the State’s 
human rights violations (phase two), opportunistic concessions from the State (phase 
three), the State’s deployment of international human rights norms, the validity of 
which it no longer contests (phase four), and the State’s alignment of its behaviours 
with international human rights norms (phase five).26 
While one should be sceptical about such a linear and teleological approach 
to human rights development that again posits compliance with international human 
rights norms, as interpreted by Western States and scholars, as its pinnacle,27 most 
observers of China’s human rights record likely would argue that China is in the 
midst of phase three in its socialisation with international human rights norms, with 
its occasional release of noted political prisoners being the most illuminating (and 
intentionally so, for Western States and media). However, as Nathan has observed, 
‘China has behaved as a realist power, making concessions it perceived as necessary 
to influence states with which it was interacting and not making them when they were 
not seen as necessary’.28 Furthermore, it is important to note that ‘[t]he arbitrariness 
with which a regime can, in response to political pressure, release an individual who 
had been sentenced to prison may be just as much a signal of systemic deficiencies as 
the arbitrariness with which a regime can arrest and imprison an individual.’29 The 
release of a few noted political prisoners necessarily entails that China is under less 
                                                            
25 See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
26  Caroline Fleay, ‘Human Rights, Transnational Actors and the Chinese Government: 
Another Look at the Spiral Model’, 2 Journal of Global Ethics (2006), 43, 45-47. 
27 See discussion in Chapter I. 
28 Andrew J. Nathan, ‘China and the International Human Rights Regime’, in Elizabeth 
Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 136, 159. 
29 Alan M. Wachman, ‘Does the Diplomacy of Shame Promote Human Rights in China?’, 22 
Third World Quarterly (2001), 257, 273. 
 133 
pressure, at least at the time of such release and surrounding publicity, to abate its 
human rights violations and that most political prisoners continue to be under house 
arrest, imprisoned or tortured. 
China does not deny the validity of international human rights law; it 
maintains that it does not commit human rights violations on a widespread or 
systemic basis. As Caroline Fleay argues, ‘denial is still considered to be part of 
socialisation as it reflects the fact that at least the state acknowledges that its 
international reputation has been tarnished, and the human rights concept is not 
usually rejected outright’.30 China has ratified six of the nine core human rights 
treaties, with the notable exception of the International Covenant on Civil and 







Key reservations and declarations 
 
International Convention on the 





Acceded on 29 December 1982 
 
The International Court of Justice 
does not have competence to settle 
disputes between China and other 
States Parties regarding the 








Signed on 5 October 1998 
Not yet ratified 
 
* The ICCPR applies in Hong Kong 
since 1979 and continues to apply 




International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 




Signed on 27 October 1997 
Ratified on 27 March 2001 
 
The right to form or to join a trade 
union of one’s choosing must be in 
accordance with Chinese law 
 
The right to work does not override 
employment restrictions applicable 
to non-local workers in Hong Kong 
 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against 





Signed on 17 July 1980 
Ratified on 4 November 1980 
 
 
The Convention does not apply in 
International Court of Justice or 
inter-State arbitration proceedings 
against China 
 
The Convention does not apply in 
Hong Kong in relation to religious 
denominations, preservation of 
property rights for the male line in 
the New Territories, and immigration 
and pension schemes 
 
                                                            
30 Fleay, supra n.26, 46. 
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Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 





Signed on 12 December 1986 
Ratified on 4 October 1988 
 
 
The Committee against Torture does 
not have competence to investigate 
‘well-founded indications’ of 
systematic torture in China 
 
China has opted out of a dispute 
settlement mechanism regarding 
interpretation or application of the 
Convention 
   
 






Signed on 29 August 1990 
Ratified on 2 March 1992 
 
 
A child’s right to life is subject to 
Chinese laws regarding family 
planning 
 
The right to life in Hong Kong 
commences after live birth 
 
Restrictions may apply on the right 
to enter or to remain in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong may detain juveniles and 




International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of 






Convention on the Rights of Persons 





Signed on 30 March 2007 
Ratified on 1 August 2008 
 
 
Hong Kong immigration and 
nationality laws unaffected by 
Convention provisions on liberty of 
movement and on nationality 
 
 
International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from 






Source: Sonya Sceats with Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the International Human Rights System’, Chatham House, 
October 2012, 33-34. 
 
China has maintained that, as a developing State, economic, social and 
cultural rights must take precedence over civil and political rights. In its 2012 White 
Paper on National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015),31 China stated 
that notwithstanding its economic development, it remained a developing State 
‘fraught with problems from unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable 
development’,32 which given its vast territory and the huge disparity in terms of 
wealth within its populace, particularly between people in cities and those in rural 
areas, was not an untrue statement. China reiterated its position that it ‘will continue 
to give priority to the protection of the people’s rights to subsistence and 
                                                            
31 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, June 2012. 
32 Ibid., Introduction. 
 135 
development. It will take proactive measures to ensure and improve the people’s 
livelihood, spare no efforts to solve the problems of immediate concern to the people, 
and improve the level of protection of economic, social and cultural rights, so as to 
ensure that the benefits of development are shared by all members of society.’33 
China also stated that it ‘endeavours to develop socialist democracy, improve the 
socialist rule of law, expand the orderly political participation of citizens and 
[guarantee] people’s civil and political rights in an all-round way.’34 
While Western States and scholars criticise China’s emphasis on economic, 
social and cultural rights at the expense of civil and political rights, human rights 
discourses have invariably focused on the latter and relegated the former to lesser 
significance. In its statement to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 
1993, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated: 
 
The shocking reality against the background of which this challenge 
must be seen, is that States and the international community as a 
whole continue to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social 
and cultural rights which, if they occurred in relation to civil and 
political rights, would provoke expressions of horror and outrage and 
would lead to concerted calls for immediate action. In effect, despite 
the rhetoric, violations of civil and political rights continue to be 
treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently 
intolerable, than massive and direct denials of economic, social and 
cultural rights.35 
                                                            
33 Ibid., I. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
34 Ibid., II. Civil and Political Rights. 
35 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on its Seventh 
Session, E/1993/22, 23 November–11 December 1992, Annex III: Statement to the World 
Conference on Human Rights on Behalf of the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, para.5. 
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Although the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reaffirmed that 
‘[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’,36 
issues relating to realisation of economic, social and cultural rights are left 
unaddressed in almost the entire Declaration and Programme.37 China in 2000 urged 
that the Human Rights Commission, since replaced by the Human Rights Council, 
should ‘play its part in the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. It must 
urgently address the tendency to emphasize civil and political rights at the expense of 
economic, social and cultural ones’.38 In 2005, China insisted in a statement to the 
Commission that the international community must ‘take measures to correct the 
prevailing imbalance between two categories of human rights’ and ‘called on it to 
respond positively to the legitimate demand of developing countries by giving greater 
prominence to economic, social and cultural rights’.39 
That having been said, there is no evidence that economic, social and cultural 
rights and civil and political rights are mutually exclusive or that economic, social 
and cultural rights will be realised if civil and political rights are to be sidelined.40 
The European Court of Human Rights, in the context of the European Convention on 
                                                            
36 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993, 
A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 32 ILM 1661 (1993), para.5. 
37 Audrey R. Chapman, ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 18 Human Rights Quarterly (1996), 23, 24-25, 
fn.3. 
38 E/CN.4/2000/SR.23 (2000), para.60. 
39 E/CN.4/2004/SR.26 (2005), para.84. 
40  Illustrating the commensurability between civil and political rights and economic 
development in East Asia where Confucianism is prevalent, Inoue Tatsuo refers to Japan’s 
post-World War II democracy (albeit imposed by the United States) and economic 
development and maintains that China’s argument that on account of its need for economic 
development it should not be held to developed States’ human rights standards is self-
defeating in its quest for equal respect on the global stage as it ‘suppresses or rationalizes 
abominable Western practices past and present, such as colonialism, slavery, racism, fascism, 
anticommunist crusades (McCarthyism, Vietnam War), and so on’: ‘Liberal Democracy and 
Asian Orientalism’, in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge 
for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27, 41. With human rights 
starting to develop in Western States only after the Second World War, the Orientalist 
argument that China continues to rely on to justify its human rights record ‘traps the West as 
well as Asia in a distorted perception of self-identity’ (42), which stereotypes China as inferior 
to Western States that only serves as ‘an epistemological device for guaranteeing Western 
hegemony over Asia’ (39). 
 137 
Human Rights, stated in Airey v. Ireland41 that even ‘[w]hilst the Convention sets 
forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of 
a social or economic nature. … the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention 
may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive 
factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that 
sphere from the field covered by the Convention.’42 The 2000 Human Development 
Report explained the close correlations between human development and human 
rights and between economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights.43 
China’s handling of the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic during 2002–
2003 demonstrated the importance of civil and political rights, including freedom of 
the press, in the protection of all human rights, including the right to health. 
China stresses that human rights are matters within the internal affairs and 
jurisdiction of a State and that a State is bound by the United Nations Charter and 
customary international law not to interfere in other States’ internal affairs, a position 
China has expressed in its voting behaviour and argumentation within the Security 
Council, as Chapter VI discusses. In its 1991 White Paper on Human Rights in 
China,44 China maintained that 
 
China is in favour of strengthening international cooperation in the 
realm of human rights on the basis of mutual understanding and 
seeking a common ground while reserving differences. However, no 
country in its effort to realise and protect human rights can take a 
route that is divorced from its history and its economic, political and 
cultural realities. … It is neither proper nor feasible for any country 
to judge other countries by the yardstick of its own mode or to 
                                                            
41 (1979) 2 EHRR 305. 
42 Ibid., para.26. 
43  United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000: Human 
Rights and Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch.I. 
44 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, November 1991. 
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impose its own mode on others. Therefore, the purpose of 
international protection of human rights and related activities should 
be to promote normal cooperation in the international field of human 
rights and international harmony, mutual understanding and mutual 
respect. Consideration should be given to the differing views on 
human rights held by countries with different political, economic and 
social systems, as well as different historical, religious and cultural 
backgrounds. International human rights activities should be carried 
on in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving 
differences, mutual respect, and the promotion of understanding and 
cooperation.45 
 
China’s position was restated in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights.46 
The Bangkok Declaration states, inter alia, that Asian States ‘recognise that while 
human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds’,47 and that ‘States have the primary responsibility for the 
promotion and protection of human rights through appropriate infrastructure and 
mechanisms, and also recognise that remedies must be sought and provided primarily 
through such mechanisms and procedures’.48 In its 2004 White Paper on Progress in 
China’s Human Rights Cause in 2003,49 China stated thus: 
                                                            
45 Ibid., X. Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities. 
46 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, adopted by Ministers and representatives of Asian States in Bangkok during 29 
March–2 April 1993 pursuant to U.N. G.A. Res. 46/116 (1991) in the context of preparations 
for the World Conference on Human Rights to be held in Vienna during 14–25 June 1993. 
47 Ibid., para.8.   
48 Ibid., para.9. Reference should be had also to paragraph 3, which ‘[stresses] the urgent need 
to democratise the United Nations system, eliminate selectivity and improve procedures and 
mechanisms in order to strengthen international cooperation, based on principles of equality 
and mutual respect, and ensure a positive, balanced and non-confrontational approach in 
addressing and realising all aspects of human rights’; paragraph 4, which ‘[discourages] any 
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China holds that the development of human rights is an important 
mark of the continuous progress of the civilisation of human society, 
and an important part of the progressive current of world peace and 
development. Full realisation of human rights is the common goal of 
countries throughout the world as well as an important target for 
China in her efforts to build a moderately prosperous society in an 
all-round way, as well as her ‘peaceful rise’ in the world. China will, 
as always, devote herself to promoting the human rights cause, 
actively carry out exchanges and cooperation with the international 
                                                                                                                                                           
attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development assistance’; 
paragraph 5, which ‘[emphasises] the principles of respect for national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use 
of human rights as an instrument of political pressure’; paragraph 6, which ‘[reiterates] that all 
countries, large and small, have the right to determine their political systems, control and 
freely utilise their resources, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’; paragraph 7, which ‘[stresses] the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity 
of all human rights and the need to avoid the application of double standards in the 
implementation of human rights and its politicisation, and that no violation of human rights 
can be justified’; paragraph 10, which ‘[reaffirms] the interdependence and indivisibility of 
economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, and the need to give equal emphasis to all 
categories of human rights’; paragraph 17, which ‘[reaffirms] the right to development, as 
established in the Declaration on the Right to Development, as a universal and inalienable 
right and an integral part of fundamental human rights, which must be realised through 
international cooperation, respect for fundamental human rights, the establishment of a 
monitoring mechanism and the creation of essential international conditions for the realisation 
of such right’; paragraph 19, which ‘[affirms] that poverty is one of the major obstacles 
hindering the full enjoyment of human rights’; paragraph 20, which ‘[affirms] also the need to 
develop the right of humankind regarding a clean, safe and healthy environment’; paragraph 
22, which ‘[reaffirms Asian States’] strong commitment to the promotion and protection of 
the rights of women through the guarantee of equal participation in the political, social, 
economic and cultural concerns of society, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination 
and of gender-based violence against women’; paragraph 23, which ‘[recognises] the rights of 
the child to enjoy special protection and to be afforded the opportunities and facilities to 
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner 
and in conditions of freedom and dignity’; paragraph 24, which indicates Asian States’ 
embrace of ‘the important role played by national institutions in the genuine and constructive 
promotion of human rights’, and their belief ‘that the conceptualisation and eventual 
establishment of such institutions are best left for the States to decide’; paragraph 25, which 
‘[acknowledges] the importance of cooperation and dialogue between governments and non-
governmental organisations on the basis of shared values as well as mutual respect and 
understanding in the promotion of human rights, and encourage the non-governmental 
organisations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council to contribute 
positively to this process in accordance with Council resolution 1296(XLIV)’; paragraph 26, 
which ‘[reiterates] the need to explore the possibilities of establishing regional arrangements 
for the promotion and protection of human rights in Asia’; and paragraph 27, which 
‘[reiterates] further the need to explore ways to generate international cooperation and 
financial support for education and training in the field of human rights at the national level 
and for the establishment of national infrastructures to promote and protect human rights if 
requested by States’. 
49 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, March 2004.  
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community according to the provisions of the Constitution of China 
and the need for modernisation of the country, and make her 
contributions to promoting the healthy development of the 
international human rights cause.50 
 
China has stressed that any interference by foreign States or the international 
community in the internal affairs of a State, even amidst widespread human rights 
violations or a humanitarian catastrophe, will simply ‘endanger world peace and 
security’. 51  Nevertheless, as Chapter VI demonstrates, China’s approach to 
international peacekeeping has been evolving and on particular occasions it has 
supported peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the Security Council. As noted in 
Chapter II, foreign criticism of Chinese policies, practices, preferences and traditions, 
particularly without proper understanding of or regard for how the Chinese people 
view them, merely helps bolster the internal legitimacy of the authoritarian 
government. International acceptance of a human rights norm does not mean that 
such acceptance necessarily translates into acceptance in a domestic setting.52 As 
Jürgen Habermas has observed, democratic institutions imposed without domestic 
                                                            
50 Ibid., VIII. International Exchanges and Cooperation in Human Rights. 
51 1991 White Paper on Human Rights in China, supra n.44, X. Active Participation in 
International Human Rights Activities. In particular, China stated, ibid., that it ‘has firmly 
opposed … any country making use of the issue of human rights to sell its own values, 
ideology, political standards and mode of development, and … any country interfering in the 
internal affairs of other countries on the pretext of human rights, the internal affairs of 
developing countries in particular, and so hurting the sovereignty and dignity of many 
developing countries. Together with other developing countries, China has waged a resolute 
struggle against all such acts of interference, and upheld justice by speaking out from a sense 
of fairness. China has always maintained that human rights are essentially matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a country. Respect for each country’s sovereignty and non-
interference in internal affairs are universally recognised principles of international law, which 
are applicable to all fields of international relations, and of course applicable to the field of 
human rights as well. … Using the human rights issue for the political purpose of imposing 
the ideology of one country on another is no longer a question of human rights, but a 
manifestation of power politics in the form of interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries. Such abnormal practice in international human rights activities must be eliminated 
… Hegemonism and power politics continue to exist and endanger world peace and 
development. Interference in other countries’ internal affairs and the pushing of power politics 
on the pretext of human rights are obstructing the realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’ 
52  Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, ‘Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some 
Conceptual and Measurement Issues’, 36 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1992), 634, 646. 
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support tend to ‘disintegrate without the initiatives of a population accustomed to 
freedom’.53 
Finally, China’s substantial investment in States ruled by repressive regimes, 
with no conditions attached, has been much criticised on human rights grounds.54 
Critics typically do not acknowledge that China has also invested heavily in Western 
democratic States such as Australia and Canada whose economies have been 
tremendously bolstered in recent years, and that democratic States provide aid to 
repressive regimes often for non-altruistic reasons or resulting in continued repressive 
rule and expanded military expenditures.55 As will be discussed below, economic 
development is positively correlated with human rights protection and government 
efficacy, among others. It is not implausible that the increasing affluence of the 
Chinese people and their growing awareness of their rights may in time influence 
populations currently enduring repressive regimes to become more assertive about 
                                                            
53 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 130 (emphasis in original). 
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their own rights and governments. In fact, as Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur have 
noted, the United Nations worked with the Chinese and African governments in 
establishing a China–Africa Business Partnership and a China–Africa Business 
Council, both of which commenced operations in 2005, while the United Nations 
Development Programme (‘UNDP’) spearheaded a multi-donor effort in order to 
establish an International Poverty Reduction Centre in Beijing in 2006 with a view to 
helping developing States learn from the practices and lessons of China’s 
development and emulating them at home.56 China has also been a major donor to the 
UNDP’s Voluntary Trust Fund for the Promotion of South–South Cooperation and 
encouraged ‘ongoing development dialogue between countries in the Global South’.57 
 
IV. China’s approach to the Human Rights Council and universal periodic 
review 
 
While communist China formally entered the foray of international organisations on 
25 October 1971, it began to participate in the activities of the Human Rights 
Commission only in 1979 as an observer and in 1982 as a full member. China argued 
that human rights debates within the United Nations should focus on thematic issues 
and not monitoring of national human rights situations. The Human Rights 
Commission and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, China contended, ‘should carry out studies and refrain from deliberating on 
human rights situations in specific countries’,58 and the Commission should be ‘a 
forum for mutual learning from experience’.59 
Due to disillusionment and dismay with the Commission about the lack of 
human rights qualifications for election to membership and how it stymied human 
                                                            
56 Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, ‘Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?’, 33:4 
Washington Quarterly (2010), 119, 128. 
57 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Forging a Global South’, 19 December 2004.  
58 E/CN.4/2000/SR.50 (2000), para.74. 
59 E/CN.4/2004/SR.21 (2004), para.56. 
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rights development, 60  in April 2006 the General Assembly through Resolution 
60/25161 replaced it with the Human Rights Council as a subsidiary organ of the 
General Assembly62 (instead of the Economic and Social Council as was the case 
with the Commission) with 47 Member States (compared to 53 in the Commission) 
based on ‘equitable geographical distribution’63 and ‘elected directly and individually 
by secret ballot by the majority of the members of the General Assembly’.64 Members 
                                                            
60 In his Secretary-General report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
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Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining 
credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have sought membership of the 
Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to 
criticise others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the 
reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.’ For discussions of criticism about the 
Commission, the rationales and negotiations leading to its replacement by the Human Rights 
Council as well as the concerns that the Council might face, see Philip Alston, ‘Reconceiving 
the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New Human Rights Council’, 7 
Melbourne Journal of International Law (2006), 185; Felice D. Gaer, ‘A Voice Not an Echo: 
Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System’, 7 Human Rights Law Review 
(2007), 109; Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘“To Preserve and Build on its Achievements and to 
Redress its Shortcomings”: The Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the 
Human Rights Council’, 29 Human Rights Quarterly (2007), 307; Elvira Domínguez 
Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment 
of the First Session’, 7 Chinese Journal of International Law (2008), 721; Patrizia Scannella 
and Peter Splinter, ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Promise to be Fulfilled’, 7 
Human Rights Law Review (2007), 41; Nico Schrijver, ‘The UN Human Rights Council: A 
New “Society of the Committed” or Just Old Wine in New Bottles?’, 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2007), 809; Rhona K.M. Smith, ‘More of the Same or Something 
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62 Ibid., para.1. 
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discrimination (sixth session), good governance and corruption (seventh session), complicity 
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64 Ibid. 
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are to serve for three years and are not eligible for immediate re-election after two 
consecutive terms.65 In addition to its universal periodic review mechanism through 
which each and every United Nations Member State must participate in evaluation of 
its human rights performance, 66  the Council shall ‘assume, review and, where 
necessary, improve and rationalise all mandates, mechanisms, functions and 
responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights in order to maintain a system of 
special procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure’.67 
In terms of qualifications for election, the resolution requires only that States 
‘take into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of 
human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto’. 68 
Nevertheless, the resolution states that ‘members elected to the Council shall uphold 
the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights, shall fully 
cooperate with the Council and be reviewed under the universal periodic review 
mechanism during the term of their membership’.69 The General Assembly may by a 
two-thirds majority of votes suspend membership in the Council if a Member 
‘commits gross and systematic violations of human rights’.70 As the Libyan regime’s 
suppression of internal unrest escalated in 2011, Libya’s Ambassador to the Council 
‘emphasized that the Libyan mission had decided to represent and serve the Libyan 
people and not the regime’.71 The Council on 25 February 2011 recommended that 
Libya’s membership in the Council be suspended, and the General Assembly 
complied on 1 March 2011 through a resolution adopted by consensus.72 
While Resolution 60/251 does not stipulate how the universal periodic review 
mechanism should complement existing reporting and monitoring procedures under 
                                                            
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., para.5(e). 
67 Ibid., para.6. 
68 Ibid., para.8. 
69 Ibid., para.9. 
70 Ibid., para.8. 
71 See Catherine Powell, ‘Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?’, 106 American 
Journal of International Law (2012), 298, 311. 
72 See U.N. G.A. Press Release, GA/11050, 1 March 2011.  
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human rights treaties, it indicates that the mechanism should entail regular and 
systematic reviews, ‘based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfilment by 
each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner that ensures 
universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States; the review 
shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on interactive dialogue, with the full 
involvement of the State concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-
building needs.’73 The Council is to meet at least thrice a year for at least ten weeks in 
aggregate.74 Currently 14 States are evaluated under the universal periodic review 
mechanism in each Council session. 
China has stated that the universal periodic review mechanism should focus 
on human rights development in accordance with a State’s particular political, 
economic and socio-cultural conditions75 and its particular situations that pertain at a 
given time.76 China has argued that imposition of any international standards could 
only be counterproductive: ‘To arbitrarily impose a fixed set of human rights rules, 
regardless of the differences in the specific environment and reality, will not serve the 
interests of the people of any country.’77 China has urged that the Human Rights 
Council should ‘promote the inclusive coexistence of different conceptions of human 
rights’.78 China’s position on universal periodic review is not dissimilar to that which 
it expressed vis-à-vis the Human Rights Commission as it opposes monitoring and 
reporting of country human rights situations, describing it as ‘the most politicized 
aspect’ of the Council.79 In a debate about Cuba in 2007, China stated that country 
mandates were ‘against the principle[s] of the Human Rights Council and should be 
disregarded’.80 After the Arab Spring began to take hold, China urged the Council to 
‘appropriately settle differences through dialogue and cooperation, respect different 
                                                            
73 U.N. G.A. Res. 60/251 (2006), para.5(e). 
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practices emanating from specific cultural traditions and do away with the practice of 
using human rights to pursue other political based agendas’.81 
Before the universal periodic review mechanism was set in stone, China 
called for a procedural provision that support of one-third of Council membership be 
required before a draft resolution on a State could be tabled and two-thirds of Council 
membership be requisite for adoption of any such draft resolution. While China’s 
proposal was rejected, it was agreed that a Member proposing a resolution on a 
specific State should ensure ‘the broadest possible support for [its] initiatives 
(preferably 15 Members)’.82 It was agreed that universal periodic review should be 
conducted in an ‘objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-
confrontational and non-politicized manner’ and ‘take into account the level of 
development and specificities of countries’.83 
However, similar to its evolving position on international peacekeeping, as 
will be discussed in Chapter VI, China does not oppose specific country mandates 
where the consent of the State in question has been obtained. China lauded Cambodia 
for facilitating the special rapporteur in assessing the human rights situation in 
Cambodia and ‘expressed support for the Council to extend the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur, in strict conformity to the provisions included in the Institution 
Building resolution of the Council’.84 China supported a special session on how Haiti 
following the earthquake in 2010 could be assisted, the mandate of the independent 
expert on the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire, and capacity-building initiatives 
for Somalia and Yemen. China has also co-sponsored a resolution put forward by Sri 
Lanka on the latter’s endeavour to combat terrorism.85 
Finally, perhaps still considering itself to be a newcomer to international 
human rights mechanisms, much as it did with the International Court of Justice 
                                                            
81 17th Human Rights Council session, 15 June 2011. 
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during the 1970s and early 1980s (as discussed in Chapter III), China has rarely 
assumed leadership in the Council even on issues central to its position that socio-
economic rights and the right to development should be prioritised. Sceats with 
Breslin note that China thus far has introduced only two resolutions in the Council, 
on the impact of globalisation on human rights and on the personnel composition of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.86 However, as China 
became more immersed and assertive about the roles it may play within the Council, 
at the 18th session on peaceful protests, it delivered a joint statement on behalf of 32 
‘Like-Minded States’ that emphasised a government’s obligations ‘to take necessary 
measures to maintain public security, public order and social stability’ in accordance 
with international and municipal laws. The joint statement also called for 
international co-operation when it came to human rights development and protection 
‘with full respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, the non-
use of force or the threat of force in international relations and non-intervention in 
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State’.87 
 
V. Domestic human rights protection in China 
 
Against this backdrop of China’s participation in international human rights 
mechanisms, one should wonder if international human rights norms might contribute 
to domestic human rights protection and development in China. After all, 
international human rights norms require implementation and enforcement in a State 
and its municipal legal system in order to be truly effective. This section thus 
explores how certain human rights might already be available in China under its 
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Constitution and laws, and the extent to which international human rights norms 
might have facilitated the development and protection of human rights in China. 
In Chinese lexicon, citizen as a concept is generally understood to mean ‘the 
masses’.88 Historically the Chinese tended to view the notion of human rights as one 
stemming from selfishness, as ‘Confucianism emphasizes that a genuine community 
is not composed of mutually disinterested egoistic individuals, but is composed of 
virtuous members thinking of shared goals and values over one’s own’.89  The 
increasing affluence of many Chinese people, especially in urban areas, and their 
growing awareness of international human rights norms and Western discourses 
about liberal democracy have already generated local demand for political reform, 
including improved protection of their public and private rights, and a say in the 
elections or selections of their representatives, at least at sub-national and local 
levels.90 
I do not suggest that China is a model international citizen when it comes to 
human rights. However, human rights are taken seriously in China in ways that may 
converge with or diverge from dominant Western interpretations. China’s state 
behaviours vis-à-vis human rights, including its recognition of human rights and 
freedoms in its territory, as a microcosm of the symbiosis between China’s exercise 
of State sovereignty and the current international legal order, should thus be taken 
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seriously. In order to understand and underscore how China’s culture, Party-state 
politics and attitudes to law may affect the depth and extent of human rights 
protection and development in China, I now turn to discuss how workers’ rights 
(which have developed partly as a result of the government’s suppression of dissent 
on Tiananmen Square in June 1989), women’s rights (despite the patriarchal nature of 
Chinese society), and privacy rights (despite China’s communitarian culture) have 
come to be recognised, protected and understood in China. These specific rights 
highlight and exemplify the tensions between traditional Chinese culture and the 
notion of rights and how such tensions may be capable of being reconciled, and their 
selection in this study by no means implies that other rights are not available in the 
Chinese legal system. 
 
a. Workers’ rights* 
Workers’ rights, Virginia Leary maintains, are a good indicator of the extent to which 
a State recognises and protects the rights of its citizens, for workers constitute the 
bedrock of a society.91 After its large-scale suppression of dissent on Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989, the PRC government was disinclined from suppressing labour 
protests so long as they remained localised and did not escalate into general strikes.92 
Ching Kwan Lee has observed that labour protests in China have since discarded the 
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banner of class struggle and begun to revolve around the rule of law and rights.93 In 
China, workers do not enjoy a right to strike, which was removed when the 1982 
Constitution was promulgated and was not revived by the 1992 Trade Union Law.94 
Any demonstration or assembly requires prior approval of the local public security 
bureau, which is rarely granted.95 
However, the passage of a Labour Law in 199496 marked a crucial change in 
labour relations in China, in particular through the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions. The Law enables arrangements for collective bargaining on the basis of 
tripartite representation of trade unions, investors, and the state bureaucracy. The 
Law, which governs all employment relationships in China,97 is organised into 
thirteen chapters with 107 provisions. Article 3 in Chapter 1 guarantees, inter alia, 
workers’ rights to equality in employment, freedom of employment, labour safety and 
sanitation protection, and remuneration for work, rest, holidays and leaves of 
absence. Article 7 guarantees ‘the right to participate in and organise trade unions in 
accordance with law’,98 and states that trade unions ‘shall represent and safeguard the 
legitimate rights and interests of labourers, and stage activities independently in 
accordance with law.’99 Article 8 states that workers ‘shall take part in democratic 
management through workers’ congress, workers’ representative assembly, or any 
other forms in accordance with law, or consult with the employer on an equal footing 
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about protection of the legitimate rights and interests of labourers.’100 Articles 12 and 
13 in Chapter 2 prescribe that the state create and expand employment opportunities 
and encourage enterprises to do the same, and that gender discrimination in 
employment be outlawed, with special protection for female and young workers laid 
down in Chapter 7. The Law pays prominent attention to the roles of employment 
contracts, with Chapter 3 devoted to the nature and requirements of contractual 
stipulations, including collective agreements. Chapter 4 places emphasis on work 
conditions, with Article 36 stipulating a maximum of eight work hours a day and 44 
work hours a week, Article 38 guaranteeing one day of rest per week, and Article 44 
mandating overtime pay. Articles 48 and 49 in Chapter 5 stipulate minimum wage 
standards, while Chapter 6 stipulates standards and requirements for labour sanitation 
and safety. Chapter 8 provides for professional training, whereas Chapter 9 governs 
requirements for social insurance and welfare treatment. Importantly, Chapter 10 
stipulates standards and processes for settlement of labour disputes. Chapter 11 
specifies requirements for supervision and inspection of compliance with the Law, 
and Chapter 12 details the legal consequences for non-compliance. Hilary Josephs 
argues that ‘the Law appears to acknowledge that the same inequality of bargaining 
power between employer and employee which prevails in market economies can also 
exist in a transition economy, and therefore the worker requires added legal 
protection, including the ability to enforce his rights as a private litigant’.101 
Despite China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) in 
December 2001 and enthusiasm about how the WTO might be used to promote and 
protect human rights, including worker’s rights, in China and generally,102 I have 
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explained elsewhere103 that the WTO is not a suitable forum to help promote or 
protect human rights, including workers’ rights in China, for it is constrained by its 
constituting legal framework that is the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
WTO which does not confer the WTO jurisdiction to deal with matters that fall 
outside the ambit of the Agreement and its Annexes.104 
However, the WTO’s lack of jurisdiction to take into account and enforce 
human rights norms in its dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms does not 
absolve its Members from their general and continuing obligation to guarantee and 
protect international human rights norms including those embodied in other treaties 
they have ratified. In light of the jurisdictional limitations of the WTO, it has been 
suggested that the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’), a specialised agency of 
the United Nations and a tripartite organisation of governments, employers, and 
union representatives, may be suitable for the development and protection of 
workers’ rights in China.105 Acknowledging that the ILO lacks effective enforcement 
mechanisms,106 Daniel Ehrenberg proposes that the ILO and the WTO, with the 
latter’s compulsory dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, should be 
merged such that adherence to international human rights and labour rights and 
standards could be sought in respect of production of such goods that another WTO 
Member might import. Believing that such collaboration ‘could be used as a model to 
                                                                                                                                                           
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development’. In his report 
to the fifty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Kofi Annan stated that 
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demonstrate how cooperation between multilateral organizations can be effectively 
utilized to effectuate international human rights and labor rights policies, and 
optimize world public order’,107 Ehrenberg provides detailed guidelines as to how 
such collaboration might proceed.108 In its Singapore Ministerial Declaration,109 the 
WTO acknowledged the ILO’s competence in the field of labour rights and standards 
and noted its complementariness with the roles and functions of the ILO.110 
However, only 21 of the 189 ILO conventions are legally binding on 
China.111 China’s general rejection of international tribunals as a means to settle 
disputes between States, let alone between a State and its citizens, the effective 
absence in China of a right of association, and the fact that such proposed joint 
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27 April 1934; Convention No.14 on Weekly Rest (Industry), 1921, ratified by China on 17 
May 1934; Convention No.16 on Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea), 1921, ratified 
by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No.19 on Equality of Treatment (Accident 
Compensation), 1925, ratified by China on 27 April 1934; Convention No.22 on Seamen’s 
Articles of Agreement, 1926, ratified by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No.23 on 
Repatriation of Seamen, 1926, ratified by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No.26 on 
Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery, 1928, ratified by China on 5 May 1930; Convention 
No.27 on Marking of Weight (Packages Transported by Vessels), 1929, ratified by China on 
24 June 1931; Convention No.32 (Revised) on Protection against Accidents (Dockers), 1932, 
ratified by China on 30 November 1935; Convention No.45 on Underground Work (Women), 
1935, ratified by China on 2 December 1936; Convention No.80 on Final Articles Revision, 
1946, ratified by China on 4 August 1947; Convention No.100 on Equal Remuneration, 1951, 
ratified by China on 2 November 1990; Convention No.111 on Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation), 1958, ratified by China on 12 January 2006; Convention No.122 on 
Employment Policy, 1964, ratified by China on 17 December 1997; Convention No.138 on 
Minimum Age, 1973, ratified by China on 28 April 1999 (with obligatory declaration of 
minimum age set at 16 years); Convention No.144 on Tripartite Consultation (International 
Labour Standards), 1976, ratified by China on 2 November 1990; Convention No.150 on 
Labour Administration, 1978, ratified by China on 7 March 2002; Convention No.159 on 
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons), 1983, ratified by China on 2 
February 1988; Convention No.167 on Safety and Health in Construction, 1988, ratified by 
China on 7 March 2002; Convention No.170 on Chemicals, 1990, ratified by China on 11 
January 1995; Convention No.182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, ratified by China 
on 8 August 2002. 
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enforcement mechanism will require the consent of all contracting parties to both the 
Marrakesh Agreement and the numerous ILO conventions, render Ehrenberg’s 
project a definite impossibility. Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse in fact warn 
that ‘attachment of economic sanctions to the powers of the ILO may destabilize the 
organization, causing states to withdraw from membership or to withhold ratification 
of its Conventions to an even greater extent than is the case at present.’112 
The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work113 states 
that all Members of the ILO, ‘even if they have not ratified the Conventions in 
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the 
Organisation to respect, to promote and to realise, in good faith and in accordance 
with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the 
subject of those Conventions’.114  On the basis of the Declaration, Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann argues that ‘UN membership entails legal obligations to respect core 
human rights’,115 and that the rules and principles that ILO conventions and ‘other 
modern human rights instruments’116 have set out illustrate that certain human rights 
have reached the status of erga omnes obligations of States and international 
organisations.117 Petersmann fails to address the cardinal principle of international 
law that the consent of a State must have been obtained before a treaty obligation 
may be imposed, and membership in an international organisation does not by itself 
constitute consent to be bound by any treaty or declaration as might be adopted under 
the framework of the organisation. The Annex to the ILO Declaration specifically 
states that the Declaration ‘is of a strictly promotional nature’.118 Lastly, legal liability 
                                                            
112 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, ‘Trade Policy & Labor Standards’, 14 Minnesota 
Journal of Global Trade (2005), 261, 284. 
113 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Annex, adopted by the 
ILO General Conference at Geneva on 18 June 1998, 37 ILM 1233 (1998). 
114 Ibid., para.2. 
115 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘The “Human Rights Approach” Advocated by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it Relevant 
for WTO Law and Policy?’, 7 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 605, 634. 
116 Ibid., 617. 
117 Ibid. 
118 ILO Declaration, supra n.113, Annex: Follow-up to the Declaration, para.2.
 155 
cannot be ascribed Member States of an international organisation whose collective 
decision violates international law119  (although it is noteworthy that China has 
indicated its support for legal liability to be ascribed Member States individually).120 
 
b. Women’s rights 
A special area of Chinese domestic human rights law has emerged in the past two 
decades, known as social protection law or social law, designed to protect specific 
groups of citizens deemed by the state to be socially vulnerable.121 Reflective of the 
patriarchal and paternalistic nature of Chinese society, youth, the elderly, and women 
are considered especially socially vulnerable and in need of legal protection. Michael 
Palmer observes that ‘for the protection of the young we see a strongly controlling 
framework of rules and policies, seemingly directed at creating the model Chinese 
socialist citizen. In contrast, in the legal support offered to the elderly, there is a 
robust and seemingly more genuine attempt to protect and assist the elderly to deal 
with difficulties of age discrimination.’122 Palmer argues that the purpose of legal 
protection afforded on the basis of age is to preserve ‘a system of gerontocracy’.123  
Given the inferior positions of women and girls in Chinese society,124 I now 
focus on how women’s rights protection has been implemented or stonewalled in 
                                                            
119 See Rosalyn Higgins, Report to Institut de droit international, 66-I Yearbook of Institut de 
droit international (1995), 375; Resolution of Institut de droit international on the Legal 
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their Obligations towards Third States, Session of Lisbon, 1 September 1995. 
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China since 1980, when China ratified the CEDAW in 1979,125 by exploring the 1992 
Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (Women’s Protection Law) 
as amended in 2005.126 
Article 2 of the amended Women’s Protection Law states that ‘[e]quality 
between men and women is a basic state policy’127 and prohibits discrimination, 
maltreatment, abandonment, and physical abuse of women. Article 3 mandates that 
the State Council and municipal authorities at or above the county level formulate 
programmes for women’s development. Articles 6 and 7 state that municipal 
authorities at or above the county level, trade unions, and local women’s federations 
at various levels (with emphasis particularly laid on the All-China Women’s 
Federation128) shall ensure, represent, uphold and strive to safeguard the rights and 
interests of women. Article 14 requires that authorities ensure a complaint about a 
violation of the Law to be addressed properly. Article 52 enables a woman to request 
a relevant government department to remedy a violation of the Law or to commence 
                                                            
125 China, however, has not acceded to the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW that would 
enable an individual to submit a complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, which since January 2008 is serviced by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
126 Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 3 April 1992, 
as amended in accordance with Decision on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women adopted at the 17th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 28 August 2005. 
127 Ibid., Art.2. 
128 Palmer is sceptical of the extent to which the All-China Women’s Federation may be able 
or willing to enhance the promotion and protection of women’s rights in China. He notes, 
supra n.121, 171, that the Federation is ‘a quasi-governmental body’ intended as an 
intermediary between the Party-state and society, and it is predominantly the Party-state that 
receives information. Furthermore, the Federation seeks to act for women collectively in a 
way that undermines an a woman’s individual rights and interests and potentially her 
complaint about a particular violation of the Law. It does not challenge the Party-state’s 
understanding and views of the nature and implications of womanhood, a woman’s human 
agency and her rights and interests. In addition, the Federation defines its role in terms of 
promoting ‘equality between men and women’ and not gender equality, thereby maintaining 
the status quo that men, their positions in society and what and how they do things in public or 
in private are the standards to which women should adhere. Lastly, ‘as a large, nation-wide 
representative body, with close links to the party-state leadership, the Federation tends to 
operate in a top-down manner. Its endeavours at the grass-roots level and its responsiveness to 
the local community are limited and its activities and campaigns tend to prioritise the party-
state’s axiomatic goals of economic development rather than women’s welfare’: ibid. The 
Federation also ‘continues to call upon women to contribute more in social, moral and family 
affairs. From the point of view of the party-state leadership, an important role of the 
Federation is to safeguard moral purity and stability’: Du Jie, ‘Gender and Governance: The 
Rise of New Women’s Organisations’, in Jude Howell, ed., Governance in China (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 172, 183. 
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arbitration or legal proceedings, with legal aid or judicial relief where necessary. 
However, as adversarial litigation is generally not preferred in China, women are 
urged to seek recourse to administrative processes or mediations (even though 
mediations in China are quite evaluative and coercive).129 Palmer criticises the Law 
as vague and in want of a clear definition of ‘discrimination against women’.130 
Gender equality in China is valued not for its own sake but for women to fully 
contribute to China’s ‘socialist modernisation’.131 
Article 16 seeks to ensure equality of access to educational institutions by 
stipulating that, except for special subjects (which are not specified or defined), a 
school may not refuse to enrol women or raise enrolment standards vis-à-vis women 
on grounds of their gender. Palmer maintains that enhancement of gender equality on 
matters of education is of great importance as social status in China is heavily 
dependent on education.132 Articles 22 to 25 guarantee gender equality on matters of 
employment, pay, promotion, and social security, although the position of women, 
even in cities, has not improved since the early 1990s.133 Article 26 provides women 
with special protection ‘during menstrual period, pregnancy, obstetrical period and 
nursing period’;134 under the same provision, women may not be assigned any work 
or physical labour unsuitable to women. Article 27 prohibits lowering a female 
employee’s salary or unilaterally terminating her employment on grounds of her 
marriage, pregnancy, maternity leave or breast-feeding. Article 28 extends to women 
                                                            
129 Palmer, ibid., 167. 
130 Ibid., 156. 
131 Women’s Protection Law, Art.1. 
132 Palmer, supra n.121, 157-58. 
133 Ibid., 159. See also Shu Xiaoling and Bian Yanjie, ‘Market Transition and Gender Gap in 
Earnings in Urban China’, 81:4 Social Forces (2003), 1107. Shu and Bian, ibid., 1136-37, 
argue that gender inequality that persists in China reflects ‘a consistent gender difference in 
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eliminated] the practice of discrimination, and its numerous mechanisms of self-maintenance, 
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institutional and attitudinal biases’: as quoted in Palmer, ibid., 175, n.34. 
134 Women’s Protection Law, Art.26. 
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‘social insurance, social relief, social welfare and health care services’.135 Sexual 
harassment is now proscribed in China under Article 40, while Article 42 protects a 
woman’s rights of reputation, honour, privacy, and portrait. Given the increasing 
affluence of the Chinese people and the seemingly endless construction of properties, 
a woman’s legal equality on matters of property ownership is a prime concern and is 
affirmed by Article 30, while Article 32 provides for women equal rights of 
compensation for land expropriated or requisitioned by the state. 
Domestic violence, previously treated as a non-issue, is now prohibited by 
national legislation. The 1980 Marriage Law as amended in 2001136 declares that 
‘[d]omestic violence shall be prohibited. Maltreatment and desertion of one family 
member by another shall be prohibited.’137 Articles 43 to 46 of the amended Marriage 
Law deal with succour measures and legal liability where domestic violence is a 
reason. Article 46 of the amended Women’s Protection Law stipulates that 
‘[d]omestic violence against women is prohibited. The state takes measures to 
prevent and stop domestic violence. The departments of public security, civil affairs, 
judicial administration, etc., as well as urban and rural mass organisations of self-
government at the grass-roots level and public organisations shall, within the scope of 
their respective duties, prevent and stop domestic violence, and provide succour to 
female victims.’138 Palmer argues that the enactment of these provisions was not only 
due to pressure from civil society in China, but also China’s concern that the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women might otherwise 
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criticise its failure to implement the CEDAW.139 
Related to domestic violence is China’s one-child policy, introduced in 1978 
to contain population growth. The policy is inconsistent with Article 16(1)(e) of the 
CEDAW, which states that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women[, 
t]he same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their 
children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them 
to exercise these rights.’140 The policy also contravenes Article 12(1) of the CEDAW, 
which states that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related 
to family planning.’141 China might argue that its one-child policy is not inconsistent 
with the provisions as the policy applies equally to men. However, responsibilities for 
family planning (especially the bearing of a son) are always regarded in Chinese 
society as those of a woman, with family planning, in particular a woman’s failure to 
bear a son, often a major cause of domestic violence.142 While Article 51 of the 
amended Women’s Protection Law provides that a woman has ‘the freedom not to 
bear any child’,143 the provision ‘rests uneasily with provisions in Article 17 of the 
Population and Birth Planning Law 2001 which declare that: “citizens have the right 
to reproduction”.’144 Palmer argues that a husband may rely on Article 17 to commit 
marital rape.145 
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Last but not least, given the traditional preference for sons, forced abortions 
and female infanticides are prevalent in China. Such practices are now specifically 
outlawed, with Article 38 of the amended Women’s Protection Law stating that 
‘[w]omen’s right of life and health is inviolable. Drowning, abandoning or cruel 
infanticide in any manner of female babies is prohibited; discriminating against or 
maltreating of women who give birth to female babies or women who are sterile is 
prohibited; cruel treatment causing bodily injury to or death of women by means of 
superstition or violence is prohibited; maltreating or abandoning women who are ill, 
disabled and aged is prohibited.’146 Of course, as with all laws, whether such practices 
will in time diminish or cease depends ultimately on cultural and behavioural changes 
through education, public appeals and advertising, and other suitable means. 
While the amended Women’s Protection Law serves important purposes, 
objectives and results, and is a laudable step to enhancing the positions of women and 
girls in society, in public affairs, in private dealings and at home, one purpose and 
objective remains amiss: the Law tells people and authorities what to do and what not 
to do, instead of setting, instigating, and encouraging a foundation upon which 
individuals’, authorities’, and society’s behaviours and attitudes to women and girls 
may evolve for the better. Furthermore, the Law in its entire text refers to women 
almost invariably in the plural sense,147 with the result that a woman or a girl, as an 
individual human being with her own human agency, dignity, and need for protection 
from harm, is entirely overlooked. 
 
c. Privacy rights* 
                                                                                                                                                           
with very conservatively as a matter of judicial practice so that very few prosecutions have 
actually convicted a husband of the rape of his wife.’ 
146 Women’s Protection Law, Art.38. 
147 Of the 59 substantive provisions in the amended Women’s Protection Law, a woman is 
referred to in the singular sense only in ten. Girls and female babies are always referred to in 
the plural sense in all relevant provisions. 
* This sub-section draws on my article ‘Privacy’ in David Pong, ed., Encyclopedia of Modern 
China, Vol.3 (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 2009), 176-77, completed during my 
doctoral candidature at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
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This section concludes its discussion of domestic human rights protection in China 
with the issue of privacy rights, given the communitarian nature of Chinese society 
and the interplay between privacy rights and workers’ and women’s rights. Privacy is 
strongly correlated with how a society is governed. As Raymond Wacks discerns, ‘at 
the heart of the concern to protect “privacy” lies a conception of the individual and 
his or her relationship with society’.148 
In discussing privacy in China, it is pertinent to note that privacy as a legal 
concept is of relatively recent origin in Western States. Although Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis first formulated the concept in an 1890 Harvard Law Review 
article,149 privacy has still not been recognised as a constitutional right per se in most 
Western States, including the United States. In its 2007 ranking of then 27 European 
Union and 19 other States including China, as well as Taiwan, Privacy International, 
an NGO, ranked China second last on the list, with a score of 1.3 out of 5.0 (tied with 
Malaysia and Russia) denoting an ‘endemic surveillance society’. Both the United 
Kingdom (1.4) and the United States (1.5) fell under the same category.150 In Chinese 
language, the word si (private/privacy) has generally negative connotations (except in 
the context of family) such as secrecy and selfishness, whereas gong (public) and 
guan (official) are used in relation to fairness and justice.151 Bonnie McDougall 
argues that ‘[t]he emphasis on public service as a personal goal and on the public 
good as a national objective by Chinese political figures throughout the greater part 
of the twentieth century is partly responsible for the perception that privacy as a value 
is foreign to China’.152 As will be discussed below, as democratic practices have 
begun to take hold in China, albeit at sub-national and local levels only, 
dissatisfaction – and expressions of it – with public officials, some of whom have 
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visibly engaged in corruption and profiteering, has increased and reinforced 
discontent within the Chinese populace about the pervasiveness that public officials 
intrude the lives and livelihood of ordinary people. It is, nevertheless, precisely such 
expressions of dissatisfaction with public officials and their policies and practices that 
illustrate, reinforce and demarcate the boundary that divides affairs that the state may 
control and private realms of which the state is expected to steer clear. In Confucian 
culture, family is considered a realm separate from the state, within which individuals 
may enjoy freedom from public scrutiny – albeit as a family unit and not as 
individuals. 
Nevertheless, the excesses of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution 
and China’s subsequent economic and political reforms have resulted in increasing 
acceptance in society, by the state and among individuals, of the notion that certain 
activities should be regarded as entirely personal and free from scrutiny outside the 
confines of one’s home. Privacy is now recognised and protected in China as a 
constitutional and legal right to reputation. Under Article 38 of the 1982 Constitution, 
‘[t]he personal dignity of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. 
Insult, libel, false charge or frame-up directed against citizens by any means is 
prohibited.’153 Article 39 guarantees the inviolability of the home and prohibits 
unlawful search or intrusion. Article 40 provides that ‘[n]o organisation or individual 
may, on any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens’ 
correspondence except in cases where, to meet the needs of state security or of 
investigation into criminal offences, public security or procuratorial organs are 
permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with procedures prescribed by 
law.’154 Article 252 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China prohibits 
infringement of a person’s ‘right of communication freedom by hiding, destroying, or 
illegally opening’ of letters belonging to another, and illegal search or intrusion of 
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another person or his or her home.155 Article 101 of the General Principles of the 
Civil Law protects a ‘right of reputation’ and states that ‘[t]he personality of citizens 
shall be protected by law, and the use of insults, libel or other means to damage the 
reputation of citizens or legal persons shall be prohibited.’156 However, information 
relating to public affairs or immoral conduct is not protected.157 As the Party-state 
controls the media and alternative sources of information, the Internet, which in 2006 
was used by 123 million Chinese people,158 has raised significant issues relating to 
privacy protection. According to a Chinese government survey, 23.2 per cent of 
Internet users and 18.6 per cent of non-users regarded Internet use as very likely to 
lead to unauthorised disclosure of personal information.159 Meanwhile, perpetrators of 
domestic violence assert privacy as a pretext to circumvent sanction. Thus, privacy 
rights in China paradoxically help construct a realm to which women’s lives and 
voices are relegated as unimportant or irrelevant to (male) society.160 
 
VI. The rule of law in China: A hopeless case? 
 
The United Nations and Western States have long sought to foster acceptance by 
developing States of a rule-of-law model, and the World Bank requires it as a 
condition of foreign aid, emphasising that ‘[t]he rule of law is a key element of 
predictability and stability where business risks may be rationally assessed, 
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transaction costs lowered, and governmental arbitrariness reduced’.161 An array of 
problems inheres, however, in transplanting a theory of governance that may not be 
compatible with a society unwilling to accept it. A rule-of-law model does not by 
itself guarantee democratic governance or respect for human rights (by the state and 
among its people). In fact, law has long been used at the hands of despotic or 
authoritarian governments as a tool to suppress political dissent. As Joseph Raz has 
noted, ‘[i]f rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to 
propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful function. 
We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to believe that good 
should triumph … A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human 
rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious 
persecution may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law better 
than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies.’162 
With a culture predicated on communitarian norms and values and on 
resolving differences under the umbrella of social harmony rather than through 
adversarial litigation, China has been lukewarm in embracing a rule-of-law model in 
its governance and legal structure. Recent years have nevertheless seen an increasing 
ambivalence among Chinese state apparatuses and scholars as to the place of law in 
China. For example, law is seen to be necessary to constrain the executive 
government and the Party163 that in a State remains supreme (and subsumes all 
branches of government),164 and to facilitate economic development.165 The 1982 
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Constitution prescribes that government be one of law and not of men and that law be 
supreme. 166  Article 41 states that ‘citizens who have suffered losses through 
infringement of their civil rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to 
compensation in accordance with law’.167 Article 51 states that ‘[t]he exercise by 
PRC citizens of their freedoms and rights may not infringe on the interests of the 
state, of society, and of the collective, or on the lawful freedoms and rights of other 
citizens.’168 It ought to be noted that restrictions on the exercise of one’s rights or 
freedoms are not unique in China, as they similarly are contained in human rights 
treaties such as the ICCPR169 and the European Convention on Human Rights,170 and 
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rights and freedoms of others.’ Article 19(3), ibid., states that the exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression ‘carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.’ Article 21, 
ibid., states that ‘[t]he right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and 
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.’ Article 22, ibid., states that ‘[n]o restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise of [the right to freedom of association with others, including the right 
to form and join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests] other than those which 
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
170 Article 8(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms states that ‘[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
[the right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence] except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
 166 
within a democratic State such as Canada in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.171 In October 2000, China stated before the Human Rights Commission 
that ‘[t]he concept of a state subject to the rule of law had been formally incorporated 
into the Constitution in 1999. Chinese society was in a phase of transition between 
two systems; supremacy of power was about to give way to supremacy of law.’172 
While China has not ratified the ICCPR, the National People’s Congress in 2004 
amended the Constitution by adding a special clause on protection of human rights.173 
Article 5 of the Constitution states that ‘[t]he state upholds the uniformity and 
dignity of the socialist legal system. No law or administrative or local rules and 
regulations shall contravene the Constitution. All state organs, the armed forces, all 
political parties and public organisations and all enterprises and undertakings must 
                                                                                                                                                           
and freedoms of others.’ Article 9(2), ibid., states that ‘[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ Article 10(2), ibid., states 
that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, ‘since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’ Article 11(2), ibid., states that ‘[n]o restrictions 
shall be placed on the exercise of [the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom 
of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of one’s interests] other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration 
of the State.’ Article 15(1), ibid., states that ‘[i]n time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating 
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.’ Article 16, ibid., states that ‘[n]othing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be 
regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political 
activity of aliens.’ Article 17, ibid., states that ‘[n]othing in this Convention may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or 
at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.’ 
171 Article 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I, Constitution Act 1982, 
S.C.1982, c.79; Canada Act 1982  (United Kingdom), c.11), commonly referred to as the 
‘notwithstanding clause’, provides that Parliament or the legislature of a province may 
derogate from certain express rights provided for in the Charter, and such derogation may 
continue to subsist upon a new Act of Parliament or a new piece of legislation enacted by a 
provincial legislature. 
172 E/CN.4/2000/SR.31 (2000), para.14. 
173 1982 Constitution, Art.33, para.3. 
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abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution and the 
law must be investigated. No organisation or individual may enjoy the privilege of 
being above the Constitution and the law.’174 I argue that the focus of the provision in 
fact illuminates a rule-of-law model, which requires that the Constitution and laws be 
the ultimate point of reference in governance, legislative enactments, and individual 
behaviours. Randall Peerenboom notes that Li Peng’s observance of the 
constitutionally prescribed two-term limit for premiership and his acceptance of a 
lower-level position as head of the National People’s Congress, as well as the Party’s 
withdrawal in 1993 of an amendment to the Constitution that had violated prescribed 
procedures, illustrated respect for law that would have been highly unlikely during 
the Mao era.175 It is also worth noting that China has resorted to law when intervening 
in constitutional disputes arising from Hong Kong (even if in doing so it may distort 
legal language).176 As Michael Dowdle has pointed out, even if bad faith belies the 
Party’s claims that it adheres to the rule of law, the fact that such claims have been 
made evidences the normative appeal of a rule-of-law model to the Chinese 
leadership.177 Dowdle also notes that constitutionalism and the rule of law have 
increasingly been used in the power wrangling between the National People’s 
Congress and the Party.178  
Dowdle furthermore cautions against conflating particular cultural rational 
value orderings with particular rational value orderings at the individual level, as the 
collective decision-making process is highly dependent on variable options, 
information flows, and expectations of repercussions.179 Scholars of Chinese culture 
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are able to find communitarian and individualistic priorities to co-exist in Chinese 
society.180 Moreover, in many settings, formal law, as opposed to informal rules, may 
not be the best means by which to attain social justice. Although the concept of 
guanxi, or informal network, suffers a deficit of legitimacy from the standpoint of a 
rule-of-law model, given its all-encompassing omnipotence in Chinese behaviours, it 
may serve disciplinary and co-ordinating functions that supplant the transparency, 
accountability and predictability the rule of law is presumed to provide. As Xue 
Hanqin noted in her 2011 Hague Academy Lectures on contemporary Chinese 
perspectives of international law, the importance and values of informal network are 
not confined to China but can be found in all societies.181 The rule of law is as much 
about the supremacy of law as an expression and exercise of a distinct, but by no 
means unique or perforce desirable or essential, political value. Enforced legality 
under a rule-of-law model, much like Anne-Marie Slaughter’s enforced liberal 
internationalism as discussed in Chapter II, ignores the structural problems China 
must address in order for a sound legal system to firmly take hold, and conflates itself 
with an ultimate good. The shortcomings and problems a rule-of-law model presents, 
particularly in the context of China, meanwhile escape scrutiny and useful lessons 
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Rights and Asian Values (New York: Carnegie Center on Ethics and International Affairs, 
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from China’s experience that might enhance a rule-of-law model are overlooked or 
dismissed. Human agency and human differences in better understanding, co-
ordination and co-operation both among States and among individuals are 
devalued.182 
 
VII. Implementation of democratic practices in China  
 
When discussing democracy in China, the suppression of dissent on Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989 immediately springs to mind. To foreign eyes, the student 
protesters were demanding democracy only to be brutally suppressed. Andrew 
Walder and Gong Xiaoxia characterise the protests as representing ‘the emergence of 
a new species of political protest in the People’s Republic’ that diverged from the 
kind of worker activism previously seen in the Cultural Revolution ‘where factions of 
political leaders mobilized their local followers for political combat’. 183  Jack 
Goldstone argues that ‘unlike other confrontations that involved mainly intellectuals, 
such as the Hundred Flowers Movement, or other events that were in some sense 
orchestrated by the regime, such as the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen marked the 
first time that intellectuals and popular elements acted independently to challenge the 
regime’.184 
A deeper understanding, however, shows that the student protesters on 
Tiananmen Square, in terms of how they perceived democracy, were in unison with 
Chinese traditions. Democracy as that which embodies and enshrines a plurality of 
diverse opinions and participation by all segments of society was not one that the 
student protesters on Tiananmen Square in 1989 conceived. Joseph Esherick and 
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Jeffrey Wasserstrom observed that the student protesters seemed to consider the min 
(people) in minzhu (democracy) to mean them primarily if not exclusively.185 Mary 
Erbaugh and Richard Kraus similarly observed that students protesting in Fujian 
province at the same time were ‘horrified at the suggestion that truly popular 
elections would have to include peasants, who would certainly outvote educated 
people like themselves’. 186  On Tiananmen Square, as students spoke of the 
importance of (their) views, principles and ideals and sought to assert exclusive 
control over the course and aims of the protests, workers focused from the beginning 
on economic issues187 and ‘displayed an acute sense of alienation not only from the 
political system but to a considerable extent also from the student leaders and 
intellectuals’.188 Workers’ demands revolved around price stabilisation, employment 
security, freedom of employment, cessation of gender discrimination in employment, 
improvements in work conditions, and a right to strike.189 Throughout the protests, 
workers regarded students as the epitome of the elitist class that oppressed them. 
Walder and Gong noted that students went as far as to exclude workers from 
Tiananmen Square until military action appeared imminent when workers were 
finally allowed onto the Square to protect students. It was only on the day before the 
crackdown that students sought workers’ collaboration in staging a general strike. 
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Afterwards, workers received much harsher penalties than did students, including the 
death penalty, for taking part in the protests.190 
As noted in Chapter II, dominant Western discourses of international law and 
State sovereignty, including the question of whether liberal democracy now 
constitutes a rule or requirement for a State to possess internal and external 
legitimacy for its exercise of sovereignty, are pregnant with problems and concerns 
that not only undermine the universality of international law and the stability of the 
current international legal order, but also neglect the flaws that inhere in Western 
conceptions of liberal democracy. Chenyang Li has argued in the context of China 
that ‘[i]t is a simple-minded fallacious inference that, since democracy is good, 
anything that is undemocratic must be bad. An argument can be made that in the 
United States and throughout the democratic West, healthy society has been 
threatened precisely by the diminishing of traditional values similar to these 
undemocratic Confucian values.’191 
It is, in fact, a misconception that no democratic practices take place in 
China. While universal suffrage continues to be wanting in China at the national level 
and contests for higher offices remain a matter not for the masses but a select few 
Party officials, an Election Law of the Representatives of the National People’s 
Congress and the Local People’s Congresses at All Levels was adopted in July 
1979,192 which requires that all representatives at or below the county level be 
directly elected.193 An Organic Law of the Village Administration Committees was 
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adopted in November 1998, which provides that self-government in villages should 
be implemented across the country.194 
Voting has been implemented in every province, with generally high turnout 
rates195 and improvements over time in the conduct of elections.196 The Party has set 
out policies for village representative assemblies to implement, and implementation is 
monitored by Party members within the assemblies.197 Article 97 of the Constitution 
provides that ‘[d]eputies to the people’s congresses of provinces, municipalities 
directly under the Central Government, and cities divided into districts are elected by 
the people’s congresses at the next lower level; deputies to the people’s congresses of 
counties, cities not divided into districts, municipal districts, townships, nationality 
townships and towns are elected directly by their constituencies. The number of 
deputies to local people’s congresses at different levels and the manner of their 
election are prescribed by law.’198 According to Article 99 of the Constitution: 
 
Local people’s congresses at different levels ensure the observance 
and implementation of the Constitution, the statutes and the 
administrative rules and regulations in their respective administrative 
areas. Within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, they 
adopt and issue resolutions and examine and decide on plans for 
local economic and cultural development and for development of 
public services. Local people’s congresses at and above the county 
level examine and approve the plans for economic and social 
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development and the budgets of their respective administrative areas, 
and examine and approve reports on their implementation. They have 
the power to alter or annul inappropriate decisions of their own 
standing committees. The people’s congresses of nationality 
townships may, within the limits of their authority as prescribed by 
law, take specific measures suited to the peculiarities of the 
nationalities concerned.199 
 
Importantly, from the standpoints of accountability of officials, electorates’ 
participatory capacity and inclination, and human agency, Article 101 of the 
Constitution provides that ‘[a]t their respective levels, local people’s congresses elect, 
and have the power to recall, governors and deputy governors, or mayors and deputy 
mayors, or heads and deputy heads of counties, districts, townships and towns. Local 
people’s congresses at and above the county level elect, and have the power to recall, 
presidents of people’s courts and chief procurators of people’s procuratorates at the 
corresponding level.’200 
It has been found that elections in China tend to generate a synergetic 
relationship between the electorates and their elected representatives. Such synergy 
may be created and reinforced by the direct and intimate relationships that the 
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electorates and their elected (or nominated) representatives share. Under Article 111 
of the Constitution: 
 
The residents’ committees and villagers’ committees established 
among urban and rural residents on the basis of their place of 
residence are mass organisations of self-management at the grass-
roots level. The chairman, vice-chairmen and members of each 
residents’ or villagers’ committee are elected by the residents. The 
relationship between the residents’ and villagers’ committees and the 
grass-roots organs of state power is prescribed by law. The residents’ 
and villagers’ committees establish committees for people’s 
mediation, public security, public health and other matters in order to 
manage public affairs and social services in their areas, mediate civil 
disputes, help maintain public order and convey residents’ opinions 
and demands and make suggestions to the people’s government.201 
 
Lianjiang Li, Anne Thurston, and Xu Wang have shown that elections have an 
empowering effect on villagers in China.202 Eighty-six per cent of the 218 villagers 
Lin Changsheng surveyed in Liaoning and Jilin provinces believed that elected 
officials were likely to be more effective in defending the interests of villagers.203 
Elected representatives in turn tend to believe that they are accountable to their 
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electorates.204 According to Gao Xinjun, more than one-third of elected officials from 
14 villages in a Henan township indicated that they would side with villagers as 
opposed to conflicting higher-level directives.205 He Baogang and Lang Youxing 
found that 43 per cent of the 111 surveyed elected village committee directors in 
Zhejiang province believed that they must be accountable to their electorates, with 
only ten per cent indicating that they must be accountable to higher levels of the state 
bureaucracy.206 The Organic Law of Village Administration Committees affirms that 
villagers’ committees shall ‘convey the villagers’ opinions and demands and make 
suggestions’ to the government.207 At a broader level, Melanie Manion has noted the 
capacity of genuine elections to create and sustain congruence between the 
electorates and elected officials regarding the roles of the state in the economy.208 
Additionally, village elections help enable citizenship practices to emerge and 
mature,209 and legitimise governance.210 
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An inevitable consequence of elections is expressions of dissatisfaction on 
the part of voters with their elected representatives and, ultimately, with the state, 
which can point to greater levels of accountability and openness of criticism, 
increased electioneering, or incompetence and corruption. In surveys conducted by Li 
and Tony Saich, respondents in rural areas ranked their level of satisfaction with their 
village leadership to be at the lowest as opposed to national, provincial, county, and 
township leaderships. Nevertheless, such dissatisfaction in fact may augment the 
legitimacy of elected representatives and the national government, as more people 
confront corrupt officials, participate in elections, and assert their rights on the basis 
of law.211 
Expressions of dissatisfaction with elected representatives and the state, and 
the participatory nature of electioneering and elections, have increased discontent 
about the continuing dominance of Party officials in national politics. In a study by 
Min Qi in 1989 that Yongnian Zheng adopted in his 1994 analysis of whether 
development and democracy were compatible in China, 54 per cent of 1,721 
respondents were proud of the socialist state, and 56 per cent of 1,510 respondents 
agreed that in China development should take precedence over basic principles of 
democratic governance. Significantly, 30 per cent of 1,419 respondents indicated that 
they had not had their expectations satisfied by the Party’s performance. While 56 per 
cent of 472 respondents were proud to be Party members, only 43 per cent of 1,230 
respondents wanted to become one (even though Party membership is a prerequisite 
to high state and private positions). Whereas 57 per cent of 1,405 respondents were 
satisfied with the Party’s policies and 52 per cent with the Party’s social development 
goals, a paltry 18 per cent of 1,404 respondents found the Party to play a frontline 
role for their lives and society. Only 16 per cent of 1,709 respondents found the 
National People’s Congress to function well while 23 per cent found its functioning 
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to be poor. A mere 39 per cent of 1,600 respondents shared high expectations of 
contributions the National People’s Congress could make to Chinese democracy, 
while 14 per cent had no expectations at all. Seventy-two per cent of 1,369 
respondents believed that a main reason democratic development had taken a slow 
pace in China was its political institutions’ intransigence or resistance, and 67 per 
cent of 1,337 respondents believed that it was necessary to reform the political 
system. Seventy-five per cent of 1,391 respondents agreed that democracy needed to 
be set in place in China.212 
Despite, or perhaps due to, the roles and values elections may play and 
embody in the implementation and augmentation of democratic governance in China, 
the Party has not wholeheartedly embraced the contestation that elections necessarily 
entail, and the low level of support for the Party among the Chinese people certainly 
would be unlikely to induce the Party to introduce democratic governance in China at 
a broader, let alone national, level any time soon. It is indisputable that the Party 
continues to have a dominant role in all state apparatuses.213 According to William 
Alford, Cai Dingjian, and Liu Nanping, the notion that the Constitution may be 
utilised to constrain the executive government or the Party has not been successfully 
put into practice, the Supreme People’s Court has instructed lower courts to not rely 
on the Constitution, and the task of interpreting the Constitution remains vested in the 
National People’s Congress through its Standing Committee.214 Rather alarmingly, 
under Article 110 of the Constitution: 
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Local people’s governments at different levels are responsible, and 
report on their work, to people’s congresses at the corresponding 
level. Local people’s governments at and above the county level are 
responsible, and report on their work, to the standing committee of 
the people’s congress at the corresponding level when the congress is 
not in session. Local people’s governments at different levels are 
responsible, and report on their work, to the state administrative 
organs at the next higher level. Local people’s governments at 
different levels throughout the country are state administrative organs 
under the unified leadership of the State Council and are subordinate 
to it.215 
 
At the local level, while the Organic Law on Local People’s Congresses and 
Local People’s Governments as amended in 2004216 mandates contested elections,217 
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it allows for an uncontested election where only one candidate is nominated,218 with 
the result that contestation may be controlled by the Party through informal but strong 
pressure on candidates and their supporters. In 1997, the head of the Party’s Central 
Organisation Department promoted uncontested elections as Party policy, as the Party 
concluded that contestation was ‘not conducive to stability or development, with ill 
effects impossible to eradicate for years after’.219 Shen Yaping and Chen Kelin found 
that more than three-fourths of candidates for nine local people’s congresses in 
Jiangxi province were ‘partner candidates’, who ran with the objective of not winning 
any votes, including their own.220 The Organic Law insists that Party branches 
constitute a village’s ‘leadership core’, and Party secretaries have been found to enjoy 
much more power than elected committee directors.221 In July 2002, the Central 
Committee and the State Council issued a joint circular endorsing ‘concurrent office-
holding by village chiefs and Party secretaries’ and ‘merging the Party branch and the 
village committee’.222 Wang argues that self-government by villagers’ committees 
has been promoted by the state in order to foster its legitimacy and capacity to govern 
in rural areas, and that democratic movement, including generation of democratic 
consciousness, need not proceed on a large scale but may flourish first in rural areas 
and at a local level.223 However, instead of relinquishing control over village affairs, 
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the Party-state may use elections and self-government through villagers’ committees 
to masquerade its continued control over rural politics.224 
 
VIII. Civil society and its implications for human rights and democratic 
development in China 
 
Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that a strong participatory civil society is more 
important than elections in fostering a political system or a political culture in which 
individuals may mediate powers vested in state authorities.225 Civil society in China 
has been a major subject of discussions.226 As David Strand has found, however, civil 
society in China still retains the essentials of guanxi and seeks supporters from within 
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the state bureaucracy.227 In addition, NGOs suffer their own democratic deficits in 
their formation, networking, agenda setting, and activism, as they are managed, 
staffed and funded by those who share identical interests and beliefs to the exclusion 
of dissent. Ngaire Woods notes that NGOs tend to be assumed to act in an optimal 
and objective manner: 
 
Yet NGOs are a vast and largely unregulated spectrum of 
organizations – some legitimate, some self-serving and corrupt. … 
NGOs themselves need to be subjected to standards of accountability 
and good governance. Accountability, for example, has often meant 
NGOs working in developing countries being answerable to donors 
in the industrialized countries. Yet good governance surely requires 
that these NGOs become accountable to those most affected by their 
work and on whose behalf they are advancing claims.228 
 
While rights assessment, evidence documentation and advocacy by NGOs 
serve important and laudable purposes, objectives and results, their reasoning and 
judgments are often coloured by a lack of objectivity and an unwillingness to 
appreciate that a person’s, a group’s or a society’s practices, policies, preferences, 
priorities and decision-making processes may be informed by traditions and resources 
other than liberal discourses of human rights or democracy. Peerenboom observes 
that reports issued by human rights NGOs 
 
generally suffer from a cursory or one-sided presentation of facts, the 
lack of citation to sources for factual claims, reliance on hearsay 
evidence and unconfirmed information, and no or little legal analysis, 
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with citations to relevant PRC or international law as rare as a 
snowman in the tropics. Most reports dismiss summarily the 
arguments of the government and prosecutors about violations of 
PRC law, underestimate the complexity of the legal issues involved, 
and assume an expansive and liberal interpretation of civil and 
political rights that is often contested as a matter of international law. 
They rarely attempt to place the individual cases selected within a 
broader comparative, historical, economic, or political context or 
include any statistical analysis that would give any indication of the 
representativeness of the cases.229 
 
Methodological flaws in empirical and theoretical studies have led critics of the 
human rights situation in China to assess China by a double standard, not only vis-à-
vis developed States but also developing States and other emerging powers such as 
India. Peerenboom finds that China in fact has managed to do quite well against all 
indicia of good governance, especially when compared with States with a similar 
level of economic development and wealth,230 and that economic development is 
positively correlated with protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, government efficacy, observance of the rule of law, and measures against 
corruption.231 Even though China’s Constitution does not contain directly justiciable 
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rights232 and Chinese citizens do not enjoy habeas corpus protection, they may be 
able to challenge decisions through administrative channels.233 
On occasions where NGOs refer to international law, they tend to premise 
their findings on the assumption that China’s practices, policies and decisions violate 
international law, even if China may not even have ratified the particular human 
rights treaty that they seek to rely on (such as the ICCPR). China’s refusal or 
disinclination to ratify a human rights treaty is taken as non-compliance with 
international human rights norms or indicator of its non-readiness or unwillingness to 
accept its roles and responsibilities as a responsible international actor. 
However, there is no obligation under international law on the part of a State 
to accede to a treaty; a decision to ratify and a decision to not ratify a treaty are 
prerogatives of a State. Even within the European Union that is often regarded as 
exemplifying the diminution of State sovereignty, a Union treaty requires the 
ratifications of all 28 Member States for it to come into force. Furthermore, until they 
mature as norms of customary international law, provisions that inhere in a bilateral 
or multilateral treaty entail international legal obligations between the contracting 
parties only and do not form part of the general corpus of international law.234 The 
distinction is important as different States and their legal systems treat their treaty 
obligations and customary/general international law differently; a State may 
withdraw from a treaty but not a customary norm or a general principle of 
international law (save deviation leading to the creation of a new customary norm).235 
The distinction also helps correct the misconception that numerous ratifications of a 
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treaty equate or constitute maturation of obligations it contains as customary norms or 
the treaty as a universal treaty. Indeed, under the principle of the persistent objector, a 
State may object to being bound by a norm of customary international law.236 As 
Chapter II discussed, for many developing States, State sovereignty represents the 
ultimate bulwark against human rights violations. To impose a quasi-obligation on a 
State to accept a human rights norm or ratify a human rights treaty because other 
States have done so betrays both the principle of State sovereignty and that of popular 
sovereignty. 
Critics of China’s human rights record also point to its assumed non-
compliance with the spirit and letter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’). As noted in Chapter II, James Crawford argued in 1994 that a customary 
right to democratic governance could be discerned from the UDHR and the 
ICCPR, 237  while failing to produce evidence of the general, consistent and 
widespread State practice accompanied by the requisite opinio juris, particularly in 
Asia that is the largest continent with the largest population, and forgetting that 
ratification of a treaty alone does not evince State practice.238 Superficial reliance on 
the UDHR and human rights treaties betrays a lack of understanding of their nature 
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and impact. Hersch Lauterpacht was particularly sceptical of the UDHR as a 
document entailing any legal value or significance.239 In fact, Lauterpacht believed 
that the UDHR was equally devoid of moral force, given the vagueness and flaws of 
its provisions and the intended lack of real action on the part of almost all States in 
implementing the stated rights.240 Lastly, the UDHR, it must be remembered, was 
formulated and proclaimed only by States that existed at the time, about a quarter of 
the number of States today, many of which continued thereafter to exercise colonial 
domination and subjugation over territories and peoples in Asia and Africa, some 
with recourse to force. 
In addition, as Jochen von Bernstorff has pointed out, ‘[p]ure textualization 
of human rights in political or legal documents without normative concretization and 
practical realization leads to a “hypertrophy” of the symbolic dimension of rights. 
After 1948 practically every new national constitution included a human rights 
catalogue, many inspired by the Declaration. This textual “façade” can crate the 
illusion of enshrined rights, while obstructing consistent debate about structural 
impediments for their implementation. … It serves as a cloak of legitimacy for those 
who are in a position of power.’241 Excessive and superficial reliance on a State 
voting on the UDHR (as it was adopted by the General Assembly by consensus) and 
ratifying certain human rights treaties neglects a real possibility that a primary 
rationale for a State doing so is that it may then be able, through its appearance as a 
law-supporting international citizen, to forestall criticism of its actual malpractices of 
governance and violations of human rights and freedoms within its territory. As Oona 
Hathaway has demonstrated, many States ratify a human rights treaty with no 
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intention of abiding by it, and human rights violations may worsen post-
ratification.242 The lack of meaningful enforcement of international human rights 
treaties is precisely one principal reason why, in appraising the relationship between a 
State’s exercise of sovereignty and international human rights law, one must explore 
and understand the process by which municipal human rights laws come into 
existence and become entrenched in the State’s legal and political systems and its 
society. I have argued elsewhere that reference to international law and foreign laws 
without a principled basis undermines the (international) rule of law. It demonstrates 
not reverence, but cavalier disregard, for the meaning, content, implications and 
development of international law.243 The underlying values of the rule of law, Paul 
Stephan has stated, may actually be enhanced if a judiciary specifically and 
consistently disavows any application of international law244 (which, one should 
remember, is not given democratic assent by the citizens of a State, and exemplifies 
the flaws of resting popular sovereignty on international law – and vice versa). 
Another reason compliance is not an optimal approach to understanding the 
relationship between China and international law can be stated thus.245 There is an 
undeniable interest for a State to protect or further its reputation as a responsible 
international actor by abiding by international law and the international agreements 
into which it has entered. However, the size and power of a State are material 
variables when it comes to assessing the impact of reputation on a State’s compliance 
or non-compliance with international law. One only need recall the periodic threats 
on the part of the United States and the European Union during the 1990s of opposing 
China’s application for WTO membership and of trade embargoes or punitive trade 
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tariffs on grounds of China’s poor human rights record or its treatment of Tibet; 
ultimately, the threats did not materialise. The importance that a State assigns to a 
particular agreement, or a particular legal norm, also varies, even though ‘formal 
models of reputation rarely reflect this fact because it complicates the mathematics 
considerably and often distracts the readers from the point that they are trying to 
make’.246 A compliance rate averaged by variant levels of compliance is not the same 
as a unitary compliance rate, and it affords little in understanding a State’s general 
approach to international law. Lastly, the impact a State’s non-compliance may have 
on its future capacity to enter into an agreement within the same regime should not be 
overstated. As can be seen from the amount of international pressure brought to bear 
on China to ratify the ICCPR, the United Nations, other States, NGOs and the media 
would consider it a milestone in the international human rights movement if China 
were to ratify the treaty, even though China is more unlikely than not to improve its 
human rights record on account of such ratification and is likely to violate its 
obligations and commitments the treaty commands. 
Despite the ideology of human rights scholarship and activism and the 
proliferation of human rights treaties and declarations, human rights are not inherent 
in a person because of his or her being a human; they are recognised under particular 
national, historical, political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances at any given 
time and then, and only then, defined and protected by law, including national 
constitutions and laws and international law, all of which evolve over time. Whether 
or not we like it, recognition and protection of human rights, for them to have legal 
substance and binding force, demand and require that the framework of international 
law be respected and preserved.  As Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Narr have pointed 
out, ‘[p]eople may be born with the potential for rights; they may long for them 
consciously or unconsciously; and they may struggle for them. But human rights are 
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norms and practices which can be achieved only if proper historical circumstances are 
created.’247 The religious, gender, racial, and sexual orientation persecutions and 
equality movements highlight the importance that ‘[i]f people are not aware of the 
historical and contextual nature of human rights and not aware that human rights 
become realized only by the struggles of real people experiencing real instances of 
domination, then human rights are all too easily used as symbolic legitimizers for 
instruments of that very domination.’248 Many human rights scholars and activists 
presuppose that by shaming a State or a government, its people or the international 
community would then pressure the State or the government for political reform, or 
that the government would do so under pressure.249 As Alan Wachman has noted, 
shaming China for its human rights record has not led to improved human rights 
practices.250 In fact, Cooper Drury and Yitan Li have observed, China tends to 
respond to foreign pressure not with improved human rights practices but with less 
accommodation, and to positive rhetoric with more favourable concessions.251 It is a 
disservice on the part of human rights scholars and activists to the development of 
national and international human rights law to simplify or distort human rights as 
something that ought to be taken for granted, with the result that implementation on 
the ground and negotiations within a State and among States become more difficult to 
attain satisfactory outcomes and lasting positive impact. 
Instead, through persuasion and internalisation of international norms, 
behavioural changes on the parts of a State and of its people are more likely to occur 
and be more durable, and international NGOs have important roles to play in the 
protection of human rights and the promotion and implementation of democratic 
practices in a State. Jing-bao Nie argues that criticism about international NGOs 
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seeking to transplant or impose liberal norms on a populace despite its preferences or 
wishes should be taken seriously, but ‘it is an entirely different matter if people in 
non-Western societies want to use Western values in their own struggles against 
injustice and inequality’.252 Cecilia Milwertz and Wei Bu have demonstrated the 
gains national and sub-national women’s rights NGOs in China have made through 
engagement with international NGOs, with its generation and diffusion of knowledge, 
insights and perspectives on traditional practices and human rights norms, such that 
in less than a decade women’s rights in China have metamorphosed as human rights 
and domestic violence transformed from a non-issue to a health concern.253 The 
process has been particularly encouraging as ‘the construction of new knowledge has 
not been imposed from without as a top-down education process but has instead been 
shaped by the activists themselves in the context of international interactions’254 that 
have enabled the activists to join ‘a global emancipatory epistemic community’.255 
 
IX. Conclusion  
 
Suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as subversion of 
democratic practices, in overt and covert ways, can be found in all States, including 
liberal States with established constitutional and legal frameworks for human rights 
and democracy. Yet criticism about China’s human rights practices and lack of 
democracy has been most vocal and sustained. While I do not suggest that China has 
a good human rights record or its government does not suppress dissent, I argue that 
such criticism stems partly from Western States and scholars’ apprehension about 
China’s rise and how China’s economic development, coupled with its political 
                                                            
252 Jing-bao Nie, ‘Feminist Bioethics and the Language of Human Rights in the Chinese 
Context’, in Rosemarie Tong, Anne Donchin, and Susan Dodds, eds., Linking Visions: 
Feminist Bioethics, Human Rights, and the Developing World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004), 73, 78. 
253 Milwertz and Bu, supra n.160. 
254 Ibid., 134. 
255 Ibid. 
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importance and military capabilities, may alter the course of development of human 
rights norms and liberal democracy they have been aggressively putting forward. As 
the next chapter shows in respect of Tibet, China’s economic development itself 
constitutes a focal point of criticism as to how it undermines traditional Tibetan 
culture and practices, while China’s traditional culture, practices, norms and values 
are criticised for impeding the development and protection of human rights and 
democratisation. 
A human rights norm has many facets, most important of which are its 
requirements that the people actually recognise its existence and validity in the light 
of their culture and that their human agency be respected. While a culture in se does 
not have any rights, a people, be they the majority or a minority of a State, who 
adhere to their particular cultural norms and values have a right to enjoy their own 
culture. The Preambles to the ICCPR and the ICESCR recognise that ‘the ideal of 
free human beings … can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his … cultural rights’. 256  Common Article 1 of the two 
Covenants state that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.’257 Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, which China 
ratified in 2001, states that ‘[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life’,258 while Article 15(2) states that ‘[t]he 
steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realisation of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the 
development and the diffusion of science and culture.’ 259  The most important 
component of a human rights norm is that it may be exercised freely. Transplantation 
of Western ideals and interpretations of human rights and freedoms, including the 
                                                            
256 ICCPR, Preamble; ICESCR, Preamble. 
257 ICCPR, Art.1; ICESCR, Art.1. 
258 ICESCR, Art.15(1)(a). 
259 Ibid., Art.15(2). 
 191 
rule-of-law model, without due understanding of and regard for other States’ and 
their peoples’ cultures are likely to face opposition not only from States to such ideals 
and interpretations, but also, and more fundamentally, from peoples forced to 
disregard their own cultural norms and values. 
Human rights protection within a constitutional and legal framework is not a 
monopoly of liberal States. While China emphasises that developing States and their 
peoples need – or choose – to develop and pursue economic, social and cultural rights 
even if their civil and political rights may need to take a back seat, and that the 
understanding, development and implementation of human rights must take into 
account the particular historical, political, economic, social and cultural 
characteristics of a State and its people, it has recognised and guaranteed various 
human rights and freedoms in its territory through its Constitution and laws, 
including workers’ rights (which have developed partly as a result of the 
government’s suppression of dissent on Tiananmen Square in June 1989), women’s 
rights (despite the patriarchal nature of Chinese society), and privacy rights (despite 
China’s communitarian culture). 
Meanwhile, China’s economic development, frequently discussed among 
international policymakers and in the media, has overshadowed its implementation of 
political reform, with most Western States, scholars (with the exception of a few 
Western scholars engaged in Chinese studies) and media assuming that China is 
devoid of any form of democratic practice. In fact, China has adopted laws since 
1979 encouraging self-government in villages across the country through villagers’ 
committees and, at and above county level, through local people’s congresses and 
local people’s governments. Members of villagers’ committees, local people’s 
congresses and local people’s governments are elected directly by their constituents 
who have the power to recall them. Elected representatives are required to convey 
their constituents’ opinions and demands and make suggestions to the government. 
The periodic elections and the power to recall have enabled the Chinese people a 
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greater say in affairs central to their lives and local areas, and helped instil in them a 
sense of belonging, ownership and agency vis-à-vis their village, local, provincial 
and, ultimately, national governments.  
Instead of a top-down approach to promoting the development of human 
rights and democratic practices in China and elsewhere, a bottom-up approach is 
more preferable and effective – other States, international organisations, and 
international NGOs should engage with domestic NGOs as well as the government. 
Through such engagement, all parties may learn from and acquire diverse 
experiences; awareness of human rights norms may be able to be generated and 
internalised both by the government and among the people; their attitudes to 
traditional norms, values and practices may evolve for the better; and international 
human rights law may be improved and acquire greater legitimacy. As the Chinese 
people become increasingly affluent and aware of their rights on the basis of law, 
human rights and democratic practices, one may hope, will continue to develop more 
substantively. 
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Chapter V: Self-Determination in Schizophrenia: 
Revisiting China’s Positions on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet 





The fact that China, with the aid of international law, was reduced to a semi-colonial 
entity forced to cede parts of its territory and surrender certain sovereign rights to 
other States as a result of military losses during the nineteenth century, as Chapter III 
detailed, has resulted in a constant state of anxiety on the part of the Chinese 
leadership whenever China’s territorial integrity is threatened or even questioned. As 
self-determination has evolved as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law’ with ‘an erga omnes character’,1 is mentioned whenever one argues 
for the demise or diminution of State sovereignty, and is construed as a right of a 
people and not of a territory, China’s unease with self-determination and how self-
determination might potentially lead to its dismemberment, as happened in the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, is further heightened. China also regards discourses of self-
determination as renewed Western attempts to subvert its State sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and has taken a strong position on how self-determination should 
be recognised and implemented in China and generally. 
 However, China’s strong position should not automatically be construed as 
its denial or rejection of self-determination as a normative principle or as a legal 
right. In fact, China has developed certain systems of autonomous governance within 
its territory in ways that complement and perhaps even augment self-determination in 
its current international form. While Judge Dillard in his separate opinion in the 
                                                
1 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, 90, 102. 
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International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) advisory opinion in Western Sahara2 stated that 
‘[i]t is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the 
destiny of the people’,3 self-determination requires a delineated territory for it to be 
exercised and for the self to be determined, and there are criteria which a territory 
must fulfil in order to have a valid claim to self-determination. Self-determination in 
international law is still fundamentally statist.4 China’s approaches to self-
determination in its exercise of State sovereignty illustrate how it may be capable of 
influencing the development of international law in an area that has received one of 
the most sustained concerns. As China defends its approaches to human rights and 
democratic norms and implements them domestically within the confines of Chinese 
culture, Party-state politics, and increasing local demand for political reform, as the 
preceding chapter explored, the ways in which China has addressed some of its 
peoples’ claims to self-determination further highlight that a universalist conception 
of international law may not reflect legal or factual reality. 
This chapter first examines how self-determination has evolved as a principle 
and a right under international law and in Chinese laws and practices, including the 
manners in which it may be exercised as well as its ambiguity and fragility. In 
particular, it explores issues of self-determination that Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet 
present and illuminate. It also discusses how China, other States and the international 
community have facilitated or undermined self-determination in the three territories, 
and the roles international law has played in creating the situations in which these 
territories and their peoples now find themselves. In connexion with China’s 
approaches to self-determination within its territory, this chapter also explores its 
                                                
2 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, 12. 
3 Ibid., per Judge Dillard (sep. op.), 122. Marc Weller argues that ‘there has rarely been a 
pronouncement more dangerously mistaken than this one’: ‘The Self-determination Trap’, 4 
Ethnopolitics (2005), 3, 3. 
4 Richard Falk, ‘The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)’, in James 
Crawford, ed., The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 18, 24-27; Martti 
Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 328. 
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attitudes to self-determination in territories beyond its mountains and shores – 
notably, Kosovo and East Timor – that shed light on our understanding of self-
determination, State sovereignty, and international law. 
 
II. Self-determination in international law: Origins, definitions, and 
implications 
 
A territory’s claim to self-determination must be established in law with reference to 
its historical context, and not through what one believes to be morally just or 
politically expedient. As John Dugard has noted, ‘[m]uch of the support for the 
principle of self-determination as a legal right and as a peremptory norm is couched 
in generalisations and little attempt is made to define the content of the right with any 
precision.’5 Alfred Rubin argues that, on matters of self-determination, ‘resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly and other statements by statespeople 
unconcerned with rules that do not apply to themselves immediately – or, under 
various rationales, to their own countries’ minorities or local majorities – are 
regarded as statements of at least inchoate natural law.’6 While self-determination is 
now regarded as an inherent right of all peoples, the processes and manners in which 
a people’s right to determine their ways of life and political destinies was suppressed 
                                                
5 John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 160. Catriona Drew describes self-determination as ‘plagued by an excess of 
indeterminacy both in terms of scope and content’: ‘The East Timor Story: International Law 
on Trial’, 12 European Journal of International Law (2001), 651, 658. For example, Hurst 
Hannum states that ‘[w]ithout entering into the debate of whether the right of self-
determination is jus cogens, it would seem difficult to question its status as a “right” in 
international law. While General Assembly resolutions do not of themselves make law, the 
unanimous adoption of Resolutions 1514, 2625, and numerous others reiterating the “right” to 
self-determination is significant’: Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The 
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 
45. Alexander Orakhelashvili asserts, in circularity, that ‘[t]he right of peoples to self-
determination is undoubtedly part of jus cogens because of its fundamental importance’: 
Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 51. 
6 Alfred P. Rubin, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and Political 
Analysis’, 36 Stanford Journal of International Law (2000), 253, 254. 
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by Western powers through colonialism are well documented.7 The notion of a right 
to self-determination was one treated with derision by international lawyers of the 
past.8 It is untenable to suggest that past events are immaterial. The circumstances 
and processes in which the right has evolved constitute an important legal framework 
in determining its applicability to and implications for a territory. A claim to self-
determination that does not have a proper legal basis undermines the claim, and self-
determination as a legal right. 
 Due to the roles nationalism played in bringing about the First World War, 
the Covenant of the League of Nations proclaimed that ‘[t]o those colonies and 
territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the 
sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by 
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and 
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for 
the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.’9 Foreign rule of 
peoples continued to be forborne, and the provision applied only to colonies of enemy 
States. As Gerrit Gong has pointed out, ‘[b]ecause protectorates over “uncivilized” 
countries remained an affair between the occupying European state and the rest of the 
civilized states of the world, the “sacred trust of civilization” provided a mechanism 
for the occupying state to be granted legal privileges and duties (vis-à-vis the Family 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law’, 40 Harvard International Law Journal (1999), 1; 
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael Byers and Georg Nolte, eds., United States 
Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003); Koskenniemi, supra n.4; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and 
Imperialism’, in David Freestone, Surya Subedi, and Scott Davidson, eds., Contemporary 
Issues in International Law: A Collection of the Josephine Onoh Memorial Lectures (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 197; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and 
Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2004), 197. 
8 In 1920 when called upon by the League of Nations to advise on the legal status of the 
Aaland Islands, the International Commission of Jurists rejected outright the notion of a 
positive right to self-determination: ‘The Aaland Islands Question: Report of the Committee 
of Jurists’, League of Nations Official Journal: Special Supplement (1920), 3. 
9 Treaty of Versailles, signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919, Section I, Art.22(1). 
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of Nations) without necessarily extending legal personality to the occupied 
territory.’10 The history of the First World War, which led to the Second World War, 
the intractable problems associated with decolonisation, and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and of States such as Yugoslavia that precipitated the Kosovo crisis, 
should teach us that ‘separations or dissolutions of States do not usually diminish the 
number of minorities. On the contrary, new minority problems and inter-ethnic 
conflicts often arise.’11 
Self-determination began to develop as a legal right after the Second World 
War, as colonial powers during the war had had to rely on the manpower and 
resources of their colonies, whose peoples began to question the legitimacy of 
colonial rule when the colonial powers had failed to defend them from invasion. The 
United Nations Charter proclaims self-determination as a principle of international 
law.12 Chapter XI of the Charter provides for the utmost promotion ‘within the 
system of international peace and security established by the present Charter’13 – 
notably the principles of State sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention – 
of the interests and well-being of non-self-governing territories with a view to ‘the 
progressive development of their free political institutions’.14 Independence is not a 
mandatory objective of Chapter XI, and many colonial powers sought to cling to 
status quo ante bellum.15 Through numerous rebellions and wars of independence, 
decolonisation ensued globally, culminating in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting 
                                                
10 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 76. The notion that certain territories were the ‘sacred trust’ of the international 
community similarly found expression in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. 
11 Rein Müllerson, ‘Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the 
Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 
(2009), 2, 20. 
12 United Nations Charter, Arts.1(2) and 55. 
13 Ibid., Art.73. 
14 Ibid., Art.73(b). 
15 Notably France in Algeria, Indochina (present-day Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), 
Madagascar, Morocco, and Tunisia; the Netherlands in Indonesia; Portugal in Angola, Cape 
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe; the United Kingdom in 
India (present-day Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), Kenya, Malaya (present-day 
Malaysia and Singapore), Rhodesia, and Yemen. 
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of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,16 which declared that ‘[a]ll 
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.’17 The Declaration reaffirmed ‘the sovereign rights of all peoples and 
their territorial integrity’18 and stated that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’19 
In 1965, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty,20 which declares that ‘[e]very State has an inalienable 
right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State’,21 and that ‘[a]ll States shall respect the 
right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely 
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete 
elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations.’22 
 Self-determination then found its place in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). Common Article 1 of the Covenants states that ‘[a]ll 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.’23 Self-determination as referred to in common Article 1 relates to 
                                                
16 U.N. G.A. Res. 1514(XV) (1960). 
17 Ibid., para.2. 
18 Ibid., para.7. 
19 Ibid., para.6. 
20 U.N. G.A. Res. 2131(XX) (1965).  
21 Ibid., para.5. 
22 Ibid., para.6. 
23 ICCPR, Art.1; ICESCR, Art.1. 
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efforts at the time for decolonisation and not to dismemberment of existing States. 
Matthew Saul finds the fact that numerous States have ratified the ICCPR to 
‘[reduce] the need for enquiry’ as to whether self-determination is a treaty right or a 
norm of customary international law.24 I argue, however, that the provision in the 
Covenants does not mature as a norm of customary international law simply because 
the Covenants have been widely ratified, particularly when certain major States 
continue not to ratify either or both of the Covenants (China vis-à-vis the ICCPR and 
the United States vis-à-vis the ICESCR, with the latter’s ratification of the ICCPR in 
1992 entailing significant reservations). As the ICJ noted in its judgment in 
Continental Shelf25 between Libya and Malta in 1985, ‘[i]t is of course axiomatic that 
the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an 
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed 
in developing them’.26 
Common Article 1 was followed by the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration,27 which contains an explicit section on the principle of equal rights and 
                                                
24 Matthew Saul, ‘The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A 
Formula for Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?’, 11 Human Rights Law 
Review (2011), 609, 625. 
25 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, 13. 
26 Ibid., 29-30. As Rosalyn Higgins has pointed out, ‘an existing norm does not die without 
the great majority of states engaging in both a contrary practice and withdrawing their opinio 
juris’: Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 22. 
27 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, proclaimed by 
U.N. G.A. Res. 2625(XXV) (1970). While not without critics (e.g., Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 
‘The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of 
Principles of Friendly Relations’, 137 Recueil des cours (1972–III), 419; Robert Rosenstock, 
‘The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey’, 
65 American Journal of International Law (1971), 713), the Declaration has been hailed as 
‘an outstanding contribution to the strengthening of international legality’ (Milan Šahovic, 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation (New York: 
Oceana, 1972), 50) and ‘the most authoritative expression of the scope and meaning of the 
basic principles of today’s international legal order’ (Christian Tomuschat, ‘Yugoslavia’s 
Damaged Sovereignty over the Province of Kosovo’, in Gerard Kreijen, Marcel Brus, Jorris 
Duursma, Elizabeth de Vos, and John Dugard, eds., State, Sovereignty, and International 
Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 323, 341). In his 1978 Hague 
Academy Lectures, E. Jimènez de Aréchaga, then President of the ICJ, stated that ‘[t]his 
Resolution does not purport to amend the Charter, but to clarify the basic legal principles 
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self-determination of peoples. The principle was qualified in the same section by the 
affirmation that ‘[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour. Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or 
territory’.28 In a strong critique of the right to self-determination as empowering 
peoples, Marc Weller argues that self-determination in fact 
 
disenfranchises populations. This process of disenfranchisement has 
traditionally proceeded in five steps. First, self-determination is 
intrinsically linked with, and deployed to justify, the disenfranchising 
doctrine of territorial unity. Second, there is the issue of the 
definition of the object of protection of the right to self-determination 
                                                                                                                           
contained in Article 2. Adopted in these terms and without a dissenting vote, it constitutes an 
authoritative expression of the views held by the totality of the parties to the Charter as to 
these basic principles and certain corollaries resulting from them. In the light of these 
circumstances it seems difficult to deny the legal weight and authority of the Declaration both 
as a resolution recognizing what the Members themselves believe constitute existing rules of 
customary law and as an interpretation of the Charter by the subsequent agreement and the 
subsequent practice of all its members’: ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 
159 Recueil des cours (1978–I), 1, 32. 
28 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, The Principle of 
Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples. The affirmation was reiterated by the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993 in its Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993, A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 32 ILM 1661 (1993). In 
slightly different language, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ibid., para.2, 
states that ‘[i]n accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, [the right to self-determination] shall not be construed as authorising or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus 
possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction of any kind’. 
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– that is to say, the definition of the types of ‘people’ entitled to 
exercise this right. Third, there is the scope of application of the right 
to self-determination. … even if a ‘people’ is designated as a right 
holder, does this right trump previously existing territorial 
definitions, or is it exercised within these confines? Then there is the 
issue of the singularity of implementation of the right – is it a 
continuous process, or is it a one-time-only event? Finally, there is 
the problem of the modalities of achieving the point of self-
determination.29 
 
As Chapter III discussed, in order to reinforce its socialist foundation and 
anti-imperialistic self-conception, communist China in its early foreign policy-
making focused on endorsing national independence movements. It supported 
decolonisation on the basis of a right to self-determination, even though it was largely 
precluded from having a formal role in the development of international law on the 
matter as it was the authorities on Taiwan that represented China within the United 
Nations at the time. Self-determination has developed in Chinese laws and practices 
in tandem with its evolution on the international plane. Issues presented by Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Tibet, as well as China’s approaches to Kosovo and East Timor, 
illustrate how recognition and implementation of self-determination do not follow a 
rigid formula, and how China’s approaches to self-determination in these territories 
contribute to the content of the right as well as our understanding of its potential, 
limits and implications. 
 
III. Self-determination in Chinese laws and practices 
 
 
                                                
29 Weller, supra n.3, 5-6. 
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a. Hong Kong: A case of (non-)self-determination or sui generis?* 
As noted in Chapter II, most Western scholars, other than those with an interest in 
Hong Kong, when discussing self-determination largely dismiss or ignore issues that 
Hong Kong presents.30 A notable example could be found in Antonio Cassese’s Self-
Determination of Peoples,31 where he takes the view that ‘the whole cluster of legal 
standards (the general principle and the customary rules) on self-determination should 
be regarded as belonging to the body of peremptory norms.’32 Cassese argues that 
Hong Kong is not a case where self-determination is relevant,33 as the people of Hong 
Kong are Han Chinese,34 the United Kingdom obtained control and jurisdiction over 
Hong Kong ‘on the basis of a Treaty that provided for a lease and not a cession 
proper’,35 and the people were meaningfully consulted by the United Kingdom and 
the colonial local government, a finding he supports by reference to a statement of the 
United Kingdom.36 Cassese lauds the outcome China and the United Kingdom 
reached for Hong Kong in 1984 as ‘a useful model for dealing with disputed 
territories’.37 One might argue that Hong Kong also is a bygone case and, when 
compared with Tibet (or Kosovo or East Timor), has fared well as it continues to be a 
major international financial centre further enhanced by its access to the Chinese 
market and receipt of Chinese investment in its economy, while maintaining 
autonomous governance. 
                                                
30 Weller, ibid., 7, acknowledges that ‘[t]his doctrine is, however, displaced in certain 
circumstances, for instance in cases of territorial change that are anticipated in historical 
arrangements such as the hand-over of Hong Kong’, albeit without further elaboration. 
* This sub-section draws on my article ‘Hong Kong’s Political Autonomy and its Continuing 
Struggle for Universal Suffrage’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2006], 285-311. I 
declare and affirm that the article was written solely by me and no part of the article embodies 
any work in fulfilment of a university degree, diploma or certificate.  
31 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
32 Ibid., 140. 
33 Ibid., 79-80, fns.34 and 36. 
34 Ibid., 80, fn.36. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 79-80, fn.34. 
37 Ibid., 357. 
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I argue that a primary reason Hong Kong is neglected in legal literature on 
self-determination is that it uncomfortably exemplifies the reality that self-
determination, despite its supposed purity as a norm of jus cogens requiring uniform 
application, is not immune to selective reasoning and application of international law 
by Western States, policymakers and scholars. Neglect or disregard of historical 
circumstances underlying a territory’s claim to self-determination jeopardises the 
integrity of the norm and of international law generally. As Judge Elaraby in his 
separate opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory38 stated in respect of the Palestinian Territory, ‘[a]n 
historical survey is relevant to the question posed by the General Assembly, for it 
serves as the background to understanding the legal status of the Palestinian Territory 
on the one hand and underlines the special and continuing responsibility of the 
General Assembly on the other. This may appear as academic, without relevance to 
the present events. The present is however determined by the accumulation of past 
events and no reasonable and fair concern for the future can possibly disregard a firm 
grasp of past events.’39 
 In 1842 after its defeat in the Opium War, China ceded Hong Kong Island to 
Great Britain in perpetuity under the Treaty of Nanjing, and in 1860 after its defeat by 
Great Britain and France ceded Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island to Great 
Britain in perpetuity under the 1860 Treaty of Beijing. It was the 1898 Treaty of 
Beijing, under which Great Britain leased from China for 99 years the segment of 
present-day New Territories and all outlying islands, that gave rise to the 
misconception that the United Kingdom was legally bound to return the entirety of 
Hong Kong to China on the eve of July 1997. Although China under the imperial, 
republican, and communist governments considered the three treaties to be unequal 
treaties, as the use of force in acquiring territory was lawful during the nineteenth 
                                                
38 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136. 
39 Ibid., 249 (sep. op. Elaraby). 
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century, under the principle of the intertemporal law, the three treaties were validly 
entered into and remained binding notwithstanding subsequent changes in 
international law. While international law admits of the doctrine of rebus sic 
standibus, China was not in a position to argue that a fundamental change of 
circumstances (regarding its regime, governance or society) enabled it to amend, 
repudiate, terminate or withdraw from any treaty that established a boundary.40 
 When the Charter came into force in 1945, Hong Kong was a colony of the 
United Kingdom and listed by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory 
possessing the right to self-determination. Shortly after the People’s Republic of 
China (‘PRC’) government replaced the authorities on Taiwan as the representative 
government of China in the United Nations in October 1971,41 China demanded 
removal of Hong Kong (and Macau, then a Portuguese colony since reverted to 
China’s sovereignty in 1999) from the list, with China’s Ambassador to the United 
Nations stating that ‘the settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macao is 
entirely within China’s sovereign right and does not at all fall under the ordinary 
category of colonial territories.’42 China’s demand was met and encountered no 
protest from the United Kingdom other than a statement that it considered such 
removal ‘in no way affects the legal status of Hong Kong’.43 China and the United 
Kingdom eventually entered into negotiations that culminated in the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration.44 The Joint Declaration stated that sovereignty over Hong 
Kong was to be restored to China as of 1 July 199745 and that Hong Kong ‘will enjoy 
                                                
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.62(2)(a). 
41 U.N. G.A. Res. 2758(XXVI) (1971). 
42 Letter of China’s Ambassador Huang Hua to Chairman of the Special Committee, 10 March 
1972, reprinted in David A. Jones, Jr., ‘A Leg to Stand On? Post-1997 Hong Kong Courts as a 
Constraint on PRC Abridgement of Individual Rights and Local Autonomy’, 12 Yale Journal 
of International Law (1987), 250, 255. 
43 Letter of the United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations to the 
United Nations Secretary-General, 19 December 1972, as quoted in Robert McCorquodale, 
‘Negotiating Sovereignty: The Practice of the United Kingdom in regard to the Right of Self-
Determination’, 66 British Year Book of International Law (1995), 283, 291. 
44 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 23 ILM 1366 (1984). 
45 Ibid., Art.2. 
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a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the 
responsibility of the Central People’s Government.’46 The Joint Declaration requires 
that post-colonial Hong Kong’s legislature be constituted by elections,47 which 
necessitated that Hong Kong’s political structure in 1984 be substantially reformed, 
as direct elections were not introduced during British colonial rule until its dying 
years.48 
                                                
46 Ibid., Art.3(2). 
47 Ibid., Annex I: Elaboration by the Government of the People’s Republic of China of its 
Basic Policies regarding Hong Kong, Art.1. 
48 The process by which the United Kingdom consulted the people of Hong Kong about their 
political future was one Yash Ghai describes as shameful and manipulative: ‘Putting the Cat 
among the Pigeons: The Politics of the Referendum’, 34 Hong Kong Law Journal (2004), 
433, 444. After the Joint Declaration had already been concluded with China, the United 
Kingdom set up a special assessment ofﬁce to collect public views on the Joint Declaration for 
the United Kingdom’s consideration, while rejecting a referendum. Ian Scott, Political Change 
and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2, 
notes that ‘[p]otential respondents were warned, however, that the agreement had to be 
considered as a whole, that it could not be amended in part, and that the alternative to its 
acceptance was a unilateral plan for the future of the territory drawn up by the Chinese 
government.’ In July 1984, the colonial local government issued a Green Paper indicating an 
intention ‘to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is ﬁrmly 
rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of 
Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong’: Hong Kong 
Government, Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984), para.7(a). It proposed that in 1985 and in 1988 
a number of seats in the Legislative Council would be open to election by an electoral college 
as well as to indirect election through a limited franchise referred to as functional 
constituencies (ibid., para.25) based on ‘people’s common interests, such as commerce, 
industry, law, medicine, finance, education, trade union, etc.’: ibid., para.22. In November 
1984, the colonial local government issued a White Paper concluding that ‘[p]ublic reaction 
was generally in favour of the aims of the Green Paper and the gradual and progressive nature 
of the proposals made in it. The need to ensure that the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong 
are not put at risk by introducing too many constitutional changes too rapidly was widely 
recognised’: Hong Kong Government, White Paper: The Further Development of 
Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984), 4. The 
consultation remains of pivotal relevance to Hong Kong’s continuing struggle for universal 
suffrage. As Albert H.Y. Chen has stated, ‘[t]he force of originalism as one of the legitimate 
and most important modes of constitutional interpretation need not and cannot be denied. The 
real question is how originalism is to be applied. … originalism does not necessarily mean 
giving effect to the subjective intent of the framers and adopters of the constitution. How the 
constitutional text was understood by members of the community at the time of the enactment 
of the constitution can be an even more important consideration. In the case of the Basic Law, 
the relevant members of the community would include the people of Hong Kong. Hence how 
they understood the wording and promise of the Basic Law in the late 1980s and 1990 … does 
matter. And since much of the content of the Basic Law simply reproduces the text of [the] 
Sino-British Joint Declaration, how the people of Hong Kong understood the wording and 
promise of the Joint Declaration in 1984 also matters’: ‘The Interpretation of the Basic Law – 
Common Law and Mainland Chinese Perspectives’, 30 Hong Kong Law Journal (2000), 380, 
421. 
China considered that the United Kingdom was seeking to establish a democratically 
elected government in Hong Kong in order to undermine its authority in Hong Kong (Michael 
B. Yahuda, Hong Kong: China’s Challenge (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 74), 
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Being a norm of jus cogens, self-determination cannot be denied at the will of 
a colonial power or of a State wishing to regain control over a territory it has ceded. 
The United Nations General Assembly has stated that ‘in the absence of a decision by 
the General Assembly itself that a Non-Self-Governing Territory has attained a full 
measure of self-government in terms of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, the 
administering Power concerned should continue to transmit information under Article 
73(e) of the UN Charter with respect to that Territory.’49 The General Assembly made 
no such decision in respect of Hong Kong, and Hong Kong thus continued after 1971 
to remain a non-self-governing territory.50 The fact that China proffered a competing 
claim of sovereignty over Hong Kong does not alter the right of Hong Kong to self-
determination that must, at the very least, be ascertained through genuine consultation 
                                                                                                                           
and opposed the consultations and insisted that Hong Kong’s political structure be altered 
only in ways that ‘converged’ with the Joint Declaration (Robert Cottrell, The End of Hong 
Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (London: John Murray, 1993), 182-83. 
Cottrell, ibid., 183, opines that ‘[t]he accommodation of “convergence” produced perhaps the 
most regrettable action of the British and Hong Kong governments during this difficult period: 
the publication of a further Green Paper on representative government in 1987 [Hong Kong 
Government, Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1987)], which was designed to dampen earlier hopes for a 
brisk pace of democratization, not by an admission of China’s successful intransigence, but by 
a farrago of leading questions designed to insinuate that the change of heart had come from 
Hong Kong itself.’). The United Kingdom in turn stated that it was in charge of Hong Kong 
only until 30 June 1997. In other words, its position was that it would be neither capable of 
nor responsible for dealing with what might happen to Hong Kong thereafter. Such a position 
was contrary to international law, which prescribes that ‘[a]ny change of sovereignty over a 
territory without any exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of that territory 
does not absolve the old or the new sovereign of the responsibility to protect the right of self-
determination of the people of that territory’: McCorquodale, supra n.43, 331. McCorquodale, 
ibid., 329, explains that ‘under both treaty and customary international law, the right of self-
determination of the people of Hong Kong is not limited by any treaty. Indeed, the action of 
the United Kingdom in entering into a treaty with China without allowing the people of Hong 
Kong to exercise their right of self-determination is a breach of the United Kingdom’s treaty 
obligations (under the International Human Rights Covenants) to protect the right of self-
determination. Because common Article 1 requires all States at all times to “facilitate 
realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination”, irrespective of the 
dependency of those peoples on that State, the United Kingdom retains a legal obligation to 
the people of Hong Kong in regard to their right of self-determination after 1997.’ 
49 U.N. G.A. Res. 41/13 (1986). As Judge Skubiszewski in his separate opinion in East Timor, 
supra n.1, 259, stated, ‘[s]ince 1960 East Timor has continually appeared and still appears on 
the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories. The United Nations maintains that 
status of East Timor. Only the Organization can bring about a change. Rejection of the status 
by the original sovereign Power; or the use of force by another country to gain control over 
the territory; or recognition by individual States of the factual consequences of the recourse to 
force – none of these unilateral acts can abolish or modify the status of non-self-government. 
That status has its basis in the law of the Organization and no unilateral act can prevail over 
that law.’ 
50 McCorquodale, supra n.43, 292. 
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and exercised by the Hong Kong people. In its advisory opinion in Western Sahara, 
the ICJ stated that ‘the consultation of the people of a territory awaiting 
decolonisation is an inescapable imperative. … Thus even if integration of territory 
was demanded by an interested State, as in this case, it could not be had without 
ascertaining the freely expressed will of the people – the very sine qua non of all 
decolonization.’51 The International Commission of Jurists in its 1992 report on Hong 
Kong52 regarded it ‘intolerable for the British Government to transfer British citizens 
in Hong Kong to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China without their own 
consent and without any opportunity having been given to them to participate in 
deciding on their own future.’53 It was all the more deplorable that the United 
Kingdom enacted successive pieces of legislation depriving the Hong Kong people of 
British citizenship and the right of abode in the United Kingdom, while 
simultaneously engaging in a military and diplomatic conflict with Argentina in the 
name of defending the Falkland Islands’ right to self-determination and its own State 
sovereignty.54 
Against this political backdrop and the PRC government’s suppression in 
June 1989 of calls for democratic development in China, more than one million 
people held demonstrations in Hong Kong demanding immediate implementation of 
universal suffrage. In January 1990, Beijing agreed to an increase in the number of 
directly elected seats in the Legislative Council in 1991.55 In the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong promulgated by the National People’s Congress in 1990 under Article 31 of the 
1982 Constitution,56 which took effect upon China’s assumption of sovereignty over 
                                                
51 Western Sahara, supra n.2, 81. 
52 International Commission of Jurists, Countdown to 1997: Report of a Mission to Hong 
Kong (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1992). 
53 Ibid., 56. 
54 See Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Hong Kong: Nationality Issues since 1983’, in David Pong, ed., 
Encyclopedia of Modern China, Vol.2 (New York: Charles Scribners & Sons, 2009), 241. 
55 Leo F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between Public Interest and Private Profit 
in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 85. 
56 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China as adopted by the Seventh National People’s Congress at its Third Session on 4 April 
1990 in pursuance of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 29 ILM 1519 (1990). The Preamble 
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Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, the ICCPR (which China has not ratified), the ICESCR 
(which China ratified in 2001), and various International Labour Organisation 
conventions previously extended to Hong Kong are accorded constitutional force in 
the territory.57 The colonial local government also enacted the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights Ordinance in June 1991, implementing the ICCPR in Hong Kong, with its 
substantive rights provisions premised on those of the ICCPR. Section 2(3) of the 
Ordinance stated that in ‘interpreting and applying this Ordinance, regard shall be had 
to the fact that the purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the incorporation into 
the law of Hong Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’.58 Ghai maintains that the provision was ‘undoubtedly an invitation 
to the judiciary to consider the interpretations of the ICCPR by the Human Rights 
Committee as well as of other international bodies dealing with analogous provisions. 
This internationalises the rights issue in a manner which upsets China, which prefers 
to see rights as determined by the specific historical and economic circumstances of a 
                                                                                                                           
to the Basic Law of Hong Kong states that ‘[u]pholding national unity and territorial integrity, 
maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and taking account of its history and 
realities, the People’s Republic of China has decided that upon China’s resumption of the 
exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be 
established in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, and that under the principle of “one country, two systems”, the socialist 
system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong.’ Article 31 of the Constitution states 
that ‘[t]he state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to 
be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the 
National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions.’ The Basic Law of Hong 
Kong provides, inter alia, that Hong Kong is authorised ‘to exercise a high degree of 
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication’ (Art.2); that the socialist system and policies practised in China will not 
extend to Hong Kong, whose ‘previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years’ (Art.5); that ‘[t]he laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the 
common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be 
maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the 
legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ (Art.8); and that, in addition to 
Chinese (Cantonese), English may be used as an official language by the three branches of 
government in Hong Kong (Art.9). In addition, the Basic Law of Hong Kong in 18 substantive 
provisions guarantees such fundamental rights and freedoms as may continue to be enjoyed in 
Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997 (Arts.24-41). 
57 Basic Law of Hong Kong, Art.39. 
58 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap.383), s.2(3) (not adopted as part of the law of 
Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997). 
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particular state’.59 It was thus not surprising that section 2(3), together with three 
other provisions of the Ordinance, was specifically not adopted by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on 23 February 1997 as part of the law 
of Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997 in accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of 
Hong Kong.60 The reason for the Standing Committee’s decision not to adopt the 
provisions lay in China’s unease with international human rights law, in the form of a 
treaty it has not ratified, having explicit direct effect on the interpretation and 
application of a domestic law, that is, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, that 
affects the validity of all domestic laws and policies in Hong Kong.61 
                                                
59 Yash Ghai, ‘Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf’s Clothing? Judicial Politics and the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights’, 60 Modern Law Review (1997), 459, 461. 
60 Article 160 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong states that ‘[u]pon the establishment of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall 
be adopted as laws of the Region except for those which the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress declares to be in contravention of this Law. If any laws are later 
discovered to be in contravention of this Law, they shall be amended or cease to have force in 
accordance with the procedure as prescribed by this Law. Documents, certificates, contracts, 
and rights and obligations valid under the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall 
continue to be valid and be recognized and protected by the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, provided that they do not contravene this Law.’ By Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Treatment of the Laws 
Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Cap.2206), 
adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress on 23 February 1997, the following provisions of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance were not adopted as part of the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region as of 1 July 1997: 
Section 2(3): ‘In interpreting and applying this Ordinance, regard shall be had to the fact 
that the purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong 
Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to 
Hong Kong, and for ancillary and connected matters.’ 
Section 3(1): ‘All pre-existing legislation that admits of a construction consistent with this 
Ordinance shall be given such a construction.’ 
Section 3(2): ‘All pre-existing legislation that does not admit of a construction consistent 
with this Ordinance is, to the extent of the inconsistency, repealed.’ 
Section 4: ‘All legislation enacted on or after the commencement date shall, to the extent 
that it admits of such a construction, be constructed so as to be consistent with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong.’ 
61 Yash Ghai, Peter Wesley-Smith, and Johannes Chan have argued that the Standing 
Committee’s decision has no legal effect on the continuing direct applicability of the ICCPR 
in Hong Kong, as judges may rely on the preamble, long title and substantive provisions of the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, all of which make reference to the ICCPR and its 
incorporation into the law of Hong Kong: Yash Ghai, ‘The Continuity of Laws and Legal 
Rights and Obligations in the SAR’, 27 Hong Kong Law Journal (1997), 136; Peter Wesley-
Smith, ‘Maintenance of the Bill of Rights’, 27 Hong Kong Law Journal (1997), 15; Johannes 
Chan, ‘The Status of the Bill of Rights in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’, 28 
Hong Kong Law Journal (1998), 152. Chan further asserts, ibid., 152-54, that the repeal of 
any statutory provision found to be inconsistent with the Ordinance took effect on the 
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  Neither the United Kingdom nor the colonial local government desired a Bill 
of Rights for Hong Kong but for China’s suppression of calls for political reform in 
June 198962 that caused public and investors’ confidence in Hong Kong to sink ‘to an 
all-time low’63 and an influx of emigration and outflow of capital from Hong Kong. 
China opposed a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong as it considered the Basic Law of 
Hong Kong to suffice for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that the 
ICCPR guarantees. According to Ghai, ‘China interprets the expression as “applied to 
Hong Kong” [in Article 39 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong] to mean as already 
provided for under domestic law, a stance which the Chinese claim Britain earlier 
promoted as a way to persuade it to include the ICCPR in the Joint Declaration.’64 
While the PRC government refrained from refusing to adopt the Bill in toto as part of 
the law of Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997, it did refuse to adopt four provisions of the 
Ordinance which expressly incorporated the Covenant into the law of Hong Kong, as 
has been noted. 
 Notwithstanding its objection to the direct applicability of the ICCPR in 
Hong Kong and the fact that it has not ratified the ICCPR, Article 40 of which 
requires submission of periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee on States 
Parties’ implementation (similar reporting requirements exist under Article 17 of the 
ICESCR, to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), China has 
committed itself to submitting periodic reports on Hong Kong to the two 
Committees.65 Dinusha Panditaratne asserts that China has complied with the 
                                                                                                                           
commencement of the Ordinance, that is, 8 June 1991, and it matters neither when the 
impugned statutory provision was enacted nor when the inconsistency was discovered; any 
such impugned statutory provision could not be ‘laws previously in force in Hong Kong’ 
under Article 8 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and thus could not have been adopted as part 
of the law of Hong Kong as of 1 July 1997. 
62 Ghai, supra n.59, 460. 
63 Norman J. Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 27. 
64 Ghai, supra n.59, 461. 
65 Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China, CPR/C/HKSAR/99/1, 16 June 1999, Introduction, para.3; 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
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reporting procedures in respect of Hong Kong generally in a timely manner,66 with 
the Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee thanking ‘the delegation [of Hong 
Kong] for its prompt and full compliance with its reporting obligations under the 
Covenant’.67 The two reports on Hong Kong submitted to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights since 1997 also encountered no delay.68 
However, the subsequent report on Hong Kong in respect of its implementation of the 
ICCPR was submitted more than a year behind schedule.69 At the substantive level, 
Panditaratne argues that the four reports that Hong Kong submitted to the two 
Committees since 1997 ‘reflect a comprehensive and practical – rather than purely 
normative or quantitative – approach to reporting information’,70 with the first report 
on Hong Kong to the Human Rights Committee commended as ‘impressively 
thorough’71 and ‘highly informative’,72 and the second report ‘particularly thorough 
and thoughtful’.73 Significantly, China has allowed Hong Kong to conduct its own 
consultations with interested parties, including local civil society, in order to prepare 
its reports to the two Committees.74 
When the United Kingdom extended its ratification of the ICCPR to Hong 
Kong in 1976, it declared its ‘understanding that, by virtue of Article 103 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, in the event of any conflict between their obligations 
                                                                                                                           
China: Report of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China, E/1990/5/Add.43, 20 September 1999, Introduction, para.3. See also Andrew Byrnes, 
‘Uses and Abuses of the Treaty Reporting Procedure: Hong Kong between Two Systems’, in 
Philip Alston and James Crawford, eds., The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 287, 313. 
66 Dinusha Panditaratne, ‘Reporting on Hong Kong to UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: For 
Better or Worse since 1997?’, 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008), 295. 
67 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of its 1805th Meeting, 
CCPR/C/SR.1805, 8 November 1999, para.53. 
68 Panditaratne, supra n.66, 304. 
69 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China: Second 
Periodic Report, CCPR/C/HKG/2005/2, 3 March 2005, para.1. 
70 Panditaratne, supra n.66, 306. 
71 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of its 1803rd Meeting, 
CCPR/C/SR.1803, 5 November 1999, para.76. 
72 Ibid., para.55. 
73 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Summary Record of its 2351st Meeting, CCPR/C/ 
SR.2351, 31 March 2006, para.69. 
74 Byrnes, supra n.65, 313. 
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under Article 1 of the Covenant and their obligations under the Charter (in particular, 
under Articles 1, 2 and 73 thereof) their obligations under the Charter shall prevail’.75 
The United Kingdom stated in respect of the ICCPR that it reserved ‘the right not to 
apply sub-paragraph (b) of article 25 in so far as it may require the establishment of 
an elected Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong’.76 The failure of the 
United Kingdom to recognise and implement the right of the Hong Kong people to 
vote for their representatives to the executive and legislative branches of government 
throughout its colonial rule has the lasting impact that universal suffrage continues to 
be stalled after China assumed sovereignty over Hong Kong in July 1997. While the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong provides for universal suffrage as the ultimate aim of 
governance in Hong Kong,77 China opposed Governor Chris Patten’s proposal that 
the franchise for functional constituencies be widened from approximately 70,000 for 
the 1991 election to over three million for the 1995 election, and warned that it would 
not abide by the Joint Declaration that the Hong Kong legislature elected in 1995 was 
to continue to subsist into 1999 if the proposed reform were implemented. Reform 
                                                
75 Declarations and reservations by the United Kingdom made upon ratification, accession or 
succession of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 20 May 1976. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Article 45 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong states that ‘[t]he Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations 
held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government. The method for selecting 
the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly 
progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures. The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is prescribed in Annex I: 
“Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region”.’ Article 68, ibid., states that ‘[t]he Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be constituted by election. The method for forming the 
Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly 
progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by 
universal suffrage. The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures 
for voting on bills and motions are prescribed in Annex II: “Method for the Formation of the 
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting 
Procedures”.’ Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II, ibid., stipulate the procedures 
for any change to the selection and formation methods. Both Annexes state that if there is a 
need to make any change for terms subsequent to 2007, such change must be endorsed by a 
two-third majority of the Legislative Council, obtain the consent of the Chief Executive of 
Hong Kong, and be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
for approval (in the case of selection of the Chief Executive) or for the record (in the case of 
formation of the Legislative Council). 
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proceeded nonetheless and China arranged for an entirely appointed Provisional 
Legislative Council to be put in place on 1 July 1997 so that new laws could 
immediately be passed to narrow the electoral franchise for Hong Kong’s first post-
colonial election in May 1998, in which only twenty legislators were returned by 
universal suffrage, while thirty were returned by functional constituencies and ten by 
an Election Committee whose 800 members were appointed by the Central 
Government. In the 2000 election, the number of legislators returned by the Election 
Committee was reduced to six while the number of directly elected legislators was 
increased to 24; in the 2004 election, the six Election Committee seats were replaced 
with seats returned by universal suffrage. In the 2012 election, the composition of the 
Legislative Council was enlarged to seventy seats, half of which were allocated for 
geographical constituencies returned by universal suffrage and the other half for 
functional constituencies. Hong Kong’s exercise of internal self-determination,78 in 
the form of universal suffrage by all Hong Kong permanent residents for all seats in 
the Legislative Council and for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, remains a goal 
that the Chinese and Hong Kong governments continue to stonewall. 
The experience Hong Kong has endured illustrates that recognition and 
implementation of self-determination remain dependent on the foreign policy 
preferences and priorities of administering and foreign States that stymie and 
undermine, if not altogether deny, the right of a non-self-governing territory and its 
                                                
78 The right to self-determination as embodied in common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR does not indicate that it entails a right to secession or independence. Ralph Wilde 
asserts that articulation of the right to self-determination as within the ambit of international 
human rights law serves as an alternative to external self-determination that is generally 
inapplicable beyond the colonial context: International Territorial Administration: How 
Trusteeship and the Civilising Mission Never Went Away (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 161. Drew, supra n.5, 663, has commented that ‘[d]espite its textbook characterisation 
as part of human rights law, the law of self-determination has always been bound up more 
with notions of sovereignty and title to territory than what we traditionally consider to be 
“human rights”.’ Lauri Hannikainen notes that although ‘[m]any international instruments 
speak of “the right of self-determination of all peoples” … the international community of 
States has not really required the realisation of internal self-determination within existing 
States’: Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing, 1988), 357 (emphasis in 
original). 
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people to decide for themselves how they wish to be governed. Conversely, the same 
foreign policy-dominated approach has enabled many a territorial entity to claim a 
right to self-determination to which it may not be entitled under international law, as 
the following discussion of Taiwan shows. 
 
b. Taiwan: Self-determination in Realpolitik* 
Although commonly associated with Hong Kong and Macau, the system of ‘one 
country, two systems’ special administrative regions was in fact intended for 
Taiwan’s reunification with China. Apart from its firm position that Taiwan is an 
integral part of China, the PRC government believes that independence of Taiwan 
would bring about separatism and chaos in China and irretrievably undermine its 
legitimacy.79 Wang Jisi observes that ‘[m]any Chinese feel that China’s revival would 
be meaningless and unreal if the mainland failed to reunify with Taiwan.’80 The legal 
status of Taiwan, ‘[t]he most concrete marker of sovereignty for China today’,81 
remains one of the most contentious issues vis-à-vis China and international law that 
has repercussions not only for Taiwan and China, for the definitional scopes of 
statehood and sovereignty, but also for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
While the question of whether a territorial entity is a State ultimately is a 
legal one,82 the legal status of Taiwan has invariably been constructed as a political 
                                                
* This sub-section draws on my article ‘The Legal Status of Taiwan and the Legality of the 
Use of Force in a Cross-Taiwan Strait Conflict’, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 
(2009), 455-92, completed during my doctoral candidature at the Faculty of Law, National 
University of Singapore. 
79 Wang Yizhou, Tanxun quanqiu zhuyi guoji guanxi [Exploring Globalist International 
Relations] (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), 344-45. 
80 Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Changing Role in Asia’, in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The 
Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International 
Exchange, 2004), 3, 14. 
81 Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Purpose Transitions: China’s Rise and the American Response’, in 
Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds, China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of 
International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 163, 181. 
82 As James Crawford has put it, ‘[a] State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a 
fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a 
certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules’: The Creation of States in International Law, 
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matter. In the process, the substance and authority of international law are 
destabilised. Collapsing law into politics jeopardises international legal rules and 
principles that are applicable to all States. Consideration of political facts and 
developments must serve to inform and not prejudice our endeavour to find objective 
legal answers. As the ICJ has pointed out, the fact that a legal question entails 
political aspects does not deprive the question of its legal character.83 
 China ceded Taiwan (then known as Formosa) and appertaining islands to 
Japan in perpetuity under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki after China’s defeat in the 
First Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895). In the course of the Second World War, the 
Allies stated in the 1943 Cairo Declaration their ‘purpose … that all the territories 
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, 
shall be restored to the Republic of China.’84 The Allies’ Potsdam Proclamation in 
1945 reaffirmed that ‘[t]he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and 
Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, 
Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine’,85 which Japan in its Instrument of 
Surrender undertook to implement.86 However, Taiwan continued to be Japanese 
territory de jure until Japan relinquished its title in 1951 under the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty.87 As an arbitral tribunal stated in the Iloilo Claims Case88 in 1925, ‘in 
                                                                                                                           
1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 4. Krystyna Marek has stated that ‘[a] legal 
system which does not itself determine the character and existence of its subjects is 
unthinkable. International law does not “create” States, just as State law does not “create” 
individuals. But it is international law and international law alone which provides the legal 
evaluation of the process, determines whether an entity is in fact a State, delimits its 
competences and decides when it ceases to exist’: Identity and Continuity of States in Public 
International Law, 2nd ed. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1968), 2. 
83 Application for Review of Judgement No.158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1973, 172, para.14; Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
2010, 403, para.27. 
84 Cairo Declaration, 27 November 1943. 
85 Potsdam Proclamation, 26 July 1945. 
86 Japan’s Instrument of Surrender, 2 September 1945. 
87 Signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951 and entered into force on 28 April 1952. It 
has been argued that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and Japan’s Instrument 
of Surrender sufficiently transferred title to Taiwan from Japan to China de jure. I do not 
agree with such a position. 
 216 
                                                                                                                           
One might argue that Japan’s relinquishment of its title to Taiwan without specifying a 
transferee rendered Taiwan terra nullius and the occupation of Taiwan by the Chinese 
Nationalist forces might have been capable of creating statehood in Taiwan as such. It has 
been suggested that the co-existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic during the Cold War might serve as an example whereby China and 
Taiwan may co-exist as two sovereign States: see, e.g., Markus G. Puder, ‘The Grass Will Not 
Be Trampled Because the Tigers Need Not Fight – New Thoughts and Old Paradigms for 
Détente across the Taiwan Strait’, 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2001), 481. 
Such a solution cannot be applicable to Taiwan on account of a juridical fact peculiar to 
Germany: ‘It is this fact of the complete disintegration of the government in Germany, 
followed by unconditional surrender and by occupation of the territory, which explains and 
justifies the assumption and exercise of supreme governmental power by the Allies. The same 
fact distinguishes the present occupation of Germany from the type of occupation which 
occurs when, in the course of actual warfare, an invading army enters and occupies the 
territory of another State, whose government is still in existence and is in receipt of 
international recognition, and whose armies, with those of its allies, are still in the field’: In re 
Altstötter and Others (The Justice Trial) (United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg), 14 
International Law Reports (1947), Case No.126, 278, 280. The United States Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg in In re Greifelt and Others, 15 International Law Reports (1948), 
Case No.216, 653, 655, similarly concluded that ‘[a]ny purported annexation of territories of a 
foreign nation, occurring during the time of war and while opposing armies were still in the 
field, we held to be invalid and ineffective.’ James Crawford argues that ‘Japanese 
relinquishment, which took place against a background of a commitment to return Taiwan to 
“China”, and the continued occupation of Taiwan by a recognized government of “China”, 
operated to re-vest sovereignty in China as a State without taking any position as to the 
government entitled to exercise that sovereignty’: The Creation of States in International Law, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 209. 
A terra nullius is a territory in want of inhabitants sufficiently organised. In Legal Status 
of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No.53 (1933), 22, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that occupation had significance under 
international law only if the territory at the material times was terra nullius or belonged to the 
occupying State. The Nationalist forces made no claim of statehood in Taiwan as such. Their 
occupation of Taiwan, both antecedent and subsequent to the signing of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, in which neither the PRC government nor the authorities on Taiwan took part 
and Article 25 of which explicitly states that the Treaty shall have effects upon signatories 
States only, entailed the animus occupandi of holding Taiwan in the name of China of which 
they considered themselves the sole legitimate government until 1994, when they began to 
make claims of Taiwan being, and always having been, a separate State. As Ian Brownlie 
pointed out in 1982, ‘[o]ften the confusion attending the “factual ambitions” of the entity is 
compounded by the endemic ignorance of the Anglophonic press in matters of international 
relations and also the success of techniques of news management in muddying the waters. … 
Journalists would commonly fail to see that the authorities on Taiwan did not claim statehood 
for themselves (or at all) but claimed to be the government of an existing State (called China). 
… After the Peking Government had been installed as representative of China in the United 
Nations, the position of Taiwan was the subject of especially obtuse comment. Thus it was 
said that “Taiwan had been expelled from the United Nations”: but of course it had not been a 
member and did not consider itself to be a State in any case’: ‘Recognition in Theory and 
Practice’, 53 British Year Book of International Law (1982), 197, 202 (emphasis in original). 
In 1949 when the Nationalist forces lost in the Chinese civil war and fled en masse to Taiwan, 
they did so considering themselves the government of China and contemplating an eventual 
resumption of authority and control over Mainland China. Thomas B. Gold observes that the 
authorities on Taiwan ‘assiduously promoted the idea that the island was the repository and 
guarantor of Chinese tradition as well as the mainland’s rich diversity’: ‘Taiwan’s Quest for 
Identity in the Shadow of China’, in Steve Tsang, ed., In the Shadow of China: Political 
Developments in Taiwan since 1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 169, 171. 
It must be noted that China’s non-participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was not 
due to any doubt about its statehood or State sovereignty but to a compromise between the 
United Kingdom, which recognised the PRC government in 1950 and insisted on China’s 
participation, and the United States, which changed its declaration of non-intervention in the 
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case of cession the sovereignty de jure, and the obligations resulting therefrom, did 
not begin before the treaty of cession had been ratified’.89 The Chinese Nationalist 
forces occupied Taiwan in 1945 with the sufferance of the Allies (and Japan), which 
did not confer or embody sovereignty over Taiwan as a State. 
The Chinese Nationalist forces’ occupation of Taiwan prior to Japan’s 
surrender in September 1945 and their en masse retreat to Taiwan reflected their view 
that Mainland China and Taiwan were one territorial entity de jure, for otherwise 
their occupation would have contravened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
another State (which it actually did: of Japan until 1951). The authorities on Taiwan, 
considering themselves in an unfinished civil war with the PRC government, imposed 
martial law on Taiwan’s civilian population between 1949 and 1987 outlawing ‘any 
political movements for Taiwan’s independence and insisted on [their] claim of 
sovereignty of all of China’.90 Such belligerency was perpetuated by the United 
States, with President Truman in 1950 ordering the Seventh Fleet to patrol the 
                                                                                                                           
Chinese civil war after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and proposed that neither the 
PRC government nor the authorities on Taiwan should be invited to the San Francisco Peace 
Conference: Kenzo Uchida, ‘A Brief History of Postwar Japan–China Relations’, 9 
Developing Economies (1971), 538, 539. On 16 August 1951, Zhou Enlai, China’s Premier 
and Foreign Minister, condemned the proposed Peace Conference and Treaty as a violation of 
the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta 
Agreements, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far 
Eastern Commission: ‘The United Nations Declaration provides that no separate Peace should 
be made. The Potsdam Agreement states that the “preparatory work of the Peace Settlements” 
should be undertaken by those States which were signatories to the terms of surrender 
imposed upon the Enemy State concerned.’ The PRC government took particular exception to 
Article 15 of the Treaty, which imposed on Japan liability for reparations only for acts that 
took place after 7 December 1941, while the Pacific theatre of the Second World War dated 
back to as early as 1937, if not 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria, and to the omission of 
the question of the legal status of Taiwan and appertaining islands. The PRC government 
declared that it would reserve its right to demand reparations from Japan and refuse to 
recognise the legality and validity of the Treaty: John Price, ‘A Just Peace? The 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in Historical Perspective’, Japan Policy Research Institute Working 
Paper No.78, June 2001. It was only by the Joint Communiqué of 29 September 1972 between 
Japan and China that China renounced its claim to war reparations from Japan. In Article 3 of 
the Joint Communiqué, it is stated that ‘[t]he Government of the People’s Republic of China 
reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. 
The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam 
Proclamation.’ 
88 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (1925–1926), Case No.254, 336. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Che-Fu Lee, ‘China’s Perception of the Taiwan Issue’, 32 New England Law Review 
(1998), 695, 697. 
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Taiwan Strait and President Eisenhower in 1953 sanctioning an attack by the 
authorities on Taiwan upon Mainland China.91 On 1 October 1949, the PRC 
government became the lawful and effective government of China. As Matthew 
Craven has pointed out, ‘mere loss of territory (even if quite extensive) will not affect 
the legal personality of the State, nor will a political transformation in the State. 
Indeed, it has been accepted that in the context of belligerent occupation, complete 
lack of government does not extinguish the sovereignty of the State.’92 
As Japan desired to end its state of war with China, under pressure from the 
United States to enter into a peace treaty only with the authorities on Taiwan, in 1952 
                                                
91 Crawford, supra n.82, 199. On 5 January 1950, President Truman stated that in accordance 
with the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, ‘Formosa was surrendered to 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and for the past four years, the United Nations and the other 
Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island’: Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol.22 (1950), 79, as quoted in Wang Tieya, ‘International Law in China: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives’, 221 Recueil des cours (1990–II), 195, 324. On the 
same day the United States Secretary of State stated that the Cairo Declaration ‘was 
incorporated in the Declaration at Potsdam and that the Declaration at Potsdam was conveyed 
to the Japanese as one of the terms of their surrender and was accepted by them, and the 
surrender was made on that basis. Shortly after that, the Island of Formosa was turned over to 
the Chinese in accordance with the declaration made. The Chinese have administered Formosa 
for four years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority and 
that occupation. When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any lawyers’ 
doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments’: Department of 
State Bulletin, 80-81, as quoted in Wang, ibid. However, after the outbreak of the Korean 
War, President Truman on 17 June 1950 declared that the ‘determination of the future status 
of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, 
or consideration by the United Nations’: Department of State Bulletin, Vol.23 (1950), 5; as 
quoted in Wang, ibid., 325. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation were not 
mentioned in President Truman’s statement, and no legal basis was given for the United 
States’ change of position: Wang, ibid. At a House of Commons debate on 4 February 1955 
on the legal status of Taiwan, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (as he then was) stated 
the position of the United Kingdom thus: ‘The Cairo Declaration … was a statement of intent 
that Formosa should be retroceded to China after the war. This retrocession has, in fact, never 
taken place because of the difficulties arising from the existence of the two entities to 
represent China and the differences among the powers as to the status of these entities. The 
Potsdam Declaration … laid down as one of the conditions for the Japanese peace that the 
terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In September 1945, the administration of 
Formosa was taken over from the Japanese by Chinese forces at the direction of the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers, but this was not a cession, not did it in itself involve any 
change of sovereignty. The arrangement made with Chiang Kai-shek put him there on a basis 
of military occupation pending further arrangements and did not of themselves constitute the 
territory as Chinese’: House of Commons Debates (Hansard), Vol.536, col.159, 4 February 
1955. At Vanderbilt University on 27 February 2008 where I presented a seminar on the legal 
status of Taiwan, Brett Benson queried if my conclusion would be different if the authorities 
on Taiwan launched a successful attack on Mainland China and resumed its claim that it was 
the sole legitimate government of China. Such an event, if it were to occur, would clearly 
demonstrate and reinforce the fact that Taiwan as such is not a State. 
92 Matthew C.R. Craven, ‘The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’, 
66 British Year Book of International Law (1995), 333, 361. 
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it concluded with the authorities on Taiwan the Treaty of Taipei,93 which reiterated its 
relinquishment in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of its title to Taiwan.94 As with the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty, the PRC government objected to the Treaty of Taipei 
and the preceding negotiations as ‘the gravest and most naked act of war 
provocation’.95 The authorities on Taiwan entered into the Treaty in the name of 
China; Article 4 states that ‘[i]t is recognised that all treaties, conventions, and 
agreements concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China have 
become null and void as a consequence of the war.’96 The authorities on Taiwan’s 
purported representation of China after their en masse retreat to Taiwan in September 
1949 again reflected their view that China and Taiwan constituted one single State de 
jure.97 There is a presumption in international law that ‘the territory ought in principle 
                                                
93 Signed at Taipei on 28 April 1952. 
94 Ibid., Art.2. 
95 Uchida, supra n.87, 539-40. It was only by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between 
China and Japan of 12 August 1978 that the state of war between the two States ceased. 
96 Treaty of Taipei, Art.4. 
97 Furthermore, the Treaty of Taipei did not, and did not seek to, resolve the question of the 
legal status of Taiwan, which Japan in any case could not have done as it had in the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty relinquished its title to Taiwan. Indeed, assuming arguendo that Japan 
did specify or imply, either in the Treaty of Taipei or in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
Taiwan as the transferee of the title to the territory, the pivotal question of the legal status of 
Taiwan would remain unresolved as Taiwan was not, and did not claim to be, a State and to 
confer on Taiwan title to the territory would merely have meant that the State of China, which 
the authorities on Taiwan purported to represent, was returned such title. It is important to 
keep in mind that ‘a government is only recognized for what it claims to be’ (D.P. O’Connell, 
‘The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem’, 50 American Journal of 
International Law (1956), 405, 415) – although it ‘may be recognized for less than it claims’: 
Crawford, supra n.82, 211, fn.64 (emphasis in original). As early as 1955, Quincy Wright 
stated that ‘[i]f it were assumed that the Japanese surrender constituted a definitive 
renunciation of Formosa and the Pescadores and that the Chinese occupation constituted 
definitive re-annexation of these territories by China, then the Communist government, if 
recognized as the government of China, would have a legal claim to these islands’: ‘The 
Chinese Recognition Problem’, 49 American Journal of International Law (1955), 320, 332. 
To divest China of its State sovereignty over Taiwan, Crawford argues, would ‘have been a 
violation of the agreed terms of the peace as well as intervention in the civil war in China’: 
ibid., 211. The sufferance and protection the authorities on Taiwan have received from the 
Allies, Japan and the majority of other States during and subsequent to the Second World War 
in their occupation of the territory do not create statehood in Taiwan. In fact, such foreign 
intervention has constituted unlawful disruption of China’s State sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
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to revert to the parent state when the administering state transfers power in the region, 
provided there is no conclusive evidence that the entity aspires for independence.’98 
 On 25 October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to replace 
the authorities on Taiwan with the PRC government as the representative government 
of China in the United Nations. The General Assembly concluded that the authorities 
on Taiwan’s purported representation of China since October 1949 was unlawful.99 
Insisting that only they legitimately represented China, the authorities on Taiwan 
withdrew their delegation from the United Nations. It was only in 2007 that they 
ceased to maintain such a stance and applied for United Nations membership as a 
new State as Taiwan.100 
One must keep in mind that only States and not governments may be 
admitted to United Nations membership,101 and the General Assembly restored the 
lawful rights of China to be represented in the United Nations by its lawful and 
effective government.102 As Christopher Hill has pointed out, ‘it is vital to recognize 
                                                
98 Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, ‘Self Determination, Territorial Disputes and International Law: 
An Analysis of UN and State Practice’, 1 Geopolitics and International Boundaries (1996), 
15, 47. Michael Yahuda argues that ‘[s]ince it will be more productive to examine the political 
rather than the strictly legal dimensions of Taiwan’s international identity it will be better to 
do so by employing the more avowedly political concept of international standing’: ‘The 
International Standing of the Republic of China over Taiwan’, 148 China Quarterly (1996), 
1319, 1325. Such a suggestion, if taken seriously, endangers the stability of international 
boundaries and of multi-level international co-operation, and makes a mockery of the integrity 
of international law. 
99 U.N. G.A. Res. 2758(XXVI) (1971). 
100 Chia-Lung Lin, ‘The Importance of China and Identity Politics in Taiwan’s Diplomacy’, in 
Steve Tsang, ed., Taiwan and the International Community (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), 51, 
63-64. 
101 United Nations Charter, Art.4(1). 
102 In his 1970 Hague Academy Lectures, Hans Martin Blix was adamant that the exclusion of 
the PRC government from representing China in the United Nations was unlawful as it was a 
treaty right of China as a State Party to the United Nations Charter to be represented by a 
government that under international law must properly be regarded as that of the State. He 
explained that such exclusion ‘stems from a mistaken belief that the option which may be 
exercised by States under customary international law to accept or reject relations with a new 
government, signalled by recognition or absence of recognition – is open to them also as 
members of international organizations. However, by accepting treaties constituting 
international organizations, they must be deemed to have obliged themselves to accept the 
measure of relations which is necessary under these constitutions – but not more – with 
authorities which fulfil the international law criteria of governments of States members, 
although, in a pursuit of a policy of non-recognition, they may refuse relations outside the 
framework of such organizations’: ‘Contemporary Aspects of Recognition’, 130 Recueil des 
cours (1970–II), 589, 692-93. A memorandum prepared for the United Nations Secretary-
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that a government is a temporary holder of power and a state is the set of institutions, 
dispositions and territory which makes it possible for governments to exist – and to 
change.’103 It is the blurring of the notions of State and government that perpetuates 
the impasse over the legal status of Taiwan. A change of government of a State, of 
the official name of a State, or of the government representing a State does not alter 
the State’s international legal personality or statehood.104 
 Since the United Nations Charter came into force in 1945, Taiwan has never 
been considered a non-self-governing territory, and ‘possession without title [does 
not] give the entity the right to proceed to self-determination.’105 The legal situation 
that pertains to Taiwan is thus dissimilar to that regarding East Timor (now Timor 
Leste) or the Palestinian Territory, as East Timor was and the Palestinian Territory 
continues to be recognised by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory 
under Chapter XI. Just as there are criteria a territory must fulfil in order to constitute 
a State, there are certain rules a people of a territory must meet in order to validly lay 
claim to the right to self-determination. A territory may not unilaterally declare itself 
a non-self-governing territory without a valid basis in international law.106 
                                                                                                                           
General in February 1950 on ‘Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United 
Nations’, S/1466, 5 S.C.O.R. Supplement, January–May 1950, 18-23, had attempted to clarify 
the matter, stating that ‘[f]rom the standpoint of legal theory, the linkage of representation in 
an international organization and recognition of a government is a confusion of two 
institutions which have superficial similarities but are essentially different. The recognition of 
a new State, or of a new government of an existing State, is a unilateral act which the 
recognizing government can grant or withhold. … On the other hand, membership of a State 
in the United Nations and representation of a State in organs is clearly determined by a 
collective act of the appropriate organ.’ 
103 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 32. 
104 Article 23(1) of the United Nations Charter continues to refer to ‘the Republic of China’ as 
one of the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council. Neither the 
United Nations nor the PRC government has considered it necessary for the Charter to be 
amended in order for the PRC government to represent China in the Security Council. 
105 Kaikobad, supra n.98, 49. 
106 As Malcolm N. Shaw has noted, ‘[p]ractice demonstrates that self-determination has not 
been interpreted to mean that any group defining itself as such can decide for itself its own 
political status up to and including secession from an already independent State. After all, the 
very United Nations instruments constituting the foundation of the development of self-
determination also clearly opposed the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of States’: ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris 
Today’, 67 British Year Book of International Law (1996), 75, 121. 
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One might argue that Taiwan’s right to self-determination is not dependent 
on the United Nations’ list of non-self-governing territories, and with its geographical 
separation from China and different legal, political, social and economic systems, 
Taiwan should be regarded as entitled to self-determination.107 However, citing thirty 
examples of attempted unilateral secession in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle 
East,108 James Crawford has noted that ‘outside the colonial context, the principle of 
self-determination is not recognized in practice as giving rise to unilateral rights of 
secession by parts of independent States’;109 and that ‘[w]here the government of the 
State in question has maintained its opposition to the unilateral secession, such 
attempts have gained virtually no international support or recognition, and this has 
been true even when other humanitarian aspects of the situation have triggered 
widespread concern and action.’110 It is apposite at this juncture to revert to Weller’s 
critique of self-determination as disenfranchisement of peoples: 
 
                                                
107 Citing the lone example of Bangladesh, Jorris Duursma argues that ‘[p]eoples who find 
themselves in similar circumstances as colonies will enjoy a complete right of self-
determination, even if they are not specifically mentioned on the list of Non-Self-Governing 
or Trust Territories’: ‘Preventing and Solving Wars of Secession: Recent Unorthodox Views 
on the Use of Force’, in Kreijen et al., supra n.27, 349, 350. Duursma, ibid., 350-51, finds that 
‘[b]ecause of Bangladesh’s special circumstances, international recognition followed 
promptly. … Recognition could also have been prompted, because Bangladesh was able to 
maintain effective control over its territory with Indian armed reinforcement.’ With respect, 
Duursma has distorted facts in order to advance a legal proposition unsupported by 
authorities. Bangladesh was not admitted to United Nations membership until two years after 
it declared independence from Pakistan in 1972, and only after Pakistan recognised its 
independence. James Crawford in ‘State Practice and International Law in relation to 
Secession’, 69 British Year Book of International Law (1998), 85, 115, argues that 
Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan should be viewed ‘as a fait accompli achieved as a 
result of foreign military assistance in special circumstances’ and not as evidence of a right to 
secession. India’s military intervention was considered by the international community to 
have contravened international law: see Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). As Chapter VI 
notes, China as represented by the PRC government exercised its first veto in 1972 of 
Bangladesh’s initial application for admission to United Nations membership due to its 
concern over the legal status of Taiwan and its position that the parent State’s consent was 
essential to a territory attaining independence and statehood. It was only after Pakistan 
acknowledged Bangladesh’s independence in 1974 that China no longer blocked 
Bangladesh’s admission to United Nations membership and Bangladesh was then admitted 
without vote. 
108 Crawford, ibid., 107-8. 
109 Ibid., 113. 
110 Ibid., 115-16. 
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The first element of disenfranchisement lies in the very existence of a 
right to self-determination. While this right purports to enfranchise 
populations wishing to exercise their will, it does the opposite. In 
generating what is an exceptional entitlement to secession, self-
determination appears to confirm that secession is not otherwise 
available in circumstances where the central government refuses to 
consent to a separation. This strengthens the view that a secession 
that is not covered by the exceptional right to (colonial) self-
determination amounts to an internationally unlawful act. This, for 
example, was the view (wrongly) taken by the rump Yugoslavia in 
relation to Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia. The consequence of this – mistaken – view would be that 
an entity that succeeds in secession would be an unlawful entity.111 
 
Some guidance may be drawn from Chechnya, Québec, and Yugoslavia. 
Crawford observes that, despite criticising Russia for disregarding international 
humanitarian law in its conflict in Chechnya, other States accept that Chechnya is an 
integral part of Russia and the conflict is of an internal character.112 In its Reference 
re Secession of Québec113 on whether international law endowed Québec the right to 
self-determination that would empower it to secede from Canada unilaterally, the 
Supreme Court of Canada resolved the question in the negative.114 Attention must be 
                                                
111 Weller, supra n.3, 9. 
112 Crawford, supra n.107, 110-11. 
113 [1998] 2 SCR 217. 
114 The Court, ibid., 295-96, nevertheless took liberty to interpret a right to secession as might 
arise from the right to self-determination: ‘We have also considered whether a positive legal 
entitlement to secession exists under international law in the factual circumstances 
contemplated by Question I, i.e., a clear democratic expression of support on a clear question 
for Québec secession. Some of those who supported an affirmative answer to this question did 
so on the basis of the recognized right to self-determination that belongs to all “peoples”. 
Although much of the Québec population certainly shares many of the characteristics of a 
people, it is not necessary to decide the “people” issue because, whatever may be the correct 
determination of this issue in the context of Québec, a right to secession only arises under the 
principle of self-determination of peoples at international law where “a people” is governed as 
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drawn to the European Community Arbitration Commission’s conclusion on the 
status and consequences of the break-up of Yugoslavia that self-determination was 
not at all in issue or indeed mentioned.115 At a Security Council meeting on 10 June 
1999 regarding the Kosovo crisis, China stated that ‘[w]e are not in favour of 
discrimination against or the oppression of any ethnic group. At the same time, we 
are also opposed to any act that would create division between different ethnic groups 
and undermine national unity. Fundamentally speaking, ethnic problems within a 
State should be settled in a proper manner by its own Government and people, 
through the adoption of sound policies. They must not be used as an excuse for 
external intervention, much less used by foreign States as an excuse for the use of 
force. Otherwise, there will be no genuine security for States and no normal order for 
the world.’116 The break-up of Yugoslavia and the independence of four of the six 
constituent republics were brought about not by secession but by the dismemberment 
and dissolution of Yugoslavia to which all six constituent republics now constituted 
full and equal successors in title.117 The greater aggregate size of the territories and 
                                                                                                                           
part of a colonial empire; where “a people” is subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation; and possibly where “a people” is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to 
self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples 
are expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state. A state 
whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, 
on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-
determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under 
international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by other states.’ 
115 Crawford, supra n.107, 105. 
116 S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999, 8-9. 
117 The European Community Arbitration Commission in its Opinion No.8 on Questions 
arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 ILM 1521 (1992), 1523, observed that the 
exercise of sovereignty of three of the four constituent republics seeking to secede from 
Yugoslavia over their respective territories had by then been effective and recognised among 
themselves and by the European Community, its Member States as well as numerous other 
States, culminating in their admission to United Nations membership on 22 May 1992. 
(Recognition of the constituent Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as a sovereign State by the 
other three constituent Yugoslav republics seeking independence and by the international 
community was delayed due to opposition from Greece to the official name that Macedonia 
adopted – Republic of Macedonia – which Greece claims conflicts with the same name of the 
largest region of Greece upon which Greece claims Macedonia has irredentist territorial 
designs. Macedonia was admitted to United Nations membership on 8 April 1993 under the 
provisional name ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.) The Commission, ibid., 
stated that ‘the existence of a federal state, which is made up of a number of separate entities, 
is seriously compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the 
territory and population, constitute themselves as sovereign states with the result that federal 
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populations of the four constituent republics seeking independence ‘is arguably 
crucial in the context of Yugoslavia in so far as it provides a partial basis for 
distinguishing between it and the case of the USSR, the personality of which was 
deemed to continue in the form of Russia.’118 Although Taiwan encompasses a 
significant geographical area and population, the impasse over the legal status of 
Taiwan has not jeopardised the proper functioning of China’s central government, its 
exercise of State sovereignty or its attribute as a State. China’s uninterrupted 
membership of the United Nations is testament of its continuity as a State. Indeed, it 
is precisely due to fear of dismemberment that State sovereignty and territorial 
integrity constitute the most sacrosanct principles of international law.119 
China adopted a similar, albeit more flexible, approach to the humanitarian 
crisis in East Timor in 1999. When Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor in 
1975 notwithstanding East Timor’s status as a non-self-governing territory under 
Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter with Portugal as its administering power, 
ASEAN Member States sided with Indonesia (except for Singapore, which abstained) 
on the relevant General Assembly resolutions in 1975120 and 1976121 (although they 
                                                                                                                           
authority may no longer be effectively exercised.’ The Commission, ibid., referred to Security 
Council Resolution 757 (1992) which noted that ‘the claim by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the SFRY 
[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in the United Nations has not been generally 
accepted’, and concluded that ‘the process of dissolution of the SFRY is now complete and 
that the SFRY no longer exists.’ Stephen Tierney argues that the Commission ‘was 
established to avoid the arbitrary application of the recognition criteria by states and thereby 
to limit the influence of political expediency in defining recognition policy’: ‘In a State of 
Flux: Self-Determination and the Collapse of Yugoslavia’, 6 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights (1999), 197, 212. 
118 Craven, supra n.92, 370. 
119 The European Community Arbitration Commission, supra n.117, 1522, stated that ‘[t]he 
dissolution of a state means that it no longer has legal personality, something which has major 
repercussions in international law. It therefore calls for the greatest caution.’ It is pertinent to 
note that in the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech and Slovak constituent 
republics agreed to dissolve by parliamentary action Czechoslovakia into two sovereign States 
as the Czech Republic and Slovakia as of 31 December 1992, both of which were duly 
admitted to United Nations membership on 19 January 1993 unopposed. In the entire process, 
no right to secession on the basis of the right to self-determination was claimed. 
120 U.N. G.A. Res. 3485(XXX) (1975). The resolution, inter alia, ‘[c]alls upon all States to 
respect the inalienable right of the people of Portuguese Timor to self-determination, freedom 
and independence and to determine their future political status in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, ‘[s]trongly deplores the military 
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refrained from recognising Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor), while China, 
along with Vietnam (not yet an ASEAN Member), strongly criticised Indonesia’s 
violations of East Timor’s right to self-determination and of international law.122 East 
Timor continued to remain a non-self-governing territory under Chapter XI with 
Portugal as its administering power notwithstanding Indonesia’s claim of sovereignty 
(recognised only by Australia) and exercise of effective control. Portugal and 
Indonesia eventually reached an agreement in May 1999 regarding how the status of 
East Timor could be settled. However, following a United Nations-sponsored 
referendum on 30 August 1999 in which East Timorese overwhelmingly (78.5 per 
cent) rejected proposed special autonomy for East Timor with Indonesia as sovereign 
State, rejection that would lead to separation of East Timor from Indonesia, anti-
independence militias organised by Indonesian military forces immediately mounted 
a campaign of massacres and destructions of infrastructure in the territory. At a 
Security Council meeting on 11 September 1999, while gravely concerned about ‘the 
                                                                                                                           
intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor’, ‘[c]alls upon the 
Government of Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of 
Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the territory in order 
to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and 
independence’, and ‘[c]alls upon all States to respect the unity and territorial integrity of 
Portuguese Timor’. 
121 U.N. G.A. Res. 31/53 (1976). The resolution ‘[r]eaffirms the inalienable right of the People 
of East Timor to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to 
achieve that right’, ‘[r]eaffirms its resolution 3485(XXX) and Security Council resolutions 
384 (1975) and 389 (1976)’, ‘[s]trongly deplores the persistent refusal of the Government of 
Indonesia to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3485(XXX) and 
Security Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976)’, ‘[r]ejects the claim that East Timor 
has been integrated into Indonesia, in as much as the people of the Territory have not been 
able to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence’, ‘[c]alls upon the 
Government of Indonesia to withdraw all its forces from the Territory’, ‘[d]raws the attention 
of the Security Council, in conformity with Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to the critical situation in the Territory of East Timor and recommends that it 
should take all effective steps for the immediate implementation of its resolutions 384 (1975) 
and 389 (1976) with a view to securing the full exercise by the people of East Timor of their 
right to self-determination and independence’, and ‘[r]equests the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep the situation in the Territory under 
active consideration, to follow the implementation of the present resolution, to dispatch to the 
Territory as soon as possible a visiting mission with a view to the full and speedy 
implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session’. 
122 James Cotton, ‘Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention’, 43:1 Survival (2001), 127, 
134. 
 227 
continuing violence and resulting humanitarian crisis in East Timor’,123 China 
insisted that ‘[t]he deployment of any peacekeeping force should be at the request of 
the Indonesian Government and endorsed by the Security Council.’124 Australia, 
Russia, the United States, Malaysia (a non-Permanent Member of the Security 
Council at the time) and other non-aligned States were in agreement with China that 
the consent, or at least acquiescence, of Indonesia was critical to the success of the 
peacekeeping mission in East Timor and the maintenance of long-term regional order 
and stability,125 with China and Russia additionally concerned that international 
intervention in East Timor might set a precedent.126 On 12 September 2011, Indonesia 
consented to a United Nations peacekeeping mission in East Timor. Noting the 
‘worsening humanitarian situation in East Timor’127 and expressing concern about 
‘reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law have been committed in East Timor’,128 Security 
Council Resolution 1264 (1999), adopted unanimously, authorised under Chapter VII 
of the Charter a multinational peacekeeping mission to restore peace and security in 
East Timor ‘pursuant to the request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the 
Secretary-General on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace 
and security in East Timor, to protect and support [the United Nations Mission for 
                                                
123 S/PV.4043, 11 September 1999, 13. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See Ian Johnstone, ‘Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations’, 18:2 
International Peacekeeping (2011), 170; Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘East Timor and 
the New Humanitarian Intervention’, 77 International Affairs (2001), 805. 
126 Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, ‘The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-
Determination to State-Building’, 12:1 International Peacekeeping (2005), 125, 131; Astri 
Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, 8:4 
International Peacekeeping (2001), 1, 5. Given that only Australia recognised East Timor as 
part of Indonesia and Portugal remained the administering power of East Timor as a non-self-
governing territory under Chapter XI, Aidan Hehir argues that Indonesia’s consent was 
unnecessary under international law and, given the significant pressure by which its consent 
was attained, in want of legality in se: ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security 
Council, and the Responsibility to Protect’, 38:1 International Security (2013), 137, 146, 
citing Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 371; 
Simon Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transnational Administration, and 
State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 62. 
127 U.N. S.C. Res. 1264 (1999), Preamble. 
128 Ibid. 
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East Timor] in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance operations’.129 The resolution authorised States that 
participated in the mission ‘to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate’.130 
On 25 October 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1272 authorising under 
Chapter VII the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor ‘endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East 
Timor’131 and ‘empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, 
including the administration of justice’.132 Jonathan Davis has noted that China 
contributed about two hundred civilian police personnel to the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor.133 
In the context of Taiwan, as was noted in relation to Hong Kong, self-
determination is a two-dimensional right.134 On account of its particular history, 
culture, language, political or economic system, or ethnic makeup, a territory may 
possess a right to internal self-determination that would not conflict with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. Taiwan already enjoys a high degree 
of internal self-determination as it maintains political, legal and economic systems 
independent of those in China. In fact, the people on Taiwan share significant 
ambivalence over the desirability of independence. In their 1994 White Paper on 
Relations across the Taiwan Straits, the authorities on Taiwan stated that ‘advocates 
of Taiwan independence represent only a minority of the population.’135 While the 
                                                
129 Ibid., para.3 (emphasis added). 
130 Ibid. 
131 U.N. S.C. Res. 1272 (1999), para.1. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Jonathan E. Davis, ‘From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era’, 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2011), 
217, 253. 
134 See text in note 78 supra. 
135 Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, White Paper on Relations across the 
Taiwan Straits, July 1994, reproduced in Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., The International Status 
of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Considerations (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), Appendix 4. The quoted passage appears in Henckaerts, ibid., 286. 
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people on Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese,136 attempts by 
the authorities on Taiwan since the 1990s to instil a distinct ethnic or cultural identity 
have not been successful.137 In particular, younger generations who grew up after 
Taiwan underwent democratisation during the 1990s tend to hold ‘inclusive 
identities’ as both Taiwanese and Chinese.138 
Despite reversing in 1994 their previous position and now contending that 
Taiwan is a separate State since at least 1949 (although oscillating as recently as 
September 2012 when in a speech to the European Parliament Mainland Affairs 
Council Minister Lai Shin-yuan stated that ‘Taiwan’s position is that “one China 
stands for the Republic of China”’139), the authorities on Taiwan have been pursuing 
negotiations with the PRC government with a view to Taiwan’s reunification with 
China. The authorities on Taiwan made clear their position in their 1994 White 
Paper, reiterating certain ‘Guidelines for National Unification’ drawn up by their 
                                                
136 Shelley Rigger, ‘Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and “Taiwanese 
Nationalism”’, Policy Studies 26 (Washington, D.C.: East–West Center Washington, 2006), 4. 
137 Wu Yu-shan has observed that ‘the rapid nativization of ethnic consciousness is only 
partially reflected in positions on national identity and the independence/unification question, 
and its influence on concrete policy positions [related to cross-Strait economic relations] is 
even more limited. … Put simply, the trend toward Taiwanization in basic ethnic 
consciousness has not evolved into a political demand for Taiwan independence’: ‘Liangan 
guanxi zhong de Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi’, 4 Zhongguo Shiwu (April 2001), 71, 84, as 
quoted in Rigger, ibid., 7-8. Chu Yun-han has found that the ratio of those born after 1968 
believing in Taiwanese independence as a matter of principle is not very high ‘despite the fact 
that they have been exposed more extensively to the democratization process and the state-
sponsored cultural [Taiwanization] program’: ‘Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the 
Prospects of Cross-Strait Relations’, 44 Asian Survey (2004), 484, 504. Chu’s findings were 
consistent with research in preceding years that indicated that support for Kuomintang, which 
dominated Taiwanese politics for half a century and had a longstanding policy of advocating 
Taiwanese independence (after previously maintaining that the authorities on Taiwan were the 
sole legitimate government of China), was at its weakest among younger generations: Liu I-
chou, ‘Taiwan de zhengzhi shidai’, 21 Zhengzhi Xuebao (December 1993), 99; Liu I-chou, 
‘Taiwan xuanmin zhengdang xingxiang de shidai chayi’, 5 Xuanju yanjiu (May 1994), 53; 
Chen Yi-yan and Tsai Meng-his, ‘Xinshidai xuan min de zhengdang zuxiang yu toupiao 
juece: Shouju minxuan zongtong de fenxi’, 29 Zhengzhi Xuebao (1997), 63; Chen Lu-hui, 
‘Taiwan xuanmin zhengdang renting de xingcheng’, paper presented at National Chengchi 
University Election Studies Center Research Symposium (2000), all as cited in Rigger, ibid., 
26. 
138 Rigger, ibid., 12 and 24. See also Andy G. Chang and T.Y. Wang, ‘Taiwanese or Chinese? 
Independence or Unification? An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan’, 40 
Journal of Asian and African Studies (2005), 29; Chen Yi-yan, ‘Butong zuqun zhengzhi 
wenhua de shidai fenxi’, 27 Zhengzhi Xuebao (1996), 83; Chu, ibid. 
139 Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘The ROC Government’s Steady 
Promotion of Developments in Cross-Strait Relations and the Breadth of Vision and Mind of 
President Ma’s Mainland Policy are the Keys to Peace in the Taiwan Strait’, 5 September 
2012. 
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National Unification Council.140 Meanwhile, the PRC government has acknowledged 
China’s differences from Taiwan in governance and ways of life and indicated that it 
would let the people on Taiwan govern autonomously under the ‘one country, two 
systems’ model.141 Thus, assuming arguendo that the people on Taiwan did constitute 
                                                
140 The authorities on Taiwan in their White Paper on Relations across the Taiwan Straits, 
supra n.135, reproduced in Henckaerts, supra n.135, 284, stated that 
1. The existence of the Republic of China is a simple reality that cannot be denied. 
2. ‘One China’ refers to China as a historical, geographical, cultural, and racial entity. 
3. The division of China under two separate governments on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait is a temporary, transitional phenomenon in Chinese history, and the joint efforts of 
the two sides will inevitably put China once again on the road to unification. Therefore, in 
the process of seeking unification, the two sides may first eradicate mutual hostility 
through routine people-to-people exchanges and then proceed to create the conditions for 
unification. The two sides should also respect, rather than exclude, each other in the 
international arena, and should renounce armed force as a means for achieving 
unification. 
4. Room should be left for future political negotiations. It is precisely because China is 
divided into two political entities that we must bring about its unification through 
exchanges and negotiations. The ‘Guidelines for National Unification’ clearly stipulate 
that in the long-term phase of consultation for unification, the two sides will establish a 
consultative body and complete the plans for unification through negotiation. 
(emphasis added) Reference is had also to a statement by the Mainland Affairs Council of 
Taiwan’s Executive Yuan on 1 August 1999: ‘we have always maintained that the “one 
China” concept refer[s] to the future rather than the present. The two sides are not yet unified, 
but are equals, separately ruled. We both exist concurrently. Therefore, the two sides can be 
defined as sharing a “special state-to-state relationship”, prior to unification. Cross-strait 
relations are “special”, because we share the same culture, historical origins, and ethnic bonds. 
The people on the two sides engage in exchanges in social, economic, trade … activities … 
which other divided countries cannot match. What is most important is that the two sides are 
willing to work in concert and engage in consultations on an equal basis to ensure the future 
unification of China’: as quoted in Crawford, supra n.82, 217. 
141 China has affirmed that ‘[a]fter reunification, Taiwan will become a special administrative 
region. It will be distinguished from the other provinces or regions of China by its high degree 
of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent 
judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own party, political, 
military, economic and financial affairs. It may conclude commercial and cultural agreements 
with foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It may keep its military 
forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island. On 
the other hand, representatives of the government of the special administrative region and 
those from different circles of Taiwan may be appointed to senior posts in the central 
government and participate in the running of national affairs’: Taiwan Affairs Office and 
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper: The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, August 1993, reproduced in Henckaerts, ibid., 
Appendix 3, 273. 
Issues of cross-Strait relations have been prominent in Taiwanese parliamentary elections 
since they were introduced in 1992 and Taiwanese presidential elections since 1996: Kenneth 
Lieberthal, ‘Preventing a War over Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2005), 53. Since 
Ma Ying-jeou, who is in favour of maintaining dialogues with the PRC government, was 
elected President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in May 2008, cross-Strait relations have 
improved. Ma pledged that during his office there would be ‘no independence, no 
reunification, and no use of force’: Bonnie Glaser and Brad Glosserman, ‘Promoting 
Confidence Building across the Taiwan Strait: A Report of the CSIS International Security 
Program and Pacific Forum CSIS’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., September 2008, 9. Dialogues between the PRC government and the 
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a people possessing the right to self-determination, their right will be deemed under 
international law to have been exercised by Taiwan reuniting with China as its parent 
State, so long as the people on Taiwan are treated on a basis of equality with the 
majority people of China. Conversely, to deprive China of a significant territory 
violates China and its people’s right to self-determination. It ought to be kept in mind 
that common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR stipulates that all peoples, not 
only a minority people, have the right to self-determination. 
 Nevertheless, one might argue that Taiwan through decades of autonomous 
rule has effectively seceded from China. In claiming a right to secede, one implicitly 
accepts that Taiwan, until it secedes from China, is part of China, as a territory is not 
                                                                                                                           
authorities on Taiwan, through the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits 
(representing the PRC government) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (representing the 
authorities on Taiwan), resumed in June 2008. A public opinion survey by the Mainland 
Affairs Council of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan conducted during April 2009 indicated 73.8 per 
cent in public support for Taiwan continuing negotiations and resolutions of cross-Strait issues 
(Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Summarized Results of the Public 
Opinion Survey on the Third “Chiang–Chen Talks” (April 28–30, 2009)’), with similar levels 
of support reported in subsequent surveys conducted during December 2009 (Mainland 
Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey 
on the Fourth Chiang–Chen Talks (December 25–27, 2009)’) and April–May 2010 (Mainland 
Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Summarized Results of Public Opinion Survey on 
the “Public’s View on Current Cross-Strait Relations” (April 29–May 2, 2010)’). A Cross-
Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and a Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation were signed in June 2010, with 79.3 
per cent of respondents in a July 2010 survey indicating support for handling of cross-Strait 
issues through negotiations, 61.1 per cent satisfied with the Cross-Strait Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement and 73.1 per cent with the Cross-Strait Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive 
Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Survey on Public Views on the Fifth Chiang–Chen Talks (July 2–4, 2010)’. 
See Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, ‘Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: 
Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait’, 43 Journal of 
Peace Research (2006), 523, for an analysis of the rationales and impact of economic 
interdependence on cross-Strait relations. In a September 2010 survey, 86.2 per cent of 
respondents indicated support for maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations 
(Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Summarized Results of Public Opinion 
Survey on the “Public’s Views on Current Cross-Strait Relations” (September 1–5, 2010)’. A 
subsequent survey conducted in May 2011 pointed to 88.4 per cent in public support for 
maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive 
Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey on the “Public’s Views on 
Current Cross-Strait Relations” (May 27–30, 2011)’). Subsequent cross-Strait co-operation 
has comprised the signing of a Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation in 
December 2010, a Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety Cooperation Agreement in October 
2011, and a Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement in June 2012, with the level of 
public support for continuing negotiations over cross-Strait issues and maintaining the status 
quo in cross-Strait relations remaining constant (Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, 
Taiwan, ‘Public Opinion Survey Shows High Support for the Results of the Negotiations at 
the Seventh Chiang–Chen Talks’, 28 November 2011; ‘The Public Affirms the Achievements 
of the Eighth Chiang-Chen Talks’, 31 August 2012). Ma was re-elected in January 2012. 
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capable of seceding from a State of which it does not form part. It is worth noting that 
States that have diplomatic relations with the authorities on Taiwan do so on the basis 
that they are the lawful government of China as a whole.142 In addition, as Weller has 
pointed out, ‘[a]fter all, the central government (or former central government) can 
argue that the entity is not effective, and will never be effective, as it only exists so 
long as it is not forcibly reincorporated. And such an act can occur at any moment 
chosen by the central government.’143 
The question of whether international law provides for a right to secede is yet 
to be resolved. Serbia on 8 October 2008 requested that the General Assembly vote 
on referring to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the question: ‘Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in accordance with international law?’144 China along with 76 other States 
voted in favour, while 74 States abstained, including 22 of then 27 European Union 
Member States (with the exceptions of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Spain, who voted in favour), and six States, including the United States, voted against 
referral.145  
Saul has noted that a number of States argued before the ICJ that 
independence of Kosovo could be justified as ‘remedial secession’146 while providing 
scant legal authorities.147 In an extraordinary move as it always objects to the ICJ as a 
forum through which inter-State disputes or questions of international law should be 
resolved and had never participated in any contentious or advisory proceedings 
before the ICJ (even though it nominates a Chinese judge to the bench as of right as a 
Permanent Member of the Security Council), China presented an oral statement to the 
                                                
142 Yahuda, supra n.98, 1326. 
143 Weller, supra n.3, 9. 
144 U.N. G.A. Res. 63/3 (2008). 
145 A/63/PV.22 (2008). 
146 Saul, supra n.24, 616, citing written statements to the ICJ from Albania, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, and Switzerland, 19 
April 2009. 
147 Ibid., citing written comments to the ICJ from Serbia, 17 July 2009, para.312. 
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ICJ to state its position that a right to secession, remedial or otherwise, did not exist 
under international law.148 Eventually, in its advisory opinion in Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo149 on 22 July 2010, the ICJ by majority refrained from this pivotal issue and 
confined its opinion to the question of whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence from Serbia was in accordance with international law. The majority 
considered it unnecessary to resolve whether a right to secede exists under 
international law and merely noted that international law does not authorise or 
prohibit secession. It is important to keep in mind that the majority of the ICJ held 
only that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia did not violate 
international law; they did not conclude that Kosovo was entitled under international 
law to secession, independence or statehood. Hannum has noted that, at a Security 
Council meeting on 3 August 2010, ‘[s]tatements by France, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and others that Kosovo is independent are little more than feeble 
attempts to substitute a constitutive approach to recognition for the widely accepted 
declaratory theory.’150 Furthermore, Rein Müllerson argues, even if the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, on humanitarian grounds, through the use of force had been 
lawful (or unlawful but legitimate), recognition of Kosovo as an independent State 
was not.151 
While an advisory opinion of the ICJ in itself does not constitute international 
law,152 one ought to be alarmed by the deviation in the advisory opinion from United 
Nations instruments and State practice, for many States and non-State entities may 
                                                
148 Official transcript of oral argument before the ICJ from China, 7 December 2009, 28. 
149 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, 403. 
150 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned 
Chalice Refused?’, 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011), 155, 156 (emphasis in 
original), citing S/PV.6367, 3 August 2010, 12 (France), 14 (Turkey), 15-16 (United 
Kingdom), 19 (Japan), and 19 (United States). 
151 Müllerson, supra n.11, 7. 
152 Article 68 of the Statute of the ICJ states that ‘[i]n the exercise of its advisory functions the 
Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in 
contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable.’ Article 59, ibid., 
states that ‘[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case.’ 
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rely on it for precedential value. As Judge Koroma warned in dissent, to allow 
secession outside the context of decolonisation on the basis of a unilateral declaration 
of independence ‘creates a very dangerous precedent’ and ‘amounts to nothing less 
than announcing to any and all dissident groups around the world that they are free to 
circumvent international law simply by acting in a certain way and crafting a 
unilateral declaration of independence, using certain terms. The Court’s Opinion will 
serve as a guide and instruction manual for secessionist groups the world over, and 
the stability of international law will be severely undermined.’153 Judge Koroma 
stated that it was not true that international law did not authorise or prohibit a 
unilateral declaration of independence in a case that was specific and well defined.154 
Even if international law were neutral or silent over secession or unilateral 
declarations of independence,155 it does not mean that there exists outside the context 
of decolonisation a right on the part of a territory or its people to secede.  
Amidst current political climate in which secession is increasingly regarded 
as permissible or even as of right that could, should or must be supported by the 
international community in the form of humanitarian intervention,156 China in 2005 
enacted an anti-secession law that declares that it will use force to reunite with 
                                                
153 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, supra n.149, per Judge Koroma (diss. op.), para.4. Similarly, Judge Yusuf 
in his separate opinion noted that ‘claims to separate statehood by ethnic groups or other 
entities within a State can create situations of armed conflict and may pose a threat not only to 
regional stability but also to international peace and security. The fact that the Court decided 
to restrict its opinion to whether the declaration of independence, as such, is prohibited by 
international law, without assessing the underlying claim to external self-determination, may 
be misinterpreted as legitimising such declarations under international law, by all kinds of 
separatist groups or entities that have either made or are planning to make declarations of 
independence’: para.6. 
154 Ibid., per Judge Koroma, para.20. 
155 For a discussion of whether international law does not prohibit secession or unilateral 
declarations of independence, see Theodore Christakis, ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about Secession?’, 24 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2011), 73. 
156 See discussion in Chapter II. In fact, an attempt to secede that is supported by or based on 
the intervention of a foreign State brings into play the general principles of international law 
that an illegal act cannot produce legal rights (ex injuria jus non oritur) and that ‘an entity is 
not a State if created through a violation of the rules relating to the use of force’: Crawford, 
supra n.87, 211. 
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Taiwan if necessary.157 The international community responded with calls for 
restraint,158 while the population and authorities on Taiwan denounced the measure.159 
                                                
157 Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress 
on 14 March 2005. For discussions of the anti-secession law, see, e.g., You Ji, ‘China’s Anti-
Secession Law and the Risk of War in the Taiwan Strait’, 27 Contemporary Security Policy 
(2006), 237; Keyuan Zou, ‘Governing the Taiwan Issue in Accordance with Law: An Essay 
on China’s Anti-Secession Law’, 4 Chinese Journal of International Law (2005), 455. 
158 It is worth noting that the United States has never argued that China’s use of force to regain 
control over Taiwan will contravene international law; it only urges the authorities on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait to seek peaceful resolution of the legal status of Taiwan. The 
position of the United States on Chechnya is illuminating: ‘We support the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. … We oppose attempts to alter international 
boundaries by force, whether in the form of aggression by one State against another or in the 
form of armed secessionist movements … although Chechnya is an integral part of the 
Russian Federation, Moscow should limit any use of force to a minimum, and respect human 
rights’: ‘Supporting Democracy and Economic Reform in the New Independent States’, 6 US 
Department of State Dispatch (1995), 119, 120, as quoted in Crawford, supra n.107, 111 
(emphasis added). 
Much has been written on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 enacted by the United States 
Congress. Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver find that the Taiwan Relations Act ‘has 
emerged as a powerful legislative instrument for the setting of foreign policy boundaries by 
Congress. … Unlike the usual diet of Congressional action on foreign affairs, it is “the law of 
the land”. Such a status has permitted members of Congress to declare it as the “legal 
standard” against which to judge Taiwan policy; has led at least one Congressional committee 
to suggest that a president might be held constitutionally accountable for not upholding it; and 
can provide the legitimacy for the efforts of sympathetic individuals in the defence 
bureaucracy to justify support for Congress’s efforts’: ‘An Uncertain Relationship: The 
United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act’, 165 China Quarterly (2001), 147, 171. 
While the Taiwan Relations Act may well be a legal standard by which the United States is 
constrained in its domestic policymaking and actions vis-à-vis Taiwan, the municipal 
legislation does not constitute a legal basis under international law for the United States to 
intervene in the event that China and Taiwan were to enter into an armed conflict, and is in 
fact a piece of legislation that in and of itself contravenes international law. In Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, the ICJ stressed that ‘[t]he element of coercion, 
which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly 
obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military 
action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within 
another State’ (ibid., 108); and that ‘acts constituting a breach of the customary principle of 
non-intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a 
breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations’ (ibid., 109-10). In 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 
Vol.I, 226, 246, the ICJ stated that ‘[w]hether a signalled intention to use force if certain 
events occur is or is not a “threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon 
various factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it 
would be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4. Thus it would be illegal for a State 
to threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow or not follow 
certain political or economic paths. The notions of “threat” and “use” of force under Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given 
case is illegal – for whatever reason – the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In 
short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force 
that is in conformity with the Charter. For the rest, no State – whether or not it defended the 
policy of deterrence – suggested to the Court that it would be lawful to threaten to use force if 
the use of force contemplated would be illegal.’ The ICJ explained, ibid., 246-47, that 
‘[w]hether [there] is a “threat” contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, depends upon whether the 
particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a State or against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in the event 
 236 
Article 3 of Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) states that 
‘[n]othing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the 
sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate 
means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national 
unity and territorial integrity of the State’ or ‘as a justification for intervening, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal 
or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict 
occurs.’160 Jonathan Charney and John Prescott argue that so long as Taiwan does not 
threaten or deploy military force when it declares independence, China may not 
justify the use of force against Taiwan.161 Such an argument undermines the primacy 
and sanctity of the principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity. In fact, 
should China refrain from action, the doctrine of estoppel will operate against 
                                                                                                                           
that it were intended as a means of defence, it would necessarily violate the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. In any of these circumstances the use of force, and the threat to 
use it, would be unlawful under the law of the Charter.’ Additionally, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration states that ‘[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing 
in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when 
the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.’ By providing 
arms to Taiwan (Taiwan Relations Act, s.2(b)(5)) and proclaiming its willingness to defend 
the territory against any use of force (ibid., s.2(b)(6)), the United States may be taken as 
assisting and encouraging Taiwan to secede from or resist reunification with China, which 
violates China’s State sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principle of non-intervention, 
and the prohibition of the threat or use of force as enshrined in the Charter and customary 
international law. The fact that the United States is empowered and compelled by the Taiwan 
Relations Act to provide arms to Taiwan and to defend the territory against any use of force is 
immaterial to and does not prejudice the aforementioned obligations of the United States 
under the Charter and customary international law to refrain from intervening in China’s 
internal affairs. It is a well-established principle of international law that a State may in no 
circumstance disregard its international obligations on account of its municipal laws that may 
allow or dictate otherwise. As the Permanent Court of International Justice in Treatment of 
Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No.44 (1932), 4, 24, stated, ‘a State cannot adduce as 
against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent upon 
it under international law or treaties in force.’ This rule of customary international law has 
since been codified in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
159 The authorities on Taiwan stated that ‘based on the Montevideo Convention of 1933 … it 
is undeniable that the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state’ and the anti-
secession law ‘infringes upon the sovereignty of the Republic of China’: Mainland Affairs 
Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, ‘Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on 
China’s Passing of the Anti-secession (Anti-Separation) Law’, 29 March 2005. 
160 Signed at Geneva on 8 June 1977, Art.3. 
161 Jonathan I. Charney and J.R.V. Prescott, ‘Resolving Cross-Strait Relations between China 
and Taiwan’, 94 American Journal of International Law (2000), 453, 477. 
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China’s claim and exercise of State sovereignty over Taiwan.162 As Taiwan does not 
possess the right to external self-determination, China’s entitlement to observance of 
its State sovereignty and territorial integrity is conjoined with a right to prevent the 
break-up of its territory by all means including the use of force.163 Such a right is so 
sacrosanct that ‘[t]he consequence of violations even of fundamental human rights 
will be responsibility, scrutiny and the loss of legitimacy; they do not entail the loss 
of title or status of the State concerned.’164 
Hong Kong and Taiwan’s economic significance and international profiles 
entail major repercussions for China if it threatens to further undermine their political 
autonomy. On the other hand, Tibet, with its ethnic and cultural differences from 
China, its dependence on economic aid from the national government, China’s 
                                                
162 See Phil C.W. Chan, ‘Acquiescence/Estoppel in International Boundaries: Temple of Preah 
Vihear Revisited’, 3 Chinese Journal of International Law (2004), 421. 
163 Crawford, supra n.87, 220, asserts that regardless of whether there were a ‘Taiwanese 
people’ in the midst of the Chinese civil war, ‘the experience of a half century of separate self-
government has tended to create one. In any case, attempts to solve the problem of Taiwan 
otherwise than by peaceful means must now constitute a situation “likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security” under Article 33 of the Charter.’ He 
concludes, ibid., 221, that ‘the suppression by force of 23 million people cannot be consistent 
with the Charter. To that extent there must be a cross-Strait boundary for the purposes of the 
use of force.’ With respect, as Taiwan is an integral part of China, for China to use force to 
resist secessionist attempt by Taiwan cannot be inconsistent with the Charter, which governs 
the conduct of international relations. An artificial cross-Strait boundary for the purpose of the 
use of force is an encumbrance upon, and constitutes unlawful interference in, China’s 
exercise of State sovereignty over its territory. 
164 Crawford, ibid., 149. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 
35 ILM 32 (1996), para.30, stated that ‘the practice of the Security Council is rich with cases 
of civil war or internal strife which it classified as a “threat to the peace” and dealt with under 
Chapter VII, with the encouragement or even at the behest of the General Assembly, such as 
the Congo crisis at the beginning of the 1960s and, more recently, Liberia and Somalia. It can 
thus be said that there is a common understanding, manifested by the “subsequent practice” of 
the membership of the United Nations at large, that the “threat to the peace” of Article 39 may 
include, as one of its species, internal armed conflicts.’ However, the Security Council 
generally takes the view that Article 39 applies only to armed conflict that constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security. In cases where the Security Council discerned a threat to 
international peace and security from an internal armed conflict, it was the consequences 
arising from the conflict that the Security Council found to constitute a threat. For instance, 
the Security Council in its Resolution 688 (1991) expressed grave concern about ‘the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in 
Kurdish-populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which threaten international peace and 
security in the region’ (emphasis added). The emphasis on the consequences of the internal 
armed conflict rather than the conflict itself was repeated in the first operative paragraph in 
which the Security Council condemned ‘the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of 
which threaten international peace and security in the region’ (emphasis added). 
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physical control of its territory, and its lack of recognition and representation on the 
international plane, faces significant obstacles in its exercise of the right to self-
determination that in turn have influenced the extent to which China has recognised 
and implemented self-determination in the territory. Much has been written on the 
historical status of Tibet; the following sub-section explores the legal aspects of 
Tibet’s historical–political background on account of which Tibet now finds its right 
to self-determination submerged in ambiguity. 
 
c. Tibet: A Shangri-La in minority nationality autonomy? 
The dispute over whether Tibet forms an integral part of China stems from ambiguity 
in international law, in the complicity of the international community and in Tibet’s 
historical relations with China. While the PRC government and Chinese scholars 
regard any discussion of Tibet’s historical status to be unnecessary, Western scholars 
in Tibetan studies have tended to emphasise the personal – especially the religious – 
union between the Chinese emperor and the Dalai Lama that dated as earlier as the 
Yuan dynasty and became entrenched during the Qing dynasty. While not disputing 
that the personal-religious relationship constituted the foundation of Sino-Tibetan 
relations,165 Michael van Walt van Praag argues that the relationship cannot be 
defined under contemporary international law and was sui generis.166 He concedes 
that the relationship entailed features characteristic of a protectorate; nonetheless, ‘as 
the nature of Manchu interference in Tibetan affairs, specifically in foreign affairs, 
did not differ from that characteristic of protectorate relationships and the extent of 
actual interference was limited and by no means continuous, Tibet as a State never 
ceased to exist. The exercise of sovereignty by Tibet was restricted by the Manchu 
involvement in the affairs of Tibet, but that did not result in the extinction of the 
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166 Ibid., 12. 
 239 
independent State, which continued to possess the essential attributes of statehood.’167 
Tashi Tsering acknowledges that Tibet was occupied by the Mongols, but insists that 
the situation was strictly one of occupation and not annexation.168 Elliot Sperling 
observes that Chinese historiography between the Yuan dynasty and the founding of 
the communist state never included Tibet as part of China proper.169 In addition, 
Sperling argues, being part of the Mongol empire was not the same as being a part of 
China, as the Mongol empire was one ‘with constituent elements that were not 
integral parts of China’.170 The requirement that reincarnations of the Dalai and 
Panchen Lamas be approved by the Qing court was not so much ‘to establish Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet, but was rather a means that the Qing employed in both 
Mongolia and Tibet to limit the power of the aristocracy by limiting the discovering 
of reincarnations among them’.171 Due to its conflicts with Western powers from the 
1830s onwards, China was not able to sustain its control and authority over Tibet and 
the Chinese amban in Lhasa ceded powers to the Tibetan government in 1847.172 
Sperling observes that the Qing court segregated its control of China from that of 
Tibet and Mongolia, with the latter falling under the jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan 
(which handled China’s affairs with ‘barbarians’, including with Russia).173 
The concept of suzerainty, or vassalage, in international law has always been 
uncertain. Scelle explained in 1911 that ‘[e]xactly what vassalage is, and how it 
affects sovereignty or independence, is difficult to state a priori. … The ability to 
decide definitely in this matter is chiefly the result of an anachronism. The attempt 
was made to transfer to modern international relations a notion of feudal law which 
does not harmonise with the present idea of a State; it could only survive as a 
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skeleton stripped of substance.’174 Hackworth maintained in 1940 that ‘the extent of 
the sovereignty retained by a vassal or a semi-sovereign State is not determined by 
general rules of international law. It is ascertained in each case by the facts of the 
particular case.’175 Scelle argued that vassalage implied personal union but ‘the 
armies are separate, and there may even be occasions for a regular war between the 
vassal State and the suzerain State’.176 Such a union was based on ‘reciprocal duties 
based upon treaty, and not pre-existing rights’.177 Alexandrowicz-Alexander stated 
that ‘suzerainty, though still continuing on the basis of an historical relationship, 
became a nominal title ripe for elimination or conversion into a title more favorable 
to the subordinate state’, a principle he found to be of great import in the case of 
Tibet.178 The Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion in 
Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco179 stressed that the legal status of a 
dependency needed to be assessed in light of its characteristics. 
 A lawyer knows well that ambiguity is a source as much of conflict as of 
compromise. By maintaining the notion that China was Tibet’s suzerain State and 
Tibet China’s vassal, imperial China and Tibet managed to co-exist for centuries. 
Joseph Fletcher has noted that ‘[w]ithin the empire, the myth of world suzerainty was 
a useful ideological instrument for ruling China, and … it was not to be 
compromised. But in foreign affairs the myth often proved a hindrance. Then quietly, 
the emperor practised what he pleased, not what he preached. Relations on an equal 
basis with Heart, Lhasa, Kokand, or Moscow were not exceptions to Chinese 
practices at all. They were customary dealings on the unseen side of a long-
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established tradition.’180 Dawa Norbu argues that ‘[e]mpire-tolerated heterogeneity 
allowed considerable social space for different identities, cultures, languages, etc., to 
exist, whereas the nation-state, in the name of political centralization and cultural 
unification, does not tolerate the politics of differences; instead it melts minorities 
within the crucible of national integration.’181 
Alexandrowicz-Alexander believed that a personal union did exist between 
the Qing emperor and the Dalai Lama but ceased automatically upon the demise of 
the Qing dynasty in 1912,182 a view the International Commission of Jurists 
concurred with.183 Shushi Hsü noted in 1926 that ‘it has been the practice of China as 
suzerain not to interfere with her vassals in their relationship with other nations … so 
long as she was not called upon.’184 In a treaty of friendship and commerce concluded 
in 1883 between Great Britain and Korea, there was no mention of Korea’s 
(undisputed) status as a vassal of China and China was not a signatory to the treaty.185 
The Convention between Great Britain and Tibet in 1904, concluded to ‘resolve and 
determine the doubts and difficulties’ arising from ‘the meaning and validity of the 
Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890’,186 which delineated the boundary between 
Sikkim and Tibet but could not be implemented by China as Tibet refused its validity, 
referred to the ‘Government of Tibet’187 and was not endorsed by the Chinese seal.188 
Krishna Rao argues that the provision in the 1904 treaty, that ‘[t]he Government of 
Tibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the 
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frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention’,189 
clearly implied that treaties concluded by China ostensibly for or on behalf of Tibet 
were not binding on and would not be implemented by Tibet without a separate 
agreement to which Tibet was privy.190  
As Tibet refused to enter into relations with British India, Great Britain 
invaded Tibet in 1904 in what is known as the Younghusband mission. British India 
noted that ‘recent military incidents of advance are regarded by the Chinese 
Government, if not with satisfaction, as conducing to the recovery of the authority 
they have lost, at any rate with indifference’.191 The Younghusband mission 
compelled the Qing court to regard loose political control over Tibet no longer 
acceptable, and complete control of Tibet a strategic bulwark for China from foreign 
powers.192 Dibyesh Anand observes that the mission, which brought to the fore ‘the 
question of what exactly was Tibet, who had the final say in its affairs and what were 
its precise geographical limits’,193 tends to be completely ignored in contemporary 
journalistic reports on Tibet, even though its predatory nature has been detailed in 
historical studies.194 In 1906, Great Britain and China concluded a treaty confirming 
the 1904 treaty.195 Rao argues that if China had the capacity then to conclude treaties 
on behalf of Tibet, its treaty with Great Britain in 1906 should have confirmed the 
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1890 treaty and cancelled, instead of confirming, the 1904 treaty between Great 
Britain and Tibet.196  
 When the Qing dynasty fell and Chinese troops were expelled from Tibet in 
1912, the new Republic of China government declared that Tibet would thenceforth 
be a province of China. While stating that China had suzerainty over Tibet, Great 
Britain in its note of protest stated that it ‘could not consent to the assertion of 
Chinese sovereignty over a State enjoying independent treaty relations with her’.197 In 
reply, China stated that it had ‘no intention of converting Tibet into another province 
of China and that the preservation of the traditional system of Tibetan Government 
was as much the desire of China as of Great Britain.’198 In a letter to his counterpart 
Zhou En-lai in September 1959, the Prime Minister of India stated that ‘[t]he 
arrangements for the Simla Conference were made with the full knowledge and 
consent of the Government of China. The Foreign Minister of China wrote to the 
British representative on the 7th August, 1913, that the Chinese plenipotentiary would 
proceed to India “to open negotiations for a treaty jointly” with the Tibetan and 
British plenipotentiaries. It is clear from the proceedings of the conference that not 
only did the Chinese representative fully participate in the Conference but that the 
Tibetan representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the 
Chinese and the then British Indian representatives.’199 India rejected ‘the so-called 
suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction – a political affectation 
which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties’.200 
China’s conduct in relation to the Simla Convention could result in three 
different consequences under international law. The first consequence, applying the 
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reasoning of the ICJ in Temple of Preah Vihear,201 was that China should be estopped 
from claiming that Tibet was part of China, when its representative in Lhasa 
participated in the negotiations for the Convention even though Tibet did not ratify it 
subsequently, and when the President of China upon British protest indicated that 
Tibet was not a province of China. Alternatively, given that China did not ratify the 
Convention, Tibet was free to ignore the inclusion in the Convention of Great 
Britain’s acknowledgment of China’s suzerainty over Tibet, and China ‘could not … 
claim rights of suzerainty’ on the basis of the Convention.202 Finally, on the basis of 
the cardinal principle that a treaty, or a provision therein, is binding on a State only 
after it agrees to the treaty, one may rely on China’s non-ratification of the Simla 
Convention to argue that China should not be considered bound by the Convention or 
estopped from claiming that through non-ratification it merely reserved its right to 
settle with Tibet directly. 
Despite its declaration of independence in 1913, Tibet was not recognised 
between 1913 and 1951 as an independent State by any State other than Mongolia. 
The United Kingdom, and British India, which had the most intimate relations with 
Tibet, dealt with Tibet as if an independent State subordinate to China in a 
relationship of suzerainty, so as to forestall Chinese objections.203 The United 
Kingdom was indifferent to the status of Tibet so long as Tibet was able to adhere to 
the Simla Convention.204 Although Tibet was neutral during the Second World War, 
its attempts at admission to United Nations membership were systematically ignored 
or undermined by the United Kingdom and British India. Anand notes that ‘not only 
did the British ignore Tibetan efforts to acquire international personality in 1948–49, 
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they actively discouraged any other state from encouraging them’.205 The United 
Kingdom altered its previous position that Tibet was under the suzerainty of China 
and confusedly stated that before the Qing court fell in 1912, ‘Tibet was under 
Chinese sovereignty. In that year she broke away and although she has maintained 
her independence ever since (subject to her recognition of Chinese suzerainty) the 
Chinese have in recent years shown an increasing tendency to claim sovereignty over 
the country.’206 A secret note from British Indian officials cautioned that 
‘glamorising’ Tibet might, in addition to stirring Chinese reactions, compel the 
United States to ‘scent British propaganda, and to conclude that Tibet needed 
protection rather against British imperialism, or that it needed to be roused from its 
pathetic contentment and given the blessings of civilisation and reform, if not by 
China then by American businessmen (who would be ready on their own account to 
take any opportunities they saw) or missionaries.’207 A note from British India 
warned that raising the international profile of Tibet would lead the United States to 
devise ‘ill-advised schemes’ such as a ‘presence of Tibetan representation at the 
peace conference’ and would likely give ‘the Tibetans swelled head’ and at any rate 
cause inconveniences to British India.208 Tibet’s endeavour to attain international 
recognition was further stymied after India attained independence, as the United 
Kingdom’s strategic interests in the region decreased significantly.209 The British 
Ambassador to the United Nations advised the Foreign Office that ‘[w]hat we want to 
do is to create a situation which does not oblige us in practice to do anything about 
the Communist invasion of Tibet’.210 Amy Kellam argues that ‘Chinese and Western 
discourses have converged to produce a compelling metanarrative that traditional 
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Tibet was a primitive, pre-legal society; and … this metanarrative has prejudiced 
considerations of Tibet’s legal status.’211 Contemporary Western construction of Tibet 
as a Shangri-La that should be left untouched by industrialisation and Han Chinese 
settlement aligns with the PRC government’s position that industrialisation in Tibet 
has liberated Tibetans from their traditional serf system and helped them realise 
genuine self-determination through assimilation with China’s high culture and 
revolutionary regime.212 
 After Chinese troops invaded Tibet in October 1950, the PRC government 
and the 14th Dalai Lama entered into negotiations that culminated in the Seventeen-
Point Agreement in May 1951. Article 3 of the Agreement states that ‘[t]he Tibetan 
people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified 
leadership of the Central People’s Government.’213 Article 4 states that ‘[t]he central 
authorities will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai 
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Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.’214 Article 11 states that 
‘[i]n matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the 
part of the central authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out 
reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall 
be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.’215 However, 
for the purposes of minority nationality autonomy, China defines Tibet as 
encompassing only the present-day Tibet Autonomous Region where the Dalai Lama 
used to exercise direct authority, and excluding areas with dominant Tibetan 
populations which Tibetans traditionally considered to be part of Tibet proper, 
including Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. One might argue that the 
Seventeen-Point Agreement was signed by Tibet as a result of China’s threat or use 
of force and that accordingly it was not valid under international law. Conversely, 
following the ICJ’s reasoning in Temple of Preah Vihear, Tibet is arguably estopped 
from claiming that the Agreement is not legally binding when it did not seek to 
repudiate the Agreement until 1959. 
As Chapter III explained, the legitimacy of the communist state, both 
internally and externally, is predicated upon its antagonism to imperialism. Thus, ‘to 
question the legitimacy of Tibet’s incorporation into the PRC is to question the 
legitimacy of the idea of the Chinese state as constructed by the Chinese Communist 
Party; it is to raise questions against the cultural and political nationalism that has 
been fostered within the PRC and that has taken root both inside and outside official 
party and governmental circles’.216 It is as much for reasons of legitimacy as Tibet’s 
strategic position and natural resources that China regards the notion of Tibetan 
independence as completely unacceptable. 
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The enigma surrounding Tibet and the force and legitimacy underlying its 
claim to self-determination are heavily invested (rather unduly) in the person of the 
Dalai Lama as embodiment of Tibetan Buddhism and traditions and the Tibetan 
realm. While China accepts the Dalai Lama as a religious figure, and in theory 
guarantees freedom of religious beliefs in the 1982 Constitution,217 it does not regard 
him as the political representative of Tibet or Tibetans and considers all religious 
practices as anathema to socialism and national unity.218 In July 1981, Party 
Chairman Hu Yaobang presented to the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Gyalo Dondup, a 
five-point policy with a view to direct negotiations with the Dalai Lama, who had 
fled to India in 1959: 
 
1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a 
new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic 
growth and mutual help among all nationalities. 
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and 
sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. 
There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959. 
3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his 
followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that 
they will contribute to upholding China’s unity and promoting 
solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among 
all nationalities, and the modernization program. 
                                                
217 A distinction between religious beliefs and religious practices or activities inheres in the 
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4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living 
conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to 
live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back 
to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about 
their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than 
before. 
5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief 
statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would 
like to say in the statement.219 
 
When the Tibetan delegation returned in October 1984 for a second round of 
discussions, it rejected the five-point policy and proposed instead that Tibet should 
become a demilitarised autonomous region in association with China.220 In an address 
to the United States Congressional Human Rights Caucus in 1987, the Dalai Lama 
proposed a five-point plan for Tibet, under which Tibet should be demilitarised and 
the Central Government should abandon its population transfer policy, respect 
Tibetans’ human rights and freedoms, restore and protect Tibet’s environment, and 
commence negotiations on the status of Tibet and on relations between Tibetans and 
Han Chinese.221 The United States government strongly disapproved of the Dalai 
Lama’s use of his visit as a religious leader to present a politically charged agenda, 
and disclaimed that it supported his five-point plan. In September 1988, China’s State 
Nationality Affairs Commission issued a detailed rejection of the Dalai Lama’s five-
point plan.222 
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Subsequently, in an address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 
October 1988, the Dalai Lama reiterated thus: 
 
The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and 
Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity 
founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good 
and the protection of themselves and their environment, in 
association with the People’s Republic of China. 
The Government of the People’s Republic of China could remain 
responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy. The Government of Tibet 
should, however, develop and maintain relations, through its own 
Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, 
education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political 
activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned 
with such activities. 
The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of 
basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of 
government entrusted with the task of ensuring economic equality, 
social justice and protection of the environment. This means that the 
Government of Tibet will have the right to decide on all affairs 
relating to Tibet and the Tibetans. 
As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any 
society’s development, the Government of Tibet would seek to 
ensure this freedom by full adherence to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. 
Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet’s national identity, 
and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet’s rich culture, it 
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would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard 
and develop its practice.223 
 
China responded by firmly stating that negotiations over Tibetan autonomy could not 
proceed without the Dalai Lama’s disclaimer of Tibetan independence.224 In turn, the 
Dalai Lama stated that ‘I have stated time and again that I do not wish to seek Tibet’s 
separation from China, but that I will seek its future within the framework of the 
Chinese constitution. Anyone who has heard this statement would realize, unless his 
or her view of reality is clouded by suspicion, that my demand for genuine self-rule 
does not amount to a demand for separation. … I have only one demand: self-rule and 
genuine autonomy for all Tibetans, i.e., the Tibetan nationality in its entirety.’225 
To bolster the legitimacy of its exercise of sovereignty over minority ethnic 
groups in its territory, China has fostered a system of minority nationality autonomy. 
Ethnic groups in China are officially recognised by the PRC government as 
‘nationalities’, and there are, including Han Chinese, 56 nationalities. A nationality is 
a ‘historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a 
common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in 
a common culture’.226 The system was devised in the 1949 Common Programme of 
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the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.227 Article 3 of the 1954 
Constitution stated that ‘[t]he People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational 
state. All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against or oppression of any 
nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities, are prohibited. 
All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and 
written languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways. Regional 
autonomy applies in areas where a minority nationality live in a compact community. 
All the national autonomous areas are inseparable parts of the People’s Republic of 
China.’228 In the 1982 Constitution, it is stated that  
 
All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal. The 
state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority 
nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, 
unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. 
Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are 
prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or 
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instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas 
inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and 
cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs 
of the different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is 
practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in 
compact communities; in these areas organs of self-government are 
established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national 
autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of 
China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and 
develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or 
reform their own ways and customs.229 
 
Provisions for autonomous rule in minority nationality areas, such as Tibet, are 
further set out in the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy. In particular, Article 
19 of the Law states: 
 
The people’s congresses of national autonomous areas shall have the 
power to enact regulations on the exercise of autonomy and separate 
regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural 
characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas 
concerned. The regulations on the exercise of autonomy and separate 
regulations of autonomous regions shall be submitted to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for approval before 
they go into effect. Those of autonomous prefectures and counties 
shall be submitted to the standing committees of the people’s 
congresses of provinces or autonomous regions for approval before 
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they go into effect, and they shall be reported to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record.230 
 
In addition, Article 20 states, ‘[i]f a resolution, decision, order or instruction of a state 
organ at a higher level does not suit the conditions in a national autonomous area, the 
organ of self-government of the area may either implement it with certain alterations 
or cease implementing it after reporting to and receiving the approval of the state 
organ at a higher level; the state organ at a higher level shall give the reply in 60 days 
since the day on which the report is received.’231 China has asserted that ‘[r]egional 
autonomy for ethnic minorities enables them to bring into full play their regional 
advantages and promote exchanges and cooperation between ethnic minority areas 
and other areas, and consequently quickens the pace of modernization both in the 
minority areas and the country as a whole and helps achieve common development of 
all regions and prosperity for all ethnic groups.’232 
Tibetans remain the minority nationality to which the Central Government 
has devoted most of its attention and resources. Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk 
Sharlho note that four of the Nationalities and Religion Bureau departments handle 
Tibetan affairs exclusively, while affairs that pertain to the other 54 minority 
nationalities are handled by one department.233 The authors argue that the priority 
ascribed Tibetan affairs ‘suggests an increased professionalization of Beijing’s 
approach to the Tibet issue, yet it may also create greater bureaucratic impediments to 
change and innovation. … procedural rigidity and institutional resistance to initiative 
could exert a conservative force over the United Front’s handling of the Dalai 
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Lama.’234 China has asserted that ‘[s]ince regional ethnic autonomy was implemented 
in 1965 in Tibet, the Tibetan people, in the capacity of masters of the nation and 
under the leadership of the Central Government, have actively participated in 
administration of the state and local affairs, fully exercised the rights of self-
government bestowed by the Constitution and law, engaged in Tibet’s modernization 
drive, enabled Tibetan society to develop by leaps and bounds, profoundly changed 
the old situation of poverty and backwardness in Tibet, and greatly enhanced the level 
of their own material, cultural and political life.’235 In its 1998 White Paper on 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet, China noted that ‘[a]s the organs of self-
government, the Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Congress and the Regional 
People’s Government exercise the power of autonomy according to law. In 
accordance with the Chinese Constitution and the Law on [Regional National] 
Autonomy, all areas entitled to [regional national] autonomy enjoy the extensive 
rights of autonomy, involving legislation, the use of local spoken and written 
languages, the administration of personnel, the economy, finance, education and 
culture, the management and development of natural resources, and other aspects.’236 
The PRC government’s interpretation of the rights of minority ethnic groups 
to self-determination is not at significant variance with that of its imperial or 
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republican predecessor. All three regimes viewed self-determination through the lens 
of Han Chinese ethnic and cultural superiority; assimilation equals liberation and 
equality. Nicholas Becquelin observes that increased Han Chinese migration into 
minority nationality areas has metamorphosed from a political affront to the notion of 
China as a multi-ethnic State respectful of minority nationality autonomy, to a 
publicly acknowledged goal.237 
The ever increasing Han Chinese migration into Tibet serves to dilute Tibetan 
representation in the local people’s congresses, as Han Chinese tend to reside in the 
cities and Tibetans in rural areas and one urban vote carries the same weight as four 
rural votes in autonomous regions under the 1979 Election Law as amended in 
1995.238 Pitman Potter argues that the 1982 Constitution justifies ‘state-centric 
governance and gradual diminution of local ethnic identity’ and serves ‘to entrench 
policy ideals and approaches that have the potential to marginalize minority 
nationalities’.239 Furthermore, Party policy dictates that the leadership role must 
remain with the Party as ‘the faithful representative of the interests of the people of 
all nationalities, acting as the core that brings together the efforts of the people of all 
nationalities’.240 The Preamble to the 2002 Constitution of the Chinese Communist 
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Party explains that leadership by the Party encompasses ‘political, ideological and 
organizational leadership … Acting on the principle that the Party commands the 
overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters, the Party must play the 
role as the core of leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding 
level.’241 The PRC government had opted not to set a birth limit in Tibet until the 
mid-1990s, when the official limit was set at three births, as opposed to one birth in 
inland China, and even then such a limit is not strictly enforced in Tibet.242 The 
resulting high fertility has significantly increased population in rural Tibet, decreased 
land per capita, and increased prices and taxes that cause ‘serious structural problems’ 
in rural Tibet.243 Some who call for greater Tibetan autonomy have described Han 
Chinese migration into Tibet as ‘cultural genocide’.244 
However, Barry Sautman and Irene Eng argue, the disparity in standards of 
living in Tibet between Han Chinese and Tibetans has been caused not by deliberate 
policies that discriminate in favour of Han Chinese, but by an ‘urban bias’ that 
manifests particularly among Han Chinese,245 with the discourse of ‘cultural 
genocide’ ‘a systematic misreading of the effects of the cultural transformation that 
attends social and economic change in Tibet’.246 Similarly, Barbara Erickson, a 
supporter of Tibetan independence, acknowledges that Tibet is socially stratified not 
on ethnic lines but by an urban/rural divide and that Tibetan society ‘is not an 
apartheid of wealthy Chinese set above the masses of Tibetans. Nor is it as stratified 
as the old system. Today it has a large middle class, and the material lives of most 
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have improved since market reforms.’247 Sautman and Eng identify stagnant growth 
in agriculture, underdeveloped infrastructure, widespread illiteracy, and high birth 
rate among ethnic Tibetans as contributing to Tibet’s poor development.248 Most of 
the 85,000 Han Chinese who lived in Tibet temporarily, as reflected in the 2000 
census, were in fact second-class citizens rather than privileged settlers and engaged 
in small businesses or construction work for which there was admitted demand from 
Tibetans, while ethnic minority migrants to Tibetan cities were able to integrate into 
the community more easily. The authors argue that these Han Chinese migrants are 
not dissimilar to floating Chinese populations in other regions.249 Justin Stein has 
called on China to adopt a deliberative approach to minority nationality issues,250 





Notwithstanding the passion and blood shed for realisation of peoples’ right to decide 
their ways of life, including their governments and, in appropriate cases, their own 
States, the right to self-determination in international law remains fundamentally 
statist and subject to the vicissitudes of international relations and the power of 
parent, administering and other States. When exploring the potential and limits of 
what self-determination could bring for a people and for the development of 
international law, one should not approach it with the rigid mentality that it must 
translate to independence and statehood as were generally confined to colonial 
                                                
247 Barbara Erickson, Tibet: Abode of the Gods, Pearl of the Motherland (Berkeley: Pacific 
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248 Sautman and Eng, supra n.212, 38-42. 
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250 Justin J. Stein, ‘Taking the Deliberative Turn in China: International Law, Minority Rights, 
and the Case of Xinjiang’, 14 Journal of Public and International Affairs (2003), 1. 
251 Baogang He, ‘A Deliberative Approach to the Tibet Autonomy Issue: Promoting Mutual 
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situations. International instruments and State practice have affirmed that self-
determination may be exercised through participation, on the basis of equality and 
without discrimination, in the State’s internal structures of decision-making, 
autonomous governance, and respect for the people’s human agency and dignity, 
including by guaranteeing and protecting their political, legal, economic, social, 
cultural and linguistic systems and particularities, and by providing the people a 
mechanism to choose their own representatives within the territory’s, if not the 
State’s, internal political structures.252 A State that recognises and protects such 
exercise is entitled under international law to observance of its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. One must not lose sight of the fact that the right to self-
determination, and human rights in general, derive authority and force from 
international law. All relevant rules and principles of international law are to apply. 
As Martti Koskenniemi has maintained, ‘legal rules whose content or application 
depends on the will of the legal subjects for whom they are valid are not proper legal 
rules at all but apologies for the legal subject’s political interest.’253 
 China’s historical circumstances, especially in respect of foreign States’ 
intrusions into its territory, sovereignty and sovereign rights, its territorial and ethnic 
compositions, and the strategic positions of some parts of its territory render self-
determination one of the most prominent concerns in both its internal and external 
exercises of State sovereignty. In the case of Hong Kong, notwithstanding its 
entitlement to the right to self-determination under international law, the United 
Kingdom, with the complicity of the international community, decided that Hong 
Kong should be reincorporated into China without any meaningful consultation with 
the people of Hong Kong. Democratic governance, lauded as a norm of customary 
                                                
252 As Müllerson, supra n.11, 18, has noted, ‘the principle of self-determination of peoples in 
the post-colonial context is not about a right to secession but rather about a right of everybody 
without racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic distinctions to participate in the political life of 
their country in equal terms. It is not a right to have oneself excluded; rather it is a right to be 
included.’ 
253 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’, 1 European Journal of 
International Law (1990), 4, 8. 
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international law and a hallmark of legitimacy of a State and its government, was not 
implemented by the United Kingdom in Hong Kong until the final years of its 155-
year colonial rule. Meanwhile, China has opposed and stonewalled democratic 
development in Hong Kong for fear it would generate calls for political reform on the 
Mainland. However, to prove that China’s exercise of State sovereignty does not 
conflict with its treaty commitments or human rights or democratic norms – and 
notably to encourage Taiwan to reunite with China – China has rarely intervened in 
Hong Kong’s internal affairs and its external dealings with other States and 
international organisations within the confines of Hong Kong’s autonomy. 
 China has adopted a more political approach to Taiwan. Although the 
authorities on Taiwan maintain that Taiwan is an independent State (before 1994 they 
claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the State of China in its entirety – 
including Mongolia and vetoed Mongolia’s admission to United Nations membership 
in 1955 in their capacity as the recognised government of China within the Security 
Council), they have simultaneously been pursuing negotiations with the PRC 
government with a view to reunification, while also claiming a right to secession, a 
matter that remains contested within the international community and one which the 
ICJ, as the final arbiter and interpreter of international law, refrained from resolving 
when an opportunity arose from Kosovo. In turn, China has offered Taiwan 
governance with an even greater degree of autonomy than is extended to Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, China remains insistent that independence of Taiwan is not an option 
and has indicated that it will use force to suppress secessionist movement by or in 
Taiwan. 
 Tibet, with its distinct ethnic people as opposed to peoples in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, illustrates yet another model self-determination may manifest and be 
exercised (and undermined) under international law and in Chinese laws and 
practices. China has recognised Tibetans as a distinct minority people and their right 
to self-determination in the form of minority nationality autonomy, within the 
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confines of China’s State sovereignty and territorial integrity. China realises the 
amount of international pressure Tibet’s claim to self-determination generates and has 
devoted most of its resources on minority nationality affairs to Tibet. In order to 
foster greater integration of Tibet and Tibetans with the rest of China, to advance 
economic development and standards of living in Tibet, and to make use of Tibet’s 
natural resources for China’s own economic development, China has systematically 
encouraged Han Chinese migration into Tibet. Proponents of Tibet’s autonomy argue 
that the ever increasing Han Chinese population serves to stymie and dilute Tibetans’ 
representation within Tibet and within the national government, exploit Tibet’s 
natural resources, render Tibetans perpetually dependent on and inferior to Han 
Chinese, and fundamentally destroy Tibet’s traditional culture. As noted in Chapter 
III, while Tibet’s traditional cultural norms and values are emphasised as 
exemplifying its unique status and its right to self-determination, China’s traditional 
cultural norms and values are regarded as affronts to the progressive development of 
international law. 
 As one explores how China contributes to, or impedes, the recognition and 
development of self-determination in the context of its adherence to the principle of 
State sovereignty, one ought to take note of how China has approached self-
determination in territories beyond its own mountains and shores. This chapter has 
shown that China has remained committed to the principle of State sovereignty in 
relation to Kosovo and East Timor, and opposes the notion that secession is a right 
under international law, particularly when foreign States resort to the use of force in 
aid of secessionist movement. In respect of Kosovo, China even participated in the 
advisory proceedings before the ICJ, a forum to which it always objects as a 
mechanism for inter-State dispute settlement or interpretation of international law, to 
state its position that secession was not a right under international law. China has 
adopted a more moderate and supportive approach to East Timor, a non-self-
governing territory under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. China always 
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objected to Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975 as a violation 
of East Timor’s right to self-determination and of international law. After a campaign 
of massacres sponsored by Indonesian military forces against East Timorese 
immediately following a United Nations-sponsored referendum in August 1999 on 
whether East Timor wished to opt for autonomy within Indonesia or independence, 
China supported and contributed to United Nations peacekeeping mission and 
administration in East Timor. China’s support was still conditioned on Indonesia’s 
consent and authorisation by the Security Council that had by then been obtained. 
The ways in which China has attempted to reconcile its claim and exercise of 
State sovereignty in territories entitled to the right to self-determination have major 
repercussions for the place of self-determination in the current international legal 
order, for the development and legitimacy of international law, and for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As this chapter has shown, China’s, 
other States’, and the international community’s approaches to self-determination 
illuminate the reality that self-determination is very often a tool and a language, not 
of law and rights, but of geopolitics. Given that China has insisted that the United 
Nations, and the Security Council in particular, is the most, if not only, suitable forum 
in which self-determination should be discussed and developed, how China has 
deployed international law in its voting behaviour and argumentation in the Security 
Council, not only on self-determination and State sovereignty but also generally, 
reveals and exemplifies its approaches to international law, its conception of 
international law in the international system, and the relationship between its exercise 
of State sovereignty and the current international legal order. 
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Chapter VI: A Keen Observer of the International Rule of Law? 
International Law in China’s Voting Behaviour and 





Since the Opium War, from an insular imperial regime determined to have its 
traditions preserved, China has metamorphosed into a major international actor 
whose contribution to the legitimacy and development of international law ought to 
be scrutinised and understood. Given the centrality of law in the creation, decision-
making processes and procedures, and impact of the United Nations Security Council 
and its decisions, the deliberative discourses that Security Council Member States 
engage in that in turn shape their behaviours, and the necessity for China to articulate 
its reasons publicly for its actions within the Security Council (which may consist in 
abstentions and vetoes as well as support), the roles that China plays within the 
Security Council illuminate and clarify its approaches to the current international 
legal order. China’s actions within the Security Council also show how international 
law may or may not have evolved to encompass certain contentious interpretations of 
the United Nations Charter, notably the power of the United Nations to form or 
delegate peacekeeping operations, and the purported right or duty of the international 
community or a State to use force against another State in the face of human rights 
violations or a humanitarian catastrophe. 
 As discussed in Chapter III, while China, as represented by the PRC 
government in the United Nations since 25 October 1971, was initially hostile to the 
international organisation as epitome of superpower hegemony, through subsequent 
socialisation with the United Nations and other international organisations, especially 
as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, it has navigated its place within the 
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current international legal order and the roles it may play in shaping the conduct of 
international relations, the development of international law, and the direction in 
which the current international legal order ought to proceed. 
This chapter first explains how international law serves as a constitutional–
normative framework within which the Security Council must operate, followed by a 
discussion of how the Security Council in turn may serve as a locus of deliberative 
discourses that delineate, influence and constrain its Member States’ behaviours. 
Then, it challenges the view commonly held by international relations scholars that 
international law plays a limited role on matters of international peace and security1 
by exploring China’s voting behaviour in the Security Council and the arguments it 
has proffered in justification. This chapter also discusses how China has made use of 
its Security Council permanent membership to explore possibilities for strengthening 
the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Finally, it 
addresses some scenarios in which China might resort to international legal norms 
and principles to respond to a draft Security Council resolution aimed at its conduct 
rather than simply veto it. An appreciation of how China deploys legal argumentation 
to buttress its positions helps advance ‘our understanding of the law, and thus … the 
identity, objective, and principles of the community’. 2  This chapter shows the 
importance China, through its voting behaviour and argumentation within the 
Security Council, ascribes international law as the perimeter within which the current 





* An earlier version of this chapter is published in 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2013), 875-907. 
1 Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 173; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 126-30. 
2 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’, 17 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (1995–1996), 455, 480. 
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II. Security Council and international law 
 
The United Nations was established to forestall international conflicts and the 
Security Council was envisaged as a forum where major States, together with 
specially affected States and a rotating sample of other States, 3  may meet to 
deliberate and determine the course of action to follow in a situation or dispute by 
reference to established international norms, principles, rules and procedures, in order 
that international peace and security may be maintained or restored. The United 
Nations Charter vests the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in the Security Council,4 and specifically prescribes that the 
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation without a request of the 
Security Council regarding a situation or dispute of which the Security Council has 
been seized.5 The legitimacy of Security Council decisions derives directly from the 
Charter, whereby, in discharging its responsibility in accordance with the Charter, the 
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3 Under Article 23(1) of the United Nations Charter, it falls upon the United Nations General 
Assembly to elect ten Members of the United Nations to be non-Permanent Members of the 
Security Council, ‘due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of 
Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to 
the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution.’ 
Article 23(2) states that a non-Permanent Member shall be elected for a term of two years, and 
may not be eligible for immediate re-election. Currently, three non-Permanent Members are 
elected from among African States and two from among Asian States (with the proviso that 
one of these five non-Permanent Members must be an Arab State alternately in Africa or 
Asia), two from among Latin American and Caribbean States, two from among Eastern 
European States, and two from Western European and other States (such as Australia and 
Canada). 
4 Ibid., Art.24(1). Although the responsibility conferred on the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security is primary (and thus not necessarily exclusive: 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, 148-49), under Article 39 of the Charter it is the 
Security Council alone that has the competence and capacity to ‘determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to ‘make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Security Council determinations, 
recommendations or measures are not justiciable. In his separate opinion in Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 
325, 439, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht stated that while there are legal constraints on the Security 
Council, ‘there can be no less doubt that [the Charter] does not embrace any right of the Court 
to substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council in determining the existence of a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, or the political steps to be 
taken following such a determination’. 
5 Ibid., Art.12(1). 
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Security Council acts on behalf of all United Nations Member States,6 who agree to 
accept and implement its decisions.7 
Notwithstanding the veto power of Security Council Permanent Members, 
the consequential structural inequalities within Security Council decision-making 
processes and procedures, and the political nature of Security Council determinations 
as to the existence of a threat to the peace,8 Simon Chesterman argues that ‘a 
distinction must be made between the exercise of discretion formally provided for in 
the constituent document of the organization and the arbitrary exercise of the powers 
that it grants.’ 9  A Security Council Member must justify its conduct through 
‘principled, informed, collective deliberation’10 by reference to international legal 
norms and principles lest it face moral and political censure. International law serves 
an essential contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security 
through the reliance States place upon it in justifying their policies, practices and 
actions. The Security Council itself must abide by such rules and principles of 
international law as are applicable to it, with its functions, competences and powers 
defined and constrained by the Charter as its constituting treaty. The popular belief, 
reflected in much international relations scholarship, that the Security Council 
possesses unfettered powers concerning all matters of international (and even 
domestic) concern, may override international law or constitutes a ‘world 
legislature’11 is incorrect and cannot be supported without jeopardising the integrity 
of the Security Council as a creature and institution of international law, and of the 
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6 Ibid., Art.24(1). 
7 Ibid., Art.25. 
8 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-AR72, 35 ILM 32 (1996), 
para.29. 
9 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’, 56 American Journal of Comparative 
Law (2008), 331, 351. 
10  Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions’, 20 Ethics & International Affairs (2006), 405, 434. 
11 See Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, 99 American Journal of 
International Law (2005), 175. 
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current international order underpinned by the primacy of the United Nations and its 
constituting Charter.12 
While many international relations scholars often conflate legitimacy (real or 
perceived) with legality, legitimacy and legality are two distinct concepts. A 
perception of an illegitimate process tends to reflect ‘subjective conclusions, perhaps 
based on unarticulated notions about what is fair and just, or perhaps on a conscious 
utilitarian assessment of what the process means for oneself’.13 The legitimacy of a 
decision, of a process through which it is made, and of the organisation that makes it, 
is important as it comprises ‘factors that affect our willingness to voluntarily comply 
with commands’14 and embodies ‘a property of a rule or rule-making institution 
which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because 
those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’.15 Bardo Fassbender 
ascribes legitimacy a legal character in cases where ‘it affects the authority of a rule-
making institution, defined as its ability to have its decisions implemented. In other 
words, legitimacy becomes a legal category in conjunction with the problem of 
compliance of someone subject to the law with a legal rule or decision.’16 In the 
conduct of international relations, legality cannot be considered in isolation from 
politics, even in a forum such as the Security Council where law is supposed to 
possess primacy and constraining impact over discretionary political decision-
making. In fact, very often it is law, including the principles of State sovereignty and 
of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force, that gives rise to conflicts 
and concerns calling for political reconfiguration. As Martti Koskenniemi discerns, 
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12 United Nations Charter, Art.103. 
13 David D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council’, 87 
American Journal of International Law (1993), 552, 557. 
14  Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 150. 
15 Ibid., 24. 
16 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Uncertain Steps into a Post-Cold War World: The Role and Functioning 
of the UN Security Council after a Decade of Measures against Iraq’, 13 European Journal of 
International Law (2002), 273, 293. 
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‘“[l]aw” and “discretion” did not exist in separate pigeon-holes in our minds. The 
legal debate did not “stop” at any point to leave room for a separate political choice; 
political choices were posed the moment the legal debate started.’17 Its requisite 
objectivity notwithstanding, international law in its application to a situation or 
dispute is ultimately a political act subject to discretion.18 
That policy plays a determining role in the interpretation and application of 
international law in a situation or dispute does not alter the fact that the Security 
Council remains bound by its constituting legal framework, that is, the United 
Nations Charter. As the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in its advisory opinion 
in Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 
of Charter)19 stated, ‘[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the 
observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute 
limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ 
has freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its 
constitution.’20 Hans Kelsen argues that the purpose of Security Council enforcement 
powers for which Article 39 of the Charter provides is the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace and security, and not necessarily the maintenance or restoration 
of international law.21 The Security Council, nevertheless, cannot decide on a course 
of action however its Members wish without a proper legal basis or beyond its 
jurisdiction, without jeopardising the legitimacy – and effectiveness – of all Security 
Council decisions that derive from Article 25 of the Charter. The general consent of 
United Nations Member States, which Article 25 embodies, to submit to, and to agree 
to undertake, Security Council decisions does not absolve the Security Council from 
its legal obligation to act in accordance with the Charter, as the same provision 
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17 Koskenniemi, supra n.2, 475. 
18 Ibid., 489. 
19 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1947–1948, 57. 
20 Ibid., 64. 
21 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental 
Problems (New York: Praeger, 1964), 294. 
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indicates, and the fact that an issue concerns international peace and security does not 
entitle the Security Council to act as it wishes. As the Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic stated: 
 
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, 
established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for 
that organization. The Security Council is thus [subject] to certain 
constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the 
constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond 
the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to 
mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from 
the internal division of power within the Organization. In any case, 
neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security 
Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).22  
 
Judge Weeramantry expressed his similar position in the ICJ in Lockerbie23 that ‘[t]he 
history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the view that a clear 
limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers is that those powers must 
be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of international 
law.’24 In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s advisory opinion in Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),25 Judge Fitzmaurice was 
even more forceful when he pointed out: 
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22 Tadic, supra n.8, para.28. 
23 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, 114. 
24 Ibid., per Judge Weeramantry (diss. op.), 175. 
25 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, 16. 
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Even when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter itself, the 
Security Council has no power to abrogate or alter territorial rights, 
whether of sovereignty or administration. Even a war-time 
occupation of a country or territory cannot operate to do that. … This 
is a principle of international law that is as well-established as any 
there can be, – and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for 
the United Nations is itself a subject of international law) as any of 
its individual Member States are. The Security Council might, after 
making the necessary determinations under Article 39 of the Charter, 
order the occupation of a country or piece of territory in order to 
restore peace and security, but it could not thereby, or as part of that 
operation, abrogate or alter territorial rights; – and the right to 
administer a mandated territory is a territorial right without which the 
territory could not be governed or the mandate be operated. It was to 
keep the peace, not to change the world order, that the Security 
Council was set up.26 
 
Reference is had also to the ICJ’s reference to South Africa’s continued presence in 
Namibia as ‘a situation which the Court has found to have been validly declared 
illegal [by the Security Council]’.27 
The competences and powers of the Security Council are thus confined to 
occasions where they are necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and not more. The requirement that the Security Council discharge its 
powers and responsibility only for the maintenance of international peace and 
security is further confirmed by Article 13(1)(a) of the Charter, whereby it is the 
General Assembly that is entrusted with the responsibilities, functions and powers to 
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26 Ibid., per Judge Fitzmaurice (diss. op.), 294 (emphasis in original). 
27 Ibid., Advisory Opinion, 54 (emphasis added). 
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make recommendations for the development and codification of international law. To 
hold otherwise, treaty law-making processes will be stymied. In addition, Articles 40, 
42, 43(1) and 51 of the Charter require that a Security Council action must be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security; ‘the Council’s 
general powers do not provide it with a blank cheque to take measures which would 
violate fundamental principles and rules of international law, even if these are not 
specifically referred to in Chapter I or in other provisions of the Charter’.28 The 
United Nations International Law Commission has stressed that States cannot violate 
norms of jus cogens by proxy through an international organisation.29 In his separate 
opinion in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht stated: 
 
The relief which Article 103 may give the Security Council in case of 
conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty 
obligation cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms – extend 
to a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens. 
Indeed, one only has to state the opposite proposition thus – that a 
Security Council resolution may even require participation in 
genocide – for its unacceptability to be apparent.30 
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28 T.D. Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council 
to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’, 26 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (1995), 33, 71. 
29 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’, 16 European Journal of 
International Law (2005), 59, 68. 
30 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
supra n.4, per Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, 440 (sep. op.). 
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It is noteworthy that China has voiced support for legal liability to be attached to 
Member States of an international organisation whose collective decision violates 
international law.31 
When China joined the second phase of the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations in 
1944 with the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, it proposed 
that Article 1 of the Charter should include the provision that ‘the settlement of 
international disputes should be on the basis of the principles of justice and 
international law’. China’s proposal was adopted,32 as a result of which one of the 
purposes of the United Nations, as stated in the Charter, is ‘to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace’.33 A corresponding addition was made to Article 2(3) of the 
Charter, that ‘[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.’34 That said, while the Security Council must make political decisions in 
accordance with international law, it is not its role to find legal answers to political 
problems.35 Non-compliance with the Charter or with international law is not a basis 
for the Security Council to assert jurisdiction or competence so long as there is no 
threat to the peace,36 and it is for the ICJ to provide legal answers.37 
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31 Statement of China in the Sixth Committee of the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, A/C/6/60/SR.11, 23 November 2005, para.53. However, consensus is that 
no such liability exists under international law: see Rosalyn Higgins, Report to Institut de 
droit international, 66-I Yearbook of Institut de droit international (1995), 375; Resolution of 
Institut de droit international on the Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-
Fulfillment by International Organisations of their Obligations towards Third States, Session 
of Lisbon, 1 September 1995. 
32 Yuen-Li Liang, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Security Council: The Yalta Voting 
Formula’, 24 British Year Book of International Law (1947), 330, 332-33. 
33 United Nations Charter, Art.1(1). 
34 Ibid., Art.2(3). 
35 See Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the 
Security Council’, 64 American Journal of International Law (1970), 1, 16. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 3, citing Articles 33 and 36(3) of the United Nations Charter. 
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Many speak of the Security Council’s ‘failure’ to pass a draft resolution, or 
‘failure’ of one or more Permanent Members to agree to one, in the face of a threat to 
international peace and security or a humanitarian catastrophe. The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty argued in its report in 2001 that 
‘if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention where 
humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to 
deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that 
alternative means of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely 
discounted.’38 What is amiss is that it is precisely the design and process that the 
Charter embodies and requires that a Security Council decision has the support (or at 
least acquiescence39) of all Permanent Members in order for it to be effective and not 
become a source of military conflict among Permanent Members themselves, and 
their veto power is constitutionally built through the Charter into Security Council 
decision-making processes and procedures. At no times preceding the Kosovo crisis 
in 1999, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the internal conflict in Syria since 2011 was 
the Security Council unable or incapacitated to act as a result of disagreement among 
Permanent Members. The possibility of disagreement among Permanent Members 
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38 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 53. As Jonathan E. Davis, ‘From 
Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War 
Era’, 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2011), 217, 257, has noted, the 
Commission ‘launched a series of roundtables worldwide to build consensus on the contours 
of a right of humanitarian intervention and make the doctrine less susceptible to abuse by 
grounding it in a normative legal framework’, including one at the China Institute of 
International Studies in Beijing on 14 June 2001 where significant Chinese opposition to such 
a purported right was expressed. Alex J. Bellamy, who was one of the participants in the 
Commission initiative, notes that ‘[t]he Chinese government had opposed The Responsibility 
to Protect throughout the ICISS process and insisted that all questions relating to the use of 
force defer to the Security Council’: ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian 
Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’, 20 Ethics & International Affairs (2006), 143, 151. 
The Commission in its report did acknowledge that the Security Council was the forum most 
appropriately placed to authorise international intervention to avert massive human rights 
violations or a humanitarian catastrophe: ibid., 49. 
39 Following debates within the Security Council, consensus was reached that a Permanent 
Member’s voluntary abstention or absence, as opposed to compulsory abstention required 
where the Permanent Member is a party to a dispute in question, does not constitute a veto: 
see Yuen-li Liang, ‘Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in relation to the Voting 
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and a Permanent Member’s capacity to veto a draft Security Council resolution are 
core structural parts of the Security Council decision-making process in order to 
constrain excessive or unilateral exercise of military or political power by one or 
more individual States and to ensure that any Security Council action has the 
agreement and co-operation of all major powers.40 
In the case of Kosovo, two Permanent Members (China and Russia) indicated 
that they would exercise their vetoes in relation to any United Nations-authorised/-led 
military action in Kosovo as they expressed their positions that any such action would 
be incompatible with the Charter and international law, and the Security Council 
decided collectively not to adopt a resolution authorising military action. The refusal 
of China and Russia to automatically endorse British/French/United States 
preferences in fact illustrated that the Security Council ‘acquired teeth’,41 and the 
Security Council’s ‘special responsibility’ for the maintenance of international peace 
and security was thus met. Daniel Joyner argues that this fundamental facet of the 
United Nations system is ‘wilfully misunderstood by critics of the Security Council’s 
handling of humanitarian intervention cases, who apparently desire the legitimacy of 
representative authorization for their actions by the Council, but who are unwilling to 
abide by the denial of that authorization by the same body’.42 The veto has helped 
maintain and stabilise Security Council decision-making processes and procedures by 
providing a check-and-balance exercise among Permanent Members. Without the 
veto, the Security Council will merely become another device for powerful States to 
act as they wish with a semblance of international legitimacy; the number of military 
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missions, some of which pursued for malevolent purposes, will significantly increase; 
and the chief purpose of the Security Council – the maintenance of international 
peace and security – will fail. The real issue is not so much the existence of the veto 
but ‘how the veto ought to be exercised under the Charter’.43 Instead of enabling 
Permanent Members to advance their own national interests or agendas, the veto 
imposes a duty to ‘constantly search for agreement’.44 In order that the Security 
Council and its decisions possess the requisite legitimacy and effectiveness, the 
reasoning that underlies Security Council decisions must be articulated publicly and 
supported by international legal norms and principles that are shared and respected by 
all States, as the next section explains. 
In the eyes of some, compliance of an international organisation and its 
members with established norms, principles, rules and procedures in making a 
decision does not by itself render the organisation, the norms, the principles, the 
rules, the process or the decision legitimate. Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane 
argue that ‘an institution should be presumed to be illegitimate if its practices or 
procedures predictably undermine the pursuit of the very goals in terms of which it 
justifies its existence. Thus, for example, if the fundamental character of the Security 
Council’s decision-making process renders that institution incapable of successfully 
pursuing what it now acknowledges as one of its chief goals – stopping large-scale 
violations of basic human rights – this impugns its legitimacy.’45 
It is important to keep in mind that a Security Council resolution comes into 
being only after it is passed with the support or acquiescence of all Permanent 
Members, and legitimate and effective Security Council decision-making does not 
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always have to result in a resolution. The legitimacy of a Security Council decision 
rests upon the fact that it is collectively made. A collective decision is not the same as 
a unanimous decision, much less a decision made in subservience to the wishes of 
powerful States. As Martha Finnemore has stated, multilateralism manifests more 
than in co-operation among a number of States, but in co-operation taking place in 
accordance with established norms, principles, rules and procedures of a general 
nature.46 A collective decision requires that all Security Council Members be able to 
inform Security Council deliberations with their own perspectives with the objective 
of maintaining international peace and security. That a Permanent Member such as 
China would veto an otherwise widely supported draft Security Council resolution at 
the expense of its popularity within the Security Council and among governments 
around the world speaks volume about the Permanent Member, the Security Council 
and the current international order governed under the framework of the Charter and 
international law. 
 
III. Security Council as a locus of deliberative discourses 
 
With its structural flaws and lack of representativeness, the Security Council might 
not be taken as an exemplar of an institution for deliberative discourses and, in fact, 
has faced a great deal of criticism and calls for institutional reform. David Caron 
argues that a Permanent Member’s capacity to dilute, stymie or preclude a Security 
Council decision through its threat or use of veto illustrates that the Security Council 
from its inception has betrayed its express promise to be the guarantor of 
international peace and security,47 while others are concerned that powerful States use 
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the Security Council to impose ‘hegemonic international law’.48 The problem is 
exacerbated by the practice of Permanent Members to agree on a decision through 
informal discussions, from which non-Permanent Members are excluded, before the 
formal vote. Ian Hurd asserts that Security Council meetings are now reduced to pro 
forma affairs that merely put on record what has already been informally agreed upon 
by Permanent Members, that the President of the Security Council ‘invariably notes 
in opening an official meeting that “the Security Council is meeting in accordance 
with the understanding reached in its prior consultations”.’49 Ngaire Woods notes that 
‘[a] further, deeper problem with informal processes is that they are unrecorded. This 
means that the reasoning for a decision is not open to scrutiny by other states, nor is 
the position taken by each member. In these ways, the Council is not accountable to 
states who are not party to the informal processes even if they are directly affected by 
the Council’s decisions … The experience of the Security Council also highlights that 
reliance on informal negotiations, which take place behind the scenes, magnifies the 
unequal resources available to members in order to work effectively to push their 
own preferences.’50 
Caron explains that the effectiveness of the Security Council may suffer due 
to perceptions that it is illegitimate, resulting in failure to pass a draft resolution, 
failure to pass a stronger draft resolution than is otherwise warranted, difficulty in 
summoning the necessary domestic and/or international support to implement a 
resolution, and the weakening of the Security Council generally.51 Even when the 
Security Council manages to garner the necessary votes for a decision, its habitual 
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tendency to label its actions as ‘exceptional’, ‘without precedent’ or ‘extraordinary’52 
has reinforced the perception that it merely provides a ‘law-laundering service’ to 
legitimise and enforce the unilateral will of powerful States.53 As Susan Marks 
discerns, ‘[i]f all it would have taken to make the war in Iraq legal was a few more 
votes in the Security Council, then perhaps at least some of the energy that is going 
into affirming the illegality of the war should be turned to the question of whether 
there is something wrong with international law.’54 Referring to the catastrophic 
United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia between 1993 and 1995, Richard 
Falk warns that a legal but illegitimate decision of the Security Council is likely to be 
met with opposition from the people whom the decision aims to protect, and United 
Nations imprimatur does not necessarily translate into local acceptance.55 Phillip 
Darby has criticised peacekeeping operations as imperialism in disguise, indeed 
worse than imperialism, for ‘[b]ringing development and security together in a single 
fold opened the doors to attempts to re-engineer the state, to remake whole societies 
and to recast the identities of ordinary people, all in the interests of “best practice” as 
laid down by external experts. This is interventionism on a scale beyond the 
imaginings of the former rulers of empire.’56 Malcolm Shaw argues that ‘the Western 
state’s authoritative deployment of violence is now structurally reinforced by its 
increasing, if problematic, integration with the legitimate international world 
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authority-structure of the United Nations’. 57  The United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines58 state that ‘[t]he manner in which a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have a profound impact on its 
perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which 
it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local 
customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people 
all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its legitimacy.’59 Increased attention is 
paid to local agency in peacekeeping and peace-building, 60  as peace must be 
‘contextualised more subtly, geographically, culturally, in terms of identity, and the 
evolution of the previous socio-economic polity’.61 
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 The legitimacy (and appearance thereof) of a Security Council decision is 
thus as important as its legality. Ian Johnstone argues that, instead of negotiations for 
expansion of membership of the Security Council (permanent membership or as a 
whole) or for revision of voting rules, ‘improving the quality of deliberations would 
enhance the legitimacy and, therefore, effectiveness of Council decision making’,62 
be more politically achievable,63 and enable decisions to be more amenable to those 
in disagreement ‘through the exchange of reasons that are shared or can be shared 
by all who are bound by the decisions taken’.64 The consensus that results from a 
deliberative discourse additionally has constitutive effects upon participants,65 such 
that the internalising impact that international law may bring to bear on States may 
materialise. International legal norms and principles and institutional processes and 
procedures agreed upon by States provide a normative framework for deliberative 
discourses and for the reasons such deliberative discourses generate. Once 
international legal norms and principles are internalised in a State’s foreign and 
domestic policies and practices, they become dependent on normative legitimacy and 
guide the State’s conduct, as the State endeavours to maintain a reputation as a 
trustworthy actor through norm-conforming behaviour.66 Although equal access is a 
condition of a deliberative discourse for which the Security Council might not 
necessarily provide (due to its lack of representativeness, its differentiation between 
Permanent and non-Permanent Members, and Permanent Members’ veto power), a 
deliberative discourse may still succeed provided that the requirements, and the felt 
need, for a ‘good argument’ are shared among all Security Council Members.67 
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Sincerity is not essential for deliberative discourses to influence state behaviours, 
provided that international legal norms and principles inhere in the justifications 
proffered. 68  It has been found to be extremely difficult for participants in a 
deliberative discourse to make self-serving or self-interested claims without 
encountering criticism and resistance; participants must rely on commonly accepted 
norms and principles even when advancing their own interests.69 While consensus is a 
goal of a deliberative discourse, it is not a prerequisite to its success or integrity, and 
disagreements form part and parcel, and may indeed shape the course, of a 
deliberative discourse and the development of relevant norms, principles, rules and 
values. Even after a decision has been made, new information may compel that the 
decision be revisited. A deliberative discourse is thus a dynamic, continuing process. 
A State is held accountable not only to other States but also to ‘what may be called 
their moral constituents, all those individuals who are bound by the decisions they 
make, whether de jure or de facto’70 – that is, transnational corporations, the media, 
its citizens, citizens in other States, and an ‘interpretive community’ whose expertise, 
interests and concerns extend beyond international law and who constitutes an 
important arbiter of whether the requirements of a deliberative discourse are met.71 
As discussed in Chapter II, in order to possess legitimacy, international law, and the 
obligations it imposes, must be of a general and abstract character and must not be 
subject to the shifting political preferences or expediencies of powerful States. For 
these reasons, during the debate that preceded the invasion of Iraq in 2003, all 
Permanent Members and most non-Permanent Members of the Security Council 
invoked international legal norms and principles in advancing their respective 
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positions. China and Russia insisted that in fighting terrorism the United Nations 
Charter and international law must still be complied with.72 When the United States 
failed to persuade the ‘interpretive community’ that its intention to invade Iraq was 
on the basis of its ‘war on terrorism’ and self-defence, it moved its case to one of 
enforcing Security Council resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq.73 
As the next section shows, the forum for deliberative discourses that the 
Security Council provides enables China to appreciate, adapt and assert the roles it 
may play in the maintenance of international peace and security and the development 
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of international law, and facilitates other States and the ‘interpretive community’ in 
understanding the rationales underlying China’s voting behaviour and argumentation 
within the Security Council. 
 
IV. China’s voting behaviour and argumentation in the Security Council 
 
Samuel Kim suggested in 1979 that China’s membership of the Security Council has 
the effect that ‘symbolically, both the image and the prestige of the Security Council 
in the global community have been made more legitimate, more realistic, more 
colorful and more relevant. In practical terms, the Security Council’s political 
effectiveness has also been enhanced to the extent that the presence of China has 
contributed to bridging the gap between authority claims and power capabilities of 
the Council.’74 In addition to geopolitical and normative reasons that render China’s 
participation in Security Council deliberations and decisions essential, having China 
in the fold, as has been borne out by the evolution of China’s participation in the 
United Nations from fervent opposition to firm support, enables China and other 
Security Council Members, and the international community as a whole, to 
understand and communicate with each other within a legal–institutional framework 
that binds all States. The social opprobrium that violations of international law elicit 
serves an instrumental role in bringing about treaty compliance,75 particularly for 
States such as China that seek to portray themselves as trustworthy international 
actors. Furthermore, information obtained through interactions with and within 
international organisations ‘can reduce uncertainty about the credibility of others’ 
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commitments, and thus help actors’ expectations converge around some cooperative 
outcome’,76 with the role that the Security Council serves in transmitting information 
arguably more important than its ability in resolving substantive issues.77 Above all, 
participation in international organisations tends to lead States to redefine their 
national interests in order to meet their treaty obligations. Ann Kent suggests that the 
extent, and perhaps success, of China’s socialisation with international organisations 
should be measured by ‘China’s readiness to redefine its actual interests, including its 
implementation of international norms in domestic law and practice; China’s 
preparedness to renegotiate its sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty 
pressures; and the degree to which China shows a readiness to shoulder the costs, as 
well as enjoy the benefits, of organizational participation.’78 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has appeared to hold 
unmatched influence and power within Security Council decision-making.79 Barry 
O’Neill argues that in fact it is China that holds the most influence and power as a 
Security Council Member – about twice the influence and power enjoyed by any of 
the other Permanent Members – on account of its veto power and the ‘extreme’ 
political positions it tends to hold, as the veto power of the three Western Permanent 
Members, or four if Russia is included, is often pooled whereas China may 
singlehandedly defeat a draft resolution notwithstanding Western pressure.80 O’Neill 
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suggests that the power disparity within the Security Council between China and the 
other Permanent Members would remain the same even if membership of the 
Security Council were to be enlarged.81 
The amount of influence and power that China holds within the Security 
Council is a major reason China has often been singled out for criticism by Western 
States, scholars and media for impeding the passage of draft resolutions, obstructing 
the work of the Security Council and stonewalling the development of international 
law. Such criticism is unfair, as China has rarely vetoed or threatened to veto a draft 
resolution. As at 30 August 2012, the veto was exercised 269 times. The Soviet 
Union/Russia vetoed draft Security Council resolutions 127 times, the United States 
83 times, the United Kingdom 32 times, France 18 times, and China eight times 
(including once on 13 December 1955 when it was represented by the authorities on 
Taiwan, to block Mongolia’s admission to United Nations membership on grounds 
that Mongolia was part of China82). China’s rare use of its power to veto illustrates 
the sincerity of its belief that the veto is a means by which powerful States exercise 
hegemony, as Chapter III discussed. 
 Sally Morphet argues that China’s voting behaviour within the Security 
Council since 25 October 1971, when the PRC government replaced the authorities 
on Taiwan as the representative government of China in the United Nations, may be 
characterised as having developed through four phases.83 Between November 1971 
and 1981, China was adjusting to its position, powers and responsibilities within the 
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Security Council. During this period, China vetoed proposed Security Council action 
twice. China vetoed Bangladesh’s initial application for United Nations membership 
on 25 August 1972, when Bangladesh sought to secede from Pakistan, due to its 
concern over the legal status of Taiwan and its position that the parent State’s consent 
was essential to a territory attaining independence and statehood. At the Security 
Council debate, China maintained that ‘[p]ending the true implementation of the 
relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and a reasonable 
settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and 
“Bangladesh”, the Security Council should not consider the application.’84 China 
drew attention to ‘acts of the Soviet social-imperialists’ and ‘their sinister designs to 
use others as counters or stakes to maintain and aggravate tension on the South Asian 
sub-continent’.85 After Pakistan acknowledged Bangladesh’s independence in 1974, 
China no longer blocked Bangladesh’s application for United Nations membership 
and Bangladesh was admitted without vote. On 10 September 1972, China joined the 
Soviet Union to veto a draft amendment to a draft resolution that, vetoed by the 
United States, called for cessation of hostilities between Israel and Syria/Lebanon 
after the Munich massacre, arguing that ‘[t]he history of the Middle East since the 
Second World War is one of incessant aggression and expansion by Israeli Zionism 
and of the continuous fight of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against 
aggression and expansion.’86 Between 1982 and 1985, China managed its roles vis-à-
vis both developing States and other Permanent Members with greater ease, and did 
not oppose any draft resolution. Between 1986 and July 1990 when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, China began to take a more conciliatory stance with other Permanent 
Members, and did not oppose any draft resolution. 
From August 1990 to 2000, China navigated its roles and powers within the 
Security Council in the broader context of its relations with other Permanent 
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84 S/PV.1660, 25 August 1972, 15. 
85 Ibid. 
86 S/PV.1662, 10 September 1972, para.193. 
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Members in light of the United States’ dominance and Western Permanent Members’ 
increasing tendency to authorise the use of force on humanitarian grounds, and 
vetoed proposed Security Council action twice. China vetoed a draft resolution on 10 
January 1997 on dispatching military observers to the United Nations Verification 
Mission in Guatemala and a draft resolution on 25 February 1999 on extending the 
mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia, for the 
reason that Guatemala and Macedonia recognised the authorities on Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China (although China referred to Taiwan in its explanation 
of its veto in respect of Guatemala only,87 and cited the United Nations’ limited 
financial resources and improvements on the ground in its explanation of its veto in 
respect of Macedonia88). 
Morphet’s analysis corresponds to the level of China’s adaptation to 
international law and its socialisation with the United Nations as a forum through 
which it may use its influence and power to assert its positions, particularly in respect 
of the principle of State sovereignty and the importance it attaches to how other 
States interact with Taiwan. 
On draft Security Council resolutions that it did not find correct or amenable, 
instead of vetoing, China has tended to abstain. By abstaining, a Security Council 
Member withholds from the proposed action the legitimacy that an affirmative vote 
from it provides. Given the increasing tendency to treat a Security Council resolution 
as ‘international legislation’ and a foundation upon which a norm of customary 
international law may rapidly crystallise and consolidate, one of the effects and 
rationales that stems from an abstention is its indication that the proposed action in 
the opinion of the abstaining State does not comport with certain legal requirements. 
As at 12 May 2012, China abstained on 38 draft Chapter VII resolutions89 and 18 
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87 S/PV.3730, 10 January 1997. 
88 S/PV.3982, 25 February 1999. 
89 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 678 (1990), 686 (1991), 748 (1992), 757 (1992), 770 (1992), 778 
(1992), 787 (1992), 816 (1993), 820 (1993), 883 (1993), 929 (1994), 940 (1994), 942 (1994), 
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draft non-Chapter VII resolutions90 since 1990, as opposed to its lone abstention in 
1982 during 1971–1989,91 principally on matters that concerned impositions of non-
military sanctions, use of force, establishments of international tribunals, and 
mandates and scopes of various humanitarian relief missions, on grounds that 
Security Council action would constitute interference in the relevant States’ internal 
affairs and breach of their State sovereignty. Otherwise, China abstained in 1999 on a 
draft resolution on Nauru’s application for United Nations membership due to 
Nauru’s recognition of the authorities on Taiwan as the legitimate government of 
China,92 and in 2000 on a draft resolution on Tuvalu’s application for United Nations 
membership for the same reason,93 even though it could have vetoed both draft 
resolutions as it did in 1972 in respect of Bangladesh and in 1955, when it was 
represented by the authorities on Taiwan, in respect of Mongolia.94 
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955 (1994), 988 (1995), 998 (1995), 1054 (1996), 1070 (1996), 1101 (1997), 1114 (1997), 
1134 (1997), 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1207 (1998), 1244 (1999), 1280 (1999), 
1284 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), 1593 (2005), 1672 (2006), 
1680 (2006), 1945 (2010), 1973 (2011), and 2023 (2011). 
90 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 688 (1991), 776 (1992), 777 (1992), 781 (1992), 792 (1992), 821 
(1993), 825 (1993), 855 (1993), 975 (1995), 1067 (1996), 1077 (1996), 1239 (1999), 1249 
(1999), 1290 (2000), 1559 (2004), 1706 (2006), 1757 (2007), and 1907 (2009). 
91 U.N. S.C. Res. 502 (1982); the draft resolution called for immediate cessation of hostilities 
between Argentina and the United Kingdom and complete withdrawal of Argentine forces 
from the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. 
92 U.N. S.C. Res. 1249 (1999). 
93 U.N. S.C. Res. 1290 (2000). 
94 The Security Council in its Press Release (SC/6693, 25 June 1999) on its recommendation 
of Nauru’s admission to United Nations membership stated that China explained before the 
formal vote that it ‘attached great importance to the desire of the Republic of Nauru for 
admission to the United Nations and had seriously studied its application. However, the most 
essential thing in the admission process was that the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter should be complied with. New Members should comply with General 
Assembly resolutions and fulfil their Charter obligations. China could not support the 
recommendation on admission of the Republic of Nauru to the United Nations … At the same 
time, considering the long-term interests of the peoples of China and the Republic of Nauru, 
China would not block the resolution. [China] hoped that when the Republic of Nauru joined 
the United Nations, it would comply with all the resolutions, including General Assembly 
resolution 2758 (1971).’ Similarly, the Security Council in its Press Release (SC/6807, 17 
February 2000) on its recommendation of Tuvalu’s admission to United Nations membership 
stated that before the formal vote ‘the representative of China […] in the report of the 
Membership Committee (S/2000/70) indicated that China could not associate itself with the 
Committee’s recommendation, said his delegation had attached great importance to the desire 
of Tuvalu to join the United Nations and had made a serious study of its application. A 
Member State of the United Nations should truly implement the obligations of the United 
Nations Charter and seriously abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly, which was an 
important basis on which to judge whether an applicant country had met the standard for 
membership. He reiterated that the most important thing was that the principles and purposes 
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Meanwhile, China has taken a more co-operative role with other Permanent 
Members, even when it comes to its allies on whom other Security Council Members 
wish to impose sanctions. China voted affirmatively on all three draft Security 
Council resolutions against nuclear development in North Korea95 and all three draft 
Security Council resolutions against nuclear development in Iran96 between 2006 and 
2009. Of the 28 draft Security Council resolutions regarding genocide in Darfur 
between 2004 and 2008, China voted affirmatively on 2297 while abstaining on six.98 
China, together with Russia, vetoed draft Security Council resolutions regarding 
political repression in Burma/Myanmar on 12 January 2007,99 political repression in 
Zimbabwe on 11 July 2008,100 and the Syrian government’s suppression of internal 
unrest on 4 October 2011101 and on 4 February 2012,102 on grounds that Security 
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of the Charter should be implemented, as well as General Assembly resolution 2758. Flowing 
from that primary obligation, he could not support the recommendation to the Assembly for 
acceptance of Tuvalu’s membership. At the same time, given his country’s long-term shared 
interests with the people of Tuvalu and the strong wish of the Pacific States to admit that 
country, his delegation would not block the recommendation. Hopefully, he added, after 
joining the United Nations Tuvalu could strictly abide by the United Nations Charter and 
implement the relevant General Assembly resolution.’ In 2002, Nauru shifted its recognition 
to the PRC government as the legitimate government of China, although it reversed its 
recognition in 2005, while Tuvalu has continued to recognise the authorities on Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China. 
95 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009). However, Marcus 
Noland notes that neither North Korea’s nuclear test nor United Nations sanctions had 
meaningful effects on China’s trade relations with North Korea: ‘The (Non) Impact of UN 
Sanctions on North Korea’, 7 Asia Policy (2009), 61. 
96 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007). Similar to the effects of 
United Nations sanctions on North Korea, Michael Jacobson notes that United Nations 
sanctions on Iran failed to dissuade the Iranian government from continuing its nuclear 
programme: ‘Sanctions against Iran: A Promising Struggle’, 31:3 Washington Quarterly 
(2008), 69, 78. Robert A. Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work’, 22:2 International 
Security (1997), 90, has found sanctions to have only modest impact on the sanctioned State’s 
or its regime’s behaviours. T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, ‘Fools Suffer 
Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises’, 41 International Studies 
Quarterly (1997), 27, 46, argue that ‘[i]n most cases, a state imposing sanctions on its 
opponent can expect an outcome that is just about the same as would be obtained without 
sanctions.’ 
97 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 1547 (2004), 1569 (2004), 1574 (2004), 1590 (2005), 1627 (2005), 
1651 (2005), 1663 (2006), 1665 (2006), 1679 (2006), 1709 (2006), 1713 (2006), 1714 (2006), 
1755 (2007), 1769 (2007), 1779 (2007), 1784 (2007), 1812 (2008), 1828 (2008), 1841 (2008), 
1870 (2009), 1881 (2009), and 1891 (2009). 
98 U.N. S.C. Resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), 1593 (2005), 1672 (2006), 
and 1706 (2006). 
99 S/PV.5619, 12 January 2007. 
100 S/PV.5933, 11 July 2008. 
101 S/PV.6627, 4 October 2011. 
102 S/PV.6711, 4 February 2012. 
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Council action would constitute interference in Burma/Myanmar’s, Zimbabwe’s, and 
Syria’s internal affairs and breach of the three States’ sovereignty. China did vote in 
unanimity with other Security Council Members on 14 April 2012 in favour of 
authorising up to thirty unarmed military observers to be dispatched to Syria to 
monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement between forces loyal and hostile to 
the Syrian government; 103  on 21 April 2012 of establishing a United Nations 
Supervision Mission in Syria (with an authorised capacity of up to three hundred 
unarmed military observers and necessary civilian personnel);104 and on 20 July 2012 
of extending the mandate of the Mission for a final period of thirty days.105 The 
Security Council in its Resolution 2059 (2012) indicated that it would be willing to 
further extend the mandate of the Mission ‘only in the event that the Secretary-
General reports and the Security Council [confirm] the cessation of the use of heavy 
weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides sufficient to allow [the 
Mission] to implement its mandate’.106 The mandate of the Mission ceased as of 19 
August 2012 amidst escalating violence in Syria. 
 
a. China’s evolving attitude to international peacekeeping 
Despite its rare use of veto, China has received sustained criticism about its frequent 
abstentions. Nigel Thalakada has described China as pursuing a ‘maxi-mini’ strategy, 
maximising its own security and economic benefits while minimising its 
responsibilities, 107  while Thomas Christensen calls China ‘the high church of 
realpolitik in the post-Cold War world’.108 Erik Voeten notes that China abstained on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 U.N. S.C. Res. 2042 (2012). 
104 U.N. S.C. Res. 2043 (2012). 
105 U.N. S.C. Res. 2059 (2012). 
106 Ibid., para.3. 
107 Nigel Thalakada, ‘China’s Voting Pattern in the Security Council, 1990–1995’, in Russett, 
supra n.80, 83. 
108 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Chinese Realpolitik’, 75 Foreign Affairs (September/October 
1996), 37. See also Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the 
Post-Cold War’, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Manstanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: 
Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 261; Andrew Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: 
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draft Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) concerning Iraq’s non-compliance with 
previous Security Council resolutions regarding Kuwait, in exchange for the United 
States’ abstention in a World Bank vote on Chinese loans and security guarantees 
relating to Taiwan and substantive changes in other draft Security Council 
resolutions.109 
Since the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, 
and Darfur, the concept of a ‘responsibility to protect’ has gained currency among 
Western governments and scholars. The International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty in its 2001 report developed ‘the idea sovereign states have a 
responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass 
murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do 
so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.’110 Merely 
three years had elapsed before the matter was taken up as part of the debate about 
United Nations institutional reform, when the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change stated in its 2004 report111 that ‘there is growing acceptance 
that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their 
own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that 
responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community – with it 
spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and 
rebuilding shattered societies’. 112  The Panel spoke of an ‘emerging norm of a 
collective international responsibility to protect’113 that encompassed not only ‘the 
“right to intervene” of any State but the “responsibility to protect” of every State 
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China’s Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Gerald Segal, Defending China 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
109 Erik Voeten, ‘Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action’, 95 American 
Political Science Review (2001), 845, 846, fn.8. See also David Malone, Decision-Making in 
the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990–1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
110  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, supra n.38, VIII 
(emphasis added). 
111 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004). 
112 Ibid., para.201. 
113 Ibid., para.202. 
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when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe’. 114  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter asserts that underlying a responsibility to protect is a responsibility to be 
protected, and refusal to receive protection should engage a right of the international 
community to compel receipt.115 Firmly believing that her position is not ‘a leap into 
wishing thinking’, Louise Arbour argues that ‘in existing law, in institutions and in 
lessons learned from practice’, a State has a ‘permanent’ responsibility to protect 
individuals, not only within its territory but also within the territory of another State, 
against abuse.116 
One must be very cautious when established international legal norms and 
principles – notably, the principles of State sovereignty and of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other States, and the prohibition of the use of force – could be 
forsaken with such rapidity and ease. Human sufferings, caused by rampant human 
rights abuses or humanitarian catastrophes, of course need to be addressed, but to 
distort and undermine the current international legal order, which was devised 
precisely to forestall and redress human sufferings caused by wars precipitated and 
encouraged with rhetoric, only aggravates and worsens situations in which vulnerable 
populations find themselves.117 The only authorities Arbour has cited in support of 
her position stated above118 are the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (of 
which, it is noted, China voted in favour, and whose drafters included Qian Qichen, 
China’s Foreign Minister at the time, as a member of the International Commission 
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114 Ibid., para.201. 
115 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN 
Reform’, 99 American Journal of International Law (2005), 619, 625. 
116 Louise Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in International Law and 
Practice’, 34 Review of International Studies (2008), 445, 447-48. 
117 As Carl Schmitt has argued, ‘[w]hen a state fights its political enemy in the name of 
humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to 
usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. … The concept of humanity is an 
especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-
humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one can be reminded 
of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants to 
cheat’: The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 54. 
118 Arbour, supra n.116, 449-52. 
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on Intervention and State Sovereignty),119 Article I of the Genocide Convention,120 
and the ICJ’s dictum in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
and Montenegro in 2007 that ‘if the State has available to it means likely to have a 
deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of 
harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use of 
these means as the circumstances permit.’121 Arbour goes on to assert that Security 
Council Permanent Members, given their influence and power within and outside the 
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119 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For 
All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 45, acknowledges that ‘the support 
that mattered most for the future of the High-Level Panel’s recommendations – fairly passive 
though it was at the time – was probably that from … Qian Qichen; without his immense 
prestige back in Beijing, it is difficult to believe that, given the traditional strength of its 
concerns about nonintervention, China would have been quite as relaxed on this issue as it 
proved to be at the World Summit’. However, notwithstanding China’s affirmative vote for, 
and Qian’s participation in the drafting of, the Document, I argue that the Document does not 
embody, represent, evidence or contribute to State practice and, a fortiori, the emergence of 
any new norm of customary international law. My position is the same regarding the status of 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’s report, supra n.111, as a matter of 
law (customary or otherwise). The fact that a group of government officials and scholars, 
however diverse, representative or eminent, meet, even under United Nations auspices, to 
discuss matters of international concern does not confer any of its findings or conclusions the 
status of law or evince State practice, which must be proven by the existence of general, 
consistent and widespread practice of States accompanied by the requisite opinio juris. The 
notion that scholars of international law and small groups of policymakers could collectively 
or singularly alter the meaning of an established norm, rule or principle of international law 
through creative synthesis and analysis stretches too far the degree of significance to which 
scholarly or policy opinions may influence the development of international law – it could 
almost reduce treaty-making and crystallisation of customary norms through State practice to 
irrelevance. As Alexander Orakhelashvili has stated, ‘States create international law and give 
it to us to examine. We can criticize their decisions but those decisions will still remain law. 
Again, “international lawyers are allowed to search for constructive solutions to new 
problems”, but in doing so they have to acknowledge that the solutions they search for are not 
part of international law until and unless these are adopted through the process of international 
law-making’: ‘Kosovo and the Pitfalls of Over-theorizing International Law: Observations on 
Hilpold’s Rejoinder’, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law (2009), 589, 591, quoting Peter 
Hilpold, ‘What Role for Academic Writers in Interpreting International Law? – A Rejoinder 
to Orakhelashvili’, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law (2009), 291, 296. 
120 Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
states that ‘[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent 
and to punish.’ 
121 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, 222. 
However, Arbour, supra n.116, omits to cite the Court’s immediately subsequent statement 
that ‘if neither genocide nor any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention are 
ultimately carried out, then a State that omitted to act when it could have done so cannot be 
held responsible a posteriori, since the event did not happen which … must occur for there to 
be a violation of the obligation to prevent’: Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ibid. 
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Security Council, have a ‘heavier responsibility than other States to ensure the 
protection of civilians everywhere’,122 and that in the event that a Permanent Member 
vetoes or threatens to veto ‘action that is deemed necessary by other members to avert 
genocide, or crimes against humanity’, 123  it may be held to have violated its 
obligations under the Genocide Convention.124 At a Security Council debate on 24 
March 1999 regarding the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Slovenia argued that the 
intervention was justified because ‘not all permanent members were willing to act in 
accordance with their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’.125 
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change associated the 
concept of responsibility to protect with the principle of collective security by the 
Security Council, stating that the Security Council ‘can always authorize military 
action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the 
situation is a “threat to international peace and security”’. 126  The Panel urged 
Permanent Members ‘to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases 
of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses’. 127  The 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document adopted by the General Assembly stated that ‘we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’.128 While insistent on Security Council authorisation as prerequisite to any 
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123 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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125 S/PV.3988, 24 March 1999, 6-7. 
126 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
supra n.111, para.202. 
127 Ibid., para.256. 
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peacekeeping operation, China in its 2005 official paper on United Nations reform 
acknowledged that ‘[e]ach State shoulders the primary responsibility to protect its 
own population. … When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate 
concern of the international community to ease and defuse the crisis.’129 However, at 
a Security Council meeting on 4 December 2006, China signalled its concern that the 
World Summit Outcome Document was ‘a very cautious representation of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity … it is not appropriate to expand, wilfully to interpret or 
even abuse this concept.’ 130  China reiterated its position at a Security Council 
meeting on 27 May 2008:  
 
when discussing the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the 
Security Council should approach the concept of the responsibility to 
protect – and especially its application – with great prudence. The 
Final Document of the 2005 World Summit devoted a lengthy 
section to a very careful description of the responsibility to protect 
civilians from massacres, war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. It also indicated that that concept should be further 
considered by the General Assembly. Many members are currently 
deeply concerned about the concept of the responsibility to protect, 
and the relevant discussions should therefore be pursued in the 
United Nations. The Security Council is in no position to interpret or 
expand the concept of the responsibility to protect at will, much less 
to abuse it.131 
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129 As quoted in Ramesh Thakur, ‘R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers’, 
36:2 Washington Quarterly (2013), 61, 67. 
130 S/PV.5577, 4 December 2006, 8. 
131 S/PV.5898, 27 May 2008, 9. 
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 It is important to note that the United Nations Charter does not provide for 
peacekeeping operations. International peacekeeping ‘evolved as an alternative to the 
collective security that the UN was designed to provide but could not.’132 Taylor 
Fravel notes that peacekeeping operations ‘evolved in the early 1950s as a response 
to border disputes sparked by decolonization’.133 China traditionally considered any 
peacekeeping operation to constitute interference in a State’s internal affairs and 
breach of the State’s sovereignty. China insisted that consent of the host State, 
impartiality of the peacekeeping operation, and non-use of force except in self-
defence be essential to any peacekeeping operation the Security Council were to 
authorise. At a Security Council debate on 7 July 2010 about protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, China reiterated that ‘[a]dhering to the three principles of the consent 
of the country concerned, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence 
is the key to the success of peacekeeping operations. Any deviation from those basic 
principles will cause more conflicts and problems, even to the point of jeopardizing 
the success of the peacekeeping operation concerned, rather than help to protect 
civilians.’134 
China abstained on draft Security Council Resolutions 770 (1992), 776 
(1992), 781 (1992), 836 (1993), 871 (1993), and 908 (1994) regarding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on grounds of the prohibition of the use of force, and on Security 
Council Resolution 998 (1995) regarding changing the mandate of the United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforcement action. However, 
China voted affirmatively on draft Security Council Resolutions 836 (1993), 871 
(1993), 908 (1994), 1031 (1995), and 1088 (1996) on grounds that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina consented to (and later requested) United Nations peacekeeping and that 
the situation on the ground became exceptional, although it reiterated its opposition to 
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132 William J. Durch, ‘Building on Sand: UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara’, 17:4 
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133 M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Attitude toward U.N. Peacekeeping Operations since 1989’, 36 
Asian Survey (1996), 1102, 1104. 
134 S/PV.6354, 7 July 2010, 28. 
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the use of force. China also voted in favour of draft Security Council Resolution 1037 
(1996) regarding Croatia on grounds that Croatia requested United Nations 
peacekeeping, while reiterating its opposition to the use of force, and of draft Security 
Council Resolution 794 (1992) regarding Somalia due to the exceptional nature of the 
situation on the ground.135 China abstained on draft Security Council Resolution 975 
(1995) regarding Haiti, although it eventually voted in favour of draft Security 
Council Resolutions 1048 (1995) and 1063 (1996) after Haiti requested peacekeeping 
assistance. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that China abstained on 
draft Security Council Resolution 929 (1994) on establishing a temporary 
multinational humanitarian operation in Rwanda because ‘[w]e have consistently 
argued that the indispensable condition for the UN peacekeeping operations to 
succeed is to gain consent from the parties concerned and to cooperate with the 
affected states and regional organizations. It is still hard to ensure that the Security 
Council’s resolution that approves of taking action will gain consent and cooperation 
from the affected parties.’136 China abstained on draft Security Council Resolution 
955 (1994) on establishing an international tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda 
out of concern that the principles of State sovereignty and of non-interference in other 
States’ internal affairs would be undermined. 
Concerning the humanitarian crisis and NATO intervention in Kosovo, China 
abstained on draft Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 
(1998), 1239 (1999), and 1244 (1999), and in three of the five instances provided the 
only non-affirmative vote. Instead of being a watershed in China’s acceptance of 
international peacekeeping and a ‘responsibility to protect’, the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo heightened China’s concern about the erosion of the principle of State 
sovereignty in the current international legal order. At a Security Council meeting on 
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23 March 1999, the day before NATO commenced bombing over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), China maintained: 
 
The question of Kosovo, as an internal matter of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, should be resolved among the parties 
concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia themselves. 
Settlement of the Kosovo issue should be based on respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and on guaranteeing the legitimate rights and interests of 
all ethnic groups in the Kosovo region. … We have always stood for 
the peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations, and are 
opposed to the use or threat of use of force in international affairs and 
to power politics whereby the strong bully the weak. We oppose 
interference in the internal affairs of other States, under whatever 
pretext or in whatever form.137 
 
Pang Zhongying argues that ‘[c]entral to Chinese concerns is the changing nature and 
context of peace operations – with the potential for mission creep and the move to 
“coalitions of the willing” – and the implications these would have for international 
involvement in China’s key internal affairs relating, for example, to Taiwan, Tibet, 
and Xinjiang’.138 China explained its abstention on draft Security Council Resolution 
1160 (1998) on grounds that ‘ethnic issues are extremely complicated and sensitive, 
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137 S/PV.3988, 23 March 1999, 12. 
138 Pang Zhongying, ‘China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping’, 12 International 
Peacekeeping (2005), 87, 88. Similarly, He Yin has stated that ‘[a]lthough China can be 
flexible in normative principles like state sovereignty and non-intervention … [i]t is aware 
that its flexibility regarding these norms may be a “double-edged sword”. On the one hand, 
when properly used, flexibility can provide Beijing with more diplomatic options for dealing 
with international affairs, prevent unnecessary conflicts with other powers, and yield a 
favourable environment for its development strategy. On the other hand, when overexploited, 
it [does] not only jeopardise China’s strategic interests regarding state sovereignty (especially 
the Taiwan Question) but also damages its image as a peace-loving power, especially in the 
eyes of the developing world’: China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007), 57. 
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especially in the Balkans. On the one hand, the legitimate rights and interests of all 
ethnic groups should be protected; on the other, secessionist activities by various 
extremist elements should be prevented … If the Council is to get involved in a 
dispute without a request from the country concerned, it may set bad precedent and 
have wider negative implications.’139  Indeed, Madeleine Albright, United States 
Secretary of State at the time, stressed that Kosovo was ‘a unique situation sui 
generis in the region of the Balkans’ and it was important not to regard it as precedent 
for similar action in the future.140 At a Security Council meeting on 10 June 1999 
aimed to confirm a ceasefire agreement through draft Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999), China abstained in the vote and stated: 
 
NATO seriously violated the Charter of the United Nations and 
norms of international law, and undermined the authority of the 
Security Council, thus setting an extremely dangerous precedent in 
the history of international relations. 
… Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs are basic principles of the United Nations Charter. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international situation has 
undergone major changes, but those principles are by no means 
outdated. On the contrary, they have acquired even greater relevance. 
At the threshold of the new century, it is even more imperative for us 
to reaffirm those principles. In essence, the ‘human rights over 
sovereignty’ theory strives to infringe upon the sovereignty of other 
States and to promote hegemonism under the pretext of human rights. 
This totally runs counter to the purposes and principles of the United 
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139 S/PV.3868, 31 March 1998, 11-12. 
140 United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Press Conference with Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Singapore, 26 July 1999, 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990726b.html.  
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Nations Charter. The international community should maintain 
vigilance against it. 
The draft resolution before us has failed to fully reflect China’s 
principled stand and justified concerns. In particular, it makes no 
mention of the disaster caused by NATO bombing in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and it has failed to impose necessary 
restrictions on the invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. Therefore, we have great difficulty with the draft resolution. 
However, in view of the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
has already accepted the peace plan, that NATO has suspended its 
bombing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that the draft 
resolution has reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
for the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Chinese 
delegation will not block the adoption of this draft resolution.141 
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141  S/PV.4011, 10 June 1999. Construing the NATO intervention as ‘an international 
constitutional moment’, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White argue that Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which states that ‘[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations’, should now read: ‘“All states and individuals shall refrain from the deliberate 
targeting or killing of civilians in armed conflict of any kind, for any purpose”’, which 
‘articulates a principle of civilian inviolability’ that permits and compels humanitarian 
intervention and has replaced the principle of State sovereignty as a new Grundnorm for the 
‘new’ international order: ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, 43 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2002), 1, 2. Such a fanciful analysis notwithstanding, it is 
generally agreed among scholars of international law that the NATO intervention was 
incompatible with both the Charter and customary international law as it contravened the 
prohibition of the use of force and the principles of State sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other States: see, e.g., Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex Iniuria 
Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the World Community?’, 10 European Journal of International Law 
(1999), 23; Jonathan I. Charney, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’, 32 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1999), 1231; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Limits 
of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace 
Maintenance’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 361; Louis Henkin, 
‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”’, 93 American Journal of International 
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China’s opposition to the notion of a right to humanitarian intervention is widely 
shared among developing States. The Group of 77 in 2000 categorically rejected the 
existence of such a purported right that ‘has no legal basis in the United Nations 
Charter or in the general principles of international law’.142 
Nonetheless, China voted in favour of peacekeeping operations authorised 
under Security Council Resolutions 1264 (1999), 1272 (1999), 1410 (2002) and 1704 
(2006) regarding East Timor, Security Council Resolutions 1270 (1999) and 1289 
(2000) regarding Sierra Leone, Security Council Resolutions 1291 (2000) and 1671 
(2006) regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Security Council Resolution 
1386 (2001) regarding Afghanistan, Security Council Resolutions 1464 (2003) and 
1528 (2004) regarding Côte d’Ivoire, Security Council Resolutions 1497 (2003) and 
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Law (1999), 824; Peter Hilpold, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal 
Reappraisal?’, 12 European Journal of International Law (2001), 437; Alain Pellet, ‘Brief 
Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force’, 11 European Journal of International Law (2000), 
385; Bruno Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10 European 
Journal of International Law (1999), 1. The ICJ in Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. 
United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, 
916, 922, emphasised that it was ‘profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia’ 
which ‘under the present circumstances … raises very serious issues of international law’. 
Even some of the States that participated in the NATO intervention, particularly Germany, 
cautioned against attributing precedential value to the intervention: Simma, ibid., 12-13. The 
fact that the NATO intervention was ‘collective’ is immaterial as ‘the Alliance has no greater 
freedom than its member states’ under international law: ibid., 19; to ascribe binding force to 
a unilateral decision of a majority of Security Council Permanent Members when the Security 
Council collectively, and as the only international organisation empowered by the Charter to 
authorise enforcement action for the maintenance of international peace and security, decided 
against adopting a resolution that would have authorised military intervention in Kosovo was 
‘tantamount to ignoring the very essence of the decision process within the Security Council’: 
Hilpold, ibid., 449. With the far-reaching consequences that a Security Council decision 
entails, Hilpold, ibid., stresses that ‘[a]ny attempt to introduce a majority principle for the 
permanent members of the Council, too – if only indirectly or with weakened consequences – 
and thereby abolishing or at least softening their veto power, would not only run counter to 
the letter of Article 27 of the UN Charter but also to the spirit lying at the heart of the 
constitutional consensus which permitted the establishment of [the current international 
order].’ Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), on which China abstained, and which 
legitimated ex post facto the NATO intervention but reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did not render the intervention 
compatible with the Charter or customary international law. On the contrary, the Security 
Council’s ex post facto legitimation ‘introduces in the international legal order a part of 
uncertainty which is deeply repugnant to the very function of law in any society and it is 
impossible to assume that it will not happen again in similar situations in the future’: Pellet, 
ibid., 389. As Oscar Schachter has emphasised, ‘[w]hen a principle is repeatedly and 
unanimously declared to be a basic legal rule from which no derogation is allowed, even 
numerous violations do not become state practice constitutive of a new rule’: ‘In Defense of 
International Rules on the Use of Force’, 53 University of Chicago Law Review (1986), 113, 
131. 
142 Declaration of the Group of 77 South Summit, Havana, 10–14 April 2000, para.54. 
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1509 (2003) regarding Liberia, Security Council Resolutions 1529 (2004) and 1542 
(2004) regarding Haiti, Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004) regarding Burundi, 
and Security Council Resolutions 1590 (2005) and 1769 (2007) regarding Sudan,143 
after previously abstaining on draft Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 
(2004), 1593 (2005), 1679 (2006) and 1706 (2006)144 on grounds that Sudan’s 
consent had not been obtained and pressure on the Sudanese government would only 
worsen the situation, and out of ‘national judicial sovereignty’.145 Stefan Stähle 
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143 See Stähle, supra n.135, 641-42. 
144 Ibid., 651; Nicola P. Contessi, ‘Multilateralism, Intervention and Norm Contestation: 
China’s Stance on Darfur in the UN Security Council’, 41 Security Dialogue (2010), 323, 331. 
At a Security Council meeting regarding draft Security Council Resolution 1679 (2006), 
China stated that ‘if the United Nations is to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the 
agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese Government must be obtained. That is a basic 
principle and precondition for the deployment of all United Nations peacekeeping operations’: 
S/PV.5439, 16 May 2006. At a Security Council meeting regarding draft Security Council 
Resolution 1706 (2006), China explained its abstention on grounds that ‘having participated in 
all the consultation processes in a constructive manner, China agreed upon or accepted almost 
all the contents of the resolution. However, we have consistently urged the sponsors to clearly 
include “with the consent of the Government of National Unity” in the text of the resolution, 
which is a fixed and standardized phrase utilized by the Council when deploying United 
Nations missions’: S/PV.5519, 31 August 2006. 
145 U.N. S.C. Res. 1556 (2004), Preamble and paras.1-2 and 7-8; U.N. S.C. Res. 1564 (2004), 
Preamble and para.12; S/PV.5040, 18 September 2004; S/PV.5519, 31 August 2006. At a 
Security Council meeting regarding draft Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) which 
called for the situation in Darfur to be referred to the International Criminal Court for 
investigation into human rights violations committed since July 2002, China abstained on 
grounds that ‘out of national judicial sovereignty, we would prefer to see perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights stand trial in the Sudanese judicial system. We have noted that the 
Sudanese judiciary has recently taken legal action against individuals involved. … We are not 
in favour of referring the question of Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without 
the consent of the Sudanese Government’: S/PV.5158, 31 March 2005. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted at the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, 
the United States, and Yemen voted against adoption of the Rome Statute. Due to the United 
States’ pressure that it would withdraw all of its military personnel from the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in East Timor and to a United States veto of a draft Security Council 
resolution on extending the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (see Lu Jianping 
and Wang Zhixiang, ‘China’s Attitude towards the ICC’, 3 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2005), 608, 610), the Security Council in 2002 adopted Resolution 1422 that 
‘[r]equests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a 
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a 
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or 
authorised operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or 
proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council 
decides otherwise’ (para.1). At a Security Council meeting on 31 March 2005, the United 
States stated unequivocally that ‘we have not dropped, and indeed continue to maintain, our 
long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the ICC. We believe that the Rome 
Statute is flawed and does not have sufficient protections from the possibility of politicized 
prosecutions. We reiterate our fundamental objection to the Rome Statute’s assertions that the 
ICC has jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States that have not 
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argues that the turning point of China’s voting behaviour regarding United Nations 
peacekeeping was when it supported the Australian-led mission in 1999 to restore 
peace and security in East Timor and protect United Nations personnel on the 
ground.146 Bates Gill and James Reilly assert that ‘[g]eographic proximity; a desire to 
respond in some way to anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia; initial involvement with 
the voting process; and a desire to retain UN authority, and thus Chinese influence, 
over issues of intervention and the use of force were all likely factors in China’s 
ultimate policy choices.’147 However, as Chapter V noted, China did reiterate its 
longstanding position regarding peacekeeping missions that the consent of the host 
State (in this case, Indonesia) must have been obtained, a position with which 
Australia, Russia, the United States, Malaysia (a non-Permanent Member of the 
Security Council at the time) and other non-aligned States concurred.148 
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become parties to the Rome Statute. Non-parties have no obligations in connection with that 
treaty unless otherwise decided by the Security Council, upon which Members of this 
Organization have conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’: S/PV/5158, 31 March 2005, 3. 
Lu and Wang, ibid., 611-12, have noted that five considerations inhered in China’s 
refusal to join the International Criminal Court: ‘(1) The jurisdiction of the ICC is not based 
on the principle of voluntary acceptance; the Rome Statute imposes obligations on non-State 
Parties without their consent, which violates the principle of state sovereignty and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Furthermore, the complementary jurisdiction principle 
gives the ICC the power to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct proper trials of 
its own nationals. As a result, the Court becomes a supra-national organ. (2) War crimes 
committed in internal armed conflicts fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Further, the 
definition of “war crimes” goes beyond that accepted under customary international law and 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. (3) Contrary to the existing norms of 
customary international law, the definition of “crimes against humanity” does not require that 
the state in which they are committed be “at war”. Furthermore, many actions listed under that 
heading belong to the area of human rights law rather than international criminal law; this 
deviates from the real aim of establishing the ICC. (4) The inclusion of the crime of 
aggression within the jurisdiction of the ICC weakens the power of the UN Security Council. 
(5) The proprio motu power of the Prosecutor under Article 15 of the Rome Statute may make 
it difficult for the ICC to concentrate on dealing with the most serious crimes, and may make 
the Court open to political influence so that it cannot act in a manner that is independent and 
fair.’ 
146 Stähle, supra n.135, 648. 
147 Bates Gill and James Reilly, ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from 
Beijing’, 42:3 Survival (2000), 41, 50. 
148 See Ian Johnstone, ‘Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations’, 18:2 
International Peacekeeping (2011), 170; Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘East Timor and 
the New Humanitarian Intervention’, 77 International Affairs (2001), 805. Some scholars 
have misconstrued China’s support for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in East 
Timor as a fundamental change of its position regarding humanitarian intervention or 
international peacekeeping. For example, Allen Carlson contends that China’s ‘quiet, 
supportive role in facilitating humanitarian intervention in East Timor’ and its votes in favour 
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China voted affirmatively on draft Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) 
on protection of civilians in armed conflict, which stated that ‘the deliberate targeting 
of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, 
flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
law in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and 
security’.149 China has maintained that the success or otherwise of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations is heavily dependent on the ‘democratisation of international 
relations’. At a Security Council debate on 21 June 2001 about the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s report on prevention of armed conflict,150 China asserted: 
 
The United Nations should play an important role in the promotion of 
the democratisation of international relations. Armed conflicts in the 
Middle East, the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa and other 
countries and regions could be stopped as early as possible and new 
conflicts could be prevented if all sides concerned could really follow 
the basic norms guiding state-to-state relations. Although the role and 
capacity of the United Nations has its own limitations, as the 
Secretary-General has pointed out in the report, preventing armed 
conflict represents an important orientation in the field of 
maintaining international peace and security as well as an important 
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of Security Council Resolutions 1264 (1999) and 1272 (1999) only months after its fierce 
opposition to NATO intervention in Kosovo constituted evidence that ‘Chinese foreign policy 
circles at this time basically accepted the legitimacy of human rights and humanitarian 
intervention’: Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in 
the Reform Era (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), 176. Evan A. 
Feigenbaum, ‘China’s Challenge to Pax Americana’, 24:3 Washington Quarterly (2001), 31, 
34, has gone even further to argue that ‘[i]n mid-1999, the UN experience in East Timor 
signaled that China’s orthodox view of sovereignty might be less intractable than Beijing’s 
rhetoric would otherwise indicate. China sent observers, for example, to participate in a UN 
peace enforcement operation that violated what was still sovereign Indonesian territory’ – 
even though Indonesia’s consent had been obtained, the Security Council had authorised the 
peacekeeping mission in East Timor, and East Timor had never been part of Indonesia’s 
sovereign territory under international law. 
149 U.N. S.C. Res. 1296 (2000), para.5. 
150 Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985-2/2001/574, 7 
June 2001. 
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task of the United Nations. China is willing to make its own 
contribution, together with other Member States, to strengthening the 
capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed 
conflict.151 
 
China’s increased experience with peacekeeping operations has led it to 
depart from its previous unease. While remaining wary of blurring peacekeeping 
operations with peace-building activities, China in 2001 indicated its recognition that 
‘peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and peace-building activities had 
become increasingly intertwined’,152 although it insisted that the host State should 
assume a ‘dominant role’ in resolving conflict.153 In 2003, China indicated that 
‘[g]iven the growing complexity of operations, traditional operations were no longer 
suited for certain types of conflict; the situations in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and in Liberia, for example, had highlighted the need for rapid, early and 
robust intervention’, 154  ‘including the use of enforcement measures where 
necessary’. 155  In 2004, China stated that military force, ‘where necessary’, 156 
constituted an essential part of peacekeeping operations: ‘In conflict management, the 
roles of military action and that of the civilian elements are closely interrelated and 
predicated on one another. … Military success guarantees the presence of a civilian 
role, which is an essential and indispensable element in any post-conflict 
reconstruction.’157 In 2005, President Hu Jintao stated that China was in support of a 
‘comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and 
post-conflict reconstruction’.158 Zhang Yesui, China’s Ambassador to the United 
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151 Statement of Ambassador Wang Yingfan, as quoted in Pang, supra n.138, 94. 
152 A/C.4/56/SR.20, 4 December 2001, para.45. 
153 A/C.4/55/SR.20, 5 April 2001, paras.28-29. 
154 A/C.4/58/SR.11, 14 November 2003, para.31. 
155 Ibid., para.33. 
156 Ibid.; see also A/C.4/59/SR.17, 31 December 2004, para.24. 
157 S/PV.5041, 22 September 2004, 26. 
158 S/PV.5261, 14 September 2005, 8. 
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States, stated at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 that China’s 
increasing contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations ‘reflected China’s 
commitment to global security given the country’s important role within the 
international system and the fact that its security and development are closely linked 
to that of the rest of the world’.159 Major-General Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (‘PLA’), at the PLA Peacekeeping 
Work Conference in Beijing in June 2007 stated that ‘active participation in the UN 
peacekeeping operations is … an important measure to display China’s image of 
being a peace-loving and responsible big country and likewise an important avenue to 
get adapted to the needs of the revolution in military affairs in the world and enhance 
the quality construction of the army’.160 Chin-Hao Huang notes that ‘[i]n May 2009, 
the PLA General Staff Department announced that it would strengthen the PLA’s 
emergency response system and rapid deployment capacity to respond to the various 
MOOTW [military operations other than war], including peacekeeping activities. In 
June 2009 the Central Military Commission, the PLA and five of the seven military 
area commands met in Beijing to strengthen and improve the PLA’s peacekeeping 
role, discussing ways to streamline the selection, organization, training and rotation 
of Chinese peacekeepers.’161 On 26 April 2010, the PLA issued a special report 
commemorating China’s contribution to international peacekeeping in the preceding 
two decades, which stated that ‘[u]p to the end of March 2010, the PLA has 
contributed peacekeepers over 15,000 persons/times to 18 UN peacekeeping missions 
worldwide … The Chinese peacekeeping troops have built and maintained over 8,000 
kilometres of road, constructed 230-odd bridges and given medical treatment to 
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159 As quoted in Chin-Hao Huang, ‘Principles and Praxis of China’s Peacekeeping’, 18 
International Peacekeeping (2011), 257, 260-61. 
160 PLA Daily, 22 June 2007, as quoted in Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor, ‘From Refusal to 
Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa’, 29 Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies (2011), 137, 150. 
161 Huang, supra n.159, 261, citing ‘PLA Constructs MOOTW Arms Force System’, PLA 
Daily, 14 May 2009, and ‘PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference Held in Beijing’, PLA Daily, 
26 June 2009. 
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patients for 60,000 persons/times in the UN peacekeeping mission areas, playing a 
positive role in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, maintaining the 
regional safety and stability, and facilitating the economical and social development 
in some countries.’162 According to United Nations data, China has increased its 
personnel contribution to peacekeeping operations twenty-fold and, with more than 
2,100 peacekeepers abroad, has more troops under United Nations command than 
does any other Security Council Permanent Member.163 
As President of the Security Council during January–June 2010, China 
convened a thematic debate on 13 January 2010 to explore possibilities for 
strengthening co-operation and collaboration between the United Nations and 
regional and sub-regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In its concept paper,164 while emphasising the pre-eminence of the Security 
Council,165 China indicated its wish to explore the comparative advantages that the 
United Nations and regional organisations respectively possess and those that they 
share in the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, 166  and how their respective roles and 
responsibilities may be better defined and delineated in accordance with the 
Charter.167 China considered a collaborative partnership between the United Nations 
and regional and sub-regional organisations to be crucial in preventing, managing and 
resolving conflicts, including nascent disputes and emerging crises, effectively,168 and 
in encouraging States to ‘resolve differences and problems peacefully through 
dialogue, reconciliation, negotiation, good offices and mediation’.169 Opportunities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 ‘PLA Contributes a Lot to UN Peacekeeping Operations’, PLA Daily, 26 April 2010, as 
quoted in Zhao, supra n.61, 346. 
163 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘UN Missions Summary Detailed 
by Country’, 1 October 2010.  
164 Letter dated 4 January 2010 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2010/9, 7 January 2010. 
165 Ibid., para.1. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., para.2(1). 
168 Ibid., para.2(3). 
169 Ibid. 
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such a thematic debate may generate aside, it marked the first time that China took 
the initiative as President of the Security Council to convene a thematic debate (and 
not due to previous Security Council decisions). According to Security Council 
Report, a not-for-profit organisation affiliated with Columbia University, Security 
Council Permanent Members have largely been reluctant about holding thematic 
debates, which have generally been initiated by non-Permanent Members during their 
Security Council presidencies.170 
 
b. Will China veto a draft Security Council resolution aimed at its conduct? 
Due to their veto power, Permanent Members are often taken to be immune to the 
enforcement powers of the Security Council and, consequently, the constraints of 
international law. The possibility that China might veto proposed Security Council 
action aimed at its conduct, such as its violations of human rights, its lack of 
democratic governance, its treatment of Tibet or its recourse to military force against 
Taiwan, is one that many have in mind when criticising the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the Security Council. As Andrew Hurrell argues, ‘[l]egitimacy 
implies a willingness to comply with rules or to accept a political order even if this 
goes against specific interests at specific times.’171 
As noted in Chapter III, during the 1970s China repeatedly criticised the 
United States’ and the Soviet Union’s tendencies to veto draft Security Council 
resolutions in order to exercise hegemony. In 1973, Ling Ching stated that ‘[t]he 
super-Powers were arguing very hard for their idea that it was only up to the Security 
Council to decide whether a specific act constituted an act of aggression. Obviously, 
what they had in mind was invariably their veto power in the Security Council. In the 
event of their aggression against other countries, they could remain unpunished by 
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170 Security Council Report, Update Report: UN Cooperation with Regional and Subregional 
Organizations in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 8 January 2010, No.2. 
171 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle be Squared?’, 31 
Review of International Studies (2005), 15, 16. 
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casting a single negative veto. Consequently it might well be asked whether the 
whole text of the definition of aggression would not become a mere scrap of 
paper.’172 
Pursuant to Article 27(3) of the Charter, a Security Council Member that is ‘a 
party to a dispute’ shall abstain in relevant decisions under Chapter VI or under 
Article 52(3).173 Yuen-Li Liang, who was Chairperson of the Committee of Experts 
of the Security Council that met during March–April 1946 to Study the Rules of 
Procedure of the Security Council, explained that by virtue of the fact that the term 
‘dispute’ and not ‘situation’ is used in Article 27(3), the Security Council is not under 
any obligation to invite a non-Member concerned in a ‘situation’ to participate in its 
proceedings without vote, unlike Article 32 in a case that constitutes a dispute, and it 
is for the Security Council alone to decide whether a matter constitutes a dispute.174 
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172 28 G.A.O.R., C.6 (1442nd meeting), para.77 (1973), as quoted in Samuel S. Kim, ‘The 
People’s Republic of China and the Charter-Based International Legal Order’, 72 American 
Journal of International Law (1978), 317, 344. Similarly, in 1974, An Chih-yüan stated that 
‘[a]s it stood, the definition would enable the super-Powers to take advantage of their position 
as permanent members of the Security Council to justify their acts of aggression and, by 
abusing their veto power, to prevent the Security Council from adopting any resolution 
condemning the aggressor and supporting the victim. … Since an aggressor could veto any 
draft resolution of the Security Council stating that it had committed an act of aggression, it 
was difficult to see how the definition could have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, 
simplifying the implementation of measures to suppress acts of aggression and protecting the 
rights and interests of the victim, as provided in the preamble of the draft definition’: 29 
G.A.O.R., C.6 (1475th meeting), para.16 (1974), as quoted in Kim, ibid., 345-46. 
173 United Nations Charter, Art.27(3). 
174 Liang, supra n.32, 347-48. Liang, representing China, submitted a statement regarding the 
application of Article 27(3), as follows (ibid., 349-51): 
The Yalta Formula provides that when a state is party to a dispute it shall abstain from 
voting in the non-procedural decisions of the Council under Chapter VI of the Charter 
concerning such dispute. This requirement for abstention, in the case of a permanent 
member being a party to a dispute, obviously does not affect the requirement that the 
remaining permanent members must concur in the decisions. 
It is also clear that the abstention requirement laid down in Article 27, paragraph 3, is 
not intended to apply to all matters arising under Article 35, paragraph 1. Thus when a 
state brings to the attention of the Security Council, by reason of the general interest of 
that state as a Member of the United Nations, a matter which it considers might endanger 
international peace and security, the requirement for abstention shall not apply to such 
Member in any of the decisions of the Council provided for in Article 34 and Article 36. 
In exercising such a general right, the position of the state bringing the matter to the 
attention of the Security Council is similar to that of the Secretary-General under Article 
99. 
With respect to the requirement for abstention, however, the distinction between 
disputes and situations should not extend to those cases in which one state complains that 
its specific rights have been infringed upon or their enjoyment directly endangered by the 
action of one or more other states, and alleges that a dispute, the continuance of which 
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endangers international peace and security, has arisen. Should the other state or states 
directly involved make the allegation that a situation has arisen as distinct from a dispute, 
such an attempted distinction shall not affect the requirement for abstention laid down in 
Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter. 
The specific function of the Security Council in connexion with the pacific 
settlement of disputes and situations endangering the maintenance of international peace 
and security is laid down in Article 36, which states that ‘The Security Council may, at 
any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, 
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment’. The terms of this article 
indicate that the action contemplated is not based upon a prior determination whether a 
matter is a dispute or a situation, but upon whether the matter brought before the Council 
is of such a nature that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It is clear that Article 36 makes no distinction between 
disputes and situations in so far as the function of the Council in making 
recommendations is concerned. 
At the time of the Yalta Conference the authors of the voting formula had before 
them only the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. An examination of these proposals 
reveals that the paragraph corresponding to Article 36(1) of the Charter, namely Chapter 
VIII, Section A, paragraph 5, refers only to disputes and not to situations. In embodying 
the abstention clause into the voting formula, therefore, it was clearly the intention of the 
authors to exclude from voting those states involved directly in a matter whose 
continuance might endanger international peace and security. However, as the term used 
to describe such matters was ‘dispute’ in the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, it 
was only logical that the term used in the Yalta Formula was ‘parties to a dispute’. There 
is further evidence of the fact that the term ‘parties to a dispute’ was meant to include 
‘parties directly concerned in a situation’ in cases where the Security Council has to make 
the determination provided for in Article 34 of the Charter. In a statement issued on 5 
March 1945 Mr Stettinius, then Secretary of State said: ‘This means that no nation, large 
or small, if a party to a dispute, would participate in the decisions of the Security Council 
on questions like the following: “(b) Whether the dispute or situation is of such a nature 
that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace.”’ 
As stated above, the text of the Yalta Formula was drafted on the basis of the text of 
the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in which the term ‘situation’ did not appear in connexion 
with the specific function of the Council relative to pacific settlement, as laid down in 
Chapter VIII, Section A, paragraph 5. At San Francisco this section of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals was considerably revised while the text of the Yalta Formula remained 
untouched. Among the many modifications made in Section A of Chapter VIII was the 
insertion of the term ‘or of a situation of like nature’ in paragraph 5 of that section. The 
Summary Report of the Twelfth Meeting of Committee III/2 reveals that the words ‘or of 
a situation of like nature’ were intended to give effect to the Australian amendment which 
proposed that the Security Council should be permitted to deal with both a dispute or a 
situation the continuance of which was likely to endanger the peace. Thus it is clear that 
the insertion of the term ‘or of a situation of like nature’ in Article 36 with reference to 
the specific function of the Security Council as regards pacific settlement was never 
intended to be the basis of a differentiation between the duty of states to abstain from 
voting in a dispute to which they are parties and the absence of such a duty in the case of 
situations in which they are directly concerned. 
The abstention clause in Article 27(3) of the Charter is an embodiment of the 
principle that, so far as the process of pacific settlement calls for the appreciation by the 
Council of a question presented to it, a state shall not at once be judge and party in its 
own cause. If a matter brought to the attention of the Council is sufficiently grave so that 
the Council considers that its continuance may endanger international peace and security, 
it may make such a decision exclusive of the votes of the states directly involved. If this 
decision is in the affirmative, the Security Council may recommend appropriate 
procedure or methods of adjustment by virtue of a decision which is again exclusive of 
the votes of the states directly involved. This requirement for abstention, however, does 
not flow from the fact that the states directly involved are parties to a dispute as distinct 
from being directly involved in a situation. Rather it is derived from the necessity for 
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The Article 27(3) abstention requirement does not apply to Chapter VII with which 
enforcement powers, not recommendatory powers, of the Security Council lie. 
Reisman thus argues that ‘since Article 39 permits the Council, when exercising 
chapter VII powers, to make either recommendations or decisions as it sees fit, the 
permanent members of the Council can evade Article 27(3) by operating under 
chapter VII or … by simply not indicating whether the resolution in question is being 
adopted under chapter VI or chapter VII.’175  
As China is able to rely on Article 2(7) of the Charter to shield itself from 
United Nations interference in its internal affairs, it would not need to veto a draft 
Security Council resolution intended to condemn its human rights violations, its lack 
of democratic governance or its treatment of Tibet. The most likely scenario in which 
China might veto a draft Security Council resolution aimed at its conduct is if the 
draft resolution were to condemn its use of force against Taiwan and demand that it 
cease and desist, a draft resolution that undoubtedly would fall under Chapter VII. 
Article 27(3) does not apply if Taiwan applies for admission to United Nations 
membership. China will be able to veto Taiwan’s admission given admission requires 
a decision of the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.176 
China will not be a party to a dispute or situation if a territorial entity, even Taiwan, 
applies for United Nations membership – as when China, represented by the 
authorities on Taiwan at the time, was able to veto Mongolia’s application for 
admission to United Nations membership in 1955 on grounds that Mongolia was part 
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effective action on the part of the Council on the one hand, and the principle that no state 
shall be judge and party in its own cause on the other. 
If the interpretation is accepted that, with respect to the requirement for abstention, a 
distinction exists between parties to a dispute and parties directly concerned in a situation, 
then when a matter is brought to the attention of the Security Council involving a 
permanent member, that matter can never be considered a dispute within the meaning of 
the Charter, unless that permanent member chooses to have it so considered. Furthermore, 
to make the determination of whether a dispute or situation exists subject to the veto 
power of a permanent member is to defeat the clear intention of the Yalta Formula and to 
render meaningless the distinction made therein between voting procedures applicable to 
pacific settlement and voting procedures applicable to enforcement action. 
175 Reisman, supra n.79, 93. 
176 United Nations Charter, Art.4(2). 
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of China. Another scenario in which Article 27(3) might apply is a draft Security 
Council resolution calling for abolition of the veto that a United Nations Member 
State might argue to be a cause of international peace and security continuing to be 
endangered, as it is arguable that as a Permanent Member China constitutes a party to 
the dispute (even though United Nations institutional reform should properly be 
construed as a situation). However, even if Article 27(3) were to apply, the other 
Permanent Members also would be required to abstain, and Article 27(3) requires 
nine affirmative votes for a decision to be made. Most fundamentally, abolition of the 
veto cannot take place without an amendment to the Charter, which requires 




Recent humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria have made the Security Council the 
focal point of renaissance and, simultaneously, criticism of the utility, effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the United Nations and of international law. The Security Council 
managed to pass seven draft resolutions (six unanimously) imposing sanctions on the 
Libyan government for its use of violence against its civilians, authorising a no-fly-
zone over Libya to protect Libya’s civilian population, and establishing a United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya whose mandate was extended twice. 178 
Notwithstanding its general and consistent objection to the International Criminal 
Court and its abstention on draft Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) calling for 
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177 Ibid., Art.108. 
178 U.N. S.C. Res. 1970 (2011; passed unanimously) imposing sanctions on the Libyan 
government and referring the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the International 
Criminal Court; U.N. S.C. Res. 1973 (2011; China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India 
abstained) authorising a no-fly-zone over Libya for the protection of civilians; U.N. S.C. Res. 
2009 (2011; passed unanimously) establishing a United Nations Support Mission in Libya; 
U.N. S.C. Res. 2016 (2011; passed unanimously) terminating military intervention in Libya 
on 27 October 2011; U.N. S.C. Res. 2017 (2011; passed unanimously) regarding portable 
surface-to-air missiles in Libya; U.N. S.C. Res. 2022 (2011; passed unanimously) extending 
the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya; and U.N. S.C. Res. 2040 (2012; 
passed unanimously) further extending the mandate of the Mission. 
! 313 
referral of human rights abuses in Darfur to the Court, China on 26 February 2011 
voted in favour of draft Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) referring the 
situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 to the Court.179 (With its own opposition to 
the International Criminal Court, the United States did the same.) China only 
abstained on draft Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) – together with Russia, 
Brazil, Germany, and India – as the draft resolution sought to impose a no-fly-zone 
over Libya. Alex Bellamy argues that ‘Resolution 1973 is especially important 
because it is the first time that the Security Council has authorized the use of military 
force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state.’180 
However, the notion of the international community’s responsibility to protect 
civilians in other States was not referred to in either Security Council Resolution 
1970 or 1973, and both resolutions indicated that the responsibility to protect rested 
with the Libyan government. Aidan Hehir has noted that none of the ten States that 
voted in favour of draft Security Council Resolution 1973 referred to the 
responsibility to protect as a legal or normative justification or basis for international 
intervention in Libya.181 The three leading statesmen who called for international 
intervention in Libya – United States President Barack Obama, British Prime 
Minister David Cameron, and then French President Nicolas Sarkozy – also did not 
refer to the responsibility to protect in their appeals to their domestic constituents for 
support of military action. 182  Such restraint, Hehir surmises, might stem from 
concerns that the international intervention might set a precedent or erode domestic 
support of military action, but both rationales ‘inherently undermine R2P’s 
credentials as a “norm”’.183 Jennifer Welsh agrees that the fact that the international 
community’s responsibility to protect was not alluded to was significant in 
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180 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’, 
25 Ethics & International Affairs (2011), 263, 263. 
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manifesting that such a notion ‘was still contested by some members of the Security 
Council as an appropriate rationale for military action’.184 As Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink have explained, when it comes to evolution of norms, one ought to ‘think 
seriously about the microfoundations on which theoretical claims about norms rest, 
and evaluate those claims in the context of carefully designed historical and empirical 
research’.185 
In respect of Syria, on account of China’s joint vetoes with Russia on two 
occasions, the Security Council collectively, and as the only international 
organisation empowered by the Charter to authorise enforcement action for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, decided against adopting resolutions 
that would have authorised military intervention in the internal conflict in Syria. 
While many argue that China through its vetoes in respect of Syria has shown 
that it is unfit to be a responsible world power as it has misused its role and power 
within the Security Council to continue to protect an ally from international 
intervention, China’s capacity to veto a draft resolution, and its willingness to do so 
notwithstanding Western pressure and criticism within the Security Council and 
international media, is precisely why the veto is constitutionally built into the 
structure of the United Nations and the current international legal order. Criticism of 
China’s vetoes as recalcitrant ignores the possibility that China might have real 
interest and sincere intent in ensuring that the legitimacy of international law, the 
Security Council, its decision-making process and procedures, and its decisions is not 
jeopardised by any unilateral action that other States might wish to pursue. It ought 
not to be forgotten that China is the only Permanent Member that is non-Western and 
plausibly capable of claiming to represent developing States, many of which might 
rely on China’s veto power to protect their own interests. 
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Interests aside, when China voted on draft Security Council resolutions, both 
recently and in the past, it referred to relevant international legal norms and 
principles, which many Western States and scholars preferred not to mention when 
they were inconvenient, notably, the principles of State sovereignty and of non-
interference by the United Nations in the internal affairs of a Member State, as well 
as the prohibition of the use of force. At the same time, China has shown readiness to 
be flexible in the application of international law in order for protection of civilians 
mired in internal conflicts through peacekeeping operations. China now actively 
supports and participates in peacekeeping operations authorised by the Security 
Council, provided that the three principles of international peacekeeping – the 
consent of the host State has been obtained; any peacekeeping operation must be 
impartial; and force must not be used except in self-defence – are met. Furthermore, 
China has taken initiatives to explore possibilities for strengthening the United 
Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
If one were to speak of the international rule of law, China through its voting 
behaviour and argumentation within the Security Council has demonstrated the 
importance it ascribes international law as the perimeter within which the current 
international order ought to function. China should not be criticised for impeding the 
progressive development of international law in instances where progressive 
development is a code for violations. At a Security Council meeting on 4 May 2011, 
China emphasised the importance of ‘the complete and strict implementation of the 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The international community must 
respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya. The 
internal affairs and fate of Libya must be left up to the Libyan people to decide. We 
are not in favour of any arbitrary interpretation of the Council’s resolutions or of any 
actions going beyond those mandated by the Council.’186 At a subsequent Security 
Council meeting on 10 May 2011, China cautioned that 
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the strengthening of the protection of civilians in armed conflict must 
strictly abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. The responsibility to protect civilians lies first and 
foremost with the Government of the country concerned. The 
international community and external organizations can provide 
constructive assistance, but they must observe the principles of 
objectivity and neutrality and fully respect the independence, 
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the country concerned. 
There must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil 
war by any party under the guise of protecting civilians.187 
 
Bellamy and Paul Williams, however, question how the international community 
would be able to ‘protect civilians from regimes that attack them without targeting, 
weakening and ultimately changing the behaviour of the regime’.188 Such concern 
uttered by Bellamy and Williams illustrates precisely the danger that humanitarian 
intervention might simply be deployed for the principal purpose of regime change in 
violation of the principles of State sovereignty and of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of a United Nations Member State. 
On 4 October 2011, China vetoed the first of two draft Security Council 
resolutions in respect of the internal conflict in Syria as it found that ‘under the 
current circumstances, sanctions or the threat thereof does not help to resolve the 
question of Syria and, instead, may further complicate the situation. Regrettably and 
disappointingly, this major and legitimate concern did not receive due attention from 
the sponsors. As it now stands, the draft resolution focuses solely on exerting 
pressure on Syria, even threatening to impose sanctions. It does not help to facilitate 
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the easing of the situation in Syria.’189 China’s vetoes (jointly with Russia) of two 
draft Security Council resolutions that sought to impose sanctions on Syria, after its 
support for action authorised by the Security Council and delegated to NATO against 
Libya, arguably manifested China’s concern about civilian casualties caused by 
NATO in Libya and NATO exceeding its mandate under Security Council Resolution 
1973 (2011) by targeting the Gaddafi regime and providing arms to rebel groups.190 
In fact, China’s position was taken further by a number of other Security Council 
Members, notably Russia, Brazil, and India. Russia drew a direct link between 
NATO’s action in Libya and its proposed action in Syria, and asserted that ‘[t]he 
international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security 
Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future 
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect.’191 Brazil released a 
concept note that warned of ‘a growing perception that the concept of the 
responsibility to protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting 
civilians, such as regime change. This perception may make it even more difficult to 
attain the protection objectives pursued by the international community’,192 while 
India concisely charged that ‘Libya has given R2P a bad name’.193 Thus, one should 
be cautious before criticising the rationales that underlay China’s vetoes in respect of 
Syria, and should not take China’s support for peacekeeping operations for granted or 
assume that China vetoes a draft Security Council resolution out of its own interests 
or intransigence or the interests of its allies. Instead, Western powers and the 
international community as a whole ought to reflect on whether their desire to push 
aggressively for recognition and enforcement of purported norms, such as a right or 
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duty of humanitarian intervention or a responsibility to protect (or a responsibility to 
be protected), may actually delay, if not preclude, such purported norms from 
crystallisation and consolidation, prevent the protection of civilians in internal 
conflicts, endanger peace within a State, within a region and internationally, and 
above all undermine the integrity of international law and destroy the foundation 
upon which protection of civilians and peace depend. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 
With its rise to superpower capability, the ways in which China exercises its State 
sovereignty, both within its territory and on the international plane, have attracted 
significant concern as to how the most populous State and oldest civilisation may 
seek to revise or exploit the legal and political rules of the current international order 
in order to reflect and augment its power and status. Much Western research on the 
relationship between China and international law posits that international law does 
not have the capacity to constrain or influence China’s state behaviours, or that China 
does not regard international law as relevant or does not comply with it. China’s 
impact on the development of the current international legal order is typically 
assumed to be negative; for many, China is changing international law in pernicious 
ways, including by impeding the development of international law and the workings 
of international organisations. 
In their analyses under the three main theories of international relations 
(realism, liberalism, and constructivism), Western scholars tend to conclude that 
China must be contained, either through the use of force or imposition of 
Western/liberal norms and values, the merits and transplantability of which are rarely 
questioned. International law is either reduced to irrelevance or used to legitimise 
containment. China’s engagement with international law and international 
organisations has been scrutinised primarily from the perspective of compliance. 
Compliance is not merely understood as adherence to international law and 
institutional rules and procedures, but as convergence with the norms, values, systems 
and priorities of Western States. China’s non-compliance with or rejection of a norm, 
rule or principle of international law is then taken as proof that it is unable or 
unwilling to be a responsible international actor. Conversely, China’s compliance 
signifies that Western systems, norms and values are of universal normative and 
empirical applicability. Proper understanding of how in its exercise of State 
 320 
sovereignty, including through non-compliance with or rejection of certain 
international norms and values (actual or purported), China may in fact contribute to 
the legitimacy, effectiveness and development of international law and international 
organisations, and how China’s engagement with international law within a 
normative–institutional framework has influenced the ways in which it conceives and 
exercises its State sovereignty, is in the process blurred and stymied. 
In understanding international law, not only does the content of legal rules 
and decisions matter, but also how they have evolved, how they affect their subjects, 
and how they may be improved. Chapter I explained how the relationship between 
China and international law has been overlooked in existing research literature other 
than through the myopic lens of compliance, and the research framework and 
methods this thesis adopts in explaining why it is essential that one understands the 
symbiosis between China’s exercise of State sovereignty and the current international 
legal order in their mutual impact, moderation, conciliation and development. 
Chapter II addressed major Western biases that pervade dominant discourses of 
international law and State sovereignty, including the notion that liberal democracy is 
a requirement or a rule for legitimate exercise of State sovereignty and the critique 
that State sovereignty is an impediment to the development of international law and 
the maintenance of the current international legal order. Chapter III examined how 
China’s historical experience with international law has influenced and shaped its 
approaches to the international legal order, including its conception of State 
sovereignty, during the last century of imperial rule and under republican, communist, 
and contemporary socialist-market governments. Chapters IV and V explored how 
China, in its exercise of internal sovereignty, has contributed to discourses and 
debates about what human rights, democracy and self-determination are, the forms in 
which they may manifest and the ways in which they may be augmented or 
undermined, the impact of international human rights law on a State’s behaviours, 
and how such behaviours in turn shape the development, and our understanding, of 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms. Chapter VI then discussed China’s 
contribution, in its exercise of external sovereignty, to the maintenance of 
international peace and security through its emphasis on the primacy of international 
law in its voting behaviour and argumentation in the United Nations Security Council. 
This thesis shows that China’s exercise of State sovereignty in fact has helped 
consolidate the development of the current international legal order. The symbiotic 
relationship in turn informs our understanding of international law and the current 
international legal order, including the locus in which State sovereignty resides and 
its continuing significance and implications, and the approaches of other States and 
the international community that should not escape scrutiny.  
One of the reasons State sovereignty has been ascribed a malign character, as 
discussed in Chapter II, is because China guards its State sovereignty jealously. In 
order to understand the nature and implications of China’s exercise of State 
sovereignty, it is important that one appreciates why that is the case. As Chapter III 
explained, China considers State sovereignty as the ultimate bulwark against foreign 
invasions and intrusions that it endured for over a century since the Opium War. 
Western views of China’s approaches to international law tend to ignore or trivialise 
China’s historical experience and the continuing relevance to many States of the 
principle of State sovereignty in asserting and defending their national interests and, 
in some cases, their survival and existence. 
As the rise and dominance of the United States in the twentieth century 
showed, tensions inevitably arise from a rising power’s reconciliation and 
realignment, of its strategies to further augment its power and status, with its desire to 
maintain international and domestic legitimacy through co-operation with 
international organisations and observance of international law. Instead of continuing 
to regard international law as an imperialistic tool conceived and deployed by 
Western powers, or challenging international law to suit malignant objectives, China 
has learned to use, adapt, influence and improve international law to its advantage in 
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defence of its State sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political space within the 
current international legal order underpinned by the United Nations, and to co-operate 
with and participate in international organisations and their decisions. China’s 
engagement with the current international legal order enables one to understand the 
principle of State sovereignty, and what international law is and ought to be. 
Understanding does not necessarily mean agreement; very often it is through 
disagreements that one understands, leading to further reflections, through which 
development and improvements may take place. 
Similarly, co-operation is not synonymous with mere compliance or 
submission. As Chapter IV discussed, when it comes to criticism of its human rights 
record, China is adamant that international human rights law must be understood in 
the context of the historical, political, economic, social and cultural peculiarities and 
circumstances of a State. Western governments and scholars invariably take China’s 
position, which is widely shared among most States in Asia and Africa, to be at 
variance with international human rights law that they argue demands universal 
interpretation and application. On the contrary, China’s position represents and forms 
part of how international human rights law ought, in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter, to be contextualised, understood and applied. Otherwise, 
international human rights law is merely a camouflage through which Western 
powers continue to impose their systems, norms and values on unwilling States and 
peoples in such a way that undermines the liberal principle, and international legal 
right, of peoples to decide by and for themselves how they wish their States and 
societies to be governed, and their human agency and dignity. 
Of course, China’s human rights record is not beyond reproach. In order for 
China’s human rights record to improve, it is essential that China be immersed with 
human rights norms with the result that human rights norms – and respect for them – 
become Chinese values. Just as a culture is not static, rigid or isolated in time or in 
space, norms and values crystallise, evolve and mature through a process of deviation 
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and consolidation. Such immersion is achievable not through demands that China 
conform to international human rights norms and submit to international monitoring, 
but through a bottom-up approach that cultivates a human rights culture within the 
Chinese populace and the Chinese leadership. We saw in Chapter IV that protection 
of human rights, such as workers’ rights, women’s rights, and privacy rights, has 
become increasingly entrenched in Chinese laws and practices. 
The same approach should apply to democratic development in China. 
Although the Chinese people are not currently able to elect their representatives at the 
national level and higher offices of the state continue to be in the hands of a select 
few Party officials, since the Election Law of the Representatives of the National 
People’s Congress and the Local People’s Congresses at All Levels was adopted in 
1979, all representatives at or below the county level are directly elected. Self-
government in villages has been attained incrementally across China since 1998 when 
the Organic Law of the Village Administration Committees was adopted. Voting has 
been implemented in every province, with generally enthusiastic turnout and 
improvements over time in the conduct of elections. Within the confines of Party 
policies and the limits of their authority, local people’s congresses have the power to 
decide on plans for economic and social development and budgets for their 
administrative areas, and those of nationality townships may enact specific measures 
commensurate with the demands of their minority nationalities. 
 China’s history, territorial vastness and ethnic compositions render it 
inevitable that some peoples within its territory demand, and may be entitled to, the 
right to self-determination under international law. Given China’s firm position on 
the principle of State sovereignty, its rise to superpower capability, and the strategic 
interests that other States have vis-à-vis China and neighbouring regions, the extent to 
which China has recognised, implemented or undermined its peoples’ right to self-
determination has major repercussions for the coherence and development of self-
determination as a legal right and of international law generally, and for the 
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maintenance of international peace and security. As Chapter V discussed, the ways in 
which China has attempted to reconcile its claim and exercise of State sovereignty 
over certain parts of its territory with a right the International Court of Justice 
considers to be a norm of jus cogens, and the contradictory and self-interested 
approaches of other States and the international community to self-determination, 
illuminate the reality that self-determination ultimately depends on and has been 
influenced by interlocking, and oftentimes opposing, geopolitical, economic and 
other factors. From the standpoint of international law, it is irresponsible for 
governments and scholars to ignore territories that expose contradictions that inhere 
in international policymaking and legal scholarship on self-determination, or to 
advocate a territory’s entitlement to self-determination and to secession when the 
territory is not so entitled or when a right to secession may not even exist under 
international law. The right to self-determination, in order to be enduring, derives 
from the integrity of international law and requires that such integrity be upheld. 
Meanwhile, China’s behaviours within the Security Council, as examined in 
Chapter VI, exemplifies the potential and limits of its engagement with international 
law and international organisations, including its capacity to influence the substantive 
and normative development of international law and the roles of an international 
organisation tasked with maintaining international peace and security. Due to the 
roles it has played in the amelioration and escalation of international conflicts, the 
Security Council, it is often forgotten, is a creation of a multilateral treaty and is itself 
bound by legal constraints that the United Nations Charter has delimited and imposed 
– including, most importantly, the principles of State sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and non-interference in Member States’ internal affairs. 
While communist China previously considered the United Nations to be an 
imperialistic tool of Western powers to advance their national interests and 
hegemonic objectives, since the People’s Republic of China government replaced the 
authorities on Taiwan as the representative government of China in the United 
 325 
Nations in October 1971, China has gradually evolved to accept and embrace the role 
of the United Nations Security Council as the ultimate forum and arbiter of 
international peace and security under the framework of the Charter and international 
law. At the same time, China has shown an understanding of the important roles 
international organisations play in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
China’s attitude to international peacekeeping, for which the Charter does not 
explicitly provide, has evolved from complete opposition to firm support provided 
that the three principles of international peacekeeping –consent of the host State, 
impartiality of the peacekeeping operation, and non-use of force except in self-
defence – are respected. In fact, China has become one of the biggest contributors, in 
terms of manpower and material resources, to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. China has also used its capacity within the Security Council, as a 
Permanent Member and, recently, President, to initiate discussions about how the 
United Nations may better situate itself in the maintenance of international peace and 
security in co-operation and collaboration with regional and sub-regional 
organisations. 
China’s exercise of State sovereignty is often maligned as anathema to the 
progressive development of international law and the stability of the international 
system. This thesis challenges the assumption that China is a rule-denier or rule-
breaker when it comes to international law and international organisations, and has 
demonstrated a symbiotic relationship between China’s exercise of State sovereignty 
and the current international legal order. It has shown that China’s engagement with 
international law and transnational discourses, on matters of human rights, democracy, 
self-determination, and international peace and security, has helped shape and 
influence the development and legitimacy of international law and international 
organisations, and the maintenance of the current international order as one underlain 
and governed by the international rule of law. 
In addition to issues this thesis has discussed, there remain many areas of 
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international law vis-à-vis China’s exercise of State sovereignty that merit and 
demand proper scrutiny. For example, China’s co-operation with the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, its 
leadership role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and how these endeavours 
may translate to or hinder the development of a wider political and economic union in 
the Asia-Pacific region shed interesting light on how China considers its State 
sovereignty to be able to further develop and mature in partnership with other States. 
Space constraints also prevent this thesis from discussing how Xinjiang may be 
entitled to self-determination and how its entitlement may have been undermined or 
distorted by China and the international community in the guise of the ‘war on terror’. 
For the same reason, this thesis has not addressed China’s claims of State sovereignty 
over certain island groups in the East China Sea and the South China Sea that 
illuminate the validity or otherwise of the notion that China is a threat to international 
peace and security. China’s multifaceted approaches to international adjudication 
over its territorial and maritime disputes with neighbouring States and over economic 
and investment disputes – and centrally China’s attitude to the International Court of 
Justice – illuminate the extent to which it embraces or resists international law, 
including international adjudication, in delineating a State’s territory and in resolving 
conflicts among States, and the efficacy of international law and international dispute 
settlement mechanisms. It is hoped that this thesis may serve as a springboard that 
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